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ABSTRACT 
'CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST' 
(A Comparative Socio-Legal Study Of Indian And 
Islamic Laws) 
Specific offence of CRIMINAL BREACH of Trust has been 
selected for comparative study of Indian and Islamic 
Criminal Laws - because the developments in the area are 
rapid and offences committed are also of serious nature. 
Field is completely new. No work has been done, 
particularly in relation to Islamic law. 
The author is attracted to have a comparative study also 
because both the laws are based on two entirely different 
and oppositive philosophies, that is, one is based on 
human reasons a 'man- made law.' , while the other is a 
Divine Revealed Law. 
Under Indian Concept Law is a living creature that 
reflects the aims and needs of society it serves. An act 
is not a crime if it is not in violation of Criminal Law 
though it may be condemned as it is in disregard to moral 
and religious values. According to this concept 
morality, religion and law are separable. It is based 
on human intellect and reasons, easily amenable to 
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changes in the society and in the form of government and 
the rulers. 
On the other hand Islamic law is divine, -_ "_ .- .^ : .. . 
i- • , the Will of God to be established on earth. Law 
is revealed by God, Who alone Knows what is absolutely 
good for mankind. The law is to be meticulously observed 
and interpreted in letter and spirit because Islamic law 
is what God in his wisdom has ordained for the well-being 
of all mankind. As God is the perfect being, so is His 
law, perfect and for all time. It is not a system of law 
to be judged and evaluated as good or bad in accordance 
with the changing views of the population or the policies 
of the State. Both the society and the State have 
ideally to conform to its dictates. Man sometimes, with 
his limited knowledge, may be constrained to see the 
advantages of Islamic law, but, it is a matter of faith 
that all advantages are there, may be hidden. It cannot 
be exposed to the vagaries of human reason and has to be 
preserved in its ideal, that is, perfect form. Primarily 
it is based ::>ji totalitarian faith in God where the 
believers completely surrender to Almighty, that is, 
everything of believers is for God. According to this 
concept law is not seperable from religion and moralitv. 
This totalitarian faith in God and strict adherence and 
submission to the commandments (Laws) of Allah (S.W.T.) 
has been elaborated with the help of Quranic Aayat. 
Surat-ul-Inam, ayat 162, 163, Surah-un-nisan, ayat 105, 
Surat-Yusuf, Aayat 104-111. 
Author has also selected this specific offence of 
Criminal Breach of Trust for comparative study purposes 
as about Islamic Criminal Law critics have gone to the 
extent of declaring as if there is no law. Some critics 
are of the view that Islamic criminal law is harsh, 
barbaric and retributive, not-suiting to the modern 
civilised society. They assert that law must be man-made 
if it is to fulfil the changing needs of the 
scientifically changing and developing society. They 
question the validity of Shariah for modern times. 
Author in this thesis has examined the worth of this 
criticism and has come to the conclusion that such • a 
concept of critics about Islamic law is based upon sheer 
ignorance and lack of knowledge. 
Under the circumstances, the role of Muslim scholars and 
Muslim intellectuals in this period is crucial one, 
Their's is the onerous task studing, probing anc 
discovering the law. That is also the reason whv the 
author has selected this area for comparative study 
purposes. 
The strict Muslims are of the opinion that westernisation 
of laws is serving no purpose. The introduction of 
western laws has corrupted society, bred immorality and 
destroyed the inherited and traditional values of Muslim 
society, Muslims realize that such modernzation in the 
garb of western culture belongs to an alien ideal type. 
In all Muslim countries a new trend has emerged, 
especially manifisted in religious movements aiming at 
mobilizing traditional Islamic Laws and values toward 
modernization, to give it sanction and strength. 
Conscious efforts are being made in the Muslim World now 
to eliminate all non-Islamic influences which have been 
introduced as part of western styled reform and 
modernisation and get rid of undersirable values of the 
west. 
Muslim masses in all Islamic countries world over are 
demanding the introduction of complete Islamic code of 
criminal law replacing the existing British or European 
laws. These facts have also attracted the author to make 
a comparative study so that the efficary of Islamic law 
may also be judged,to modern conditions. 
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A comparative study of criminal breach of trust under 
Islamic criminal law with Indian criminal law has also 
been preferred with a view that Indian law, to the 
orientalists and modern secularists, is suppose?! to be 
the modern comperehensive law suiting to the modern 
requirements of the present advance society. The text 
of the Penal Code of India containing provisions relating 
to criminal breach of trust is not only applied in India 
but applied in different names in other countries as 
well, such as Sudan, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Malaysia, 
Nigeria, Kenya, etc., the countries which were British 
colonies. Even after attaining Indefendence the same 
code is being applied in dealing with the crime problem-
As it is supposed to be the most uptodate and modern, it 
is selected for comparision with Islamic Criminal Law 
relating to Criminal Breach Of Trusts so that the later's 
significance in modern context may also be tested and is 
made known. 
Orthodox Muslim scholars are of the opinion that 
westernisation of laws is serving no purpose. The 
introduction of western laws has corrupted society, bred 
immorality and destroyed the inherited and traditional 
values of Muslim society. Muslims realize that 
modernization in the garb of western culture belongs to 
an alien ideal type. They are of the opinion that 
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Islamic criminal law is modern in the sense that it 
contains all rules and relevant doctrines needed for law 
to be complete and comprehensive. It fulfils all the 
human requirements which a good law needs and is equally 
competent to meet new problems which may arise in future. 
The author in the thesis has attempted to examine, the 
observations of both 'modern secularists' and 'Muslim 
orthodox' in relation to criminal breach of trust with 
a view to answer the current undergoing debate between 
them. 
The entire study relating to Criminal Breach of Trust 
would have two dimensions:-
First, theoretical, and 
secondly, operational. 
Under the first efforts would be made to study nature and 
concept of criminal breach of trust in comparision to the 
Islamic criminal law and Indian criminal law. It would 
also examine liabilities of servants and hirelings, 
agents and partners. Under the operational part 
procedure of the both the systems would be explored and 
examined. Arrests, bail, investigations, cognizance and 
institiition of suits, court structure, judges, their 
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appointments, qualifications and jurisdictions, are to 
be studied and compared. Further such matter, as 
administration of oath, confession, and evidences are to 
be compared. Position of Muhtasib, position of non-
Muslims under Islamic criminal/, ijtihad and position of 
legal advisors are also to be studied. Lastly judgement 
and punishment, appeal, revision and reference are to be 
probed and compared. In brief, study would be 
comprehensive, examining both conceptual and operational 
dimensions of the subject. 
The thesis contains ten chapters. Some chapters are 
divided into Part A and B, and parts are further sub-
divided. 
Apart from, there is a 'statement of the problem' in the 
beginning, and recapitulation and projection at the end. 
Under Indian law nature of trust has been explained with 
the help of authentic definitions from Underhill's Law 
of Trust and Trustees, and Maltland's definition of 
Trust. Further section 3 of Indian Trust Act explaining 
the nature of Trust has been elaborated and discussed. 
Breach of Trust has been discussed in details keeping in 
view the requirements of sections 405, 406, 408 and 409 
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of The Indian Penal Code and with the help of decided 
case law. 
On the other hand Nature of Trust according to Islamic L^*^ 
has.been explained in the light of Quranic Injunctions 
Ahadith, and Fatawas of learned Muslim scholars. In fact 
concept of Breach of Trust under Islamic La-wis very 
wide. It covers within its scope Divine breach of trust, 
civil breach of trust and criminal breach of trust. 
Divine breach of trust can easily be distinguished from 
civil and criminal breach of trusts but civil and 
criminal breach of trusts are not distinguishable. 
Quranic Injunctions do not make any distinction between 
civil and criminal breach of trust. 
Notable references to Quranic Ayat explaining breach of 
trust are as follows:-
Surat-al-Muminun, Ayat 8-11, 
Sura-al-Ma'arij, Ayat 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 
Sura-al-Anfal, Ayat 71, 27, 58, 
Sura-Yusuf, Ayat 52, 
Sura Qasas, Ayat 52 
Sura-al-Baqarah, Ayat 283 
Sura-al-Nisan, Ayat 58, 105, 107, 26, 10, 29, 
Sura-Maedah, Ayat 13 
Sura-al-Mumin, Ayat 19, 
Sura-al-Imran, Ayat 75 
From the study of above refered Ayat (Injunctions), it 
may be inferred that trust's range is varied and wide. 
It includes within its scope spiritual as well as social 
obligations, dealings and affairs of mankind. 
Apart from Quranic Injunctions, number of Ahadith and 
Fatawas have also been discussed to explain the nature 
of trust. 
Elaborate rules governing Breach of Trust have been 
discussed with the help of Ahadith, Ijma and Qiyas. 
Fatawas and learned opinions of Fiqih have been refered 
in the study explaining conditions under which acts 
amount to breach of trust. 
Liabilities of Servants, Agents and Partners under Indian 
law has been discussed with the help of relevant 
provisions from contract law, partnership and Penal laws. 
Similarly under Islamic law liabilities of servants 
Agents and Partners have been elaborated with the help 
of relevant God's comiiiandments, Ahadith and learned 
observations and cominenta of Faa-ih. 
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Under the oeprational parts heirarchical judicial courts 
structure, powers and jurisdictions, procedure of trials, 
Quantum and nature of evidence required and its 
admissibility, confession, compounding of cases, 
judgement, appeal, revision, reference and punishment 
have been discussed in detail with the help of decided 
cases, Quranic injunctions, Ahadith etc. Such other 
relevant matters such as Ahtisab, Position of non-Muslims 
in the Islamic State^ Ijtihadad, Tazkia-al-Shahud have 
also been discussed. 
In the end thene are comparative recapitulation, 
conclusion, recommendations and suggestions. This 
comparative study has abundantly made it clear the 
fallacy of the view declaring Islamic Law as incompatible 
with the requirements of the modern age. Comparison 
shows that islamic criminal law relating to Breach of 
Trust is quite comprehensive and exhaustive. There 
exists a wide scope for legal speculation within the 
framework of Islamic law for meeting the challenges 
arising from the fast changing conditions in the modern 
era. Excellence of Islamic law has no comparison with 
any system of law even in the so-called age of 
enlightenment. 
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This study has u so made it clear that the asttertton that 
law must be man made if it is to fulfil the changing 
needs of the changing society has no basis-
Conclusion is that a law which is not seperate from 
morality and religion can only provide remedy to modern 
problems. 
^11 /*^ii An 
l^se u-ho faithfully observe '. ^ "j l*jii'« 'k'"^- %]^ ^y^U 
Their Trusts and their covenants, *^ f^  , T^T^ HT^^-^ \, - ' ,*' 
And u/ho (strictly) guard ^ '• »k*Uu i^'Xa 'ji >* .vdJl* 
Their prayers;- ^-T - iX-'^ y^}^^^-^ \ 
These u;ili be the heirs, • w I'JI ** .iiVjl 
Who alll Inherit Paradise; ^ ^  ^  ^ .^  „ ^^yf^-^.K. "L 
They u/ill du/ell therein , • .jj* U ^ ** ,«»oUil •.i w ,-*jill 
(for ever). -^» . ^ T O-J-^-T' ^>'y^ ^ . 
(23:8,9,10,11) 
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INTRCaXJCTION 
Say: Truly, my prayer and my service of 
sacrifice, ray life and my death, are (all) for 
Allah, the cherisher of the u/orlds: No pairtner 
has He: This I am conmanded, and I am the 
first of those aho submit to His Will." 
(6:162, 163). 
This Totalitarian faith in God is the primary basis of 
Islamic Criminal Lan-. .Allah asks His Prophet to say 
that his prayer, his sacrifices, his life and death are 
all for Allah-Subhanahu-u/a-ta'ala. He is the first to 
surrender, means, supreme in submission and obedience to 
God in time and space. Everything of a believer is for 
God. This, infact, is the faith in God of all 
believers. Islamic Law is part of this integrated 
ronceot. 
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Islamic law is divine, the Will of God to be established 
on earth. Lau/ is revealed by God, Who alone Knou/s what 
is absolutely good for mankind. The law is to be 
meticulously observed and interpreted in letter and 
spirit because Islamic law is what God in his wisdom has 
ordained for the well-being of all mankind. As God is 
the perfect being, so is His law, perfect and for all 
time. It is not a system of law to be judged and 
evaluated as good or bad in accordance with the changing 
views of the population or the policies of the State. 
Both the society and the State have ideally to conform 
to its dictates, Man sometimes, with his limited 
knowledge, may be constrained to see the advantages of 
Islamic law, but, it is a matter of faith that all 
advantages are there, may be hidden. It cannot be 
exposed to the vagaries of human reason and has to be 
preserved in its ideal, that is, perfect form. . 
Allah says: 
.<UI dLJ L. ^^Ul i^ ^L^ JaJL . - l i l l AJ\ U> l LI 
"\I/e have sent down to thee the Book in Truth, 
that thou mightest judge between people by 
that \Ji/hich Allah has shou,Ti thee: So be not an 
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advocate for those, u/ho betray their trust." 
(4:105) 
.Whatever guidance Allah has given to us, that is a 
trust, u/hich u/e should not betray. Lau/s have to be 
obeyed as commanded by Allah. 
Allah in Sura-al-Maida commands:-
"If any do fail to judge by u;hat Allah hath 
revealed, they are unbelievers." (5:44) 
This verse makes it clear that the believers have to 
obediently follou/ what Allah has commanded. 
Disobedience to Allah's revealed lavjus is a betrayal and 
those u/ho act contrary to the command are unbelievers. 
These verses in definite and unequivocal terms, enjoin 
upon believer, a strict adherence to the laa' revealed by 
God to us. Thus believers, from craddle to grave, at 
every turn or movement in life are bound to follow what 
Allah has commanded. Law is inseperable from religion 
and faith. It is ideal. 
"It is no less than a message for all 
creatures." (12:104) 
"It is a detailed exposition of all things, 
and a guide and a mercy to any such as 
believe." {12:111) 
Such a Divine ordained lau; has fascinated the author to 
compare with Indian Criminal law, a law made by man, 
based on man's intellectual reasoning, a secular law 
which does not recognize a system of natural and moral 
law ranking higher than State legislation. It is based 
on a firm belief that any competent legislative body can 
change all existing laws. Indian Law is based on the 
not ion:-
"Crime is what society says is crime by 
establishing that an act is a violation of the 
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criminal lau/. Without lavu there can be no 
crime at all, although there may be moral 
indignation u/hich results in law being 
enacted. "^  
Infact, under Indian secular concept, it is said that 
law is a living creature that reflects the aims and 
needs of society it serves. An act is not a crime if it 
is not in violation of criminal law though it may be 
condemned as it is in disregard to moral and religious 
values. Thus morality, religion and law are separable. 
As the study of Comparative Criminal Law as such would 
be very wide. It has, therefore, been narrowed down. 
The area of comparative investigation selected for 
present study is confined to "Criminal Breach Trust 
under Islamic Criminal Law and Indian Criminal Law." 
Breach of Trust is an area where development is rapid. 
Offences being committed are also of serious nature. 
Field is completely new. No work has been done, 
particularly in relation to Islamic criminal law. 
"ii> l.l., ">.ii\n C53ce!!ti oi crise nh its TrsatsMt'. 5. J I. 
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About Islamic criminal lau; critics have gone to the 
extent of declaring ^  if there is no law. Under such 
circumstances comparative study explaining the 
similarities and dissimilarities is of much 
significance and importance. This fact has attracted 
the author to work on and let know the critics their 
worth. 
A comparative study of Criminal Breach of Trust under 
Islamic criminal law with Indian Criminal Law is 
proposed because Indian law is supposed to be the modern 
comprehensive law. The text of Penal Code of India is 
not only applied in India but applied in different names «^. 
other countries as well, such as Sudan, Sri Lanka, 
Pakistan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Kenya, etc., the countries 
which were British colonies. Even after attaining 
Indefendence the same code is being applied in dealing 
with the crime problem. As it is supposed to be the 
most uptodate and modern, it is selected for comparision 
with Islamic Criminal Law relating to criminal breach of 
trust so that the later's significance in modern context 
may also be tested and is made known. 
Critics of Islamic criminal law are of the view:-
"That Criminal Lavju of Islam is not in tune 
with the fast developing scientific age. It 
does not suit to the modern advanced 
conditions, nor does it come up to the 
standard of modern laws." 
The fact is that the Islamic Lavi; u/hich is part of modern 
syllabuses and curricular of colleges, and universities 
is the one knou/n as 'Personal Lau/'. This is the only 
part of Islamic Lau; which the modern scholars study. 
Apart from this the Islamic Criminal Law has now become 
obsolescent and the modern scholars, are absolutely 
ignorant of the provisions of Islamic Criminal Law. 
Western educated and brain washed secular scholars, 
generally attack Islamic traditions and its traditional 
values. To them western culture is the highest stage of 
men's spiritual • and material development, and consider 
Islamic civilization and culture useless. They advocate 
the adoption of western civilization and culture without 
reservation as the only way leading to their 
advancement. 
These westernized scholars not only attack Islamic 
culture and civilization but they make the Islamic Law 
also target of their crilicism. They assert that lau; 
must be man-made if it is to fulfil the changing needs 
of the scientifically changing and developing society. 
They question the validity of Shariah for modern times. 
Hou;ever, the strict Musljms are of the opinion that 
U/'esternisation of laws is serving no purpose. The 
introduction of western laas has corrupted society, bred 
immorality and destroyed the inherited and traditional 
values of Muslim socie/ty. Muslims realize that such 
modernization in the garb .of a-estern culture belongs to 
an alien ideal type. In all Muslim countries a neu/-
trend has emerged, especially manifested in religious 
movements aiming at mobilizing traditional Islamic Lau.s 
and values tou/ard modernization, to give it sanction and 
strength. Conscious efforts are being made in the 
Muslim U/orld now to eliminate all non-Islamic influences 
ahich have been introduced as cart of u/estern styled 
reform and modernisation and get rid of undesirable 
values of the west. 
Muslim masses in all Islamic countries world over are 
demanding the introduction of complete islamic code of 
criminal law replacing the existing British or European 
laws. 
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The contemporary Islamic vuorld is full of crisis. 
History tells us that period of crisis often blossoms 
into periods of creative thinking. The role of Muslim 
scholars and Muslim intellectuals in this period is a 
crucial one. Their's is the onerous task studying, 
probing and discovering. Islamic laws, particularly the 
Islamic criminal law, in relation to the present day 
problems in the vastly complicated world of today. 
Study of Islamic Criminal Law is also relevant in the 
present context because the western scholars consider 
Islamic criminal law harsh, barbaric and retributive, 
not-suiting to the modern civilised society. 
Islamic jurists, on the other hand, consider Islamic 
Criminal Laws superior to other laws by virtue of its 
perfection. They are of the opinion that Islamic 
Criminal Law is modern in the sense that it contains all 
rules and relevant doctrines needed for law to be 
complete and comprehensive. It fulfils all the human 
requirements which a good law needs and is equally 
competent to meet new problems which may arise in 
future. The author* will examine the above observation 
in relation to criminal breach of Trust comparing it 
with Indian law. 
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It is said that Islamic Criminal Law, breach of trust is 
a minor part of it, is permanent, stable, immutable and 
everlasting, eminated from Quranic revelation. Further 
they say that sublimity is another characteristic of 
Islamic Criminal Law which contains such principles and 
doctrines that will maintain its superiority over other 
laws and its standard will always be loftier than human 
standards. 
The specific offence of criminal breach of trust iA 
selected with the aim to find out the truth and a 
solution to this debate currently undergoing between the 
traditionalists and western modern scholars. 
In India before the advent of Britishers, during Muslim 
Rule, Islamic Criminal Law was the Lex Loci-the law of 
the land. judiciary attained its highest honourable 
place during the Mughal period. The period is also 
known as golden period of the Indian History, Justice 
in criminal matters was being administered to all 
irrespective of caste, creed or religion. 
Masses were satisfied with the standard of justice then 
being observed. However, the last period of Mughal Rule 
in India saw the downfall of the judicial system. The 
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fact, the u/hole edifice of judicial structure u;as 
shattered. Some historians have criticised the criminal 
judicial system even of the golden period as a foreign 
system imposed upon Indian people. 
In 1860, the present Indian Penal Code, prepared by Lord 
Macaulay was enacted and enforced in India completely 
replacing the Islamic criminal lau/. About this Penal 
Code also it is said that it is a British Common Lau; 
alien to Indian conditions. Hou/ever, even after 44 
years since India achieved independence it is still 
inforce and in practice. 
With a view to have historical perspective the object of 
the present study is also to examine the efficacy of 
both the systems in relation to Criminal Breach of Trust 
in reference to the Indian conditions. 
The entire study relating to Criminal Breach of Trust 
would have two dimensions: 
•First, theoretical, and 
secondly, operational. 
Under the first efforts would be made to study nature 
and concept of criminal breach of trust in comparision 
to the Islamic criminal law and Indian criminal law. It 
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u/ould also examine liabilities of servants and 
hirelings, agents and partners. Under the operational 
part procedure of the both the systems would be explored 
and examined. Arrests, bail, investigations, cognizance 
and institution of suits, court structure, judges, their 
appointments, qualifications and jurisdictiona-r-are—to-
be-^^fudied and compared. Further such matter, as 
administration of oath, confession, and evidences are to 
be compared. Position of Muhtasib, position of non-
Muslims under Islamic criminal, ijtihad_and position of 
legal advisors are also to be studied. Lastly judgement 
and punishment, appeal, revision and reference are to be 
probed and compared. In brief, study would be 
comprehensive, examining both conceptual and operational 
dimensions of the subject. 
The thesis contains ten chapters. Some chapters are 
divided into Part A and B, and parts are further sub-
divided. 
Apart from, there is a 'statement of the problem' in the 
beginning, and recapitulation and projection at the end. 
The scheme of the thesis is so arranged that theoretical 
or conceptual and practical or operational aspects of 
the subject: under study are given due representation, 
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making the study to comprehend vi;ithin it all answers to 
the questions agitating the minds of the scholars. It 
u/ould be a novel-study and of great interest to scholars 
of a criminal law who are trying to^analyze juristic 
problems intellectually and its translation into 
practical form in which they desire to shape the 
society. No doubt, study would be a good contribution 
to the academic world, particularly to India where heap 
of cases are pending in courts due to technicalities of 
laws. Justice is not being done because where justice 
is delayed justice denied. In fact, India needs its own 
Indiginous judicial system. 
CHAPTER I 
"NATURE OF TRUST : IHOIAM CRIMIHAL LAN'* 
Word 'trust' has not been defined in the Indian Penal 
Code. In Under Hill's Law of Trust and Trustees,i the 
term 'trust' has been explained as:-
"A trust is an equitable obligation, binding a 
person (who is called a trustee) to deal with 
property over which he has control (which is 
called the trust property), for the benefit of 
persons (who are called beneficiaries or 
cestuis que trust), of whom he may himself be 
one, and smy one of whom may enforce the 
obligation." 
Maitland explains trust as:-
"When a person has rights which he is bound to 
exercise upon, on behalf of another or for the 
accomplishment of some particular purpose he 
is said to have those rights Entrust for that 
12th Edition, p. 3, 
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other or for that purpose and he is called a 
trustee."2 
Both the definitions are subjected to criticism. It is 
a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, 
subjecting the person by whom the title to property is 
held to equitable duties to deal with the property for 
the benefit of another person, which arises as a result 
of manifestation of an intention to create it*. 
Section 3, of Indian Trust Act,3 defines the 'Trust' 
as:-
"Trust is an obligation annexed to the 
ownership of property, and arising out of a 
confidence reposed in and accepted by the 
owner, or declared and accepted by him, for 
the benefit of another, or of another and the 
owner." 
A perusal of the above definitions brings one to infer 
the following characteristics of the trust:-
1. A trust is a relationship; 
2 Maitland : Lectures on Equity (2nd Edn.) p. 44. 
3 
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2. It is a relationship of a fiduciary character; 
3. It is a relationship with respect to property, not 
one involving merely personal obligations; 
4. It involves the existence of equitable obligations 
imposed upon the holder of the title to the 
property to deal with it for the benefit of another 
and 
5. It arises out of a confidence reposed in and 
accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by 
him, as a result of a manifestation of an intention 
to create the relationship. 
The combination of these things characterizes the 
notion of the trust. 
"BREACH OP TROST" 
The next phrase which requires explanation is the concept 
of 'breach of trust'. It may be explained as 'any act or 
neglect on the part of a trustee which is not authorised 
or excused by the terms of the trust instrument, or by 
law, is called a breach of trust. 
7^ 
Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code^ explains * breach 
Criminal breach of trust - Whoever, being in any manner 
entrusted with property, or with any dominion over 
property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his 
own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of 
that property in violation of any direction of law 
prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be 
discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, 
which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, 
or wilfully suffers any other, person so to do, commits 
"criminal breach of trust". 
Explanation 1. A person being an employer, who deducts 
the employee's contribution from the wages payable to the 
employee for credit to a Provident Fund or Family Pension 
F\md established by law for the time being in force, 
shall be deemed to have been entrusted with the amount of 
the contribution so deducted by him and if he makes 
default in the payment of such contribution to the said 
Fxind in violation of the said law, shall be deemed to 
have dishonestly used the amount of the said contribution 
in violation of a direction of law as afoesaid. 
Explanation 2. A person, being an employer, who deducts 
the employees' contribution from the wages payable to the 
employees for credit to the Employees' State Insurance 
Fxind held and administered by the Employees' State 
Insurance Act, 1948, shall be deemed to have been 
entrusted with the amount of the contribution so deducted 
by him and if he makes default in the payment of such 
contribution to the said Fund in violation of the said 
contribution in violation of a direction of law as 
aforesaid. 
Illustrations 
(a) A, being executor to the will of a deceased person, 
dishonestly disobeys the law which directs him to 
divide the effects according to the will and 
appropriates them to his own use. A has committed 
criminal breach of trust. 
(b) A is a warehouse-keeper. Z, going on a* journey, 
entrusts his furniture to A, under a contract that 
it shall be returned on payment of a stipulated sum 
for warehouse-room. A dishonestly sells the goods. 
A has committed criminal breach of trust. 
(c) A, residing in Calcutta, is an agent for S, 
residing at Delhi. There is an express or implied 
contract between A and Z, that all sum remitted by 
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of trust' as follows:-
'*Whoever, being in any manner entrusted .... 
criminal breach of trust." 
In analysing the section in Isser Chander Ghoshe v. Peari 
Mohun Palit,' it was held that to constitute the offence 
of criminal breach of trust, there must be dishonest 
misappropriation by a person in whom confidence is placed 
Z to A shall be invested by A, according to Z's 
direction. Z remits a lakh of rupees to A with 
directions to invest the same in company's paper. 
A dishonestly disobeys the directions and employs 
the money in his own business. A has committed 
criminal breach of trust. 
(d) But if A, in the last illustration, not dishonestly 
but in good faith, believing that it will be more 
for Z's advantage to hold shares in the Bank of 
Bengal, disobeys Z's directions and buys shares in 
the Bank of Bengal for Z instead of buying 
Company's paper, here, though Z suffer loss and 
should be entitled to bring a civil action against 
A, on account of that loss, yet A, not having acted 
dishonestly, has not coimnitted criminal breach of 
trust. 
(e) A, a revenue officer, is entrusted with public 
money and is either directed by law, or bound by a 
contract, express or implied, with the Government, 
to pay into a certain treasury all the public money 
• which he holds, A dishonestly appropriates the 
money. A has committed criminal breach of trust. 
(f) A, a carrier, is entrusted by Z with property to be 
carried by land or by water, A dishonestly 
misappropriates the money. A has coimnitted 
criminal breach of trust. 
(1891) 16 W.R. (Cr.) 39. 
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as to the custody or management of the property in 
respect of which the breach of trust is charged. 
There must be an entrustment of property or dominion over 
the property of another. In the absence of such a proof 
of entrustment or dominion over the property of another, 
this section will not apply. The entrustment may be in 
any manner. 
Misappropriation or conversion must be to one's own use 
or vise in violation of any legal direction or of any 
legal contract. 
It must be proved that misappropriation or conversion was 
with dishonest intention. There is no criminal breach of 
trust if dishonest intention is not proved. Section 405 
to 409 dealing with offence of criminal breach of trust 
are aimed to punish an offence of which dishonestly is 
the essence. Every breach of trust is not criminal. On 
the other hand every breach of trust gives rise to a suit 
for damages, however, it is only when there is a proof of 
a mental element of fradulent misappropriation that the 
comnission of misappropriation of any sum of money 
becomes a penal offence punishable as criminal breach of 
trust. It is in fact this element of mental condition 
of fraudulent misappropriation that distinguishes an act 
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of embezzlement which is a civil wrong or tort, from the 
offence of criminal breach of trust. 
While considering the cases of criminal breach of trust 
the distinction between civil and criminal wrong must be 
borne in mind. An act cononitted may be intentional 
without being dishonest, or it may apparently seem to be 
dishonest without really beig so. Criminal breach of 
trust involves a civil wrong, the relief available to the 
complainant is that he may seek his redress for damages 
in the civil court, but every breach of trust in the 
absence of mens-ra cannot legally justify a criminal 
prosecution.^ The determining factor in judging whether 
a case is one of criminal breach of trust or of civil 
wrong or tort is whether the person proceeded against had 
acted dishonestly,7 causing loss to the owner or 
possessor, or depositor. In every case of breach of 
trust, in the absence of requisite mens rea, is not 
criminal.> 
Under English Law there is no exact equivalent to an 
offence of criminal breach of trust. Larceny by bailee 
and embezzlement in English law are the offences, which 
Kanhaiya Hall (1937, 38 Cr. j> 491, Amritlal v. 
Bajrangdal, 1963, 11 Cr. Lj. 474. 
Halimuddin Ahmad v. Ashoka Cement Ltd., 1976, CrLj 449 
Pat. 
(1951) 52 Cr. LJ 1178 (1182) Lah. 
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represent what, under the Indian Penal Code, is theft, 
criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust.' 
As to scope the terms of the section are very wide. 
Section applies in cases where a person is in any manner 
entrusted with property or diminion over property. It is 
not required that the trust should be in furtherance of 
any lawful object. The only thing which the section, 
inter alia, provides that if a person dishonestly 
misappropriates or converts to his own use the property 
entrusted to him he commits criminal breach of trust. 
1 
This part of explanation of trust is complete in itself. 
It does not refer to the provisions as to disposal in 
violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in 
which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal 
contract, express or implied, which he has made touching 
the discharge of such trust. Different modes are there 
in which criminal breach of trust may be coniinitted.i(> 
In Kalaktar Singh,^^ case it was held that the 
entrustment may be in any manner, not necessarily what 
implies a trust to be in the sense of a law relating to 
trust. Further the accused may get dominion of the 
property in any manner. What is contemplated by the 
9 (1957) Cr. LJ 575, Velagala Venkata Reddy v. Kovouri 
Chinna Ven Kata Reddy (1941)-Ran. 547. 
10 Nga Te (1904) 2 LBR 216: 1 Cr. LJ 730 (FB). 
11 (1978) Cr LJ 663 Pat, Shob Nath, 1975, Cr. LJ 1122 (All). 
22 
section is that the person charged for criminal breach of 
trust should receive the property.12 All those 
offenders not specifically provided for in sections 407, 
408 and 409, as well as, offences-comroitted by trustees 
with regard to entrusted property or dominion given over 
the property are covered within the scope of this 
section. 
"ESSEHTIAL IHGREOIEHTS** 
The necessary ingredients of the section are:-
1. Entrustment of property or dominion over property 
to any person; 
2. Such entrustment must be in trust; 
3. Such a person misappropriates or converts to his 
own use such a property; 
4. Using or disposing of that property, or wilfully 
offering any other person so to do in violation:-
(a) of any direction of law prescribing the mode 
in which such trust is to be discharged, or 
12 Surrendre Pal Singh (1957) Cr. LJ 170, 
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(b) of any legal contract, express or implied, 
which he has made touching the discharge of 
such trust. 
5. Such misappropriation or user or disposal must be 
dishonest. 
AHALOGQOS LAM" 
Before elaborating the ingredients, an attempt is made 
here to explain the controversary relating to some 
analogous laws. Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of 
Corruption Act, 1947, is one such provisions. It reads 
as foUows:-
Section 5 (1) "A ptiblic servant is said to commit the 
offence of criminal misconduct in the 
discharge of his duty. 
Section 5 (c) If he dishonestly or fraudulently 
misappropriates or otherwise converts for 
his own use any property entrusted to him 
or under his control as a public servant 
or allows any other person so to do." 
2A 
A controversary was arisen in a Punjab case^^ as to the 
applicability of Section 405 in the presence of Section 
5(1), (c) which one is to prevail, whether the provision 
under the Prevention of Corruption Act repeals section 
Section 405. Does the provisions make the section 405 
redundant? In Om Prakash's case. Supreme Court settled 
the issue overruling the Punjab High Court decision. 
Presence of Section 5(1)(c) does not repeal Section 405 
of the Penal Code. The offence in Section 5(1)(c) 
referred above is a distinct and seperate offence from 
the one conmitted under section 405 of the Penal Code. 
Similarly Bombay High Court in a case^^ under Section 
146(o) of Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act (1960) 
held that where an officer of the society wilfully 
sanctions or recommends for his personal use or benefit 
or for the use or benefit of a person in whom he is 
interested, a loan in the name of any other person, he 
will be guilty of an offence under the above clause. It 
is a different type of offence from criminal 
misappropriation. 
3^ A 1952 Punj. 89. 
1* A 1968 Bom. 124 (125). 
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DISTIHCTION 
A distinction between criminal misapproppriation and 
criminal breach of triist would also help in making the 
concept of breach of trust more clear. Property under 
criminal misappropriation comes into the possession of 
the offender by some casualty or otherwise which he 
afterwards misappropriates it. Whereas the offender in 
the case of criminal breach of trust is lawfully 
entrusted with the property and he dishonestly 
misappropriates or converts to his own use that property 
or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in utter 
disregard for the direction of law prescribing the mode 
in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal 
contract touching the discharge of such trust, or 
wilfully suffers any other person so to do. 
Illustrations to Section 403 and 405 abundantly makes the 
difference quite clear. 
"EMTRUSTMEHT OP PROPERTY" 
This is one the most essential ingredient of the offence 
under this section. In the absence of evidence of 
entrustment of property or dominion over property. 
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section 405 has no application.^^ Implications of 
entrustment are: the person handing over any property or 
on whose behalf that property is handed over to another, 
continues to be its owner. 
The person handing over the property must have confidence 
in the person taking the property so that fiduciary 
relationship is created between them.^^ 
The most significant implication is that the ownership or 
beneficial interest in the property against which breach 
of trust is alleged remains in some person other than the 
accused and he holds it on behalf of some person or for 
his benefit.!' The law requires that the accused 
should receive the property, and hold it on account of 
another person, so that he should be trustee of the 
property.!* A person cannot misappropriate his own 
property. Entrustment cannotes that property is handed 
over by one person to another in whom the first person 
reposes confidence in the later for a specific purpose. 
1* (1979), Chand LR (Cri, 43, 43, Punj; (1977) 1 PAC 236 
(237) (Madh. Pra); (1977), Pun LJ (Cri) 208 (210); (1971) 
Cal 93 (99): (1971), Cr. LJ 361; 1955 Pat 338 (339): 1955 
Cr. LJ 1096; (1952) Nag 255 (256). 
i« Tata JRD V. Payal Kumar 1986 (2) Crimes 449. 
!' Ibid, note II. 
10 1981 Cri. LJ 258 (259) Mad. 
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Word trust used in the section is quite comprehensive, 
includes the relationship not only of trustee and 
beneficiary but also that of bailer and bailee, master 
and servant, pledgor and pledgee, guardian and ward, and 
all other relations which postulates the fiduciary 
relationship between the complainant and the accused and 
the word entrustment has a corresponding meaning and 
embraces all. cases in which goods are entrusted for a 
specific purpose. 1* 
In Somnath v. State of Rajasthan,^^ The Supreme Court 
observed:-
"The expression 'entrusted' in Section 409 applies to 
cases of criminal breach of trust by Public Servant, or 
by Banker, merchant or agent, is used in a wide sense and 
includes all cases in which property is voluntarily 
handed over for a specific purpose and is dishonestly 
disposed of contrary to the terms on which possession has 
been handed over. It m^y be that a person to whom the 
property is handed over may be an agent of the person to 
whom it is entrusted or to whom it may belong, in which 
19 1956 Raj. 20 (20, 21), 1956 Cr. LJ 107. 1934 Rang. 41 
(42) (Waterproof coat supplied to Rly. Servant on 
condition that it should be returned on leaving service-
pledge by servant). ILR (1952) Hdv. 753 (756. In Order 
to Constitute the offence to whom property is entrusted 
must act in a fiduciary capacity). 
20 1972, SC 1990 (1993) : 1972 Cr Lj. 897. 
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case if the agent who comes into possession of it on 
behalf of his principle, fradulently misappropriates the 
property, he is none the less guilty of criminal breach 
of trust because as an agent he is entrusted with it. A 
person authorised to collect money on behalf of another 
is entrusted with the money when the amovints are paid to 
him, and though the person paying may no longer have any 
propreitary interest none the less the person whose 
behalf if was collected becomes the owner as soon as the 
amount is handed over to the person so authorised to 
collect on his behalf." 
It may be inferred from the above observation that a 
person entrusts property to another, continues to vest in 
the owner but the thing is in possession of the bailee to 
be restored to the bailor, or applied in accordance with 
his instructions. 
The ownership or beneficial interest in the property must 
be in some person than the accused, and he must hold it 
on behalf of some person or in someway for his benefit. 
Where jewellery is pledged in order to ensure the 
repayment of an overdraft there is an entrustment, it 
would amount to an entrustment.21 
21 Supra N. p. 
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The accused falsely induced by making a representation to 
the complainant that they had sent some bonds for 
rectification to Bombay and as they had not arrived and 
the last day for completion of a contract with a Bank had 
arrived, entreated the complainant to give the 
conqplain2mt's bonds temporarily for a few days, assuming 
the complainant that his bonds would be returned to him 
as soon as the rectified bonds returned from Bombay. On 
this assurance the complaint endorsed and delivered bonds 
to the accused. It was held that the bonds were not 
delivered to the accused absolutely but were entrusted to 
them. Though the accused when requested to the 
complainant to deliver certain properties had the 
intention of deceiving him, however, a subsequent 
misappropriation by them of the property to their own use 
would be considered a criminal breach of trust. "The 
fact that there was a complete offence of cheating when 
the property was received would not prevent the accused 
being guilty of the offence of criminal breach of 
trust."2 2 
A mere transaction of sale cannot amount to an 
entrustment.2 3 Similarly where goods are delivered to 
a person in pursuance of a contract for purchase, it 
would not amount to entrustment and the mere fact that 
22 Melver, (1935) 49 MLJ 681, 
2 3 Jaswantlal (1968) AIR SC 700 
30 
the person denies receipt of goods delivered does not 
make him liable for criminal breach of trust.24 
In Chanan Singh,2' case, where a person was entrusted 
with property attached by an order of court, and he on 
demand refused to produce the property, it was held that 
his denial amounted to a breach of trust, hence held 
guilty. 
A mere breach of contract or of the condition of a permit 
is not necessarily a criminal breach of trust.2< 
A secretary of a bank, authorised by the terms of a power 
of attorney to purchase government proroisory notes for 
bank, obtains the notes, he is entrusted by the bank. He 
is under ah obligation to pay them to the Bank, and has 
no right to keep them with him even in satisfaction of 
any claim he may have against the bank. Such kieeping of 
the Promisory Notes without authority amounts to 
misappropriation.27 
The word entrusted has been used in a wide sense. Cases 
such as voluntarily handing over for a specific purpose 
2 4 Labhu (1930) 32 Cr. LJ 300 
25 (1934) 36 Cr. LJ 119. 
2« 1970 Pat LJR 600. 
2 7 Ram Nath Dave 1932 OWN 485, 
31 
and dishonestly disposing of in repudiation of any 
direction of law or in violation of the contract are all 
covered within the purview of entrustment. In Shob 
Nath,3* money was deposited with the Post-Master for 
opening saving banks account was held entrustment. In 
Jage Ram,^' a person borrowed a bicycle from the 
complainant with a promise to return within a period of 
two or three days. He failed to return the Bicycle as 
promised, disposed of the machine and converted the 
proceeds to his own use. It was held that the 
relationship between the accused and the complainant was 
of a bailor and bailee as the complainant had delivered 
his bicycle to the accused for a specific purpose and a 
specific period upon contract that after expiry of the 
said period the machine would be returned to him and is 
disposing of the machine dishonestly and appropriating 
money to his own use the accused was guilty of an offence 
under this section. 
In Jaswantlal NathalaPo their Lordships of the Supreme 
Court observed:-
"The expression entrusted carries with it the 
implication that the person handing over any 
2« 1975 Cr LJ 1122 (All). 
29 (1951) Punj. 286. 
30 Jaswantlal (1968) Cr. LJ 803, 
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property or on whose behalf that property is 
handed over to another continues to be its 
owner. Further, the person handing over the 
property must have confidence in the person 
taking the property so as to create a 
fiduciary relationship between them. A mere 
transaction of sale cannot amoung to an 
entrusment." 
According to this section property may be instructed in 
any manner. It does not perceive the creation of trust 
with all its technical requisites. It sinqply conceive 
the creation of a relationship whereby the owner of the 
property hands over property to another person to be 
retained by him until the happening or not-happening of 
an event or to dispose of on such happening. However, 
ownership still remains with the transferer. The 
transferee has the custody of the property to retain or 
dispose of for the benefit of other party. The person so 
placed in possession has only a special interest by way 
of a claim for the same of money advanced or spent upon 
the safe keeping of the thing or such other accidental 
expenses as incurred by him.^i There must be some 
entrustment. It matters little whether the complainant 
on whose behalf the property is entrusted is the owner 
3 1 Supra N. P, 
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thereof or not.3 2 It is not requisite that the zunovuit 
received should be the property of the person on whose 
behalf it is received. A person deems entrusted with the 
money and the amounts are paid to him. In Som Nath 
Puri,3 3 it was held that though the person paying may 
no longer have any proprietary interest nonetheless the 
person on whose behalf it was collected becomes the owner 
as soon as the aunount is handed over to the person so 
authorised to collect on his behalf. Mere use of legal 
terms are not sufficient to render a person liable for 
breach of trust. Merely the parties are calling a 
transaction a trust is not enough though it may be 
express and in writing. Actual entrustment of property 
should be there. 
"Every payment of money by one person to another does not 
amount to entrustment unless there are circumstances 
attending it from which one can gather that it was an 
entrustment and not a mere payment.^4 in cases where 
a person gives gold to a goldsmith who has jewellery 
making business, for making some jewellery, or gives some 
money to the goldsmith to purchase gold and make 
jewellery, in both the cases there is an entrustment, if 
52 Dahyalal Dalpartram (1959) 61 Bom LR 885: (1960) Cr LJ 
217. 
5' 1972 sec (Cr) 897. 
^* i^ ftfT"^ ^ °®^^ ^" ^^ '^^ is^ a^ Kumar Jauhari (1985) CRJ 64 
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the goldsmith converts the gold or money into his own 
use, it would be a repudiation of implied contract 
between the parties, the goldsmith would be liable for 
breach of trvist.^' To Ratanlal Dhirajlal, a person 
cannot be said to be entrusted with property within the 
meaning of this section when he obtains possession of it 
by means of trick.3« A trust implies confidence placed 
by one man in another. It implies necessarily that the 
confidence was freely given and that there is a true 
consent. There is no true consent if confidence is 
obtained as a result of a trick. If there was a trick or 
deciet, a true consent cannot arise; there cam be no 
entrustment, and no offence under section 406,3' 
because an essential element of that offence is an 
entrustment. The accused represented to the complainant 
that he was a tinner while he was in fact not a tinner. 
The con^lainant thereupon gave the accused certain 
utensils to be repaired which were neither repaired nor 
returned by the accused. It was held that it might be 
said, using the words of general import, that the 
complainant entrusted the accused with property, he was, 
in fact, tricked out of it. Therefore, the offence fell 
35 Mithalal (1955) Raj 907. 
'« Law of Crimes, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, Vol. II, 23rd 
Edition P. 1529. 
3 7 Punishment for criminal breach of trust. Whoever commits 
criminal breach of trust shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which may 
extend to three years, or with-fine, or with both. 
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not under this section, but under section 420.'* 
When property is obtained by cheating there is no 
entrustment. Similarly under an agreement of sale where 
money is paid as part payment for the purchase of certain 
property, there is no entriisment and the person who 
receives the advance money may utilise that money in any 
manner he likes. Conversion of money to one's own use 
would not render him liable for breach of trust. But 
where the money is paid to him for a particular purpose 
and not as part payment of purchase money, the person who 
receives if converts into his own use, he would be liable 
for breach of trust, because there is a clear entrustment 
for a specific purpose. 
In Sat Narain,3' case, there was Chit Fund Scheme 
started by the accused company and the money collected 
from the depositors was to be utilised by the company as 
its own on condition that the members of the scheme would 
get the equivalent amount back after the completion of a 
particular specified period along with interest. It was 
held that there was no entrustment and if the company did 
not return the depositied amount to the member 
depositors. An action for breach of trust would not lie. 
3" Arab Mihan (1942) Kar 284. Radhakanta (1954, Cr. LJ 429. 
39 1974 Cr. LJ 232 (P & H); Laxman Singh (1986) 1 Crimes 
634. 
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The Sikkim Nationalised Transport^o employed a person 
to act as bus conductor to collect fare from passen?' ers. 
He collected a sum of Rs2,000/- as fare but failed to 
deposit the said amount inspite of repeated reminders, he 
was not held liable as there was no entrustment . The 
High Court held that one of the most important elements 
of entrustment is that the property in respect of which 
criminal breach of trust is alleged to have been 
committed must have been made over or transferred or 
handed over by the aggrieved person, who continues to be 
the owner thereof, to the accused. In this case there 
was no entrustment because the amount was not made over 
or transferred or handed over by any one on behalf of 
Sikkin Transport to the accused. 
However, the above verdict of the High Court is not 
correct in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Some Nath v. State of Rajasthan.*i It was held in 
that case that a person authorised to collect money on 
behalf of another is entrusted with the money when the 
amounts are paid to him. 
Where a superior officer delegates his authority to 
collect money to his subordinate staff, such a; staff 
member gets a legal right and during the exercise of such 
<<» Puspa Kumar (1978) Or. LJ 1379 (Sikkim) 
*i Supra N. p. 
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delegated power if he receives any amount or paid to him 
would be considered entrustment as envisaged by Section 
405.42 
Where a Naib Tehsildar is authorised to collect rent and 
he lawfully authorises his Maharir to collect the same, 
the collection of rent by the moharir is, under the 
circumstances, under a delegated implied authority and 
the payment to the Moharir constitute entrustment.<» 
In Kesar Singh,** case a distinction was drawn between 
the person entrusted with property and one having control 
or general charge over the property. In the first case 
if the property fotmd missing, with further proof, the 
person so entrusted would be held accountable, but in the 
second situation he would be liable only when either the 
misappropriation is shown or party to criminal breach of 
trust, committed in respect of the property by any other 
person. Illustrative cases may • be refered where mere 
giving of keys of sub-treasury to the sonar on a holiday 
does not amotmt to giving charge,*' and where the 
accused a cashier was in possession of the keys of the 
safe, the keys of the Inner Drawers were kept inside the 
*2 Rajkishore (1969) Cr. LJ. 995. 
*3 (1969) Cr LJ 1595. 
** 1969 Orissa 190. 
** Amreet Sakharam Sarup 1972 SCC (Cr) 166. 
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safe and the cash disappeared from the safe, the 
inference was that the accused was party or privy to the 
extraction of the cash from the safe.*« 
The entrustment need not be for any lawful object.^^ 
Further it is inmaterial and irredevant that the accused 
could have been legally entrusted with the property.*• 
Justice Blair, in Queen Empress v. Gouri Shanker,** 
observed:-
"A person who accepts a trust cannot turn 
round and dispute the title of his trustee." 
Sale of Cement by the government to the contractor solely 
for the purpose of its being issued for construction work 
is nothing other than sale and there is no entrustment 
which implies that the person handing over the property 
continues to be its owner. 
<« Surrender Prasad Verma 1973 SCC (CR) 700. 
•7 1958, Pat. 272 (275). It does not matter in the least 
whether the contract was legal or not so long as it was 
shown that, in some manner whatever there was an 
entrustment of the property in question (1927 Nag. 223). 
<8 1959 All 698. 
-^  AIR 1968 SC 700. 
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The manner need not be proper or legal, it may be in any 
manner. Object should not necessarily be legal or trust 
created in execution of a lawful object. It shows that 
there may be liability for criminal breach of trust where 
the trust even is created in the course of illegal 
transaction. Ramappa's'^ case elaborates the point 
more clearly. In this case the accused, a servant of 
CO., misappropriated a large sum of money made up of 
amounts which he received from the manager various times 
on the false pretence that they were required for paying 
coolies, it was held that he was guilty of criminal 
breach of trusts. When he receive the money, he did so 
as the servant of the company, for the express purpose of 
using it for his master's benefit in a particular way. 
He was, therefore, entrusted with the money and his 
misappropriation to himself amounted to criminal breach 
of trust. 
The illustrations to the section 405 show clearly that 
property comes into the possession of accused either by 
an express entrustment or by some process placing the 
accused in a positi'on of trust.^^ 
"Such Entrustment must be in trust:-" 
'• (1911) 22 MLJ 112. 
51 AIR 1949 Cal. 207. 
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According to Ratanlal Dhirajlal, 'where there is no 
original confidence, there is no trust, and a. 
misappropriation, if punishable at all, will he under 
Section 403.*2 The illustrations to Section 405 
clearly indicate that the property comes into the 
possession of the accused by some process placing the 
accused in a position of trust. The term trust under S. 
405 has different implications in different 
circumstances. Expression of trust is comprehensive 
enough to include within its scope the relationship of 
trustee and beneficiary, bailor and bailee, master and 
servamt, pledger and pledgee, banker and customer, 
graftsman and auclonier, director and company, saperder, 
guardian and ward, debtor and creditor, joint owner, 
pleader and client, husband and wife, partners, broker 
and customer, vendor and customer and all fiduciary 
relations between the complainant and the accused.'3 
In Shah Naim Ata,*< it was explained that the terms o'f 
this section are wide enough to include trustees of every 
kind, that is, those who are such, not only by reason of 
some employment for which they receive remuneration, but 
by reason of some trust constituted by express deed, or 
even by mere implication of law, though the office may be 
5 2 Supra N. p. 
*3 Supra Np. p. 
5^  (1930) 7 OWN 663: 3 CR LJ 1012. 
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gratuitious. However, if there is no trust, there will 
be no offence creating liability under Section 405 and 
Section 406. 
Trust is a must. As explained earlier trust is an 
obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and 
arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by 
the owner, or declared or accepted by him, for the 
benefit of another, or of another and the owner! These 
requirements should be satisfied first then violation or 
breach of trust would be taken into consideration. 
"Breach of Trust and Breach of Contract":-
Mere breach of contract is not criminal breach of trust. 
Omission to return earnest money on failure to perform 
contract only creates a civil liability and does not 
amount to criminal breach of trust.'' 
Intention of the accused is to be seen at the time when 
an agreement or a promise is made and not afterwards. 
Accused who agreed to complete certain work within 
stipulated time and also took an advance and on failure 
to complete the work did not return the advance does not 
5 5 1977 Punj. LJ (Cri) 369 (373). 
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amount any offence under Section 406. It is a case of 
civil liability'* and not of a breach of trust. 
In the illustrations attached with section it has 
abundantly been made clear that where the person has 
committed the offence, the property in respect of which 
the offence has been conmitted must be the property of 
another person and not of the accused. He should also 
not be the beneficial, owner, although in one case, that 
of executor, he had the legal title. In Ajoy v. Wadwani 
G.M,'7 it was held that the property in respect of 
which criminal breach of tr\ist can be comnitted must be 
either the property of person other than the person 
accused, or the beneficial interest in or ownership of it 
roust be in some other person and the offender mvist hold 
such property on trust for such other person or in some 
way for his benefit. 
Example may be given where money advanced to a broker for 
the specified purpose of purchase and supply of paddy 
with an agreement that the broker is to suffer the loss 
or get the gains by the fluctuations in fall and rise of 
market price cannot be claimed as entrusted within the 
meaning of this section, though by the agreement the 
5« 1977 Punj. LJ 129 (131). .p 
*^  1965 II Cr. LJ 418. (See also AIR 1965 SC 1319 Mohd. 
Sulaiman v. Md. Ayub). 
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company bound itself to take delivery of the paddy 
purchased and an express trust was declared in regard to 
the amounts advanced. 
Similarly, where a person instructed a jeweller to make 
a gold chain for him and paid Rs300/-, covering cost of 
gold £md making charges, as advance, and the jeweller 
failed to prepare and deliver the chain on the stipulated 
date and did not return the money ajso. On prosecution 
it was held that 'though he was guilty of dishonest and 
dishonourable conduct in not making the chain, he could 
not be said to have misappropriated the money because 
when it was paid to him it became his. His obligation 
thereafter was to produce the gold chain. That he failed 
to do, and B could recover the money from A as money paid 
on a consideration which had wholly failed. That, 
however, would not make the act of A criminal, and as 
there was no entrustment there could be no question of an 
offence under this section.>> 
In Bhikari Charan," a Sarpanch was supplied with seeds 
on credit,, failure to pay amount within stipulated time 
did not amount to breach of trust but only a breach of 
contract. 
5» Kanailal Dutta (1951) 52 Cr. LJ 28. 
59 1982 Cr. LJ (Noc) 174 (Ori). 
On the other hand significant point under consideration 
is that mere breach of contract is not enough to make a 
person liable under the section, some sort of entrustment 
should be established to make a man guilty under this 
section. Therefore, in case where a person took some 
gold jewels from the goldsmith for showing it to his wife 
for placing an order for similar jewel if approved by 
her, failed to give back to the goldsmith euxd retained 
the jewels with himself towards some debts due to him by 
the goldsmith, he found guilty for criminal breach of 
trust.«o 
Again in another case where money was paid to a goldsmith 
with instruction that he should use it for purchasing 
gold from the market and preparing jewels as desired by 
the person making the payment, but the goldsmith 
dishonestly converted the money to his own use in 
violation of the implied contract, he was held guilty of 
criminal breach of trust.^^ 
These later two cases referred above shows that there was 
some sort of entrustment, in both and the accused 
violated the condition for which he was given the money. 
However, in Mohinder Kumar,6 2 case relating to 
«o Janunu Mai (1964) II Cri. L) 717 
«i Mithalal (1955) Raj. 907. 
S2 1982 Cr. LJ 524 (P & H). 
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transaction of 'trade sales', property in goods is 
delivered to the buyer without an element of entrustment. 
If the buyer fails to pay the price promised there is no 
breach of trust. We cannot inq^ ute any criminality in 
such cases. 
The cases of craftsman and cxistomer, important element is 
to establish entrustment and fiduciary relation between 
the two where a person hands over a gold to the 
goldsmith, transfering all his rights thereto on promise 
that goldsmith would give a certain amount of gold, the 
transaction is not an entrustment but a contract. On the 
other hand if he transfers the ornament for being melted 
and converted into gold and returned to him, in such a 
transaction there is entrustment, failure to give gold 
would amount to breach of trust. 
Where property is entrusted for repair purposes and the 
repairer takes that in his own use instead of returning 
after the repair, is breach of trust. Allegations made 
in a complaint were that a truck was entrvisted to the 
accused for the purpose of repairing it and he had agreed 
to return it. in three days. The accused, however, 
instead of returning it started,2using the same. The 
allegations held constitute an offence under section 
406.«3 
«3 1977 Punj-Lj 265 (267) 
46 
"LOAM-
Whether a trust can foe created in any transaction of loan 
depends upon the facts of each case. However, the 
relationship between a debtor and creditor is not a 
fiduciary one and the advance of a loan is not an 
entrustment of money.*^ Once the money advanced after 
the grant of loan, it becomes the property of the debtor. 
A failure to repay the loan is not a breach of trust much 
less, a criminal breach of trust. In Satyabrata ^ 
Bhattacharya v. Jarnail Singh, ^> it was held that 
giving a loan to somebody for accomodating a person to 
have money for certain time is not entrustment of money 
with a direction that the money would be utilised in a 
particular manner. A payment by the debtor to the 
creditor in discharge of the debt is also not an 
entrustment. Further the failure by the creditor to give 
a receipt is not a breach of trust. 
However, there may be transactions between debtor and 
creditor where there may be entriistment also, and breach 
of such entrustment either by one or the other party to 
such loan. For example the debtor pays an amount to the 
creditor with the intention to repose trust in him and 
6< 1976 Cr. Lj. 446 (Ori) 
«* Ibid N. 44. 
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expecting to dispose of the money in a particular manner, 
it would be considered entrustment of money. Where the 
acciised borrowed jewels from the complainant for use in 
a marriage and pledged the same, raising a loan on it, it 
was held that he was guilty of criminal breach of 
trust.«• 
"Pledge": Pledge or pawn may be explained as a 'bailment 
of goods by a debtor with his creditor to be kept as 
security till the payment of the debt', and relationship 
th\is resulted are fiduciary in character between the 
pledgor and the pledgee, a dishonest converson or 
misappropriation of the property pledged, thus would 
amount to a criminal breach of trust. A dishonest use of 
pledged property by the pledgee in repudiation of any 
direction of law or of any legal contract related to the 
manner of use of the property would also amount breach of 
trust. Therefore like loan cases, there can be no 
general proposition of law that a pledgee cannot be 
guilty of criminal breach of trust where the contract 
between the complainant and the accused is that the 
pledged ornament would be returned to the complainamt on 
payment of the entire dues and the accused in spite of 
the payment retains it and uses the ornament as a pledge 
in respect of a completely independent transaction, he 
56 (1905) 10 Mys. CCR. No. 221, p. 913 
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definitely uses the ornament in violation of the legal 
contract between the parties creating the trust.^^ 
A sub-pledge by the pledgee to the extent of his interest 
(in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the 
contract of pledge) would be fully within the rights of 
the pledgee and would not constitute a breach of trust. 
It may be otherwise if it is made in violation of a 
condition in the contract of pledge.«• 
In the absence of a condition attached to the contract of 
pledge, the pledgee has a legal right to deal with the 
pledged property in any manner he likes in same way as 
can be exercised by a bailee under a bailment. 
Under section 179 of the Indian Contract Act the pledgee 
has been given the right to sub-pledge of the goods 
pledged to him proportion/to his interest. Therefore, if 
the money lender during the regular course of his money-
lending business, effects sub-pledges, with same amount, 
same date as the pledges made to him with a view to raise 
capital at a lower rate of interest, it would not amoiuit 
to breach of trust. Provided there was no express 
contract prohibiting to make sub-pledges, secondly no 
proof to show that the sub-pledges were made with a 
«' 1955 Or. Lj. 1371 (DB). 
«« 1942 Rang. 62. 
9^ 
dishonest intention. In a case where a person has been 
authorised to pledge some valuable belonging to another 
person for a specific amount, but pledges them for a 
larger sum and keep it secret from the owner, using the 
additional amount for his benefit, he would be liable for 
breach of trust. Here it is a clear case of entrustment. 
In a case where the accused, who had pledged promisory 
notes with the complainant as security for a loan, 
dishonestly induced the letter to handover the same to 
him by pretending that he acquired the same to collect 
money from his debtors with the aid of which he would pay 
cash to the complainant and the accused disposed of the 
notes in violation of his contract with the complainant, 
it was held that there was both entrustment and dishonest 
misappropriation and the accused was guilty of criminal 
breach of trust.*' 
"Hire Purchase Agreement";- Under the hire-purchase 
agreement a person agrees to bind himself with the terms 
of agreement, that is, to pay the instalments for the 
article purchased luder the agreement, till the payment 
is made for the instalments agreed, not to assign, 
underlet or part with the property during the period of 
hire, if he violates the terms, he would be guilty under 
6» Venkatagurunatha Sastri v. 1923, 45 MLJ 133; 1923 AIR (M) 
597. 
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section 406, because simply he is entrusted with the 
property, ownership still remains with whom he has 
entered the agreement for hire purchase. The title to 
the property is not transfer.-ed to the hirer during the 
period of hire. If the hirer during such period 
dishonestly disposes of the property contrary to the 
contract, he commits criminal breach of trtist.^ ^ 
Where the hirer pledges or sells the hired property in 
violation of hire agreement, he is responsible for 
criminal breach of trust.^^ 
Other illustrative cases may be, where a person hired a 
motor car under the hire purchase system, the terms of 
the agreement provided that until the instalments were 
fully paid the car was to remain the absolute property of 
the company. Further the hirer agreed that during the 
period of hire he would not assign, underlet or part with 
the possession of the car in amy way. While the 
agreement was still in force, the hirer pledged the car 
thi;(&e to three different persons on three different 
occasions. It was held that the hirer is liable for 
criminal breach of trust.'2 This is a clear case of 
violation of the legal contract. 
70 1915 Bom. 206. 
7 1 1927 Bom. 38. 
7 2 (1915) 17 Bom LR 670 
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Assignments under the pledge to three different persons 
show that the hirer had a dishonest intention and 
absolute disregard, for the terms of hire-purchase 
agreement. In another case a person got a motor-lorry on 
hire purchase-agreement, stipulating conditions that so 
long as the amount of purchase price was not fully paid, 
the vehicle would remain the absolute property of the 
transferor and the hirer would not dispose of it or deal 
with it. He also agreed that in case of default in the 
payment of instalment the owner could recover the 
possession of the car as well. The hirer, inspite of the 
agreement, sold the lorry before the instalments were 
paid, it was held that the hirer is guilty of criminal 
breach of trust.'' 
However, in cases where there is a mere breach of 
condition of the hire-purchase agreement, such as, 
failure to pay an instalment of hire, without fault, 
would not amount to criminal breach of trust. For 
example where the complainant sold a gramaphone to the 
accused on instalment system but on his not paying 
instalments the complainant asked for the machine and, 
though it was not immediately produced, it had not been 
sold and was produced in court, it was held that the 
matter was of civil nature, and the mere-non-payment of 
73 Cadd Cj. (1923) 45 All 588 
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the monthly instalment? could not be considered as a 
criminal offence.^^ 
In Sunil Ranjan Ghosh Roy,7s case the 'accused in 
violation of a hire purchase agreement removed certain 
parts from a truck, he would be guilty of breach of 
contract and cannot be proceeded \mder section 405. 
Similarly nhere the accused hired an electric motor which 
remained in his use for sometime and hire charges were 
paid for some months. Then he wrote a letter to the 
owner of the motor stating that he had purchased the 
motor on condition that it should be tried for three 
months and if it was found to be satisfactory the money 
would be paid and the purchase completed and claiming 
that he had paid the purchase money and completed the 
purchase. It was held by the Supreme Court that the 
accused had not misappropriated or converted the property 
or used it or disposed of it in violation of the contract 
and that the letter merely raised a dispute of a civil 
nature between the parties and that there was no question 
of criminal breach of trust with respect to the 
motor.'* 
7* Kalipade Mondal v. Kalikankar Chatter jee (1936) 38 Cr Li 
113. 
'5 1986 (2) Crimes 601. 
'« Mohamroed Sulaiman v. Md. Ayub (1965) II Cr. Lj. 421 SC, 
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A hire purchase agreement is different from a contract of 
sale in which case the buyer promises to pay the price in 
instalments. Distinction can be drawn on the leases that 
the hirer is entitled to terminate the agreement and 
return the property to the owner whereas the buyer imder 
contract for sale cannot cancel the sale and return the 
article but is liable to the owner for payment of the 
instalments. Further the buyer under the contract for 
sale will not be liable under section 406 even if he 
transfers it to another before the instalment are 
paid.7T 
Hiring is not entrustment and if a person fails to 
produce the article received on hire, will not be liable 
for breach of trust unless there is a proof that he acts 
dishonestly.7• 
"Vender and Purchaser" - To Supreme Court, a mere 
transaction of sale is not an entrustment. The fact that 
the'purchaser subsequently denies receipt of the goods 
does not make him guilty of the offence of criminal 
breach of trust. The facts of the case are - that the 
government sold to the accused contractor, cement for the 
purpose of constructing a building, but the contractor 
'' 1955 BLIR 144. 
'« 1932 AIR (All) 324 
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used only a part of the cement for the building and 
disposed of the balance in other ways, it was held, 'that 
in the absence of evidence of any conditions or 
particulars of the agreement between the government and 
the accused, it could not be said that there was any 
fiduciary relation between the government and the accused 
or that the government had any proprietory rights over 
the cement after the sale, or that there was any 
entrustment of the property, so as to render the accused 
guilty under this section.^^ 
In Dorabji F. Ninwalla v. Sobraj Chellaram,*<> "A, a 
buyer, obtained from the seller certain docvuients of 
title under a "trust-receipt" whereby the buyer agreed to 
pay interest on the price of the goods purchased until 
payment was made, it was held that the seller did not 
intend to retain any ownership of the goods, that no 
entrustment was made and that A did not comnnit any breach 
of trust. 
In criminal breach of trust cases the decisive test is: 
Firstly, there should be an entrustment, secondly 
presence of necessary dishonest intention, thirdly 
whether the property has passed or not passed to the 
buyer. 
T9 1968 SC 700 (702) 
«o 1939 Sind. 27. 
55 
Where a person sells goods to another person with an 
understanding that property should pass to the buyer only 
on payment of price, and before such payment the buyer 
sells the property to a third person, it would amount to 
criminal breach of trust.*^ 
Chitaley has referred other illustrative cases as 
follows:-*^ 
1. A advances money to B to purchase and deliver to A 
grain within a certain time. B failed to perform 
the promise: Held that B was not guilty of an 
offence under this section as the transaction was 
in the nature of a debt. 
2. A took ornaments from B on approval and promised to 
return the same in the evening of the same day but 
failed to do so: Held that A was not guilty of 
criminal breach of trust, but that the matter was a 
civil one governed by S.24 of the sale of goods 
Act.8 3 
»i 1924 Cal. 816. 
82 Indian Penal Code - Vol. 3, VR Mohar and WW Chitaley, p. 
309. 
"s 1953 Nag. 301. 
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3. K entrxists goods to B for sale and B sells them: a 
trust is created in respect of the sale proceeds 
also.«4 
"Joint owner" - A co-owner of property cannot be 
considered to be entrusted with the joint property in the 
absence of an agreement of entrustment, hence cannot be 
liable for breach of trust. Muslim co-owners are not 
joint-owners of the property but own seperate shares amd 
thus the principle above noted that in the aJ»sence of an 
agre«nent of entr\istment a co-owner cannot be guilty of 
breach of trust of the joint property cannot apply to 
them."5 
"Banker and customer":- In a current accoimt deposited 
with bank, if a cheque is dishonoured it would not be 
considered a breach of trust but only a breach of 
•contract,"( because the money deposited with bank is 
not said to be entrusted. The relationship between the 
customer and banker is one of debtor and creditor as the 
money deposited is considered part of banks fxind. But in 
cases of money dealing, between a bank and a customer 
sometime the transaction amounts to a bailement, not a 
deposit than violation would amount to breach of trust. 
'^  1932 Sind. 169. 
85 1950- Cal. 523. 
«« 1991 - Cal. 713. 
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"Husband and wife":- A married woman may be convicted as 
a bailee, if she fraudulently converts to her own use or 
the use of any person other than the owner thereof.'^ 
Wife is in joint possession with her husband and cannot 
therefore be convicted of criminal breach of trust.•• 
This decision is sxibjected to criticism. It is said that 
the decision is not sound. If the wife disposes of or 
deals with the separate property of her husband in any 
way prejudicial to his interest without of his consent is 
liable for theft, hence there is no reason why the wife 
should not be liable for criminal breach of trust in 
respect to such property. 
In Anil Bhardway*' it was held that where the exclusive 
property of one of the spouses is unwarranted!y taken 
away or misappropriated by the other and marriage breaks 
down, the offence of misappropriation can be made out. 
It is wrong to say that a woman's striddan property 
becomes a joint property with her husband on entering 
into the matrimonial relations. Stridhan property of a 
woman may be placed in the custody of either of her 
husband or in-laws, but they are treated as trustees and 
»7 31 LJMC 22 (Robson). 
88 1864 Weir 3rd Edd. 266. 
89 1985 Cr. Lj. 6X3 (Del). 
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are bound to return the same when demanded by her. If 
the stridhan is misappropriated or converted by the 
parent-in-laws, they would be deemed guilty for breach of 
trust.»• 
"Sapurdar":- when under the order of the court any 
property is attached and given in custody of any other 
person, such a person is known as sapurdar or custodian; 
he is in law bound to produce such property when called 
upon by the court. If he fails to produce when called 
upon by the court to do so, is guilty of offence under 
this section. In another case where there was no proof 
that the Sapur>dar misappropriated the entrusted property 
or converted in his own use and notice to account the 
property was given after the 6 years of entrustment, it 
was decided that accused was not guilty under this 
section.*i 
"Auctioneer":- In Baltharar'^ it was held that an 
auctioneer is not liable under this merely on grounds 
that he does not punctually carryout every condition of 
the agreement, that is the date of sale and the time of 
payment of the proceeds. 
>• Bhai Sher Jang Singh v. Virender Kaur, 1979, Cr. LJ. 493 
(P S H). 
»i 1960 All 380. 
92 (1914) UI Cal. 844. 
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"Disputed claim":- If the title of a property is in 
dispute, a criminal liability cannot be imputed. Right 
and title must be proved beyond doubt first, then there 
can be a liability.'3 In Raj Rishore Patter v. Joy 
Khrisna Sen'< "The accused was employed by the 
complainant and others to take their paddy for sale and 
he sold it to a Marwari. The complainant stated that the 
accused had withheld from him a portion of the money due 
from the sale of his paddy. There was a dispute between 
the parties as to the number of bags that were given to 
the complainant by the accused, and the defence was that 
some of the bags for which the price was claimed by the 
complainant, were bags given to the accused by another 
man who had filled a suit against him to recover their 
price. It was held that the accused could not be 
convicted of criminal breach of trust on refvising to give 
to the complainant money, which was claimed by another 
person as well as by the complainant. 
"Partner, Servant and Agents";- As to the liability of 
Partners, servants and agents, we are having seperate 
chapter, sand thus would discuss the law in details 
there. 
»' Superintendent v. Birendre Chandhe Chakravarty 1974 SCC 
(Cr) 191. 
9* (1900) 28 Cal. 362. 
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"Dominion over property";- Physical possession over the 
property of the accused is not necessary. All is 
required is:-
1. accused should have, dominion over the property.'> 
2. It could be disposed of under his direction. 
3. Violation should be of any direction of law 
prescribing the terms of trusts. 
4. The obligation to act in a certain manner in regard 
to the trust property having dominion over it may 
arise either expressly or impliedly. 
Illustrative cases may be where a municipal water works 
Inspector employed to control, supervise and check the 
distribution of water from the municipal supply pipes 
installed by municipal water works, it is considered that 
the Inspector has dominion over on behalf of the M. Water 
works. If there is a deliberate misappropriation or 
conversion of the water to his own use or for the use of 
his servant for which he does not pay any tax and also 
makes no information of such use of water to his 
employer, he is guilty of criminal breach of trust. 
5^ Bimala Charan Ray (1913) 35 All. 361. 
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Si^reme court in another case held that where a person 
has been given the power to deal with the funds«in a 
bank, is considered to be entrusted with dominion over. 
The property Any-Violation or misappropriation would 
amount to criminal breach of trust.'< 
In an English Mortgage where the possession of Mortgaged 
Property continues with the Mortgagor, presumption is the 
mortgagor has dominion over the property belonging to the 
mortgagee and the mortgager if fraudulently allowes the 
property to be sold in execution for default of payment 
of revenue and purchased it benami in the name of 
another, he would be guilty for criminal breach of 
tmst.sT 
Where a constable tmder reasonable suspicion seises 
prcq^ erty to be stolen he is regarded as entrusted with 
douinion over it and misappropriation by him would make 
hia liable under this section.'* 
9* A, 1962 SC. 1821 (1834): 1962, Cr.h. 805. 
^"f (1866) 5 Suth WR 230 (DB). Property includes movable and 
immovable property both. Supreme court in Dalmia RK 
(1963) 1 SCR 253, over ruling Reg v. Gridhar Dharamdas 6 
Bom. HCR Cr. 33, and judgown Sinha (1895) 23 Cal 1372, 
and approving Bishan Prasad 37, All 128, Ramchamdra 
Gurvala (1926) AIR Lah. 385, Manchester Ardeshir v. 
ismail Ibrahim 60 Bom. 706 and daud Khan 27. Cr. Lj 17, 
observed "that the case law is more in favour of the 
wider meaning being given to the word "property" in 
sections where the word is not qualified by any 
expression like movable). 
»« (1935) 36 Cr. LJ. 867. 
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If the municipal board employees customary sweepers for 
scavenging the rubbish and night soil from the house, and 
sanitary Inspector induces the sweepers to deposit the 
matter collected by th«n at a place not prescribed by the 
board and sells it for his own benefit. Inspector is 
liable for criminal breach of trust.'' 
Other illustrative case of 'dominion over property' may 
be where the employees of a society took delivery of levy 
sugar for the purpose of distributing to ration card 
holders, they committed criminal breach trust if they 
sold the sugar to persons other than ration card 
holders.io* 
In Vasant Moghe,ioi Tehsildar failed to deposit 
treasury amounts of land revenue, fines etc, under the 
circumstances he had dominion over the accounts amd was 
entrusted with money. If he did not have any regard for 
the practice and procedure which was to be followed by 
him and the amounts were not entered in the account 
books, he was held guilty under this section. 
»» Horital, 45 All 381. 
100 Ayyadurai devar, Inre (1981) Cr. LJ 258 (Mad) 
10X 1979 sec (Cri) 868. 
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In Janeshwar Dass Aggarwal ,^ <*2 the supreme court 
questioned the order of conviction on grounds that the 
ingredients of criminal breach of trust were not proved. 
An over-seer was convicted by the lower courts for 
shortage of some articles from open godown which were in 
physical charge of chowkidars. It was not proved that 
the physical charge of go down was ever handed over to 
the overseer. Furthermore there was no evidence showing 
that the overseer misappropriated any article. It is a 
basic requir^nent that the prosecution must prove 
intrustment and misappropriation of the articles. Both 
the elwDsents were absent in the present case, hence 
supreme court quashed the conviction order. 
Dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use 
that piTQP^rtY". 
"Dishonestly":- Dishonest intention is the gist of the 
offence, both of criminal misappropriation as well as of 
criminal breach of trust.i*' This section is not 
applicable if the dishonest intention is absent.^o* 
The conduct which creates civil liability is 
distinguished from the criminal breach of trust on the 
basis of dishonest intention.io' Breach of trust 
102 1981 sec (Cri). 616. 
i»3 1959 cr. LJ 1508. 
10* 1965 (2) Cr. Lj 421. 
l»» 1976 Cr. Lj 449 (451) Pat 
6A 
gives rise to a suit of damages, but it is only when 
there is a proof of a mental act of dishonest 
misappropriation that the commission of embezzlement of 
any sum of money becomes a penal offence punishable as 
criminal breach of trust. 
The question i^s what constitutes dishonest intention. 
The ter];n is not used in its popular significance, and 
need not always involve an element of fraud or 
deceit.^*< In order that the act has been done 
dishonestly, wrongful gain to one and wrongful loss to 
another is to be proved. These terms 'wrongful gain' and 
'wrongful loss' have been defined in section 23 IPC, as 
gain by unlawful means of property to which the person 
gaining is not legally entitled, and the loss by unlawful 
means of property to which the person losing it is 
legally entitled. Hence section 405 is to be read in 
conjunction with section 23 of the Indian Penal Code. It 
is not necessary that to establish dishonest intention, 
both wrongful loss and wrongful gain be caused, intention 
to cause wrongful gain be caused, intention to cause 
wrongful loss would be sufficient. In Madhavan 
Pi 11 ail0 7 (1966), it was observed that 'a person can 
be said to have dishonest intention if in taking the 
'"' afsl/J^^^L^-^^lAi"'^''*"^^"^ ""• 2"^^a»i Sanyasi Apparao, (1959) Cr. Lj 1141. 
^'>'' (1966) Cr LJ 728 at 731 
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property it is his intention to cause gain by unlawful 
means of the property to which the person so gaining is 
not legally entitled or to cause loss by wrongful means 
of property which the person so losing is entitled. As 
observed by their lordships of the Supreme Court in 
Krishna Kumar v. Union of India,^ <>* "wrongful gain" 
includes wrongful retention and wrongful loss includes 
being Keptout of the property. "It is not necessary or 
possible in every case of criminal breach of trust to 
prove in what precise memner the money was spent or 
appropriated by the accused because, under the law, even 
a temporary retention is an offence if it is 
dishonest."^0 9 
It is only the dishonest intention which is essential. 
Every breach of trust is not criminal. It may be 
international without being dishonest or it may appear to 
be dishonest without being really so. Actual results of 
wrongfulgain or wrongful loss are immaterial. 
"It is a consequence, but no essential part, of the 
offence, and a person is not accused of the offence by 
reason of it."!!" 
i»« 1959 Cr. Lj. 1508. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Mathurq. Prasad, (1946), PWN 192. 
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Dishonest intention is proved when a postman, repays the 
amount of money order to the payee's mother subsequent to 
the filing of a complaint with the postal 
author ities.m 
Accused giving a false statement of account of what he 
has done with the property received by him is a strong 
prove of his dishonest intention.i^^ 
Even in cases of retention an inference of dishonest 
intention may be drawn. However, m»re retention of 
property without any misappropriation is not criminal 
breach of trust. 
Where a person entrusts another person with some document 
for a specific purpose, and that another person hands 
over the document to a third person for a purpose 
prejudicial to the interest of the former, the second 
person would be guilty under this section. 
The transfer of an account of another person to his own 
accoimt is crime udner this section. 
Where a person takes from a goldsmith a gold jewel for 
m Salig Ram 1973 Cr. Lj 1030 (H.P.) 
112 1959^ Cr. Lj. 1508. 
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showing it to his wife and placing an order for a similar 
jewel if she approved of it but fails to return it and 
retains it with himself towards some debts due to him by 
the goldsmith, he will be guilty of an offence under s. 
406 of the Indian Penal Code. He has utilized the jewel 
for a purpose not intended and against the express 
agreement. The mere fact that the jewel is intact is 
irrelevant.!13 
Even deprivation for a short period is covered by this 
section 406. A misappropriation is not a 
misappropriation merely becatise it is only for a short 
period.!!* However, it is not possible to lay down a 
hard and fast rule that retention would always and in all 
cases lead to an inference of msiappropriation. 
An intention to misappropriate in future is not within 
the scope of section 405.!!' 
A mere delay or retention of money due to another cannot 
be a ground for inference of dishonest intention.!!( 
although it is a circumstance against the accused. 
113 (1949) 2 MLJ 296 (K. Appanna). 
11* (1907) 5 Cr. Lj. 5 (8) (DB) Bom. 
115 (1934) 36 Cr. Lj. 165. 
ii« 1961 (1) Cr. Lj. 654. 
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In Jagroop Singh's case,^^? the accused was a graduate 
and a young man who was unanimously elected to the 
Pajnhayat of a village. He did much for the development 
of the village and also increased the income of the 
Pancyahat. However, he was negligent in keeping proper 
accounts. The whole village was satisfied with his 
performance and honest fiinctioning. But he was charged 
and prosecuted for keeping with him more than Rs21,000 
cash contrary to Panchayat rule. It was observed that 
accused's criminal intention to misappropriate was not 
pr&ved. 
Wrongful remission of debt by company director, held no 
criminal breach of trust.^i* The gist is the 
dishonest misappropriation or the conversion by one to 
his own use of the property of another which has been 
entrusted to him.n' 
"Misappropriates";- To misappropriate means improperly 
setting apart for one's use to the exclusion of the 
owner. It also means 'wrongful setting apart or 
assigning of a sum of money to a purpose or use to which, 
it should not lawfully be assigned or set apart.120 
11' 1936 Mad. WW. 825 (828). 
in 1980 Cr. Lj. 68 (P & H). AIR 1963 Cal . 64. 
\>-
i^ i* Ram Khelawan (1919, 20 Cr, Lj. 654). 
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For the offence under section 405, it is not necessary 
that to constitute misappropriation the money entrusted 
should have been applied or used in any particular 
manner: It is sufficient if the accxxsed dishonestly 
intends to hold the property as his own or to deprive 
another of his property and such intention is indicated 
by some overtact or conduct on the part of the 
accused.^21 where any docvmtent has been entrusted to 
a person the document to third person to be used in a 
prejudicial way or harmful to the interest for which it 
was awarded, the person would be liable for 
misappropriation. It is not necessary to constitute 
misappropriation that the person should receive any 
money. It may be in any form but act done should be 
contrary to the interest to be achieved. To prove 
precise mode of conversion or misappropriation is also 
not necessary. 
In misappropriation possession of the property comes 
innocently. If original taking is dishonest than it may 
be a case of theft rather than of criminal breach of 
trust. 
For conviction it is not necessary that the accused 
should misappropriate the property to his own use. It 
may be misappropriated for the use of third person. If 
TTT. JYT/ 7r~^ 3T7T 
i2* 1974, 40 Cut. LT 771, 
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a person as^eyts that he is holding property for someone 
other than for whose benefit it was entrusted, his 
assertion amounts to dishonest misappropriation. 
To constitute dishonest misappropriation actual loss is 
not necessary, mere intention to cause wrongful loss is 
sufficient. Misappropriation may be for a short period 
or long period, duration is not material. 
Money may be misappropriated by a mental act without any 
actual expend of the money. However, some overtact and 
visible act must be established. 
Where a secretary of co-operative society not depositing 
proceeds of sale of society property and spending some 
amount for his purpose commits misappropriation.12 2 
Delay in making payment of collection - is not 
misappropriation.!23 Withdrawal by an employee of the 
amount deposited by him as security during his 
appointment, without the permission of the employer and 
before adjustment of the accounts between them amounts to 
criminal misappropriation.^2 4 
Mere making of wrong entries in the receipt books by the 
!22 (1974) 40 Cut. LT 873. 
123 1943, cr. Lj. 445. 
12* 1939, Cr. LJ 691, (DB). 
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licensee may not possibly bring him within the purview of 
section 403 or 405 1 PC.^^s Similarly mere delay in 
making remittance of money collected on another's behalf 
is no evidence of misappropriation when there is no 
particular obligation to pay the same at a particular 
date.12 6 
In Sardar Singh's case,i2 7 the accused a Patwari was 
entrvisted with a receipt book. The accused failed to 
return this receipt book. It was held that mere omission 
or failure to return the entriisted property does not 
amount to breach of trust. 
In Nirmalabai'si2 8 case it was held that mere 
retention of goods by a person without misappropriation 
does not constitute criminal breach of trust. 
The most significant aspect of the offence of criminal 
misappropriation is that the property might have come to 
a person innocently but by subsequent change of intention 
or knowledge with which the party was not previously 
acquianted, the retaining becomes wrongful. 
125 1932, Cr. LJ. 300. 
126 L931, Cr. LJ. 1198. 
127 1977^ Cr. LJ 1158 (SC). 
123 1953^ jiag. 813. 
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"Di^hpnest conversion";" To prove conversion it should be 
established that a man does an unauthorised act which 
deprives another of his property permanently or for an 
indefinite time. Mere preparation to convert is not an 
offence.i2» 
In Durugappa'si'* case conversion has been defined as 
'to appropriate and use another's property without right 
as if it is one's own'. The accused must not merely 
retain property to the physical exclusion of the real 
owner but also divert it to his own use. 
In Gouri Shanker's c a s e ^ a Magistrate handed over a 
pony to a iperson professing to be the secretary of a 
society for the maintenance of incurable animals. The 
pony belonged to Municipal Board which was declared by 
the authorities as unfit for work. Secretary agreed to 
take charge of the Pony, but afterwards he sold it to eka 
(one horse carriage) driver. It was held that the 
secretary was liable for conversion under this section. 
Another illustrative case of conversion may be where a 
lady wishing to purchase a railway ticket, found a long 
12> 1950 Cr. LJ. 518 (DB). 
130 1956, Cr, Lj 630. 
131 (1894) 14 AWN 197. 
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que before the ticket booking window and a person 
standing just near to the pay place. She asked him to 
get a ticket for her also and handed over some money to 
him for purchasing the ticket. He took the money and 
immediately after ran away with the money. Accused held 
guilty under this section.^^a 
Misappropriation and conversion to one's use are not the 
same thing. 
"In violation of any direction of law" - Liability under 
this section will be when there is a violation of legal 
direction prescribing the mode in which the person 
entrusted with the property is to excute the trust or 
legal contract. In a case where the accused was 
entrusted with some silver for the purpose of making 
ornament and he mixed copper there in, it was held that 
the jeweller was guilty of criminal breach of 
trust.i3» 
In Ganga Prasad's,i34 case A clerk who was incharge of 
goverzunent department Record Room, was having documents 
in his custody, handed over dociunents to a person who was 
entitled to the document in an illegal manner. It was 
132 Raghubir Kurmi, 1920 Cr. LJ. 413. 
i»3 Babaji bin Bhau (1867) 4 BHC (Cr. C) 16. 
134 27 All 260. 
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held that the clerk was rightly convicted of the offence 
of criminal breach of trust by a public servant. 
In another case where a secretary of society disbursed 
the money entrusted to him as such secretary in 
contravention of the bye-laws of the society was held 
liable for comnitting the offence of criminal breach of 
trust.13 5 
A Managing Director of a Bank in contravention of Bank's 
Article of Association dishonestly disposed of bank money 
which was entrusted to him, was held liable \inder this 
section.1'* 
Auser of property comes within the scope of section 405, 
IPC when such a user causes substanted loss to the owner 
of the property or gain to the accused. Illustration may 
be refered of the use by the printer of certain blocks 
entrusted to him to print the complainant's catalogue for 
the purpose of printing rival firm's catalogue, would be 
a breach of trust.^'T 
In Kalaktar Singh's case a contractor under an agreement 
13» (1970) 2 SCJ 461 (464). 
i3« 1958 Cr. LJ 518 (DB) (Conversion by Secretary of 
Cooperative Society). 
137 Keshab Chandra Boral v. Nityanund Biswas (1901) 6 CWN 
203. 
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with the government was assigned to execute the 
construction work for which a particular quantity of 
cement bags were alloted to him. The agreement was that 
the government would supply all material to the 
contractor, unused material was. to remain goveriunent 
material, and such material if not used was to return 
back to the government. Contractor sold the unused bags 
outside and thus held liable under this section.^^8 
It is sufficient for the prosecution to establish 
criminal breach of trust that the owner of the property 
has been deprived of its use and benefit for a time, and 
the accused has gained the benefit for a time. Permanent 
misappropriation is not to be established. 
In the following cases there is no breach of trust:-
A court appointed a person as Receiver of a certain mill 
and vested with process of management of its business in 
accordance with its Article of Association. He obtained 
illegal gratification for sale of articles belonging to 
the Mill. It was held that the illegal remuneration 
received by the accused was, not entrusted to him on 
behalf of the complainant. Therefore, there was no 
breach of trust.i^' 
138 Kalaktar Singh 1978 Cr. LJ, 663 Pats 
13' A 1953 SC 478. 
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Similarly a sum of money was given to a person in 
accordance with a lawful agreement, which later on became 
incapable of execution, the money was retained by him in 
liue of a debt due to him, he was not held guilty of 
criminal breach of trust.^^o 
In another case a sum of money was given by the 
complainant to the accused as compensation for compromise 
of a criminal suit against the complainant, which could 
not be compromised due to the refusal by the court to 
grant permission. It was held that compensation was not 
entrusted and case did not fall within section 405.^^^ 
J\n employer who invests his employee's Provident Fund 
money in his own business transactions is not liable for 
breach of trust as there is no legal obligation to employ 
it in any particular manner.^^^ 
"In violation of legal contract" - The basic requirement 
is that the contract must be legal or valid, not for an 
illegal or criminal purpose. If the contract is for an 
illegal purpose such as for the purchase of stolen 
property violation thereof would not amount to criminal 
1*0 Puran (1925) 27 Cr. LJ. 383. 
K i Kamal Fakir (1949) 53 CWN (IDR) 79. 
i<2 A 1956 Mad. 6 (61): 1956 Cr. Lj 71. 
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breach of trust. Further the contrt^ eEt^ d^^ j^ i^^ ^^ v^ n^ regard 
to the discharge of a trust. However, where there is no 
trust, merely money is advanced under a contract, a 
dispute arising out of violation of the terms of such a 
contract, will be of a civil nature. In such a case 
there is no breach of trust. A person must use or 
dispose of property in violation of any legal contract, 
express or inqplied, which he has made touching the 
discharge of such trust. 
In Gurudas,^^^ "the complainant deposited a miinicipal 
debenture with the accused on the occasion of his 
employment as a security deposit. One of the terms of 
the deposit was that it would not be returnable before 
one year and thereafter only on fulfilment of certain 
conditions. The accused deposited the debenture with a 
bank as a security against a loan taken by him. There 
was not evidence to establish that the accused had no 
intention of redeeming it. It was held that the pledge 
of the security with the bank was not a breach of any 
legal contract, express or implied, and that, therefore, 
the accused was not liable for breach of trust." 
Illustrative cases may be where a jewel was taken from a 
"goldsmith for a particular purpose under a promise to 
return it, and the person, instead of returning it, 
143 44 CWN 872. 
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claimed to retain it in liMe of a debt due to him and 
claimed the jewel as his own, he was held guilty under 
this section".14* 
"An officer who is engaged on contract for collecting 
land revenue on commission basis and converts the 
collections to his own use is guilty \mder this 
section".^^^ Taking ornaments only for the purpose of 
approval but retaining the same dishonestly is an offence 
under this section.^^* 
In Dani Singh's case, the wheat was supplied by the 
Government to a holder of Fair Price Shop with a 
condition to sell in a particular manner. The holder of 
Fair Price shop violated the condition. It was held that 
there was no breach of trust.i*' 
"Post office employees are under an implied contract with 
the consigner to obey the V.P. rules and see that the 
V.P. article is delivered in accordance therewith. Any 
delivery contrary to the rules is, therefore, a breach of 
i<* A 1950 Mad 49 (50). 
^*5 1937 ILR 1 Cal. 272 (DB). 
i<« 1964, (2) Cr. LJ 117 (Raj). 
1*7 1963 AIR Pat. 52. 
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this implied contract."i<" 
In Khitish's case a person was held liable for criminal 
breach of trust when he took goods on approval under an 
agreement that property therein was to pass only if he 
exercised his option to take them and paid cash in full 
for certain articles and in part for others, the trust 
continued till the option was exercised and cash payments 
were made. He sold them without payments. Violation of 
the conditions made him liable. 
"False explanation or Accounting or Omission to 
aecotint":-
"In criminal breach of trust failure to account for the 
money proved to have been received by the accused or 
giving a false account as to its use is generally 
coixsidered to be a strong circumstance against the 
accused. But accused cannot be convicted on it alone. 
It is merely sua inference as to dishonest intention, is 
to be taken into consideration along.with other facts of 
the case. 
It is the servant's duty to account for and pay over the 
sum of money received by him at his stated times, his not 
doing so, intentionally, is considered misappropriation, 
a breach of trust. 
i4» 1927 AIR, Mad. 626. 
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If a person recovers the money which he is bound to 
account, his not doing so, would make him liable for this 
offence, although no precise time is stated within which 
he is to account for. 
'*The mental act or intent to deprive the master of his 
property is the gist of the offence of criminal breachof 
trust."!*• In criminal breach of trust cases it is 
not possible to prove in every case the precise manner of 
misappropriation of money or how the money was spent, or 
retatined for a temporary or permanent period. What is 
most important factor to be considered is dishonest 
intention. 
In Som Nath Puriis<> the accused a traffic assistant in 
the office of Indian Airlines Corporation demanded on 
behalf of the corporation certain excess amounts for 
trunkcall charges from passengers for reservation of 
seats. After the amoxints were received he passed 
receipts on behalf of the corporation. He, however, 
subsequently falsified the counterfoil and fraudulently 
misappropriated the excess amotints. The accused was held 
guilty of breach of trust. 
Mere retention is not conclusive proof, of criminal 
i<» Chaturbhuj narain Chaudhury (1935) 15 Pat. 108. 
150 1972 Cr. LJ. 897 (SC). 
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misappropriation or criminal breach of trust.^'^ 
Appropriation if money assigned for one purpose but used 
for another purpose does not amount to misappropriation 
or criminal breach of truist. In cases where there is no 
dishonest use or disposal, a person would not be liable 
for breach of trust. 
"Wilfully suffers any other person so to do";-
"Wilful" means deliberate or intentional and not 
accidental or in advertant..^'^ wilfully presupposes 
a conscioxis action. Where a person is incharge of a 
Record Room dishonestly gave the keys of the room to 
another person for giving access corruptly to the 
records, it was held that the person wilfully suffered 
the other person to dispose of property in violation of 
the direction of law touching the discharge of the trust 
and was guilty under this section. 
"Attempt". "Abetment" 
The offence of criminal breach of trust can be 
attempted.^S3 A person who knowingly helps another 
15 1 Sardar Singh, AIR 1977 SC. 1766. 
152 Kedar Neth (1865) Cr. LJ 539. 
153 AIR 1934 Rang. 41. 
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to coinnit criminal breach of trxist abets him.^^< 
K negligence of rules by K which facilitates a criminal 
misappropriation by B, is not a wilful suffering B to 
commit criminal breach of trust.^'^ 
S. 406 provides for punishment. Any person who comnits 
criminal breach of trust shall be punished with 
imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with 
fine, or with both. In Kaviraj*s case a civil suit was 
filed and decreed. It was held that in such a situation 
criminal proceedings, and that after a long gap were not 
proper.^'* 
S. 407 - deals with criminal breach of trust by carrier, 
whar-finger, warehouse-keeper. If the offence under this 
section is committed, the accused shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which may 
extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
The requirement of the section is' that the property be 
entrusted to the carrier or whar-finger or house-keeper. 
154 1913 cr LJ 453. 
155 1958 Cr LJ 1071. 
156 1970 Cr LJ 632. 
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and then they coinnit the offence of criminal breach of 
trust. 
S. 408, criminal breach of trust by clerk or servant 
shall be the subject matter of discussion of the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
'NATURE OF TRUST - ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW 
The concept of trust under Islamic Criminal Lau/ is very 
a'ide. It covers within its purview the violation of 
obligations in relation to covenant between God and His 
creature - human beings, or amongst human being 
themselves, or treaties of war with enemies or relates 
to property, movable or immovable, goods or credits. It 
may also concern with plans, confidences, secretes, 
knowledge, talent, opportunities etc. 
Its nature is spiritual, civil as well as penal and the 
redress available may be Divine chastisement, civil 
remedy or a criminal liability. According to Quranic 
Injunctions, it may be broadly divided into:-
1. Divine breach of trust; 
2. Civil breach of trust; and 
3. Criminal breach of trust. 
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Divine breach of trust can easily be distinguished from 
civil and criminal breach of trust but civil and criminal 
breach of trust are not distinguishable. Quranic 
Injunctions do not make any distinction between civil 
and criminal breach of trust. Some definition5may cover 
both aspects of breach of trust. 
Islamic Lavi; effects every aspect of life of mankind. It 
governs from cradle to the grave and its influence even 
extends from before the birth to after the death. 
Islamic Law thus governs spiritual and temporal aspects 
of life. It is Divinely Ordained System, the Will of 
God, revealed by God, Who alone Knows what is good and 
best for humanity. The Islamic Law is to be meticulously 
observed and interpreted in letter and spirit. 
Unlike man-made laws. Islamic Law is static, not open to 
amendment, reform or repeal. As God is Ommipotent, the 
Perfect Being, so is His Law, Perfect and Eternal, for 
all time to come. It cannot be exposed to the vagaries 
of human reasons and has to be observed in its ideal. 
S.H. Amin rightly observes in his book,' "In Islamic Law 
there are set, fixed and ultimate values which are 
' iUi ic 'ijj l^iii ' 'a [jDlicnioss ?,r ^ijem iforH, 0.3. '.m. aaae 13. 
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distinct and independent from the preferences and values 
of people. As such it is invariably the human being as 
the subject of law vuho has to adjust himself. It is the 
Islamic nation, the urama, u/hich has to follow the rules 
of Islamic law as opposed to attempting to bring the law 
in live with people's attitude, or changing the law with 
a view to suit the desires and the wishes of the subjects 
of the law". 
Allah Ta'ala in Holy Quran calls those who make changes 
in His Revealed Laws as Unbelievers, wrong-doers, 
rebellious and transgressors:-
"Let the people of the gospel judge by what 
Allah hath revealed there in. If any do fail 
to judge by what Allah has revealed, they are 
those who rebel. "^  (5:47) 
"If the Jews temper with their books they are 
unbelievers; if they give false judgement, they are 
wrong-doers. If the Christians follow not their light, 
they are rebellious." Thev cannot be called obedient 
1 
''lie ioly liuran finalisli Traaslation of t ie nmmi m cosientary) printeii .it Un ?iU Holy 
Goran ?riiit.i53 "Duplex, il-'fsjjsjli al-HonaKaraii mar the .iiisices of the Kinistry of Ba;; 
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servant of God. Same is with the Muslim Cmma if they 
transgress, amend, modify or change the Holy Quranic 
commandments, they would be considered as unbelievers, 
transgressors and rebellious. In the light of above 
Quranic verse, it is imperative on Muslims to strictly 
adhere to the revealed law in all affairs and at every 
turn or movement in life. Islamic umma has to follow 
the Islamic law as opposed to attempting to bring the 
law in live with people's changing attitude, desires and 
wishes. 
To understand the trust and breach thereof, an attempt 
to acquaint with the sources of Islamic .Law is 
necessary. Generally the Islamic jurists are in the 
habit of classifying the sources of Islamic Law into the 
main classes:-
1. Chief sources, and 
2. Supplementary or secondary sources. 
Under the chief sources 'The Qur'an', the Holy Book of 
Islam, The 'Sunnah', the authentic Traditions of Prophet 
Muhammad (peace be upon him), the 'Ijma', the consensus 
of opinions of jurists or Islamic scholars, and the 
'Qiyas', judgement -iipon juristic analogy are covered. 
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Supplementary or secondary sources includes, 'Al-
Istihsan'. deviation, ona certain issue, from the rule 
of a precedent to another rule for a more relevant legal 
reason that requires such deviation, 'Al-Istislah', 
unprecendented judgement motivated by public interest to 
uyhich neither the Quran nor, the Sunnah explicitly refer, 
and 'Al-Urf' , or the custom and the usage of a particular 
society, both in speech and in action. 
"First Chief Source" 
Thus Islamic Lau; is derived from tu/o main sources, the 
•Quran and the Sunna, supplemented by consensus of the 
orthodox Muslim Scholars, and reasoning by analogy. 
Companions of Prophet preferred analogical deduction to 
reason. They interpreted and applied the law by means 
of 'analogy' or 'Qias'. Analogy has been a source of 
lau;, but, in fact, it has a derivative value as 'declared 
by' Imam Shafi'i. 
Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) says, "My community vuill 
not agree upon an error". From the above observation 
jurists consider Tjma, a source of law. However, it has 
ro ensure the conformity with Holy Qux-an and Lhe Sunna. 
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It is also subordinate to original sources of Quranic and 
Sunna so that lau/' may be protected against the 
encouragementb of the fallible reason. Analogy is to 
discover the lau; and not to establish or enact it. 
The analogical interpretation, and explanation of Holy 
Qur'an and Sunna has given birth to different schools of 
thought such as four Sunni Schools and a number of 
minority schools such as Ith'na-Ashari Shi't School, 
Zaidi Shi't School and Ibadi School. All agree that Ijma 
is to decide which of the vieu/s conforms to the text of 
Holy Quran, since the finality rests u/ith the text alone. 
Protection from facilely of the text of Holy Quran has 
been guaranteed by Allah Himself that 
"False hood-shall not approach this Book .from u/hat has 
passed or from lies ahead. It is a revelation from the 
u;ise, the praisevi/orthy". ^ 4/.'•^ 'JZ/ 
The passing away of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) 
came after the declaration of the Our'an:-
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"This day have T perfected your religion (Islam)." (5:3) 
This verse was revealed chronologically, marking the 
approaching end of Prophet Muhammad's (peace be upon him) 
ministry in his earthly life which u/as emphasized by him 
in his last Sermon (Khutba):-
"O people, bear in mind u/hat I am saying, for 
I might not see you again. I have left tu/o 
things, if you hold fast to them, never will 
you go astray after me. They are God's Book, 
and His Prophet's - Sunnah." 
To understand the concept of Breach of Trust. It should 
be clear in the very beginning that lau/ and religion are 
not separate under the Islamic Lau/ as in the case of man 
- made lau/ in India. Holy Quran contains number of 
injunctions explaining the concept of trust and breach 
thereof. These injunctions are explained below:-
In Al-Mu'minun ( ) trust has been explained 
as: -
.^>iu- ^jL. jc ^ c/-AJij -oj^j ^H^j r*^ ' V ^--^^-^ 
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"Those u/ho faithfully observe their trusts and 
their covenants and u;ho (strictly) guard their 
prayers, these vuill be the heirs u/ho unll 
Inherit Paradise; they u/ill dwell therein. 
(Forever)." (23:8-11) 
This Ayat ( ) shows that Allah promises heaven to 
those who preserve and observe their trusts and 
agreements, maintain the affairs with rectitude and 
fidelity. 
Truth . and fidelity are parts of religion in all 
relations of life. Every man of faith must discharge 
his obligations conscientiously. Trust is one such 
social obligation. 
Trust may be express or implied. Express trusts are 
those where property is entrusted or duties are assigned 
by some one to some other when he trusts, to carry out 
either immediately or in specified contingencies, such 
as death. Implied trust arise out of power, or 
position, or opportunity, e.g. a king holds his kingdom 
on trust from Allah for his subjects. Convenants create 
obligations, and express and implied, trust, and 
(.(jvfeinants tciken together cover the whole field of 
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Almost similar vieu; has been expressed about trust in 
Sura-al-Ma'arij ( ):- (70:29, 32, 33, 34, 35). 
'OJ^j r* -^j | 4 ^ ^ r* ^"^^-^ - 0 , ^ f^jj^ r* oi-^^j 
dJjl - o ^ U - ,4S1* J* pA oi«iJlj - 0 ^ ^ ( 4 ^ - ^ (^ Oi JJIj 
"And those who respect their trusts and 
covenants and those stand firm in their 
-testimonies and those u;ho (strictly) guard 
their worship such will be the honoured ones 
in the gardens (of Bliss)." 
In these aayat ( ) the divine obligations as well as 
the human obligations, are referred. All the powers of 
man are the trust of God, and they should be utilized in 
those ways only that are told by the God, and man should 
not reede from the covenant he has made in eternity with 
God. 
Obligation, created by trusts and covenants, express or 
implied are just as sacred in ordinary everyday life as 
they are in special spiritual relationships. In 
addition, our life itself, and such reason and talents 
ds x'e rxissess, HH -xell as our wealth and Dossessions are 
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trusts, of which we must fulfil the duties 
functiliously. 
"Sura-'al-Mu'minun' and Sura-al-Ma'arij', both explains 
the attributes and character of pious people u/ho will be 
rewarded with paradise by Allah taala. One such 
attribute or characteristic is preserving and fulfiling 
the obligation of trust. This shows the significance 
attached to the terra 'trust' under the Islamic Law. 
Both social and spiritual aspects are covered in. 
Breach of trust would obviously deprive the believer all 
such benevolences promised by Allah Ta'ala. 
Trust in Sura-^ al-Ahzab ( ) has been 
explained as follows:-
(72) 
(72) "We did indeed offer the trust to the heavens 
and the earth and the mountains; but they 
refused to undertake it, being afraid thereof; 
but man udnertook it. he was indeed unjust 
and foolish. " (33:72) 
9A 
In this Ayat hypothetical sending dou/n of the Qur'an to 
the mountains is mentioned, and it is mentioned that 
such parable are put forth in order to aid men to 
reflection. 
The Heavens, the earth, and the mountains, other 
creatures of Allah, besides man, refused to undertake a 
trust or a responsibility, and may be imagined as happy 
u/ithout a choice of good or evil being given through 
their uyill. They preferred to submit their will 
entirely to Allah's will, which is All-Wise and Perfect, 
and which would give them for more happiness than a 
faculty of choice, with their imperfect knowledge. Man 
was too audacious and ignorant to realise this, and the 
result has been that man as a race has been disrupted: 
the evil ones have betrayed the trust and brought 
punishment on themselves, though the good have been able 
to rise far above other creation, to be the 
'Muqarrabin', the nearest ones to Allah. 
Word 'Hamala', means to undertake, bear, carry (the 
trust or responsibility), to be equal to it. This is 
ordinary meaning, and the majority of commentators 
construe so. But some udnerstand it to mean "to carry 
away, rvia away with, to embezzle (the thing entrusted); 
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hence to be false to the trust, to betray the trust." 
In that case the sense of verses 72-73 u/ould be: "Allah 
offered the trust to other creatures, but they refused, 
lest they should betray it, being afraid from that point 
of vieu;, but man u/as less fair to himself: in his 
ignorance he accepted and betrayed the trust, u/ith the 
result that some of his race became hypocrites and 
unbelievers and u/ere punished, though others were 
faithful to the trust and received Allah's Mercy." The 
resulting conclusion is the same under both 
interpretations. 
Word 'Zalum' used in the Ayat has been translated as 
'unjust' and u/ord 'jahul' as ignorant. Both the u/ords 
in Arabic are in intensive form, as much as to say, 'man 
signally failed to measure his ovi/n pou/ers or his OU/TI 
knou/ledge'. But Allah's Grace came to his assistance. 
Where man did his best, he won through by Allah's grace, 
even though man's best was but a poor good. 
How did man generically undertake this great 
responsibility, which made him vicegerent on earth? 
Here comes the doctrine of a covenant, express or 
implied, between Allah and humanity. A covenant 
(mithaq) necessarily implies trust, and its breach 
necessarilv imo lies ounlshment. 
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Duty of man is that he should not let this divine trust 
to he spoiled. He should carry this trust u/ith full 
efforts, struggle, anxiety and care. Those individuals 
who fully keep that trust secure and develop it, may be 
rewarded and honoured, and those who commits the breach 
of trust out of heedlessness or mischief may be 
punished, and who somewhat commit fault in this 
connection may be pardoned and forgiven. 
Allah-Ta'ala does not like those, who commit breach of 
trust. In 'Sura Anfal Khyanat', breach of trust has 
been explained as:-
"But if they have treacherous design, against 
thee, (O Messenger!) they have already been in 
treeson against Allah, and so hath He given 
(thee) power over them. And Allah is He who 
hath (full) knowledge and wisdom." (8:71) 
In this ayat for word Khiyanat (breach of trust) has 
been translated as treachery or treason. Breach of 
trust has been equalled here as treacherous designs and 
treason against Allah. 
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Some prisioners of war were trusted by Holy Prophet when 
they declared to have had adopted Islam. Kindness were 
shown to them but they committed breach of that trust 
when they abused the kindness shown to them and their 
declaration of Islam was merely by way of treachery and 
hypoceracy. Allah says that it is not a matter for 
discouragement to those who showed the kindness. Such 
persons have already coiimitted breach of trust with 
Allah when they took up arms against Allah's Prophet. 
\][/hat was the breach of trust against god which they had 
committed before? Those first treachery is the breach 
of the First Covenant ( ) which they had made in 
the spiritual world before coming into this world of 
matter. Second, some Bani Hashim had promised to 
support the Prophet in the life of Abu Talib but they 
committed breach of trust when they joined with the 
opponents of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and 
came down in Badr to fight. This was another Khinayah 
(breach of trust)). against God. The result was that 
they suffered defeat and disgrace, and were now in the 
hands of Muslim who had full power over them. Thus they 
have seen by their own eyes the result of khiyanat 
(breach of trust) against God. Allah knows all, and in 
His U/'isdom will order all things for the best. Allah is 
all powerful to punish them for anv such khivanat 
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against Him and His Prophet. They cannot hide their 
hidden intention from God because God knou/s the heart of 
every soul in the u/orld. 
The believers have done their duty in shou/ing clemency 
as they could in the circumstances of vi/ar. For them 
"Allah sufficeth* (viii. 62). 
In Sura-Yusuf, it is made clear that Allah never guide 
the snare of the false one. Khiyanat has been 
prohibited and Khai-neen ( ) {those u/ho commit 
breach of trust) are disliked by Allah. Ayat 52 from 
Sura Yusuf is quoted belovu vuhich deal with ( ) 
Khai-neen:-
(52) "This (says), in order that He may knou,' 
that I have never been false to him in 
his absence, and that Allah u/ill never 
guide the snare of the false ones." 
In this Ayat ( ) Hazrat Yusuf was referring to 
his fidelity to the Aziz, that he had never taken 
advantage of his absence to play false with his wife, 
although he was human being and liable to err. The 
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confidence u/hich Aziz reposed in ( ) Hazrat Yusuf 
by keeping him in his house u/as preserved. Even in 
Aziz's absence no breach of trust conmitted because 
Hazrat Yusuf ( ) knew that Allah did not like the 
Khaineen ( ). 
As to the characteristics of a good servant, trust is 
one such attribute. Servant employed should be 
trustworthy. Sura-Qasas explains servants trustiness as 
follows:-
' I "Said one of the (damsels): O my (dear) 
father! Engage Him on wages: truly the 
best of men for thee to employ is the 
(man) who is strong and trusty." (^^'^^) 
One of the daughters said to the father, keep Hazrat 
Moose as servant, indeed the best servant whom than 
desireth to keep is the one who is strong and trusty. 
The inference is that Allah likes those servants who are 
strong and trusty. Hazrat Moose had both things - he 
was strong as well as trusty. From Hazrat Moose's 
purity and selfleness she understood his trustiness. 
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Ayat 283, Sura al-Baqarah, i s another injunction on 
breach of t r u s t . I t reads a s : -
^ ^1 U^ U ^ ^ > Ul^ \jj^ fJj jL. Jc ^ ^\j 
^j SAI42I l _ ^ -ilj ifj UJI j s J j <£iLI ^ j\ ^ U b j J i Li-* 
TAT : of «*>LJI SJJ-,) 
"If ye are on a journey, and cannot find a scribe, 
a pledge with possession (may serve the purpose). 
And if one of you deposits a thing on trust with 
another, let the trustee (faithfully) discharge His 
trust, and let him fear Allah his Lord. Canceal 
not evidence; for u/hatever conceals it, his heart 
is tainted with sin. And Allah knou/eth all that ye 
do." 
Another translation: "And if you are upon a journey and 
you do not find a u/riter then pledge in hand. Then if 
there is a mutual confidence the trusted one should 
deliver the trust in full and fear God his Lord. And do 
not conceal the evidence and who so conceals it then no 
doubt his heart is sinful. And God knows well your 
action." 
According to this Ayat, pledges and securities are also 
covered under trust. Violation of such securities and 
pledges would amount to breach of trust. 
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The law of deposit implies great trust in the depository 
on the part of the depositor. The depository becomes a 
trustee, and the doctrine of trust can be further 
developed on that basis. The trustee's duty is to guard 
the interests of the person on whose behalf he holds the 
trust and to render back the property and accounts when 
required according to the terms of the trust. This duty 
is again linked to the sanction of religion, which 
requires a higher standard than law. 
This ayat explains that if you make a contract of debt 
while in journey and you do not find a writer to write 
the document, then the debtor should put some thing as 
pledge with the creditor. In journey the necessity of 
pledge in hand would be more than in stay, hence the 
order of pledge is given in journey, otherwise in stay 
and in the presence of writer pledge is lawful according 
to tradition. And if the creditor relies on the debtor 
and as such does not demand the pledge in hand, it is 
incumbent on the debtor to repay the demand in full and 
fear God and should not coiwnit breach of trust. 
Ayat 58, Sura al-Nisan is another injunction on trust. 
It reads as:-
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J j - - - U - - . ^ l^ 4iJI 1^ ^ (.SJi-i U ; aJI J J jJL l^ .^ ;*: 
(oA : oT «^L^Jl Sj^^) 
(58) "Allah doth command you to render back 
your trusts to those to whom they are 
due, and when ye judge betu/een people 
that ye judge with justice: verily hou; 
excellent is the teaching which He giveth 
yoU! For Allah is He Who heareth and 
seeth all things." 
Another translation of the above quoted verse:-
"No doubt, God bids you to deliver the trusts 
to their owners and when you judge between the 
people, that you judge with justice. God 
gives you a good admonition. No doubt, God is 
All hearing, All seeing." 
It means the admonition which God has given you - the 
delivery of trust to their owners and the doing of 
justice in all matters is much beneficial. God knows 
all the hidden and public affairs, and the present and 
future circumstances, so if you fail on some occasion 
when you consider that justice and integrity shall not 
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be conclusive to your tangible expendiency, then your 
consideration shall not be reliable and commendable in 
the presence of this Divine Admonition. Expendiency 
shall be subservient to the Divine Commandment and not 
the divine Commandment shall be subordinated to 
expediency. 
Under the same Sura, that is Sura-e-Nisa there is 
another commandment of Allah Taala:-
^ "ij 4J! Aj\ L. ^Ul ^  fL^ J*JU .-1^ 1 dUI bJ^ ll Ul 
(105) "We have sent dovun to thee the Book 
in truth, that thou mightest judge 
between people by that which Allah 
has shown thee: so be not an 
advocate for those who betray their 
trust." 
The verse refers to the case of Ta'ima bin Obairaq, who 
was niminally a Muslim but really a Hypocrate, and given 
to all sorts of wicked deeds. He was suspected of 
having stolen a set of armour, and when the trial was 
hot, he planted the stolen property into the house of a 
Jew, where it was found. The Jew denied the charge and 
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accused Ta'ima, but the sympathies of the Muslim 
community u/ere u/ith Ta'ima on account of his nominal 
professing of Islam. The case was brought to the 
Prophet (peace be upon him), u/ho acquitted the Jew 
according to the strict principle of jusitce, as "guided 
by Allah*. Attempts were made to prejudice him and 
deceive him into using his authority to favour Ta'ima. 
When Ta'ima realised that his punishment was imminent he 
fled and turned apostate. 
The general lesson is that the righteous man is faced 
with all sorts of subtle wiles, the wicked will try to 
appeal to his highest sympathies and most honourable 
motives to deceive him and use him as an instrument for 
defeating justice. He should be careful and cautions, 
and seek the help of Allah for protection against 
deception and for firmness in dealing the strictest 
justice without fear or favour. To do otherwise is to 
betray a sacred trust; the trustee must defeat all 
attempts made to mislead him. Then the non-
administration of justice is a breach of trust for which 
a man would be liable for punishment. Khaineen ( ) 
are disliked by Allah, they are those who betray the 
trust-reposed in them. 
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Further Allah gives the coninandment under the same Sura 
Nisa as follou/s:-
.L-il 
(107) "Contend not on behalf of such as 
betray their own souls. For Allah 
loveth not one given to perfidy and 
sin." 
Our souls are a sort of trust with us. We have to guard 
them against all temptation. Those u/ho surrender to 
crime or evil, betray that trust. U/e are u/arned against 
being deceived into taking their part, induced either by 
plausible appearances, or by such incentives to 
partially as that they belong to our oum people or that 
some link connects them u/ith us, u/hereas when we are out 
to do justice, we must not allow any irrelevant 
considerations to sway us. Allah is not pleased with 
those who are perfidious-sinner and commit breach of 
trust. 
In Sura Anfal, Ayat 27 Allah Taala commands:-
.0>^ ^\j ^ 1 \jij^j Jj^Jlj ^\ 1^^-^ \^\ ^ijl l^L 
(TV! of «JUiVl Sjj-) 
106 
(27) "O ye that believe! Betray not the trust of 
Allah and the Messenger, nor misappropriate 
knowingly things entrusted to you." 
Another translation:-
"O believers! Betray not God and the 
Messenger and misappropriate not your trusts 
knou/ingly, " 
Men may betray the trust of Allah and His Prophet by 
misusing property, or abusing the confidence reposed in 
them, or the knou;ledge or talents given to them. On 
that special occasion, u/hen the plans for the protection 
of Allah's vrorshippers against annihilation were of 
special importance, the Prophet's trust and confidence 
had to be guarded with special case. Occasions for 
scrupulously respecting the trust and confidence of our 
fellow-men occur every day in our life, and few of us 
can claim perfection in this respect. Hence the special 
distinction of the Prophet of Allah, who earned the 
title of 'Al-Amien', the one who was true to every trust 
reposed in him. 
Betrayal of God and the Messenger is that one may 
disobey their commands and orders. By tongue they 
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declare themselves the loyal Muslims but do u-'hat the 
infidels do. Betrayal also means to detract from the 
right path of honesty or misappropriate the trusts 
assigned by God and the Messenger. It is obligatory on 
the part of a Muslim to guard against and u/ard off .any 
mistrust pertaining to Allah, and Allah's Messenger. 
Under this head come all divine and human obligations. 
Under the same Sura Anfal, there is another Allah's 
commandment. Ayat 58, says:-
w*. ^ JJI J A ^ y ^ 1 J-iU -4iLk ^ ^ ^  ^ U J : LIJ 
(58) "If thou fearest treachery from any group, 
throu; back (their covenant) to them, (so as to 
be) on equal terms: for Allah loveth not the 
treacherous." 
Here in this Ayat, word Khiyanat ( ) has been 
explained as "treachery" and U/ord Khaineen ( ) as 
treacherous. If the unbelievers commits breach of trust 
created by the covenant between Muslims and unbeliever, 
the former are not bound to honour it. Rven in cases 
where the unbelievers have not committed breach of trust 
openly but there are signs that they are prone to break 
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the covenant entered into between them, Muslims are 
allowed if they deem it necessary and wise to throw back 
their covenant. 
Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) has said that "when 
a covenant is made with a certain people no knot should 
be untied and no knot should be tied till the term of 
the covenant is completed, or the other party should be 
informed that the covenant is returned and they are no 
longer bound by the contract.^ No doubt, God is not 
pleased with the Khaineen ( ), those who conmiit 
the breach of trust ( ) . 
Khiyanat ( ) has been explained in Sura Maedah 
also. Avat 13 reads as:-
^ ^1 ^ y ^ v-5 f^,j^ ^ j (4^ ^ ^ (4^ M 
(13) "But because of their breach of their 
covenant, we cursed them, and made their 
hearts grow hard: they change the words from 
theit right places and forget a goodpart of 
] M;ii "Mr Ma Jnbara (Cod is please 'nts mi 'i toiiover iSaiiabii ot r.je Propiiet (peace 
be :;3fll( M a i . 
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the Message that u/as sent them, nor u/ilt thou 
cease to find them. Barring a fevu-ever bent 
on (new) deceits: but forgive them, and 
overlook (their misdeeds): for Allah loveth 
those vuho are kind." 
Because of the breach of covenant Allah vuithdreu; His 
overflou/ing grace from them. The u/ithdravual of graces 
made their hearts grow hard in two ways: (1) they were 
no longer protected from the assaults of evil, and, (2) 
they became impervious even to the message of 
forgiveness and merecy which is open to all Allah's 
creatures. 
Khiyanat has been interpreted here as deceits. Israel, 
when it lost Allah's grace as above, began to sin 
against truth and religion in three ways:-
1. They began to misuse scripture itself, by either 
taking words out of their right meaning or applying 
them to things for which they were never meant. 
2. In doing'so, they conveniently forgot a part of the 
message and purpose of Allah, and 
3. They invented new deceits to support the oldones. 
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These are reasons u;hy u/ord Khiyanat ( ) has been 
used here. In fact, by changing the scripture at u;ill 
they committed breach of trust and those u/ho do so Allah 
does not love them. Allah is not pleased u/ith such 
persons. 
During the Prophet's life time he u/as receiving reports 
of Khiyanat in old-scripture. For example once they 
concealed the command relating to 'Rajam" ( ). 
Again on inquiry they gave a false information about a 
matter relating to 'Taurat' ( ). Such breaches 
of trust were frequent. Only feu/ of these are such u;ho 
do not deceit. So Allah commands that such persons be 
pardoned and their mis deeds forgotten. Allah loves 
those u/ho are kind. 
In Sura al-Mumin, breach of trust has been explained 
(19) "(Allah) knou/s the treachery of the eyes, and 
all that the hearts (of men) conceal." 
Here u/e come into the region of evil motives and 
thoughts u/hich may be concealed in the hearts, breast, 
or mind, but which are all perfectly knoum to Allah. 
Ill 
Khainata ( ) has been interpreted here as 
treachery. Intention to commit breach of trust may be 
confined upto the movement of eyes or concealed in heart 
is knovwi to Allah. He knou/s everyting. Nothing is 
concealed from him. 
Sura An-Nisa explains trust in relation to orphan's 
property as:-
^1^1 l^t ^j *-JJL ± ^ \ \jij^ ^j ^\y^\ ^ ^ \ lj:lj 
(2) "To orphans restore their property (u;hen they 
reach their age) nor substitute (your) 
u/orthless things fbr (their) good ones and 
devour not their substance (by mixing it up) 
u/ith your ovi/n. For this is indeed a great 
sin." 
The guardian of the orphans, whose father has died, is 
ordered to restore them their property when they become 
mature. The guardian of the orphans is prohibited to 
take any good thing from his u/ealth and put a bad thing 
in place of the good thing. The guardian is also 
forbidden to devour the u;ealth of the orphans by mixing 
the things of the orphans u/ith his oum things, e.g. the 
guardian is allou/cd to manage the meals of the orphan 
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U/ith his ovwi meals in common, but in this management the 
orphan should not be given any loss. Under this 
pretence the vwealth of the orphan should not be 
devoured, because devouring the u/ealth of an orphan is 
a great curse u/hose effects are very destructive in both 
the u/orlds. Such a breach of trust is a very great 
crime and a great sin. 
The coiwnandments dealing the orphans have great 
significance because orphans deserves more care and 
kindness owing to his helplessness, feebility and 
meakness. A careful management of the property of an 
orphan is enjoined so that the orpahn may not suffer any 
loss, uyhatsoever. Islam does not allow breach of trust 
in such cases u/ith a vieu/ to oppress or deprive the weak 
and meek of their rights. In the days of Prophet (peace 
be upon him) orphans were deprived of their property and 
were left in destitution. The Holy Quran came and gave 
a strong blow to such evil practices. 
Ayat 6, of Sura An-Nisa, is another injunction-
prohibiting misappropriative of orphan's property. 
Injunction reads as:-
^ O^ ^J 'jjt^ o' 'j'-^ J ^>-< ^J^^ ^j i^ J'j-' (4r^ ' 
i"( : ol « *UJI 3jj^) 
<JJL ^^J ^ Ijo^ti 
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(6) "Make trial, of orphans until they reach the 
age of marriage; if then ye find some 
judgement in them, release their property to 
them; but consume it not u/astefully, nor in 
haste against their grovuing up, if the 
guardian is vx;ell-off, let him claim no 
remuneration, but if he is poor, let him have 
for himself u/hat is just and reasonable. When 
ye release their property to them, take 
u;itnesses in their presence; but all-
sufficient. " 
Another translation:-
"And train the orphan u/ell till they reach the 
age ot marriage. Then if you perceive in them 
right judgement deliver unto them their 
property, and devour not the u/ealth of the 
orphans more than necessary and before need 
are they are grou/n. 
And u/ho has no need he should abstain from the 
wealth of the orphan and he u;ho is poor may 
consume according to custom. And u/hen you 
deliver to them their property take adtness 
1U 
over them and god is sufficient for 
reckoning." 
The orphans should be trained and educated and tested 
till the age of adolescence. If you find after 
adolescence that they are able to understand their loss 
and profit and manage their property fairly u;ell, 
deliver their property unto them. If the orphan does 
not shou/ right judgement or u/idsora of management even 
after adolescence, he u/ill be u/aited till the age of 
tu/enty five years. If he attains right judgement and 
u/isdom of management before the age of tu/enty five 
years, the property shall be given to him, and after 
tu/enty five years the property shall be delivered to him 
forthu/ith, u/hether he attains to u/isdom or not. This is 
the religion of Imam Abu Hanifa (Be mercy on him). 
The u/ealth of the orphan should be managed properly and 
must be spent u/hen necessary. The unnecessary or more 
than necessary expenditure is prohibited. For example, 
u/here one dollar can do, tu/o dollars should not be 
spent. It u/ould amount to breach of trust. 
Moreover, the u/ealth of the orphan should not spent 
hastily their thinking that this u/ealth u/ill be returned 
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u/hen he is grovjun up. This u/ould also be considered 
misappropriation and breach of trust. 
As to rich and poor guardian there is a difference of 
approach. If the guardian is a rich man he should not 
consume the wealth of the orphan for his ovun personal 
benefit or for the benefit of his dependants. If the 
guardian, is poor he may take as remuneration of his 
service from the u/ealth of the orphan, but the u/ealth of 
the orphan should not be used by the vwealthy man in any 
case. 
When the father of child has died a list of his property 
should be prepared before some Muslims and handed over 
to the trustee. When the orphan is adolescent the 
property should be returned to him according to the 
list, and the expenditure adjusted. And what is being 
returned to the orphan should be given before the 
witnesses to remove possible future disputes. And God 
knows well the accounts of every individual. He does 
not require the accounts of the human beings. All these 
instructions are to avoid litigation, relating to 
misappropriation or breach of trust. 
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In Ayat 10, sura-an-nisa, warning for punishment in case 
of misappropriation or breach of trust is given. It 
i> ^jk, J ^j}^L U LUi ^ 1 Jl^ l o^L ^,li\ J 
^ Those "who unjustTV eat up the property of 
orphans, eat up a fire into their ovwi bodies, 
they will soon be enduring a blazing fire!" 
It means those who misappropriate the property of the 
orphan without right, they devour but fire in their 
bellies, and shall roast in a blaze in near future. 
In Ayat 29, sura-an-nisa, there is a general commandment 
to human being, prohibiting misappropriation and breach 
of trust of property entrusted. It says:-
"O ye who believe! Eat not up your property 
among yourselves in varieties but let there be 
amongst you traffic and trade by mutual good-
will. Nor kill (or destroy) yourselves: for 
verily Allah hath been to you most merciful.! 
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Misappropriation of someone's u/ealth u/rongly by means of 
breach of trust, falsehood and theft is prohibited. But 
if there is trading or business by mutual consent -
buying and selling by agreeing together - then there is 
no harm in consuming the u/ealth or good, of one another. 
Further prohibition is that you should not kill each 
other. God is very kind to you that he sent such orders 
u/hich protect your life and u/ealth from the oppressors, 
exploiters, violators of trust and tyrants. 
There are three verses from Sura Al-Imran u/hich are also 
related to breech of trust, Ayat 75 says:-
<u\z J ^ ^j 4JI *A}i ^ jlkJL *i-t J ^ .-jiSJl JAI ^ J 
LJLs ^ \J\S ^L dy^ LiU <J* *i-,aL-)ll JJI »A}^ "^ ^^^-^i 
"Among people of the book are some u/ho, if 
entrusted u/ith a hoard of gold, u/ill (readily) 
pay it back; others, u/ho, if entrusted u/itXa 
single silver coin, u/ill not repay it unless 
thou constantly stoodest demanding, because 
they say: "There is no u/ay over us as to the 
unletteted people, but they tell a lie against 
Allah, and (well) they know it." 
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Every race imbued with race agrrogance resorts to this 
kind of moral or religious subturfage. Even if its 
members are usually honest or just among themselves, 
they are contemptuous of those outside their circle, and 
cheat and deceive them without any queulms of conscience. 
The people of the book were so much avaricious of wordly 
wealth that they had change the laws and injunctions of 
the Heavenly Books e.g. they had forged this law that 
there was no sin in misappropriating the wealth of the 
Pagau Avabs because they were ignorant people and did 
not possess heavenly knowledge, so heavenly law did not 
apply in their case, as if heavenly law was their 
special concern. They are knowlingly forging against 
God a false thing. God has never allowed the breach of 
trust. Even today this is the law of Islamic Fiqh that 
misappropriation of a trust is not lawful whether the 
trust is of a Muslim or unbeliever. 
In the second Ayat 76, commandment is:-
"Nay, those that keep their plighted faith and 
act aright, verily Allah loves those who act 
aright." 
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God loves those u;ho fulfil the legal contracts vuith God 
and the servants, and fearing God lead the u/ay of piety 
i.e. abstain from preposterous ideas. The quality of 
honesty and integrity is also included in it. 
The third Avat is related to the earlier too. It says:-
"As for those u»ho sell the faith they ou/e to 
Allah and their ovi/n solemn plighted u/ord for 
a small price, they shall have no portion in 
the hereafter, nor u;ill Allah (deignto) speak 
to them or look at them on the day of 
judgement, nor u/ill He cleanse them. (of 
sin): they shall have a grevious 
chastisement." 
God u/ill not speak to such dishonest fellou/s in the 
Hereafter and u;ill not see them u/ith mercy and neither 
they u/ill be purified of their sin. They u/ill incur 
God's displeasure and they u/ill be chastised severely. 
Just see such is the curse upon those u/ho commits breach 
of trusts u/ith God and fellou/ human beings. 
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Ayat 161, is and the commandment on breach of trust. It 
relates to the person of Holy Prophet. It reads:-
^\^\ iLjT .^l_^ jT ijy^) 
"No Prophet could (ever act dishonestly if any 
person acts dishonestly he shall, on the day 
of judgement, restore u/hat he misappropriated; 
then shall every soul receive its due u/hatever 
is earned, and none shall be dealt u/ith 
unjustly." 
Besides the gentleness of nature of Prophet Muhammad 
(peace be upon), he u/as knou/n from his earliest life for 
his trust u;orthiness. Hence his title of Al-Amin. 
Unsempulous people often read their ovwi low motives into 
other men, and their accusation, which is meant to 
injure, fastens on the various virtues for u/hich the man 
they attack is u/ell-knovwi. Some of the hypocrates after 
'Uhud' raised some doubts about the division of the 
spoils, thinking to sow the seeds of poison in the 
hearts of the men who had deserted their post in their 
craving for booty. Those low suspicions were never 
believed in by any sensible people, and they have no 
interest for us now. But the general principles here 
declared are of eternal value. 
1. Prophets of Allah do not act from unworthv motives. 
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2. Those u/ho act from such motives are the lou/est of 
creatures, and they 'i/ill make no profit. 
3. A Prophet of Allah is not to be judged by the same 
standard as a greedy creature. 
4. In Allah's eyes there are various grades of men, 
and u;e must try to understand and appreciate such 
grades. If we trust our leader, we shall not 
question his honesty without cause. If he is 
dishonest, he is not fit to be a leader. 
Holy Prophet is an epitome of all moral virtues and an 
embodiment of all human perfections; any 
misunderstanding about his character is a great, sin 
which is tentamount to Kufr ( ). To quote an Ayat 
from Holy Quran:-
"Your companion (Muhammad (peace be upon him) 
errs not, nor is he deceived. U/hatever he 
utters, it is not his ovwi whim and fancy. It 
is naught else but a divine revelation 
revealed unto him." ( 5 3 :- 2-4) 
In Sura Bani Israil, it is said:-
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• ^ j ^ *^j^j >i^ J« cr^' {^ ^jisi dji tijjj 
(106)* (It is) Quran vi/hich u/e have divided 
(into parts from time to time), in order that 
thou mightest recite it to men at intervals: 
u;e have revealed it by stages." 
Allah-ta'ala trusted Prophet (peace be upon him). 
Prophet in turn presented to mankind vuhatever revealed 
to him. He never committed any breach of trust or 
betrayal with Allah. Islamic law is revealed law, which 
was revealed upon Prophet in stages so that he could 
explain the revelations to the mankind. Allah's 
revealation comes as a light to illuminate our 
difficulties and show us the way in actual situations 
that arise. Prophet never committed any mistake. 
Some people alleged that Quran was composed by Prophet 
himself, it is not God's revelation. It is false 
allegation Prophet never deviated or mixed any thing 
from his side. Whatever Allah revealed that is as 
presented before mankind. Trust of God in His Prophet 
was never shaken. The above allegation has been 
challenged by God in the Quran itself. If it is composed 
by man, the people may rival it. Quran says:-
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(13) "Or they may say, "He forged it". Say, 
"Bring ye then ten suras forged, like unto it, 
and call (to your aid) u/homsoever ye can, 
other than Allah! If ye speak the truth!" 
(11:13) 
Those who doubt they are challenged to produce ten 
verses like Holy Quran. If they could not then they 
should accept it as an outstanding Revelations of Allah. 
Same vieu; has been expressed in Surah al-Baqarah:-
(23)"And if ye are in doubt as to what we have 
revealed from time to time to our servant then 
produce a sura like thereunto; and call your 
witnesses or helpers (if there are any) 
besides Allah, if ye are truthful." (2:23) 
In fact all true revelation is itself a miracle, and 
stands on its own merit. No one can produce any 
parallel to the revealed verses of Holy Quran. This 
challenged was never met by those who exhausted all 
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their means to crush Muhammad (peace be upon him) and 
his religion. 
From the above study of Quranic injunctions it may be, 
inferred that 'trust's range is varied and wide. It 
includes within it's scope spiritual as u/ell as social 
obligations, dealings and affairs of mankind. 
It should be admitted that Quran being basically a book 
of religious guidance, is not an easy reference to legal 
studies. Hou/ever, u/hatever revellations are there the 
Islamic lau; u/hether penal or civil is to be interpretted 
inaccordance to that revealed text. 
Sur-al-Baqarah, ayat 27, and Sur-ar-Rad, ayat 25, are 
also relevant here. In these verses Allah has cursed 
those u/ho commit the breach of Trust. They do nothing 
but cause loss to themselves, and vwarn^  that there is a 
terrible home for them. Terrible home is the opposit of 
the state of blessed, and eternal home, the gardens of 
perpetual bliss. 
Second Chief Source 
Sunnah is an Arabic u/ord meaning by 'method' , applied by 
the Prophet (peace be upon him), as legal term comprising 
u/hat he said, did and agreed to. 
Sunnah is the human, though prophetic, clarification of 
the Quran by Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). Its 
authority is derived from the prophethood of Muhammad, 
as expressed in Holy Quran. Quran says:-
. ^j>ii, ^ j ^ \ J>L ^LdJ otrJ^iJI ^ 1 UJ^ Ij jtji\j .^^t 
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(44') "(We sent them) with clear signs and 
scriptures and we have sent down unto thee 
(also) the message; that thou mayest explain 
clearly to men what is sent for them, and that 
they may give thought." (16:44) 
This verse shows the supreme authority of Prophet 
Muhammad (peace be upon him) in the interpretation of 
the Holy Quran. Interpretation may have been by his 
words or by his actions all are included within the 
purview of 'Sunnah'. This authority is binding on all 
Prophet, Muhammad (peace be upon him) is called 
Authority of sunnah or Ahadis as main second source of 
Islamic law i.e. shariah is proved by different Ayats 
from Holy Quran. 
Surah al-Hashar, Ayat 7, is an example approving the 
authority of Sunnah that is the sayings and doings of 
Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) are to be strictly 
followed. It says:-
(1) "So take what the messenger gives you, and 
refrain from what he prohibits you and fear 
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Allah, for Allah is strict in punishment." 
(59:7) 
Surah al-Ahzab, Ayat 21, is another example of authority 
of Sunnah proved from the verse of Holy Quran. It reads 
(2)"Ye have indeed in the Messenger of Allah 
an excellent exempler for him who hopes in 
Allah and the final day, and u;ho remember 
Allah much." (33:21) 
Surah al-Imran, Ayat 31, also proves the authority of 
sunnah:-
(31)Say: "If ye do love Allah, follou; me: 
Allah will love you and forgive you your sins; 
for Allah is oft forgiving, most merciful." 
(3:31) 
Ayat 32, Surah al-Imran says:-
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Say: "Obey Allah and His Messenger", but if 
thy turn back, Allah loveth not those who 
reject faith." (3:32) 
Other Verses, on authority of Sunnah are:-
hA,\j LJ— I ^ ^ ^I ^ j j i j *i^jj *UI JI l^j m , ; ^ ^ l Jji ^\S LJI 
(5)"The answer of the believers, when summond 
to Allah,vand His Messenger, in order that he 
may judge between them, is no other than this: 
they say, "We hear and we obey". It is such 
as these that will prosper." (24:51) 
Similarly Ayat 63, says:-
(63) "Deem not the summons of" the Messenger 
among yourselves like the summons of one of 
you to another: Allah doth know those of you 
who slip away under shelter of some excuse: 
then let those beware who with-stand the 
Messenger's order lest some trial befall them, 
or a grevious chastisement be inflicted on 
them." (24:63) 
Approving the authority Surah al-Misan, Ayat 59, says:-
Jl *j^^ j^ y pjL:: o*i 1^ ^ -^il Jj' J J>-^' ^^^^J *^' ^y^^ '>^ ' <>i^ ' ^ ^ 
( 0 ^ t <L<1 tcLajJt * J ^ M ) 
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(59) "O ye u/ho believe! Obey Allah, and obey 
the Messenger, and those charged u/ith 
authority among you, if he differ in anything 
among yourself, refer it to Allah and His 
Messenger, if ye do believe in Allah. And the 
last day: That is best, and most suitable for 
final determination." (4:59) 
Ayat 65, Surah al-Nisaa says:-
J Ij"^ "^  j^  ^ J^ r^* "^.r^ i/^ OJ^^i 
(65) "But no by thy Lord, they can have no 
(real) faith. Until they make thee judge in 
all disputes betvween them and find in their 
souls no resistance against. Thy decisions, 
but accept them with the fullest conviction." 
(4:65) 
The test of true faith is not mere lip profession, but 
bring all over doubts and disputes to the one in u/hom u/e 
profess faith. Further u/hen a decision is given we are 
not only to accept it, but find in our in most souls no 
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difficulty and no resitance, but on the contrary a 
joyful acceptance springing from the conviction of our 
ou/n faith. 
These are some of the authentic proves approving the 
authority of Sunnah as second main source of Islamic law 
or Shariah. 
Belivers are bound to follow the Sunnah is made clear by 
the Holy Quran:-
(20) "O ye who believe! Obey Allah and His 
Messenger, and turn not away from him when ye 
hear (him speak). The binding of the 
authority of interpretation by prophet upon 
all Muslims is also expressed- by another 
Ayat:- (4:80) 
(A* : ol i^LJI Ijj^) 
(80) "He who obeys the Messenger, obeys 
Allah." 
It means that obedience to Prophet is the obedience to 
Allah. Prophet's duty is to convey the message of 
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Allah. If men perversely disobey that message, they are 
not disobeying him but they are disobeying Allah. This 
recognition of Sunnah by Holy Quran makes the saying and 
actions of the Holy Prophet authoritic text of Islamic 
law. 
Practice has been that whenever there is a problem, it 
is to be solved in the light what the Holy Quran says. 
If Quran is silent then to seek the help from Sunnah, 
Hazrat Abu Baker, the first Caliph whenever he had to 
pass a judgement, looked into the Quran, if he found an 
"applicable text therein, he would apply it. If not, he 
would ask the people whether any of them knew of a 
judgement passed by the Prophet on the particular issue. 
It sometimes happened that seme people would come 
forward and state that the prophet had passed a 
judgement on it. If nothing found then he used to 
consult the chief representatives of the people. Umar, 
the second caliph did the same. 
With this brief background let us turn how the Prophet 
looks at the trust and violation thereof. Prophet 
Muharranad (peace be upon him) explains trust in relation 
to divine and religious obligations, and moral and 
social obligations. U/e may note down some of the Sunnas 
or Ahadls as follows:-
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Hazrat Abu Huraira narrated that Prophet (peace be upon 
him) said:-
"The signs of a hypocrite are three: 
1. \lUhenever he speaks, he tells a lie. 
2. Whenever he promises, he alu/ays breaks it 
(his promise). 
3. If you trust him, he proves to be 
dishonest. (If you entrust something as 
trust with him, he will not return it)." 
(Bukhari, Ref. 1.032). 
The above hadith shows that entrustment is the 
requirement and whatever is entrusted must be returned 
honestly. Breach of trust places a person in the 
category of a hypocrite. 
In the following Hadis or Sunnah entrustment to 
administer the property is again a basic requirement. 
Concsrning the wakf of 'Umar', Hazrat Amr Ibn -^:lina^  al-
iMakki narrated that prophet (peace be uoon him) said:-
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"If was not sinful of the trustee (of the 
u/akf) to eat.or provide his friend, from it, 
provided the trustee had no intention of 
colelcting fortune (for himself)." 
(Bukhari, ref. 3.507). 
Ibn 'Umar was the manager of the trust of "Umar and he 
used to give presents from it to those with whom he used 
to stay at Mecca". Here again udner this hadis 
misappropriation of entrusted property is prohibited. 
No one appointed as trustee of wakf property should 
administer or manage the affairs in such a way by which 
he commits the breach of trust and thus makes his own 
fortune. 
Entrustment creates an obligation which has to be 
fulfilled. Hazral Az-Zubair, a Sahabi (follower of 
Prophet) whenever entrusted with property by someone, he 
used to refuse the acceptance. Instead of taking the 
responsibility of trust he preferred debt because he was 
afraid of managing the entrusted property. 
To quote Abdullah bin Az-Zubair, he said that his father 
Hazrat Az-Zubair preferred debt than the trust. He 
says:-
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"If somebody brought some money to deposit 
u/ith him (Hazrat Az-Zubair), he \uould say, 
"No, (I shall not keep it as a trust), but I 
shall take it as a debt, for I am afraid it 
might be lost." 
(Bukhari, Ref. 4.358) 
This shou/s the significance attached to _tXie trust 
property and fear of breach of trust. He used to prefer 
debt rather than take the responsibility as a trustee. 
Abu Dharr has reported that u/hen he asked Prophet (peace 
be upon him) u/ould he not appoint him to public office, 
Prophet stroked his shoulder and said:-
"Abu Dharr, thou art u/eak and authority is a 
trust, and on the day of judgement it is a 
cause of humiliation and repentence except for 
one u/ho fulfils its obligations and (properly) 
discharges the duties attendant thereto." 
(Sahih Muslim - ref. 4491) 
According to the above hadis, entrustment of public 
office is also a trust. Those u/ho are assigned to 
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execute the duties attached thereto if fails in due 
performance they coninit the breach of trust. 
Assingment of duty to teach Sunnah and al-Islam is also 
kind of trust. Non-performance of such a duty properly 
urauld also amount to breach jif^  trust. 
The people of Yemen came to Allah's Messenger (may peace 
be upon him) and said:-
"Send u/ith us a person u/ho should teach us 
Sunnah and al-Islam, where upon he (the 
Prophet (peace be upon him) caught hold of the 
hand of 'Ubaida and said: he is a man of trust 
of this ummah." 
(Anas Ibn Malik, Sahih Muslim, Ref. 5948). 
Who is a Muslim and a believer? According to Prophet 
(may peace be upon him) the person u/ho respect his 
trust, does not misappropriate things entrusted. In 
other vuords a person u/ho does not commit breach of 
trust. 
Allah's Messenger (peace be upon him) said:-
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"A Muslim is one from u/hose tongue and hand 
the Muslims are safe and a believer is one in 
vjuhom people trust in regard to their lives and 
wealth." 
(Hazrat Abu Huraira, Mishkat al-masabih, Ref. 
0033 - Transmitted by Tirmidhi and Nasa'i). 
Again relating to believer there is another Hadis Abu 
Sa'id al-Khudri narrated that Allah's Messenger (may 
Allah bless him and grant the peace) said:-
The believer in the world are in three 
classes: those u/ho believe in Allah and His 
Messenger and do not doubt, but strive u/ith 
their property and their persons in Allah's 
cause; the man u/hom people entrust their 
properties and their persons; and the man u/ho, 
u/hen he is about to display greed, abandons it 
for the sake of Allah, who is great and 
glorious." 
(Mishkat al-masabih, Ref. 3854, Ahmad, 
transmitted it). 
Allah's Messenger (peace be upon him) in another Hadis 
emphasises that the things entrusted must be returned to 
the claimant of the things honestly. To quote Hazrat 
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Aisha, Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) 
u/ore tuKD coarse stripped garments, and vuhen he sat and 
su/eated he found them heavy. A certain Jew received a 
consignment of cloth from Syria, so, I suggested he 
schould send for him and buy two garments from him and 
to be paid when circumstances were easier. 
He did so, and when the man replied, "I know what you 
want is to go off with my property", Allah's Messenger 
(peace be upon him) said:-
"He has lied, he knows I am one of the most 
pious of them and most accustoned to pay what 
is given on trust." 
(Mishkat al-Masabih, Ref, 4361, Trimidhi and 
Nasa'i, transmitted it). 
Prophet guaranteed a believer to achieve paradise if he 
fulfils certain virtues, one of them is to fulfil the 
trust. According to Ubada Ibn as-Samit, Prophet (peace 
be upon him) said:-
"If you guarantee me six things on your part 
I shall guarantee you paradise. Speak the 
truth when you talk, keep a promise when you 
make it, when you are entrusted with something 
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fulfil your trust, avoid sexual immorality, 
lower your eyes, and restrain your hands from 
injustice.' 
(Mishkat al-Masabih, Ref. 4870, Ahmad and 
Baihaqi, in Shu'ab al-Iman transmitted it). 
Again prophet {peace be upon him) mentioned, certain 
virtues a pious man u/ho loves and be loved by Allah and 
His Messenger should fulfil includes fulfilment of trust 
also. 
Hazrat Abd-ar-Rahman Ibn Abu Qurad narrated that Prophet 
(peace be upon him) performed ablution one day and his 
companion begans to wipe themselves u/ith the water he 
had used. 
The Prophet (peace be upon him) asked them what induced 
to do that, and when they replied that it was love for 
Allah and His Messenger (peace be upon him) he said:-
"If any one is pleased to love Allah and His 
Messenger (peace be upon him) or rather to 
have Allah and His Messeger (peace be upon 
him) love him, he should speak the truth when 
he tells anything, fulfil his trust when he is 
put in a position of trust, and be a good 
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neighbour." (Mishkat al-Masabih, Ref. 4990. 
Baihaqi transmitted it in Shu'ab al-Iman). 
Condemning the breach of trust, according to Abu Said 
al-Khudri, Prophet (peace be upon him) u/hile addressing 
after the afternoon prayer about the happening on the 
day of resurrection u/ithout mentioning it warned:-
"The world is sweet and verdant and Allah is 
putting you as successors in it, so consider 
how you act. Be on guard against the world, 
and be on you guard against women. He warned 
that, everyone who corranitted breach of trust 
would have a banner on the day of resurrection 
to the extent of his commission of breach in 
the world." 
(Mishkat al-Masabih, Ref. 5145, Transmitted by 
Trimidhi). 
Honouring the trust is one of the virtues of a good and 
piousman. Mentioning the virtues of a good man Prophet 
(peace be upon him) said:-
"If you have four characteristics, whatever 
worldly advantages passes you by does not 
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matter to you: keeping a trust, speaking the 
truth, a good character, and abstemiousness in 
food." 
(Abdullah, Ibn Amar, Mishkat al-Masabih, 
transmitted it by Ahmad and Baihaqi, in Shuab 
al-Iman). 
In the following hadis, just see how Allah Taala curses 
and punishes those who commit their breach of trust. 
According to Hazrat Abu Huraira, Allah's Messenger 
(peace be upon him), said:-
"When the booty is taken in turn, property 
given in trust is treated as spoil, zakat is 
looked upon as a fine look at that time 
for a violent wind, and earthquake, being 
swallowed up by the earth, metamorphosis, 
pelting rain, and §igns following one another 
like bits of a necklace falling one after the 
other when its string is cut." 
(Mishkat al-Masabih, Ref. 5450, Trimidhi 
transmitted it). 
As to breach of trust relating to moral obligations, 
Hazrat Abu Huraira narrated that Prophet (peace be upon 
him) asked Abdul Haitham Ibn-al-Tayyihan if he had a 
uo 
servant, and when he replied that he had none, he told 
him to come to him u/hen captives arrived. Tu/o captives 
u/ere brought to the Prophet, and u/hen Abdul haitham came 
to him he told him to choose one of them. 
He asked Allah's Prophet (peace be upon him) to choose 
himself for him, the Prophet said:-
"The one u/ho is consulted is in a position of 
a trustee. Take this one, for I have seen him 
praying, and treat him kindly." 
(Mishkat al-Masabih, Ref. 5062, Trimidhi 
transmitted it). 
Again on violation of moral obligation, Hazrat Jabir Ibn 
Abdullah narrated that Prophet (peace be upon him) 
said:-
"When a man tells something and then departs, 
it is a trust." 
(Abu Dawud, Ref. 4850). 
On violation of moral obligation Prophet (peace be upon 
him) said:-
U1 
"The sanctity of the u/ives of Mujahlds is like 
the sanctity of their mothers for those u/ho 
sit at home (i.e., do not go out for jihad). 
Anyone u/ho stays behind looking after the 
family of a Mu^ajiid—and commits breach of 
trust u/ill be made to stand on the day of 
judgement before the Mujahid u/ho u/ill take 
au/ay from his meritorious deeds u/hatever he 
likes. So u/hat do you think (u/ill he leave 
anything)?" 
(Buraida Ibn al-Hasib, Sahih Muslim Ref, 
4673). 
One cannot imagine hou/ dreadful a punishment u/ould be 
for a believer u/ho commits breach of trust under 
situation referred in the above quoted Hadis, His life 
long u/orldly meritorious deeds u/ould be taken au/ay in 
one stroke. 
Treaties entered u/ith enemies and resulted obligations 
there-from are also covered under the head of trust. If 
the enemies coninit breach of trust by violating the 
A 
terms then there is no obligation on believers to 
observe them. Whatever harm is caused by enemies, 
reciproficity is the principle. The follou/ing Hadis may 
be referred as an example of trust created by a treaty. 
U2 
Salama Ibn al-Akvua narrated that we arrived at Hudaibiya 
u/ith the Messenger of Allah (may peace be upon him) and 
we were fourteen hundred in number when all 
companions had sworn allegiance to the Holy Prophet 
(peace be upon him), the polytheists sent messages of 
peace, until people could move from our camp to that of 
the Meccans and vice-versa. Finally, the peace treaty 
was concluded. I (Salama Ibn al-Akwa) was a dependant 
of Talha bin Ubaidullah, I watered his horse and rubbed 
its back. I served Talha (doing odd jobs for him) and 
partook from his food. I had left my family and my 
property as an emigrant in the cause of Allah and His 
Messenger (peace be upon him). U/hen we and the people 
of Mecca had concluded a peace treaty and the people of 
one side began to mix with those of the other, I came to 
a tree, swept away its thorns and lay down (for rest) at 
its base. 
While I lay there, four of the polytheists from the 
Meccans came to me and began to talk ill of the 
Messenger of Allah (may peace be upon him). I got 
enraged with them and moved to another tree. They hung 
their weapons (to the branches of the trees) and laid 
down (for rest). (While they laid there), somebody from 
the lower part of the valley cried out: run up, O 
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Muhajirs! Ibn Zunaim had been murdered. I dreu; my 
su/ord and attacked these four while they u/ere asleep. 
I seized their arms and collected them up in my hand, 
and said: "By the Being Who has conferred honour upon 
Muhammad, none of you shall raise his head, else I u/ill 
smite his face." 
(Then) I came driving them along to the Holy Prophet 
(may peace be upon hiip). At the same time, my uncle 
Amir came (to him) with a man from Abalat called Mikraz. 
Amir was dragging him on a horse with a thick covering 
on its back along with seventy polytheists. The 
Messenger of Allah (may peace be upon him) casted a 
glance at them and said:-
"Let them go (so that) they may prove guilty 
of breach of trust more than once (beofre we 
take action against them)." 
(Sahih Muslim, Ref. 4450). 
Messenger of Allah (may peace be upon him) forgave them. 
Where a person is entrusted with property or dominion 
over property, discharges his obligations, honestly, his 
social status is exalted. Hazrat malik Ibn Anas 
narrated that someone said to Lnaman, "What has brought 
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you to u;hat u/e see? (Meaning h is high rank) . Luqman 
s a i d : -
"Truthful speech, fulfilling the trust, and 
leaving u/hat does not concern me." 
(Al-Muvwatta, Ref. 56, 7.17). 
To sum up, the jurists in the light of above noted 
Ahadith and Quranic injunctions and commandments 
developed the vyhole edifice of the nature of trust and 
breach thereof. The u/hole discussion may be summed 
under the three heads:-
1. Trust ( ) results from divinine and spiritual 
covenant between Allah Taala and his servants 
(humang beings); 
2. Trust results from treaties entered into during 
either war or peace with enemies or enemy 
countries; and 
3. Trust results from covenants or uuthout covenants, 
between human beings. 
The present study is confined to the last category noted 
above. 
U5 
Third Chief Source 
Under this source of Islamic criminal law we refer here 
consensus approaches of Islamic jurists and scholars and 
judgements based upon juristic analogy. 
Muslim scholars or jurists (Faqih) have explained 
criminal matters in the light of Quranic verses, 
injunctions and commandments of Allah-Ta'ala, and Sunnah 
or Ahadith of Prophet Muharanad (peace be upon him). 
They attempted to interprete the Quranic ayat and 
Sunnah, and thus made analogical deductions in the form 
of fatwas and judgements and also propounded definitions 
of specific crimes and laid down general principles 
governing them in confirmity with Quran and Sunnah. 
Thus explaining any matter they strictly adhere to the 
injunction, and commandments of Allah and Sunnah of 
Prophet Muhairanad. 
The nature of trust, and breach of trust have also been 
defined and explained by the jurists. Here we will 
refer some authentic fatwas, judgements and definitions 
of trust for our comparative study purposes. 
U6 
Muslim jurists have used \uord 'Emanat ( ) or Vadiat 
( ) for the vuord ' Trust' . For ' Breach of Trust' 
they use the vuord Khyanat ( ). 
•FATAWA-E-MAULANA HAZRAT ASHRAF ALI THANWI" 
Maulana Hazrat Ashraf Ali Thanu/i, an eminent islamic 
Faqih (jurist) has explained 'Emanat* and Khyanat as 
follows:-* 
Mas-ala 1, ( ) keeping of Emanat is a great 
responsibility according to religious code. If anyone 
deposits something with someone and he accepts it, then 
it becomes essential for him to keep it safe and 
protected. If it is lost due to negligence or was 
stolen the trustee is liable to the depositor's claim. 
But without negligence where the entrusted property is 
burnt due to the house being set on fire, then the 
depositor c.annQt claim •its_compensation.. Even if the 
keeper had promised it in case of loss also, the 
depositor is not entitle to any compensation." 
{ 'Bahisliti Zeiar', Kaglaoa isiraf i l l Tkanvi, cage HI. Enqlish traislatioii b? Kobaiied laasoor Shaa Sarohi. X.i, 
LL.flJllig. 
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"Mas-ala 2, "if anyone u/hile going au/ay asked scaneone 
else to keep his articles vuith him and he agreed to it 
or did not say anything and the man left leaving the 
article u/ith him, then it has become a deposit (Emanat). 
But if the man clearly refused to accept it and even 
then the man left the article vi/ith him then it is not a 
deposit. But if the person took up the article after 
the other person has left and kept itj then it became a 
deposit." 
"Mas-ala 3, the condition - that is - one u/ho keeps the 
deposit vwith him - may keep the deposit in his oum 
custody or u/ith some of his relatives u;ho live in the 
same house and with u/hom he can keep his ou;n deposits 
and is trustxworthy. But it should not be kept vuith an 
unreliable person because in case of its being lost he 
will have to give its compensation. It is not proper to 
keep it with any other person u/ithout the permission of 
the ou/ner." 
"Mas-ala 4", if the custodian forgot the deposit and it 
u/as lost, then he is responsible to compensate the 
article," 
"Mas-ala 5", if fire breaks out in the home of 
custodian, then the deposit may be kept u/ith someone 
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else. But it should be iranediately taken back when the 
cause is removed. It is also permissible to entrust the 
deposits to someone else at the time of dying if no 
relation or member of the family is present." 
"Mas-ala 6", if anyone has deposited some cash with 
someone, then it is essential to keep the same cash, 
coins or notes etc, in safe custody. It is not 
permissible even to mix this amount with one's own money 
or to spend it. It is wrong to presume that all money 
is the same and spend it thinking that the amount will 
be paid when demanded. The deposit may be used if 
permitted by the owner. But in such a case it would 
become a debt. If the same money is kept and somehow it 
is lost, then the custodian will not be liable to pay 
the compensation. But if the money was spent with the 
permission of the depositor, then it shall have to be 
paid in every case." 
"Mas-ala 7", if any one deposited RslOO/- with someone 
and the custodian with the permission of the depositor 
mixed these RslOO/- with his own hundred rupees, then 
this amount of Rs200/- became a joint property. If 
these are stolen then both will suffer and the custodian 
shall have to pay nothing to the depositor." 
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"Mas-ala 8*, if anyone deposited milk animal u/ith 
someone, then it is not permissible to use its milk 
u/ithout the permission of the ovwner. If it is used 
without his permission, then its price shall have to be 
given to the ovuner." 
"Mas-ala 9", the same is true about ornaments, clothes 
and other domestic goods. These should also not be 
used". 
"Mas-ala 10", if some gave some money as deposit to a 
person and while keeping the money in his pocket, or 
purse it fell down and the custodian believed that he 
had kept it in his pocket or purse, then no compensation 
will be due on him. 
"Mas-ala 11" - whenever the depositor demands back, it 
is essential to be returned immediately. It should not 
be delayed without any legitimate cause as it is 
justified and improper. If the depositor agree, to take 
it after sometime, then it is permissible. 
"Articles Taken on Loan" - Articles taken on loan for 
temporary use also amount to deposit and are covered by 
the same injunctions. These should also be kept safely. 
It is a common practice that clothes, ornaments or 
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utensils etc. are taken for temporary use on the 
understanding that the same u/ill be returned u/hen not 
needed. These are also deposits. If inspite of all 
precautions, any such article is lost, then the ovwier is 
not entitled to any compensation even if the debtor had 
promised to compensate in case of loss. But if it u/as 
lost due to carelessness, there compensation is 
essential. Such article should also be returned u/hen 
demanded." 
A perusal of the above referred mas-a-el shows that 
these are answers to given situations. They determine 
u/hether in a given situation there is a trust or not", 
and u/hen does it amount to breach of trust and the 
liability arising therefrom. Generally the liability is 
civil u/here compensation is au/arded. But such cases are 
covered by penal liability also. The aggrieved party 
may apply to criminal courts for the prosecution of the 
u/rongdoer also. 
From these fatu/a, u/e infer the following essentials of 
trust and of breach of trust:-
1. Two parties, the depositor, the person who entrusts 
the goods or property, and secondly, the trustee, 
to whom the goods or property is entrusted. 
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2. Entrustment of property or giving dominion over the 
property by the depositor to the trustee, and 
acceptance by the trustee for the property 
entrusted. 
3. Emanat (Trust, is a great responsibility. Once 
accepted it is the responsibility of the trustee to 
keep it safe and protected. 
4. If the trustee is negligent in keeping it safe and 
the property is either lost or stolen, the trustee 
is liable. 
5. If no negligence, property is burnt due to the 
house set on fire, trustee not liable to the 
depositor. Depositor under such a situation is not 
entitle to claim any compensation or seek any 
redress in Shariah criminal courts. 
6. In a case u/here someone is going au/ay asks another 
person to keep his property vwith him and the second 
person does not say anything and the man left 
having his property u/ith the second person, then 
the property so left becomes trust (Emanat) u/ith 
him. Hou/ever, u/here the person refused to accept 
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the entrustment, it vjuould not amount to trust 
(Eraanat). But inspite of refusal he leaves behind 
his property and goes away and the second persons 
keeps it u/ith him it becomes a trust. 
7. Entrusted property may be kept in the trustee's 
custody or trustee may keep with some of his 
relative u/ho live in the same house and u/ith u/hom 
he also keeps his ou/n deposits and the custodian is 
a trustu/orthy person. The trustee should not keep 
the trust property u/ith an unreliable person. In 
the later situation if the property is lost, the 
trustee would be liable. Further, it is not proper 
to keep the trustproperty u/ith any other person 
without the permission of the owner. 
8. In case where due to the forgetfulness of the 
trustee, property is lost, he would be liable for. 
9. In case where fire breaks out in the house, 
property entrusted may be kept with someone else 
also. But immediately after the fire is 
extinguished it must be taken back by the trustee. 
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10. It is also permissible to entrust the property to 
some third person at the time u/hen the trustee is 
dying and" neither his relative nor a family member 
is present near him. 
11. It is also obligatorty on the trustee to keep the 
property as it is. In other words if the deposit 
is in cash, the same coins or notes should be 
preserved. He should not mix the trusted property 
u/ith his oufli unless so permitted by the depositor. 
It is vurong to presume that all money is the same 
and spend it thinking that the amount u/ould be 
returned when demanded. 
12. The trusted property may be used by the trustee if 
so permitted by the ovuner. But in such situation 
it u/ould become a debt. Further if the entrusted 
property is mixed with his ovwn property then it 
becomes a joint property. If the joint property is 
stolen the trustee has to pay nothing to the 
depositor because in such a case both of them 
suffer. 
13. If the entrusted property is such which has daily 
returns and profits then it is not permissible to 
utilize such usufructs without the permission of 
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the ovwier. If the usufructs are used without the 
permission of the ovwier, the trust has to pay the. 
price thereof to the owner. 
14. Where the entrusted property is in the nature of 
oranaments, clol^s and other domestic goods, they 
are also not to be used by the trustee. 
15. In a case where the property entrusted is kept in 
the pocket or purse falls down and the impression 
of the trustee is that he has kept it properly, in 
consequence lost, then trustee is not answerable as 
there is no fault of him. 
16. Where the entrusted property is demanded back by 
the depositor, it must be returned immediately. 
There should not be any delay unless there is a 
legitimate cuase to the contrary. But if the 
depositor agrees to take the property after 
sometime, then it is justified. 
17. Property taken on loan for temporary use also 
amount to trust and is subject in it's governance 
to the same principles above noted. 
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These are possible Inferences vx/hich govern trust. 
Misappropriation results in breach of trust and in 
consequence makes a person liable for the such 
violations of the general principles laid do\Mn in fatu/a. 
•FATAWA-E-KAZEE KHAN" 
For elaborating further u/e may refer sane fatawa fron 
Fataua-i-Kazee Khan also.^ 
These fatu/as relate to breach of trust. 
- "Amount of deposits should be faithfully restored", 
(page 126). 
- "There should be no Khyanat or misappropriation of 
Emanat or trust property" (Page 219). 
- "Bizaut, or entrusting another to sell a thing is 
jaiz." (Page 266). 
- "It is Haram to misappropriate property." 
5 Tifore-Ui-Lectsres-Translated b; loiouaMe Xotlvi Xobaiied Imi Has baliadiir, aid looln 
lillJiat Sissaii. 
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- "It is unlawful to eat, if edible, a misappropriated 
thing." (Page 27). 
These fatu/as from fatawa-i- Kazee Khan shou/ that there 
is an absolute prnhjjvjj"ion for misappropriation ofL trust 
property. It has been declared Haram. If a thing is 
edible its use is prohibited. 
Trust Explained: Fatau« E-Hlndia-'Fatau«-E-Alam-Giri 
Where an ou/ner assings another person to look after for 
the safe keeping of his property, in shariah, it is 
knou/n as 'Kida' ( ). Whereas the property is left 
u/ith trustee ( ), in shariah, it is called a 
"Trust" ( ). Kanz ( ) 
Trust ( ) requires proposal and acceptance { 
), that is 'depositor' ( ) should say to the 
'Trustee' ( ) that he has entrusted him u/ith the 
proeprty or use such urords- or does such deeds u/hich may 
represent his intention, and the 'Trustee' ( ) 
should accept the 'Trust' ( ) either by his u/ords or 
by his action, or by deeds only. 'Tabe-yeen' ( ). 
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Further 'trust' ( ) is created sometime by 
proposal and acceptanc-e ( ) and sometime 
inferred by implication ( ). 
When the depositor ( ) says, "I entrust this thing 
as trust to you" ( ), and the trustee ( ) in 
response says, "I accept it", trust is created- In 
cases, however, where property has been transfered for 
safe-keeping, without proposal and acceptance ( 
), 'Eida' ( ) would not be complete. Whereas 
in 'Trust' ( ) mere proposal ( ) is enough. 
Exception to this rule is 'usurpation' ( ). \Uhere 
the owner of the property, says to the 'usurpur' ( ), 
"I entrust the thing usurped ( ) as trust", then 
as usurpur ( ) he is immuned from liability though 
he may not have accepted the trust either by his deed or 
words. But as 'Trustee' ( ) he is responsible for 
safe-keeping and his acceptance in such a case is 
"Trust by implication ( ) has been explained as: 
"Where a person entrusted the property to another, and 
said nothing, or said that property had been made 
'Trust' ( ) to him, and that person remained 
silent, did not say any word in response thereto, he 
becomes a 'Trustee' ( ) because his keeping silent 
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amounted to acceptance ( ), though, thereafter, 
that person absconded and property vwas lost. For any 
loss he \would be responsible. (Khazanat-Ul-Mufteen). 
According to this explanation there should be depositor 
{ ) and trustee ( ), For trust ( ) 
something must be entrusted to another person ( ). 
For entrustment proposal and acceptance ( ) are 
required. Proposal and acceptance by depositor ( ) 
and trustee { ) may be express or implied by 
implication ( ). Sometime for trust ( ) mere 
proposal { ) is enough but to this there are 
exceptions. 
Apart from the above requisites. The things entrusted 
or made ( ) should be capable of possession. Thing, 
like absconded slave, a bird flying in the air, and a 
thing fallen into the dept of sea cannot be the subject 
matter of trust ( ). (Behrul-Ra-Eq). 
In Hedaya the term trust ( ) has been explained 
as:-
6 IBeiaja- Coueiitary on I s h i i c L8», Translated by Charles iaiiUon. Page. 411 (Siorter 
Editios). 
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"Widda, in the language of the law, signifies 
a person erapovuering another to keep his 
property, the proprietor of thing is styled 
modee ( ), or the depositor; 
- the person so empowered, the mode ( ) 
or trustee: and the property so left u/ith 
another, for the purpose of keeping it, is 
styled widdeeyat ( ) because Widda ( 
) literally means to leave, and thing in 
question is left with the mode or trustee." 
"Abdul Qadir Oudah Shaheed's^^^eu/s on trust" :-
Abdul Qadri Oudah Shaheed has explained 'breach of 
trust' in his book - "Criminal Law of Islam," by 
referring the Quranic verses and Sunnah of Prophet 
Muhammad (peace be upon him). He has referred the 
following Aayat explaining the trust and breach of 
trust:-' 
1. Surah al-Ahzab (33-72) 
2. Surah al-Nisan (4-58) 
Crjiiial La« ol I s la i , Vo], I , hbiil Qadir Oiidali Shalieeii. 
Tliese iajat have a already beeo discussed io lietails ander tie liead Frist la is Source of 
jliariali or Is lai ic Lav, 
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3. ' Surah al-Anfal (8-27) 
4. Surah al-Nisan (4-2) 
5. Surah al-Nisan (4-6) 
6. Surah al-Nisan (4-10) 
7. Surah al-Nisan (4-29) 
besides Quranic Ayat, above noted, Qadir Oudah Shaheed 
in explaining "Breach of Trust" takes the help from, 
Ahadith also. He quotes 'Holy Prophet u/here he mentions 
the distinguishing characteristics of a hypocrite" as:-
A man having four qualities is a hypocrite to his finger 
tips. If he possesses one of the four qualities, he has 
then one quality of inpostor unless he shakes it off. 
The qualities are: he commits breach of trust whenever 
something is kept in his custody; whenever he tells 
something it is a lie; u/henever he enters into a 
transaction, he is dishonest, and whenever he picks up 
a quarrel, he abuses." 
Abdul Qadir's approach is to explain the breach of trust 
in the light of Quranic injunctions and Sunnah. If the 
case is covered under the above sources then it may be 
trust. U/hoever breaks, the law would be liable. 
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The governing principle under Shariah is that both crime 
and punishment pre-suppose the existence of provision 
(injunctions and sunnah). 
a 
"Trust explained in The Mejelles":-
Apart from the criminal law of Islam by Abdul Qa^ jj?-ettd&h 
Shaheed, we have the Mejelle also wherein an attempt has 
been made to define and explain the nature of trust 
inaccordance to Quranic injunctions and Sunnah. Articles 
762^ " defines Emanat (trust) as follows:-
"Emanet is a thing fgund with someone, who is 
considered to be in charge of it. Whether it 
is made an emanet by a court requiring the 
safe keeping of property, like property 
entrusted to another for safe keeping (Vedie, 
Article 763), and whether it be an emanat in 
a contract requiring compensation for loss, 
like a thing taken on hire, are thing received 
9 Xejelle M m idll}e. represests as itteipt to codif; part of taiaii fiO vliicli treats of 
loaiaiat (traisactioss ietieei people). Tie codificatjoii m tie m l ol a coiilssioo o! 
j)irists, headeii bj iliied ujeviiet Pasha, tie Xiiister of Justice in Tvrke} approved b; Sieikli 
al-jslaiic and otier. Tiis coipilatiog is used as a guide aid osefil book of reference boti 
ia ciyjl as»»!! as criiisal latters. (?3<)e i i ! , 
10 Book 11, Article 163, "be lejelle, traoslated in Euglisb bj C.!. Tyser B.i.L, President, 
District Court of Syrenia. 
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as a loan for use, and u*iether it passes as an 
emanat into the hands of someone u/ithout 
contract existing or a design formed. As, if 
the property of a neighbour falls into the 
house of scaneone on account of the u/ind, by 
reason there being no contract, that property 
is not property deposited u/i'th another for 
safe keeping (Vedie, Article 763), but it is 
an emanat (plural emanat)." 
For entrusting the property either by way of contract or 
U/'ithout contract, different specific terms have been 
used u/ith the intention to shovu the variety of processes 
of entrustment of emanet (trust), such as:--^  
Vedia, Ida, Ariyyet, Mu'ar, Musta'ar, L'are, Mu'ar, 
Isti'ire, andMusta'ir. 
This definition has been propounded in inconfirmity u;ith 
the Quranic verses as well as the Ahadith or Sunnah. 
According to this definition the following requisites 
Irticle 163 - led i ' a is property deposited jitS soseoae for safe-ieep, 
Srtielfe "M - 'Ida' is to kWm to ajother t i t nit ieepiig of one on propertj. To the person irho 
deliver i t , t!ie naie Kiiiii is liven to the person »ho acispts i t , the lase 'Vedi' and 'Hnstevde. 
Jrtir.le Ififi - liriyvpt i s property the use nf jtiirh i s iiraotcd, nrafnitoiisly, that i s fo 33]. »ithO!lt i prine. 
It is cjUeii 'laar mi Knsta'ar. 
Article M - 'Y are is to five an Sriyvet, T; the person nho gives i t . the naie loir ' is liven. 
Article 167 - I s t i ' are is to taSe an Irivyet. To the person taking i t , the naie insta'ir is oiven. 
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should be there for creating a trust or calling a thing 
to be emanat:-
Broadly speaking emanat or trust may be created either 
by contract or vjuithout contract. 
1. The first requisite is that there must be a thing 
or property. 
2. Thing or property should be found in possession of 
someone. 
3. The person having custody over or dominion over is 
considered to be the incharge of it. 
4. Emanat or trust may be the creation of a contract. 
5. A contract may be for safe keeping the property or 
thing. 
6. Property may be made u/iddeeyat or entrusted to 
another peson for safe keeping. 
7. The person whop creates the trust or transfer the 
emanats for safe keeping is knou/ri as 'mude' , and 
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the person u/ho accepts the trust or emanat is knou/n 
as 'vedi' or 'mustevda'. 
8. A thing may be emanat in a contract requiring 
compensation for loss. Under this requisite cases 
of taking thing on hire or received on loan for use 
are covered. 
9. Ariyyet case where the use of property is permitted 
gratiutiously and without price one also covered 
under the scope of the term emanet; the person who 
gives the property on Ariyyet is known as Mu'ir and 
the taking the property is known as Musta'ir, 
10. Property is emanat or trust into the hands of 
someone even without contract or entrustment for 
example when the property of neighbour falls into 
the house of someone on account of the wind, by 
reason of there being no contract. property in 
such a case is not entrusted vedic ( ) with 
another for safe keeping but it is an emanat 
(trust). In other words there can be a trust 
(emanat) even without entrusting the property to 
the trustee or delivery of possession thereof or 
giving dominion over it for safe-keeping. 
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Inference from the above analysis is that the scope of 
trust (emanat) under Shariah or Islamic law is very 
u/ide. Obligations resulted either by contract or 
without contract are convered within it's purview. 
166 
•RULES GOVERNING BREACH OF TRUST" 
The rules governing emanat (trust) are enumerated inMejelle Ahkame 
Adliya in Book VI, under three chapters, from Articles 768 to 832 
which are quite exhaustive. Significance of these Articles lies, 
in fact, that they are all inconsonance with the spirit of Quranic 
injunctions and Sunnah. Violation of these rules would amount to 
Khiyyanat (breach of trust). Articles are considered belowv 
1 Biiles Goveniiifl Trust: Hedaja CoiieDtan oa Islaiic La», Claries iaiilton, Lile Kej^lle 'Sale Co^ erisiiig Trust" have also tieeii explaiiej is Sedaja. Tbe details are as follovs:-
OF IIDU, 01 lETOSirS 
i trustee is not responsible for a deposit ajless he transgresses sith respect to it. i DEPOSIT renins in the hands of 
the person »ho receive charge of it, as a tnst, that is to sav, he is not ansmahle for it. If, :herefore, a deposit 
he losr or destroyed in the trustee's hands, vithont any transgression on his part, he is not in that case responsiile for 
it. hecaijse the prophet has said, "an honest trnstee is not responsihle", and also becanse there is a necessity, ajonqst 
ianiind, for deposits; and this necessity conld not he ansiered in case of lahng trnstees responsible, as no one vonld 
then accept the trnst. 
He say keep it hiiself, or coiiit the care of it to and of his faiily. i TilllSTEE lay either keep the deposit hiiself, or 
coiiit for that purpose to soie one of his faiily snch as his »ife, his son, his lother, or his father; becanse it is 
evideni that a trustee does not engage to keep the property of another «ith lore care than he does his -M'. and be soietiies 
ieeps his oiin hiiself; and soietiies coiiits it to one of his faiily. Besides, there exists an absolnte necessity for 
collitting the trnst to his faiily, since, it is neither possible for his to retain ahays in the hoise, or. vhen he goes 
out, to carry the deposit »ith hii-for all those reasons, therefore, the consent of the proprietor is understood toeitend 
to the trustee's cojiitting the deposit to the care of his faiily. 
Bat if he give charge of it to a stranger he becoies responsible. BUT if the trustee shonld coiiit the deposit to the charge 
of any other than a leiher of his faiily (as if he Kere either to hire soie person ont of his faiily, for the purpose of 
keeping it, or to give it in deposit to soie one out of his faiilyl, he is then responsible, in as lucb as there is a 
difference betueen the care of different people, and it »as his ovn care, and not that of another, to vhich the proprietor 
assented. Besides, a thing does not involved its siiilar: and hence a trnstee is noi eipo»ered to cojstitnte another the 
trnstee of the saie thing; in the saie lanner as an agent is not peraitted to constitute another agent. 'By the ten faiily, 
in this place, is to be understood all such as live »ith the trustee, or vhose laintenance is incuibest upon bii, or his 
apon ihei, as a vife or adult son). 
h i :o 'ilso, if he lodge it in a place of csstody belonging to .jjother. If a trustee lodge the ieposit;; a place of custody 
beloflgj::! to another, he becoies responsible for it: becau-se the lodging it in another's platfi of csjtody is, in effect, 
depositing it vitb that other, it is other»ise, honever, if he hire the said place; for in that instiace his lodging it 
there is considered in the saie liafct vitb his keeoino it hiiself .md therefore does not induce resionsibility. 
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le is lot lade respoisiMe bf pittiig it oit of lis o n possesion vitl i tiei to tie iuediate preservation of it. If tie 
loise of a tristee tale fire, and le deliver tie deposit to lis leiglboir or if. leiig in a boat on tie point of sinliig, 
le tlrot tie deposit into aiotler boat, and it ii eitler case le lost le is not responsible, since be acted onl; for tie 
preservation of it, and conse^nentlj according to tie consent of tie proprietor. lit tie assertion of tie tristee, in sid 
cases, is not to le credited uless sipported b; vitiesses, since, ipoi tie establislient of a caise of respoisililiti, 
le pleads tie existence of a necessiti, d i d invalidates tie responsililiti, aid tie case tlerefore tie saie as if le lere 
to plead tlat tie proprietor lad eipoiered lii to coisign tie deposit to aiotler. 
le lecoies respoisiile oi leglectiig to deliver it oi deiand. If tie proprietor of tie deposit deiaid it froi tie tristee, 
and le neglect delivering it to bii, beiig at tie saie tiie capaile of sicl deliver^ le becoies ii tlat case responsible 
for it, since lis neglecting or refising to deliver, uder a capacity to do so, is a traisgressioi. Tie groind of tlis 
is, tlat tie deiand of tie proprietor clearly indicates lis dissent froi tie tristee's retaining possessioi aiy longer, 
and is tlerefore a disiissioi of lii froi tie trist. leice tie tristee is reponsible, becaise of lis retainiig possessioi 
after socl dissent. 
If le lixes it inseparall; litl lis o n property, le list lale tie proprietor a coipensatioi - If tie tristee lix tie deposit 
vitl lis o n property, ii sicl a lanner tlat a separation becoies difficnlt, le list ii tlat case lale ai adegiate 
coipensation, and tie proprietor (according to laieefal las not tie optioi of slariig tie lixed property, iletler tie 
lixtire be of a loiogeneois natire (sicl as lill vitl lilt, vleat vitl ileat, or vlite dins litl vlite dins), or of a 
leterogeieois natire (sicl as oil of sesaie litl oil of olives, or vleat litl barley). Tie tvo disciples allege tlat vlere 
tie lixtire is of loiogenons articles not of a ligiidiatire (sicb as vlite dins vitl ilitedins, or vleat vitl ileat), 
tie proprietor of tie deposit las tie optioi eitler of lecoiiig a slarer vitl tie tristee, or of taiiiig a coipeisatioi for 
tie value; becaise altloigl it be iipossible in sicl a case, for tie proprietor to receive lis rhlt vitl respect to 
appearaice, still it is possille for lii to receive it vitl respect to reality (tbat is in effect), by lakiig a division, 
since, in all articles of veiglt, or leasireient of capacity, a delivery of tie actnal article, according to all aitlorities. 
Sicl. tlerefore, beiig tie case, it appears tlat lixtire. in tie instance in qiestion, is a destrnction In anotler respect; 
and conseqieitly, tlat tie proprietor of tie articles placed in deposit las tie optioi eitberof talits a coipeisation on 
the principle of tie lixtnre being a destrictioi, or of becoiiig a sharer (if he please) on the principle of its not being 
a destruction. The argiient of laneefa is tlat liitnre is in every respect a destrnction. because of its being an action 
vhich occasions ai iipossibility of returning tie thing to the proprietor ii its origiial substance, - In regard to vlat 
the tvo disciples advance, that 'it is possille for the proprietor to receive lis rig'lt vitl respect to reality, byieans 
of a division', it is ansvered tlat tie proprietor cannot attain his actual riglt byieans of division. Besides, division 
has been institited froi necessity, lerely as a lode of advantage in cases of partnership. Division, tlerefore, is lerely 
an effect of partnership, and is incapable of being a caise of it, for otlervise the principal voild becoie secoidary, and 
the secondary principal. Tie resilt of tlis disagreeient is tlat if tie proprietor slonld eieipt the tristee, ilere le 
lales tie lixtire, by saying to lii 'I exeipt yoi froi tie coipeisatioi die by yoi oi accoint of tie lixtire', in tlat case, 
according to Haieefa, lis riglt becoies eitirely caicelled, siice (agreeably to his teiets) tie proprietor's riglt is liiited 
to tie coipeisatioi, vlicl he expressly forgog; vlere as, according to tie tvo disciples, tie proprietor's right of option 
to a coipensation ceases in consegieice of such exeiption, and resolves itself into a share in tie lixed property; lecaise 
although by the exeiptioi, his right of optioi be destroyed, still his actial property is uot destroyed. It is to le 
observed tlat tie lixture of oie liqiid vitl a differeit ligiid (sicl as of oil of Sesaie vitl oil of olives) it to a 
coipeisation, according to allov destroys tie riglt of tie proprietor to a participation ii tie lixed property, aid fixes 
and detenines it is a coipensation, according to all our doctors, as sncl a lixture is a destrictioi vitl respect lotl 
to appearance aid reality; since a division is in tlis iistaice iipracticalle, becaise of the difference of species. Of 
the saie class, according to the Savayet Saheel, are all cases of an adiixtnre of different articles, not ligiids, vlere 
tie separation is difficilt, as in tie lixtire of vleat vith barley. In cases vlere the separation regiires a process, 
or is attended vith soie difficilty (sicl as if dins slonld be lelte'd and incorporated vitl otlers), the depositor's riglt 
to tie silstaice ceases, and he is entitled to a coipensation, according to laneefa, as before stated. Hboo Toosaf holds 
that in this case the sialler is sibordinate to tie greater (for, according to his teiets, superiority list be regarded), 
aid that therefore, tbepersoi vho possessed the largest slareof the property becoies proprietor of thevhole, aid liable 
to coipeisate to the other for the value of his quaitui. Xolaiied, on tl eotler land, laintaiss that the proprietor of 
lie deposit becoies a participator vith the other in either case, because accordisg to his tenets, species cannot acquire 
a superiority over the saie species, as has been already explained in treating of fosterage. 
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If tbe liitire be occasioied bj accideit, tbe proprietor becoies a proportioiite sbarer ii tbe ibole. If a iepoilt be liiei 
litb tbe proeprtT of tbe tristee, sot bf » } act of tie latter, bat bf accidut (as if a baq coitaiiiif tbe deposit, iii 
aiotber coitaiiiiq property of tbe trtstee, sboild botb be ton, aid tbe coiteits liiflel toqetber), ii tbit case tbe 
trastee becoies a sbarer ii tbe propert; litb tbe depositor, aid is lot respouible for a coipeisatioi, siice be did lot 
coMit ai! act iidiciiq respoisibilit!. Tbe; tberefore becoie partiers ii tbe ibole accordiiq to all oir doctors. 
If tbe tristee eipeid a part, aid sipp]} tbe aeficieic], b] liitire, froi bis o n propertj, be is respoisible for tbe ibole. 
If a tristee expeid part of tbe deposit, aid tbei prodice a siiilar to ibat be bad expeided, aid lix it litb tbe reuiiliq 
part, ii sicb a laiier tbat a separatioi is difficilt, be is, ii tbat case, respoisible for, tbe ibole of tbe deposit; 
becaise tbe part expeided is a debt die b; bii, ibicb be cauot otberiise discbarqe tbai ii tbe preseice of tbe oner, 
ibei, tberefore, be lixes bis o n property litb tbe reiaiider of tbe deposit, be in fact destroys tbat reiaiider; as las 
before explaiied. 
Ii cases of traisqressioi respect to tbe deposit, the trastee is respoisible so loiq as tbe traisqressioi coitims. If 
a tristee traisqress litb repsect to tbe deposit, by coiiertiiq it to bis o n ise (as if, beiiq a qiardriped, be sboild 
ride opoi it, or, beiig a qon, be sboild leat it, or beiiq a slace, be sboild ise bis seriicesl, or by conittiiq it to 
tbe case of > straiqer, aid be iftenards refriii froi tbe ise of it, or reeeiie it bacb f r n tbe strasqer, bis 
respoisibility tbereipoi ceases. Sbafei laiitaiis tbat be does lot becMe eieipted froi respoisibility; becaise tbe 
coitract of deposit ceases aid deteriiies iwediately oi tbe exteice of respoisibility, siice respoisibility aid deposit 
are irrecoicileable: tbe tristee, tberefore, ii sicb case, cauot be exeipted iitil be lade actial restititioi to tbe 
proprietor. Tbe arqtieit of oir doctors is, tbat tbe order of tbe depositor to presene tbe property coitiiied to operate, 
as it las absolate, aid oot restricted to aiy particalar tiie; it beii;aiderstood. ii tbis case, tbat tbe proprietor bad 
geoerally desired bii to preserve tbe property, litboat restrictiig sicb desire to aiy particalar tiie. is, tberefore, 
tbe order is still ii force, it foilois tbat tbe trastee, after abstaiiiig froi tbe traisgressioi, becoies agaii trastee. 
becaise tbe object of tbe cootract vas preseriatioa. Tbe coitract. loreover, las sospeided in its effect lerely froi tbe 
secessity of establisbiig a braicb of it: ibei, tberefore, tbe braicb is reioied, tbe coitract becoies revived ii its 
effect; ii tbe saie laiier as ibere a persoi bires aiotber to giard bis property for a loitb, aid tbe persoi so bired reiits 
his pard for part of tbe loitb, in ibicb case he is eititled to laqes ii proportioi to tbe laiber of days be did latcb. 
In easier to Sbafeis assertioi, tbat 'tbe trastee cauot be exeipted froi respoisibility aitil beiaie actaal restitatioi 
to tbe proprietor', it is to be observed tbat, as the origiial order still coitiiaes ii force, aid the trastee ceases froi 
his traisgressioB, a recovery of tbe deposit is obtaiied iito the possessioi of tbe trastee, vbo is tbe stbstitite or 
coifideot of tbe proprietor; aid as tbis recovery is eqaivaleitto a restitatioi of it to tbe proprietor hiiself, be [tbe 
tristee] is coiseqieitly lot respoisible for it oi tbe groiid of destractioi. 
If the trastee deiy tbe deposit, ipoi deiaid, he is repoisible ii case of tbe loss of it. If tbe proprietor of tbe deposit 
deiaid it of tbe trastee, aid tbe tristee deay tbe deposit, aid it be aftervards lost, tbe trastee is ii tbat case 
respoisible: becaise, as tbe depositor, ii labiig tbe deiaid, disiisses tbe trastee froi bis charge, ii follovs tbat tbe 
trastee, ii retaiiiig the deposit after sicb deiaid, is ai asirper, aid is coiseqieitly respoisible. If also, after tbe 
deiial, the tristee sboild ackioiledge tbe deposit, still he does lot thereby becoie exeipted froi respoisibility, becaise 
the coitract bad beei previoisly doie aiay, iiasiicb as tbe deiaid of restitiioi by tbe depositor las a dissolitioi oi bis 
part, aid the deiial of tbe deposit las a dissolitioi oi tbe part of tbe tristee; ii tbe saie or of sale either by tbe biyer 
or seller, is a dissolitioi oi tbeir part -lof vbei a dissolitioi tabes place oi botb sides, the coitract to ibicb it 
relates is doie avay; aid caiiot aftervards be revived, iiless by a lei foriatioi, ibicb does lot appear ii tbe case ii 
qaestioi. Ii tbis case, tberefore, a recovery iito tbe possessioi of tbe proprietor's sibstitate cauot be iiderstood. 
It is otberiise vbere tbe trastee deviates froi his iistrictiois by traasgressiig ipoi tbe property, aid afteriards ceases 
froi sicb deviatioi aid coiforis to bis orders, for ii tbis case a recovery appears iito tbe possessioi of tbe proprietor's 
sibstitite, as «as before explaiied. 
Bit lot if tbe deiial be lade to a straiger. 
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If Ufc^tmtttleijtlfc.i9diitt9tw»iettoau Ut^yroprieter, ke is lot respeisille, lecordiif to Iboo Yoosif 
(coitriri to U e tfiiiei of Zifferj, h u m ieiiil to iii oiler tin tie proprietor la} le for tie sale of 
pruenitisi. n e t r u t N , wrteier is lOt eo^ttot to lit o n iisiisslei, uless ii tie presuce of tie 
depositor, or uless U e depositor cliii lis proptrti Iroi lii. Tie order for leepiiq tie property, tierefore, 
still coitiiies ii forci - eoitrui to ilere tie dttiil is iide to tie depositor. 
1 tristee is at liUrt) to cirri tie deposit litl lit ipoi a joinef. i tnstee is at liberti, accordiif to 
laiufa, to earri tie deposit litl lit ilei le traiels, altloiql eirriafe aid otIer expeises le tierel} iicirred. 
Tie tio disciples laiitiii tlit is lot penitted to lii ilere carriage or otIer eipeise is iicirred. Slafei, 
01 tie otIer laid, laiitiiis tlit it is lot illoiille ii eitler case, lecaise le coislders »order to leep tie 
article li tie C O M O I aceeptatloi of leepliq, laiel! keepliq li cities, ii tie saie lauer as ilere a persoi lires 
aiotler for tie preseriatlol of lis goods for a stated tiie, ii ilici case tie persoi lired is lot at lilert; 
to travel litl tie foods, or, if le sloild do so, lecoies respoisille for tiei. Tie arqueit of laieefa is, tiat 
tie proprietor's conissioi for presenatloi is alsolite aid iicoifiied; aid tIat a plali is a place of 
preseriatioi, proiided tie road le secired; oi ilici priiciple it is periitted to a fatler or qiardiai to travel 
litl tie propert; of tieir lard. Tie reasoiiif of tie tio disciples is tlit, ii ease of traielliif, ilere 
carriage for tie deposit is lecessarj, tie eipeise of it list fall oi tie depositor; aid as it is probable be 
lai lot asseit to tlis, lis conissioi for leepiig tie article list, ii sicl a case, le coisidered as liiited 
to a city. Tie aisier to tlis is tlit tie circiutaice of tie upeise of reieieit, as it lay be a coiseqieice 
of ai atteitioi to tie pr-esenatloi of lis property, aid tie filfilieit of lis conissioi - Tie aisier to Slafei 
Is tlat altloifl are articles cliefly abond ii cities, still tbe leepiif or presenii; of tiei is lot 
particilirly coifised to cities, bit eiteids alile to cities aid to pliiis; slice tbe iilabitiits of pliiis list 
necessarily leep tIeir property in plains - Besides, a reioial of tie deposit lay soietiies be a desirable object 
to tie proprietor: as ibere it is lade froi a city in diiqer to one in secirity; or to tie particnlar city is 
vbici tie proprietor diells, loi as tie leepinq of an article Is not, in its conon acceptation liiited to cities, 
it follois tlat 9 coiiission for keeping Is not liiited to any particilar city, it Is otieriise in a case of lire 
for keeping, as lire is a contract of excbange, ibicb reqiires a delivery of tbe sibject of tbe contract (naiely, 
keeping or giarding) in tbe place ibere tbe contract is execited. 
Provided tie coitract be absolnte, tie road safe, and tbe joiriey necessary. It is to be observed tlat tlis case 
proceeds on a sipposition of tbe coitract being absolnte. tbe road ibid tbe tristee travels safe, and tie jonrney 
necessary: for, if tbe road be daigerois, or tie joiriey lot necessary, tie tristee is respossille, according 
to all onr doctors. If also, tie ioiriey be not necessary, and tie tristees travel viti all lis faiily, le is 
not responsible: bit if, tbe joiriey not being lecessary, be sloild leave lis faiily bebiid, le becoies 
responsible, as is tlat case it las lis dity to lave left tie deposit litl lis faiily. 
Diless tlis be expressly probibited. If tie proprietor expressly prolibit tbe tnstee froi carrying tie deposit ont of 
tie city, and be nevertleless carry it oit, le becoies in tlat case responsille for it, as tie restriction so iiposed is 
a valid one since keeping tie article in a city is lost eligible. 
In case of a deposit by tio persois, tie tnstee caiiot deliver to eitler lis slare, lit in presence of tie otIer. If tio 
len deposit soietMig jointly litl anotler, aid one of tin afteriards appear, aid deiaid lis slare of tbe deposit, tie 
tnstee list not give it, uless in tie presence of tieotler depositor, a^ordiigto iau.efa. Tie tio disciples laintaiii 
tlat tie tnstee inst deliver tie daiiait lis slare; aid tie saie is also said in ladooree's coipeidiii. li tie i m 
Sagleer is said tlat if tiree lei deposit oie tloisaid dins litl a particilar persoi, and tio of tlei aftenards disappear, 
tie tlird is not entitled to tale lis slare, according to laneefa; bit according to tbe tio disciples le is entitled to 
take it. (It is to be observed tbat tlis differeice of opiiioi relate solely to articles of leiglt, or leasireieit of 
capacity). Tbe argiient of tie tio disciples-is tbat tie depositor daiis bis oin sbare only, and is tierefore entitled 
to receive it, viere it is attainable in tie saie laiier as a copartner in a debt. Tie argiieit of laieefa is tlat tie 
person present, in claiiing lis absentee's since le claii a separate and deteriinate portion, ilereas lis rigit is 
indefinite. lov vIere a rigIt is lixed indefinitely vitI anotler, it is to be rendered separate and deteriiiate only by 
leans of division; bit tie tristee las no poier to lake a division; and accordingly, if le lere to give tie present claiiant 
lis slare. it is not accoiit a division by any of onr doctors -it is otbervise in a case of a participated delt, becanse 
n tlat instance, tie present creditor claim froi tbe debtor a delivery of lis rlglt. vlici lay be lade litloit a division. 
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since debt is discbarqed b; leais of siiilars. litb respect to vbat is adiaice b} tbe tio disciples tbat 'tbe depositor 
is entitled to receive bis sbare Mere it is attainable' it « } be aisvered, tbat it does not froi beice folloi tbat tbe 
tnstee is liable to wi coipilsios oi tbat bead: is tbe saie lasser as iibere for isstaice, a person deposits one tboisand 
dins vitb asotber, »bo is indebted is one tboisasd dins to a tbird person; in ibicb case altbonqb it be laiftl for tbe 
creditor to t a h bis die iberever it be attainable, still it is not laifil for tbe trnstee to pa; bii litl tbe said deposit. 
TIO persons receinig a diTisible article in trnst, n s t eacb beep on ball. If a person deposit, litb tio len, 
an article capable of division, it is sot laifsl for eitber of tbese trnstee to coiiit sscb article eitirel; to 
tbe otber, bit tbey list divide it, aid retais eacb and balf; ibereas, if tbe article lere iscapable of divisios, 
eitber ligbt laifiil; keep it eitirelv litb tkecosseit of tbe otber, Tbis is tbe doctrine of laneefa; and sicb 
also is tbe lai. according to bit, is a case of t i o p a m e s , to iboi a tblsg iscapable or a division is joiitl] 
pledied; for is tbat case eitber of tbei, vitb tbe consent of tbe otber, lav retain sole possessioi of it, asd 
so libevise, is tbe case of tio agests eipoiered to bn; asjtbiiq, asd estrssted joistlj iltb tbepircbase lose;, 
for ii tbat case, also, ose of tbe parties la; retais tbe vbole of tbeiose; litb tbe consent of tbe otber. Tbe 
tio disciple allele tbat it is laifnl for one of tbe -parties to take entire cbarge, litb tbe consent of tbe otber, 
is eitber case: for as tbe proprietor bas laiifested bis coifidesce is tbe istegrit; of botb, it, is tberefore 
laifil for eitber, to deliver tbe deposit to tbe otber litboit being responsible, in tbe saie lanner as ibere 
tbe deposit is incapable of division. Tbe arguest of laneefa is, tbat tbe proprietor bas given bis approbation 
to tbe cbarge being anited in tio, bnt not to its being vested entirely is ose; becanse tbe act of keeping, ibere 
it relates to a divisible article applies onlj to a part of tbe article, not to tbe ibole. "be deliver? 
tberefore, of tbe ibole by eitber party to tbe otber is litboit tbe proprietor's consent; and tbe party ibo lakes 
sscb delivery is accordingly responsible. Bst tbe receiver is sot responsible, since (accordisa to M s tenets) 
tbe trnstee of a trnstee is not ssbiect to responsibility. It is otberiise ibere tbe deposit is incapable of 
division: for ihere an article of tiat natnre is deposited vitb tio persons, it is iipossible for tbei ioiitjv 
to be concerned in tbe case of it every boir of tbe day and sigbt, unless by tins; and tbe approbation of tbe 
proprietor, vitb respect to tbe vbole, is tberefore of necessity constrsed to extend to eitber of tbei in 
particular. 
ilestrictions are not regarded ibere tbey are repignant to csstoi or convenience. If tbe proprietor of a deposit 
say to tbe trnstee "deliver not tbe deposit to yonr life' and be nevertbeless deliver it to bis life, be becoies 
in tbat case responsible, it is recorded, in tbe jaia Sagbeer, tbat if tbe proprietor probibit tbe trnstee froi 
delivering tbe deposit to any one of bis faiily and be nevertbeless deliver it to one of bis faiily froi any 
anavoidabie necessity, be is not lade responsible by baving so delivered it; as if, for instance, tbe deposit 
be an aniial, and tbe proprietor probibit tbe trnstee froi giving cbarge of it to bis slave, or as if, being of 
tbe description of tbings nsially coiiitted to.tbe care of voien, be sbonld probibit bii froi delivering it to 
any of bis lives. Tbe coipiler of tbe Bedaya reiakrs, tbat as tbe loner of tbese reports is absolnte, and tbat 
gnoted froi tbe Jaia Sagber restricted, tbe first ongbt also to be niderstood as restricted: for tbis reason, 
tbat it is iipossible to lanage tbe conservation litb an observance of tbe condition, ibicb is tberefore sugatory. 
8nt if tbe trnstee sbonld not act froi necessity, as if, baving tvo lives, or tio slaves, tbe proprietor sbonld 
probibit tbe delivery to one particular life, or to one particular slave, and tbe trnstee nevertbeless coiiit 
tbe deposit to tbe particular life or slave so probibited, be becoies responsible, since tbe condition in tbis 
case Is osefnl, as saie of tbe faiily lay not be trnstiortby; and, as tbe conservation of tbe deposit is not 
incoipatible litb tbe observance of tbe condition, it is tberefore valid. 
Or ibere tbey relate to tbe particular apartient in a bonse. If tbe proprietor say to tbe trustees. "Keep tbe deposit 
in tbis apartient of tbe Sarai", and be keep it in anotber apartient of tbe saie Sarai, in tbat case be is not responsible 
for it; becanse tbe condition las useless, inasiucb as tbere is no difference vitb respect to keeping in different 
apartients of tbe saie Sarai. (If, on tie contrary, be lere to keep it in a different Sarai. be is rec-ponsible; because, 
as a i n l a m i of Sarai's occasions a diiferBnce in tbe keeping", tbe condition is Lherefore of use, mi tbe reslriction 
is consequently valid). If. boiever, ibere be an m i n t , different betiees tvo different apartsents of tbe saie Sarai (as 
if, tbe Sarai being extensive, tbe apartsent probibited sbonld be full of boles and rrevicesl, the coaditini! so lade is 
valid, and tbe trustee becoies responsible in case of oreservina it in tbat atartient. 
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'Article 768" 
An emanet is not a thing for vj/hich compensation has to be made. 
That is to say, in case of the destruction or damage of an emanet 
without any fault being committed by the person entrusted (Emin), 
evidence, no superiority lould liave bees gi?ej to either eiideice oi tlie gromd or prioritj, to also ij the presejt iistaace 
- Tie iefendJit isst also giie a coipeisatlon oi j,otier thossaid dins to tie claiiaits, since ii m m tiei tie one 
tioBsand viici «as present le onlj pays eaci ialf jij dae-snpposing tiat tie l a m , in consepence of a refisal to tale 
tie first oatl, sioild iiiediatelj pass a decree ij fj^oir of tie first claiiast, litlont »aitijg to tender an oati siti 
respect to tie claii of tie otier, in this case I|)| jjee Tezadee, in tiis couentar nnon tie Jaia Sanieer, sajs tiat an 
oati list be tendered liti regard to tie second: j y if tie difendait refuse to take it, a decres inst then ie passed 
jointly, in fayoor of boti claiiants, in an epa) jjgree; iecanse tie decree in favoar of tie first claiiant las not 
destrnctive of tie right of the second, since the jrocedence, in tie adiinistration of tie oati, nas deteriined eitier bv 
the Jill of the fazee, or the ciance of tie die; ^jj jjither of these have p o m to destroy the second's right - fhasaf 
has snbstitnted a slave in this case; tiat is, instead of one tionsand dins, he has snnnosed tie dispute to related to 
a slave, and he laintains that the sentence ongit to be execnted in favonr of the first claiiant. since the aatter is 
uncertain, in as unci as several of tie learned have given it as tbeir opinion, tiat a decree sionld be passed in favonr 
of the first vitbont vaiting for the second, ^j a denial to take an oati is eonaivalest, by iipiication, to an 
acknonledgient. He, loreover, reiakrs, that tie o^h »itb resnect to the second claiiant inst not be adiinistered to tiis 
effect, 'tiis slave is not the slave of snci as on^", becaase a refnsal on tie part of the defendant to take snci an oati 
is of no conieonence, after the slave in pestion had been nroved to be the oronerty of another. Tie tenor of the oati, 
tierefore, inst be "tiere is notiing dne froi le to tiis lan, not tiis slave,'nor less tian tie said value'. He also 
observes, tiat it is repisite tiis oati be adiinistered, accordino to loiaiied: bnt not accordino to iioo foosaf; because 
if a tristee sionld lake an acknovledgient of lie deposit in favonr of a cer-tain person, and tie thing acknoniedged sionld 
by a decree of tie kazee ie given to anotier, tien, according to Xoiaiied, tie ackn'oiledger is responsible bnt not according 
to Iboo roosaf, M the case in gnestion is a brai^h of this case relative to tie ackno»dgeient iere alluded to, is »iere 
a person first acknojledges a particular person, i^i aftervards denies it, averrino tiat anotier person had denosited tie 
slave »itl iii, and a decree is passed in favonr of the first acknol»edge. because of the second acho^ledment being a 
retraction of tie first; in vhici case, if he sbom^ have given the slave to tie first vithont a decree of the razee be 
is respottsiile, in tie opinion of all our doctors; or if he should have dven tie slave iy the decree of the lazee, in that 
case also, according to Hoiaiied, ie is respoasiile, hecanse ie acknowledges iis olligation-to keep the slave on acconnt 
of the second and.yet he destroys tie said slave (that is, so far as relates to tie claii of the secondl, iy leans of iis 
acknoKledgient, and is consenuently responsible, iccordinj to Iboo Toosaf be is not responsible in this instance, iecanse 
he as iolds, it is not tie iiiediate act of acknoKiejgiejt'that destroys tie slave, so far as relates to the right of tie 
otier, but tie giving of iii to tie other, liich ij the necessary conseonence of the order of tie lazee. Xoiaii'ed, on tie 
otier iand, laintains tiat it »as he nio urged tie jazee to oass tiat decree; Kience ie is reponsille. lav tie reason for 
assiiilating the case ]n aiiestion »itl tiis one is, that the ackno»ledgeient in favour of tie second claiiant, after tie 
first bad acpired a right to the thing, is useful to tie second claiiant in as inch as (the oninion of lohaiied. it induces 
3 responsibility in bis favonr. Hence in this cas^, jt jsregnisite. according to Mailed,.' to adiisister an oati to the 
second claiiant. notvitbstanding the slave have b^en nroved to be the riubt of the first, because the object froi it is 
to obtain a reiasal lot akelbe oath, vnicb is epnaieji to an acino»iedoient: and an acknovledoienl. even in that case, 
is useful, as it induces responsibility, iccordij^ to Aboo-yoosaf, on t'se contrarv, an oath is'not to be adiinistered; 
because, in this saie lanneras the defendant is not sade resoonsiile by an acboiledgeiect, 50 neither is bebv a refusal 
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Here tie deposit is traisferred to a seeoid tristee, aid lost, tie proprietor recei?es is coipositioi froi tie orifiul 
tristee. If a p e r m deposit SMetliie litl aiotler, aid tlit otier agaii deposit it litl a tllrd persoi, aid it le lost 
ii tlis persoi's liids, ii tiat case tie priprietor of tie deposit, accordiif to laieefa, list tale a coipeisatioi froi 
tie first tristee, lot froi tie secoid. Tie tic disciples allege tIat tie proprietor is at liiertj to tale tie coipeisatioi 
eitler froi tie first or secoid tristee; aid tIat, iicase le sloild take it froi tie first, le (tie first] is lot eipoiered 
to tale ai iideuificatioi froi tie secoid; lit tIat, ii case of lis talii; it froi tie secoid, tiei is secoid tiei eititled 
to tale ai iideuificatioi froi tie first. Tie reasoilM of tie tio disciples is tIat tie secoid tristee las received tie 
deposit froi tie laids of a persoi ilo las liiself lecoie respoisible (ii coiseqieice of tie defiatioi froi is trist) aid 
is tierefore respoisible; ii tie saie lauer as tie tristee of ai isirper; tIat is to say, if ai isirper deposit titi aiT 
persoi tie foods le las istrped, aid tie} be lost ii tie tristee's laids, tie proprietor is, at lilertf to tale a 
coipeisatioi eitler froi tie irisper or tie tristee; aid so also ii tie case ii qiestioi. Tie groiid of tlis is, tIat tie 
proprietor of tie deposit lot laviig givei lis approbatioi to tie secoid deposit; tie first tristee «as ;iilt; of a 
traisgressioi; aid tie secoid tristee nas also piltrof a-traisgressioi ii Ia?ii9 received it vitloit tie coiseitof tie 
proprietor. Tie proprietor, tlirefore, las tie optioi of taliig a coipeisatioi froi eitler. II, lovever, le tale tie 
coipeisatioi froi tie first tristee, le [tie first tristee] is lot ii tIat case eititled to iideuifi liiself froi tie 
secoid; becaise, ipoi paiiig tie coipeisatioi, le becoies proprietor, vlicl coistitites tie secoid a legal tristee; aid 
a legal tristee is lot respoisible for tie deposit. If, oi tie coitrar), tie proprietor tale tie coipeisatioi froi tie 
secoid tristee, le [tie secoid] is ii tIat case eititled to ai iideuificatioi froi tie first; becaise. as lot beiig a legal 
tristee; le list be coisidered lerelj as ai ageit for coiservatioi oi belalf of tie origiial tristee; aid as sicl le is 
eititled to ai iideuificatioi for ilatever losses le la; sistaii, collected litl tie ageic;. Tie reasoiiig of Baieefa 
is, tIat the secoid tristee received the article froi the haids of a tristee, aidiot.of a respoisible persoi; becaise the 
first tristee be separated froi the secoid tristee; siice so loig as it is ii eiisteice iiith hii, the lisdoi aid jidgeieit 
of the first trustee are coisidered to be, as it vere, exteit aiil at laid lith regard to it. The proprietor, loreover, 
is supposed asseitlig to ai; lode of leepiig his property vbici lay be agreeable to the trustee's iidgieit; aid as that 
still coitiiies to be exerted, it follots that no traisgressioi vhatever has as vet talei place. Bit, ipoi the article 
being lost by the second tristee, the first trustee it held to abaidoi the charge he bad iidertaiei, aid is therefore 
respoisible. The secoid tristee. oi the other laid, coitiiies ii his origiial predicaieit; that is. M s seisii is a seisii 
of trust ii the eid. ii the saie laiier as it las at the begiiiiig; aid as be is lot foiid ii a i traisgressioi, he 
therefore is not respoisible for the deposit; ii the saie laiier as vhere tie viid blovs a goii i6ar to aiy persoi, aid 
it is after yards destroyed - ii vhici case that persoi is lot respoisible. 
Case of claii advanced by tvo persois to a s u of loiey in the possession of a third. If tvo persois sloild separately 
clali a thoisaid dins in the possessioi of a third; eaci asserting that he bad deposited thei lith hii; aid tie possessor 
deny their claiis, bit refise to tale ai oath to that effect, the thoisaid dins list, ii that case, be divided betveei 
the tvo claiiaits, aid the defeidait retails ansierable to tiei for one thoisaid lore. The reasoi of this is, that the 
claii of each several claiiait is valid, as the claii of each has the probability of trith - leice each is entitled to exact 
an oath froi the defendant, vbo, oi his aprt, is regiired to lalea separate depositioivith respect to each, as the right 
of each is distinct. The kazee. in adiiiistering the oaths, lay lavfilly being vith either, since it is iipossihle to 
adiiiister both at the saie tiie, and neither has gronid of preference over the other. If hovever. i contentioi should 
take pplace betteei the claiiaits on this poiit. the die list be throvi ii order to satisfy thei.. aid to reiove aiy 
sispicioi of partiality oi the part of the lazee. If he thei take ai oatyl ii denial of the daii' of aie, let aiotler oath 
he adiiiistered to lii ii deiial of the secoid's claii; aid if he this lade oath, deiying the claiis of both, nothing is 
die froi hii, for lait of proof. If be sloild refise to take the secoid oath, a decree list be passed ii favoir of tie 
secoid claiiait, siicethe proof is established. If. oitle coitrary, he refise to take the first oath, a decree list lot 
be passed ii favoir of the first claiiait, lot ai oath list he teidered to hii »itb regarded to the claii of the secoid 
it vere otheriise if, at the tiie of refnsing, he vere be lake an acknovledgeient in favoir of the first: for in that case 
a decree voild iiiediately pass; since ackiovledgient is proof and a caise of property ii itself; vhereas a refusal to take 
an oath is neither proof; nor a caused of property, unless in conjunction vith the decree of the lazee. It is therefore 
lavfttl for the lazee, in sicb a case, to sis'peid his decree until he shall have tendered the secoid oath, that be lay 
apprised of the full extent to vbich lis decree is to go: and if the defendant refuse to take the secoid oath, that le lay 
he apprised of the full extent lo vhich his decree is to go: and if the defendant refuse to take tie second oath also, 
the idzee list Ibei pass a decree eguail; in favour of both: because neither party Is a superiority over the other in point 
of proof; and no regard vhatever is paid to priority of refusal [to svear], since the tvo refusals do sot constitute proof 
separately, but together and at one period, naiely, at the period of the decree of the fazee: jod as. if both had adduced 
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it is not necessary to make compensation. It means that a person 
(emin) u/ould be liable for breach of trust u/hen he is at fault. 
For making Emin liable, his negligence or carelessness vuhich is 
responsible for the destruction of property, is to be proved. If 
it is proved he vwould be liable for breach of trust. 
"FINDER'S LIABILITY": VArticle 769" 
If someone finds a thing on the road, or in any other place, and 
takes it for the^  purpose of making it his ovwi property, he becomes 
like a uT^n5f«'3r^ppr©pM.Qjtoi:-4..3hasib). 
Therefore, in case that property has been destroyed or damaged, 
although there may not be any fault of his ou;n, he is responsible. 
But in case he has taken it for the purpose of giving it to its 
ou/ner, if its ovwier is knovjm, in his hands, it is a pure emanet 
(trust). It is necessary that he should deliver it to its ou/ner. 
And if it ou/ner is not knou;n, it is a thing picked up by a chance, 
and it is an emanet (trust) in the hands of the person u/ho picks 
it up, that is to say, a-ho finds and takes it. 
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In Hedaya' sarnie view has been taken as in Article 769 noted above 
about a thing found on the road or in any other place. It has been 
termed as "LOOKTA". If the finder takes away for the purpose of 
preserving it would be considered as "Trust" ( ) • It has been 
explained as:-
"Lookta signifies property which a person finds lying 
upon the ground, and takes away for the purpose of 
preserving it, in the manner of a "Trust". It is proper, 
to observe that the terms "LAKEET" and "LOOKTA" have an 
affinity with respect to their sense, the difference 
between them being merely this, that Lakeet is used with 
regard to the human species, and Lookta with regard to 
any thing else. 
A LOOKTA, or TROVE property, is considered as a "TRUST" in the 
hands of the "MOOLTAKIT" or finder, where he has called persons to 
witness that "he takes such property in order to preserve it, and 
that he will restore it to the proprietor", because this mode of 
taking it is authorised by the law, and is even the most eligible 
conduct - (That is to say, the taking up of the property is 
permitted by the law, and is even more eligible than suffering it 
to remain where it is found) according to many of our doctors. 
This is where there is no apprehension of the property being 
Mi'i:i. ' m \ Ilr 53i(' "'A. Vol, II, 
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damaged or destroyed - but a'here that is to be apprehended, "the 
taking of it up is incumbent, according to u/hat the learned in the 
lau; have remarked upon this point. Now such being the case, the 
property is not a subject of responsibility; that is 
indemnification for the trove property is not incumbent upon the 
finder, where it happens to perish in his hands: and in the same 
manner, the finder is not responsible in a case where himself and 
the proprietor both agree that he had taken the property avowedly 
"for the owner"; because their agreement in this point is a proof 
with respect to both; and hence the declaration of the proprietor 
that "he (the finder) had taken them for the owner" - amounts to 
the same as if the finder were to produced evidence that he had 
taken them for the owner. If, however, the finder declares "I took 
them for myself", responsibility is incumbent upon him according 
to all authorities, because he here appears to have taken the 
property of another without that other's consent, and without the 
permission of the law". Rest of the rules governing finder's 
liability for breach of trust are same as referred below from 
Mejelle. 
Liabilities relating to above situation are enumerated in Article 
770 noted below.-
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"Article 770" 
A person, who finds a thing picked up by chance, causes 
advertisement to be made, and until the ou/ner appears, he keeps it 
with himself as an emanet (trust). If someone appears and proves 
that it is his own property, it becomes necessary to give it up to 
him. 
The two articles enunciate the principle that where a thing is 
found on the road or any other place and picked by the finder such 
a thing is emanet (trust) in his possession. These articles deal 
with three different situations:-
Firstly, someone finds the thing and converts it in his own use. 
He commits criminal breach of trust and is considered as 
misappropriator of property. In case after the misappropriation 
of the picked up thing property is destroyed or damaged though 
without his fault he would be liaMe. 
Secondly, the finder has taken the property for handing over it to 
the true claimaint whom he knows. It is an emanet (trust). He 
must find out the claimant or the owner of property. Property on 
finding the claimant be handedover to him. He should make possible 
efforts to inform the owner. If he fails to take necessary 
measures for ascertaining and informing the claimant, he commits 
brp-ach of trust and is liable. 
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Thirdly, if the claimant or ovwier of the property is not knovwi of 
the thing picked up by chance. It is still an emanet. Converting 
to his own use would be misappropriation. For ascertaining the 
claimant of the lost article he should make advertisement. It may 
be pronouncements of the picked up thing in public or private 
gathering or any other possible way by which the true claimant may 
know about his lost article. If after the advertisement or 
announcement someone comes and identifies the lost article or 
thing, it must be handed over to him. Under such situation 
whatever expenses are incurred by the finder of thing on 
advertisements, he may claim them from the claimant. Making no 
efforts to know who is the claimant or no proper steps taken to 
advertise the picked up thing and converted into his own use would 
amount to breach of trust for which the finder would be liable. 
According to Article 770, rt is the duty of the finder to ascertain 
the whereabouts of the owner of the lost property by making due 
advertisement, failures subject him to liability as it amounts to 
breach of trust. 
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"Liability for damage to things in one's possession" 
"Article 771". 
Article is self-explanatory. It deals u/ith different situations 
u/here a person deems to have committed Khiyyanet (breah of_tru^ t-} 
and is liable. It also lays conditions u/here inspite of the fact 
that harm is caused to the emanat (trust property) but a peson is 
not liable. Article is quoted belou;:-
"In case the property of another destroyed, by accident, 
u/hile in someone's possession, if he has taken without 
the leave of the ou/ner, in every case he is responsible." 
And if he has taken it u/ith the leave of the oumer, by reason 
its being an emanet in his hands, there is no responsibility. 
But in case it u/as on approval for sale at a fixed price, and • 
price u/as named, compensation becomes necessary. 
For example - if someone takes a basin from a china shop, of his 
ou/n accord, and it falls from his hand and is broken, he is 
responsible. And, if he takes it by the permission of the oumer, 
and u/hile is he looking on it, it by chance falls to the ground and 
is broken, compensation does not become necessary. And if that 
basin falls on a quantity of other basins, and is broken and also 
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breaks them, compensation must be made for those basins, but no 
compensation is necessary for that basin, by reason of its being 
an eraanet. 
But if he says "how many piastres is this basin? And, after the 
shop-keeper has said, "take it. It is so many Kiastries", he takes 
it in his hand and it falls and is-broken. He is responsible. 
Likewise, u/hen one is drinking sharbat, and the cup of the sharbat 
seller falls from his hand and is broken, by reason of its being 
an emanet of the class "Arriyyet (Art. 765), no compensation is 
necessary. But if it has fallen in consequence of the bad manner 
in which he himself used it, he is responsible." 
"Express and Implied Permission" 
"Article 772" 
This article deals with permission which may be either express or 
implied. But in cases where there is an express prohibition for 
doing a thing implied consent cannot be a defence. A person would 
be- liable if he has committed breach of express prohibition. 
Article lavs down the rule as follows:-
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"Permission by indication is the same as permission explicitly 
given. But, if there is an explicit prohibition, permission by 
indication cannot be considered." 
For example - u/hen a person has entered the house of another with 
his leave, he has by indication leave to drink u/ater from a tumbler 
standing openly. And u/hile the person is drinking, if the glass 
in his hand falls by accident, and is broken, compensation does not 
become necessary. 
But u/hen the ou/ner of the house says "do not touch that tumbler" 
and makes a prohibition, if the person takes it in his hand, and 
it falls, and is broken, he is responsible." 
In this article u/ords indication leave used for implied or 
constructive consent, and explicit leave are used for express 
consent. 
"Contract How Made" 
This chapter dealing u/ith contract hou/ made is divided into tu/o 
parts. Part I sets out precepts relating to the contract and 
condition for making a delivery for safe keeing (Ida). 
Article 773" - lavs dou/n the orinciole as follou/s:-
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"A delivery for safe keeping becomes a concluded contract, by a 
proposal and acceptance, expressly made or indicated. For 
example, if the oumer of the thing delivered say, "I have delivered 
this thing to you for safe-keeping" or "I have made it an emanet", 
and the person u/ho accepts it says, "I have accepted" there is a 
concluded contract of delivery for safe-keeping expressly made. 
A person is having a cloth in his hand. Another person asks the 
holder of cloth to give it to him. The holder of cloth gives the 
cloth to him. It is a trust. If any loss caused to the cloth. 
It would amount to breach of trust. (ZAHEERIA). 
Also, if someone enters- an inn and says to the inn keeper "Where 
can I tie up my animal?" And the Inn keeper shows a place, and the 
person ties it there, a contract of delivery for safe-keeping is 
concluded by implication. 
Same illustration has been reported in 'FATAWA-E-AHLE-SUMERQAiND ( 
) that a person u/ith horse came to an inn and asked the 
Inn Keeper where should he tie his horse. The Inn Keeper pointed 
out a place to tie the horse there. The Inn Keeper himself tied 
the horse. Thereafter that person went away. On return back that 
person found that his horse was not there. On inquirty the Inn 
Keeper replied that his companion had carried the horse for 
providing it the drinking water. That person had no companion. 
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It is a breach of trust. The Inn Keeper is llatxl-e-for-The l^ s^ of 
horse. (MUHEET). 
Likewise, if someone leaves his property u/ith a shopkeeper, and 
goes au/ay, and the shopkeeper sees it and is silent, that property 
becomes a thing delivered for safe-keeping (vedia' ) u/ith the oumer 
of that shop. 
But if the ounier of the shop says "I do not accept" and returns it, 
there is no contract of delivery for safe-keeping. 
Similarly, a thing is kept u/ith another person and asked him to 
take care of it. He refuses to look after. Property is lost. 
That person is not liable. Because of his refusal there is no 
trust created. (MUHEET). 
And, likeu/ise, someone leaves his property u;ith a number of 
persons, intending to deliver it for safe keeping, and goes au/ay, 
and they also see. it and keep silence, that property becomes a 
thing delivered for safe-keeping u/ith all of them. 
But if one by one they get up and leave that place, by reason of 
its being clear that the person remaining after the others is the 
guardian, it becomes a thing delivered for safe keeping (Vedica), 
•u;i t.h h i m . " 
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If a person sitting in a gathering gets up and goes away leaving 
behind his books, then all those persons remained there they would 
be considered as trustees ( ). If all of them left behind 
those books and thus lost, all of them would be liable. But one 
by one left the place, then the last person who remained there 
would be responsible for any loss ensued to the books. He would 
be considered as trustee. (MUHEET SERKH-ASI)-
Some persons were sitting on a shop. The shop-owner in their 
presence went away leaving behind the doors of his shop open. They 
also left the shop one by one. Thereafter, some articles were 
lifted from the shop. The last person who left the shop would be 
responsible. (MULTAQIT). 
Analysing this article it can be inferred that there must be 
entrustment (Vadiat, by delivering the thing. It must be effected 
by contract which requires proposal and acceptance by the parties 
concerned. Proposal and acceptance may be express or implied. 
•Either Party Can Annul The Contract' 
The next article authorises the 'mudi', the person who delviers 
the thing, and the 'vedi', the person who accepts the thing as 
emanat to revoke the contract at anv time at will. Once revoked 
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there is no liability on the vedi for any loss caused^ to the 
property. Article is referred belou;:-
"Article 774": "Both, the person who delivers his property for safe 
keeping, and the person, u/ho accepts it to keep safely, have the 
rights to annul the contract for safe keeping at any time they 
like." 
The u/ord right shou/s the significance that either party may revoke 
or annul the contract at anytime. It is all discretionary u/ith the 
parties to continue the contract or to rescind it any time they 
like. 
"Article 775": This article deals u/ith the nature of thing which 
can be made subject matter of emanat (Trust). Article reads as;-
"It is a condition that the thing delivered to be kept, 
be suitable for receipt and capable of being taken. 
"Therefore, the delivery for safe keeping of a bird, 
u/hich is in the air, is not good." 
"'X'ho can deliver and accept a thing for keeping":- "Article 776": 
This article deals with the competancy of persons, one who delivers 
the thing and another who accepts the thing. IVhen are they 
competent to contract? Article 776 explains:-
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"It is a condition that the person, vjuho delivers the thing to be 
kept, and, the person, who accepts it, be of sound mind and capable 
of contracting (Mumeyyiz, Article 943). It is not a condition that 
they should be of full age. 
Therefore, it is not lawful for a madman or an infant who is not 
capable of contracting (Article 943),-' to delvier a thing for safe 
keeping, or, to accept a thing delivered for safe keeping. But 
a delivery for safe keeping, and the acceptance of a thing 
delivered for safe keeping by one infant, who is capable of 
contracting and freed from control (Me'zun), is good". 
Thus according to this article to be competent to contract the 
requirements are:-
1. Firstly, that a person be "Sagir Mumeyyiz", capable of knowing 
the nature of transaction. It is not necessary that the 
parties should be major. Even the person who is accepting may 
be minor but should be capable of knowing the effects of the 
contract. If he is incapable than he would be deemed to be 
an infant, a person not competent to contract. 
in. H]: ''mr ;Myr lusiayyi:' :• i VOUIKI person not. uderstaniiiBi sellioo ui bnioii, 'M is to nh m 
ho'viao that b] i PA?. r i a i t ; ',; owersbi? ^re 'ost , aui that, by parchase they are izmnL aJiJ not Wan abl^ 
to iiistijiiiiisli froi a ssail i'-'.csit, a iscsit -md it is clear has beea n excessive >.m[. 'AhWiM kmivi 
iivH iri ten." 5 vornig person J^O can ristiaiiiisii these, is (:.ili''.ft "'Mir Msayyi?,". 
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2. Secondly, parties should be of sound mind. If a person is 
made, is not competent either to deliver the thing or accept 
the thing as emanat (trust), 
3. Thirdly, the person u;ho delivers and the person u/ho accepts 
should be free from control. (Me'zun). 
If the above three requirements are satisfied any contract entered 
into u/ould be binding and effective on the parties. 
In Fatawa-e-Alam-Giri, the competency to deliver and accept the 
trust has been explained as:-
"1. Trustee ( ) should of sound mind. 
2. Madman or infant, incapable of understanding thing should not 
accept trust. 
3. If infant is capable to understand thing, he is competent. 
It is not necessary that he should of age of majority. 
4. A boy u/ho has the permission to consume thing, he can accept 
the trust. It is not necessary that he should be independent. 
Thus a thing can be entrusted to a slave. 
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5. A boy u;ho is prohibited to consume things on his ovwi 
acceptance of trust is not proper. 
6. For contract of trust it is not necessary that the trustee 
( ) should be independent, 
7. A slave ( ) can make a thing "Trust" ( ) and 
acceptance of such from him is proper. Rules governing 
trust would be applied in such a case. But acceptance of 
trust from slave { ) is not proper. (BADAI - ). 
If these elements are satisfied then the parties are competent to 
deliver and accept the trust. 
Part II is about the rights and liabilities in respect of property 
delivered for safe keeping as emanet (Trust). ("Liability for loss 
or destruction"):- "Article 777" - "The thing delivered for safe-
keeping is like an emanet (Art. 762), in the hands of the person 
who accepts it. 
Therefore, if it be destroyed or wasted without any default of the 
person who accepts it, and without any fault in the keeping of it, 
it does not become necessary to make compensation. ("Where 
trustee is paid"):- "But if the contract for delivery has been made 
for payment to be made for the safe-keeping, in case it is 
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destroyed or u/asted by a cause u;hich it is possible to guard 
against, it becomes a cause of compensation. 
For example - if a watch, which is delivered for safe keeping, is 
destroyed by falling accidentally from the hands of someone, 
compensation does not become necessary. 
But if he tramples the vi/atch under foot, or if something falls from 
his hands and the u/atch is destroyed, compensation becomes 
necessary. 
Likewise, if, after someone has delivered his property to another, 
and paid him a wage for its safe keeping, it suffers damage arising 
from a cause which it is possible to provide against, like theft, 
it becomes necessary for the person, who accepts the property to 
keep, to make compensation. 
•Liability of Servant of Trustee" 
"Article 778" - If something falling from the hands of the servant 
of the person, who accepts the property, destroys the property 
delivered for safe-keeping, the servant is responsible. 
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"Treatment of Property" 
"Article 779* - It is a fault to do things in respect of the 
property delivered to be kept, if there is no permission from the 
ovx;ner. 
"Keeping of the Property by Whom" 
"Article 780" - "The person vuho accepts the property to keep, takes 
care of it himself as if it u/ere his own property, or causes it to 
be kept by someone, u;ho is trustworthy. 
And if without fault or neglect on the part of the person entrusted 
by him, it is destroyed or u/asted, neither the person u/ho accepted 
the property to keep, nor the person entrusted by him, is liable 
to make compensation." 
"Article 781" - "The person, who undertakes to keep the property, 
can keep it were he keeps his own property." "Trustee" ( ) 
can entrust the trust property to his family members. To whom the 
trustee gives the property whether wife, son, daughter or parents, 
it is subject to the condition that the person must be trustworthy. 
There should not be any doubt about her or his safe-keeping. 
(Fatawe-Qazi-Khan). 
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If the trustee has tu/o vwives. Both the u/ives have one son each 
from their former husbands. They also live u/ith them. They u/ould 
also be included in the family of the trustee. If the trustee 
entrusts the "Trust" ( ) to them and is lost. The trustee 
u;ould { ) not be liable. (ZAHEERIA - ) 
The trustee hands over the trust property to his u;ife and 
thereafter he divorces her. Iddat period is passed but he does 
not take back the trust property. If the property is lost, some 
Islamic jurists are of the opinion that he would be liable because 
it was his responsibility to take back the trust property from her. 
(FATAWA-E-ALAM-GIRI- Page 84). 
"Manner of care to be taken" 
"Article 782" - "The thing delivered to be kept must.be taken care 
of in the same u/ay u/hich things like it, are taken case of. 
Therefore, to place things like money and jewellery in places like 
a stable, or strawshed, by reason of its being a neglect in keeping 
them, if, in this case, they are wasted or destroyed, compensation 
becomes necessary." 
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"VWien Tvjo Persons Entrusted" 
"Article 783" - "When there are different persons u;ho undertake to 
keep the thing, if the thing is not capable of division, by the 
leave of one the other keep it, or they keep it in turns, and in 
that case, if the thing, delivered to be kept, is destroyed u/ithout 
fault or neglect, neither is compelled to make compensation. 
And, if the thing is capable of division, the persons, who accept 
the charge of it, divide it equally in their possession, and each 
one takes care of his share. 
And one cannot give his share to another u;hile the permission of 
the person, who delivered the thing to them, is not given. If he 
does give it, and it is destroyed or wasted, without fault or 
neglect, while in the hands of the other, the person, who takes it, 
is not liable to make compensation, but the person who gave it, is 
liable to make compensation for his own share." 
If the trustees are two persons and the trust is divisible, both 
of them have right to divide between them the trust half and half 
with a view to keep the trust ( ) safe. If one of the trustees 
entrusts the whole trust to the other trustee and trust is lost. 
The depositor trustee would be responsible for the loss of half of 
the trust and the other one would not be liable. 
(IMAM /^ Z AM (R a hma t u 11 a ha 1 eh) . 
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If thing entrusted is not divisible. Both of the trustees u/ould 
be responsible for its safe keeping. Any one of the trustees of 
entrusts the property to the other trustee, the other trustee u/ould 
not be responsible for the whole trust. (Shareh-TANAU/'I) . 
"Article 784" - "A condition in a contract of safe keeping is 
observed, if the restriction is possible to be observed, if not, 
it is void. 
For example - when an agreement for the safe-keeping of a property 
has been made, with a condition that it must be kept in the house 
of the person entrusted, if a necessity has arisen for removing it 
to another place in consequence of a fire having occured, no 
attention is paid to the condition. And in this case when the 
thing entrusted is removed to another place, if it is destroyed or 
wasted without fault or neglect, compensation is not necessary. 
Likewise, if the person, who delivers the property to keep, gives 
an order to the person, who accepts it, to keep the property, and 
forbids him to give it to his wife, or his child, or his servant, 
or the persons who keeps his own property, if necessities, 
compelling him to give it to that person, arise, the prohibition 
is not considered. 
In this case if the person entrusted gives the thing, entrusted to 
his keeping, to that person, a'nd it is destroyed or wasted without 
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fault or neglect, compensation is not necessary. And if he gives 
it u/hile there is no necessity he is responsible. 
Likeu/ise, u/hen a condition has been made for keeping in a certain 
room of a house, in case the person entrusted has kept it in 
another room of that house, if those rooms are equal for the 
purpose of safe keeping, the condition is not regarded. 
And in this case, "if the thing entrusted is destroyed, again, 
compensation does not become necessary. 
But if there is an unequality betu'een the rooms, like one being 
constructed of masonary and the other of u;ood, the condition is no 
observed. The person entrusted is compelled to keept the thing in 
the room agreed upon. And if it is destroyed u/hen put in a room 
inferior to that room as regards safe keeping, compensation is 
made. 
The significant point under consideration is that the condition 
imposed by the Depositor ( ) should be practicable. It should 
be implimented. But if the condition is such implementation is 
neither possible nor beneficial than it u/ould not be valid. Under 
the circumstances of the condition imposed not followed, the 
trustee ( ) for breach of it ^ i/ould not be liable. 
(BADA-E- ). 
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If the conditions imposed by the depositor ( ) are:-
1. That the trustee should keep the trust ( ) in his pocket 
and not put it at any place, or 
2. That he should keep safe the trust by his right hand and not 
use his left hand, or 
3. That the trustee should see the trust ( ) by his right 
eye and not by his left eye, or 
4. That he should not carry the trust ( ) out of Koofa (name 
of the city) and not transfer from Koofa, or 
5. That he should keep safe the trust ( ) in a box in a 
specific house. 
Such conditions would not be valid. Breach of such conditions by 
the trustee u/ould not made him liable for. 
(TAMER-TASHI). 
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•Duty of Trustee when Death of Depositor Doubtful" 
"Article 785* - "Where the ou/ner of the thing delivered for safe 
custody is absent it is not knovwi whether he is dead or alive, the 
person entrusted keeps it, until the death of its owner is certain. 
But, in case the thing being taken care of is one of those things, 
which will spoil by keeping, he may sell with the leave of the 
judge, and can keep the price of the thing as an emanet with him. 
But if he does not sell and it perishes by keeping, compensation 
does not become necessary." 
•Feeding of Thing Being Kept" 
"Article 786" - The feeding of the thing delivered to be kept, when 
it has need for food, like a horse or a cow, falls on the owner 
when the owner cannot be found, the person who has accepted the 
thing to keep may make an application to the judge, and the judge 
6f orders the carrying out of arrangements which are safer and most 
beneficial for the owner of the thing, then the letting of the 
thing is possible. The person, who has charge of it, lets it with 
the approval of the judge, and from what is received he may 
provides the food. And if the letting is not possible, likewise 
with the approval of the judge, immediately, or after he has 
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provided food from his ou;n property for three days, he sells for 
the equivalent value. And he can demand from the ovwier u;hat he has 
expend for three days at the outside. 
But if he has incurred expense u/ithout the leave of the judge, he 
cannot recover it from the person u/ho delivered the thing to keep. 
"Fault or Neglect" 
"Article 787" - "If there is any fault or negligent on the part of 
the person entrusted, and destruction or loss of value comes on the 
thing in his charge, compensation becomes necessary. 
Therefore, if the custodian destroys money, delivered for safe 
keeping mth himself, by diverting it into his business, he becomes 
responsible. 
In this case, u/hen he has in his way diverted a sum of money u/hich 
was an emanet (Art. 762), u/ith him, and afterwards, after he has 
put in its place some of his own property, if it is lost without 
fault or neglect, he cannot escape liability. 
And also, if, while the person entrusted goes riding an animal, 
delivered into his hands for safe-keeping, without leave, whether 
by extra-ordinary riding, or other cause it is destroyed, or of 
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during the journey it is stolen, the person who undertook to keep 
the animal becomes responsible. 
Likewise, when the person who accepts the care of the thing, is 
bound to remove it to another place in case of fire, he does not 
remove it and it is burnt by a fire, compensation is necessary. 
Imam Muhammad (Rahmat-ullahaleh) says that if the house of trustee 
catches fire and under necessity if the trustee hands over the 
trust property to a stranger, in case of loss he would not be 
responsible. But after extinguishing the fire if he does not take 
keep the trust property and is lost, he would be liable. 
Same views have been expressed by Sahabe-Muheet ( ) and Imam 
Qazi Khan. (FASUL-Amadia). 
The trustee would not the responsible for any loss caused to the 
trust if he handed over the trust to someone else for safe-keeping 
under urgent necessity. For example, the trustee's house catches 
fire and fear is that the trust would be burnt, or the trust 
property is in the boat and the fear is that boat would be sunk, 
or thieves or dacoits come and fear is that trust property would 
he taken away by them. Under these conditions of necessity if the 
trustee hands over the trust to another person and is lost, the 
trustee would not be liable. 
(Fatwaw-e-Kazi Khan). 
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Article 788 - It is a wrongful act to mix the property delivered 
for safe-custody with other property, without the leave of the 
owner, in case their seperation from one another cannot be made. 
For example - when the person who has taken charge of them has 
mixed a quantity of gold Yuz Liks (T.L.) delivered to him to keep, 
with gold Yuzlik, of his own, or with gold Yuzliks which have 
delivered by someone else to be kept, without leave, if they are 
destroyed or stolen, he becomes responsible. 
And again if someone, other than the person who has taken charge 
of them, mixes the said gold coins in that way, that person is 
liable." 
•Mixing by Leave or Accident" 
"Article 789' - "If the person who has undertaken the safe keeping 
of the thing, with the leave of the owner, mixes it with other 
property as mentioned in the last article, or without any act of 
his, two properties become mixed, in a way that they cannot be 
separated from one another {like a purse of gold, which has been 
put for safe-custody in a chest, being torn, and the gold inside 
it being mixed with other gold), as regards the whole, the shares 
of the owner of that delivered for safe custody and of the 
custodian are up to the amounts belonging to each. 
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In this case, if it is lost, or destroyed without fault or neglects 
no compensation is payable. 
•Trustee Cannot Delegate His Charge' 
'Article 790' - "The custodian cannot give the thing, which is in 
his charge, into the custody of another, without leave. If he 
does, and afterwards it is destroyed, he is responsible. 
And if it is destroyed by the fault or neglect of the second 
custodian, the owner, if he wishes, he can make the first custodian 
compensate him, and the first custodian recovers it back from the 
second custodian. 
Delegation of Charge by Leave" 
"Article 791" - If the custodian has delivered the thing in his 
custody to the safe-keeping of another, if the owner permits it, 
the first custodian drops out, and that person becomes custodian. 
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•Letting, Lending, or Pledging by Trustee' 
'Article 792' - The custodian can let for hire, or lend for use, 
or pledge the property delivered to him to keep, just as he can use 
it, u/ith the leave of the person who delivered it with him. 
But if he lets, lends or pledges it, without the leave of the 
owner, if the thing is destroyed or perished in the hands of the 
hirer, borrower or pledgee, or if there is a diminution in its 
value, the custodian must make compensation. 
The trust ( ) cannot be made to another person. It 
cannot be given as Arriyat ( ) nor can be let out on hire or 
be pledged. If the trustee ( ) does any of the above referred 
acts he would be responsible for breach of trust. 
(BEHRUL-RAIQ). 
•Lending" or Paying Money by Trustee" 
"Article 793" - If the custodian lends and pays money, which is an 
emanet (Art. 762) to another, without leave, if the owner does not 
permit it, the custodian is responsible for that money. 
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Likewise, if the has paid the debts of the ou/ner, owed to another, 
u/ith money delivered to him to keep safe personally, he is 
responsible. 
"Return of thing to owner. Expense of Return" 
"Article 794' - U/hen the owner of thing, entrusted to be kept, 
demands it, it must be returned and delivered to himself, and the 
provision for the return and delivery, that is, the care and 
expense falls on the owner. 
And if the custodian does not give up the thing entrusted to him, 
when the owner demands, if it is destroyed, or perished, he is 
responsible. 
But if he does not give it up in consequence of some valid excuse, 
like the thing being at a distant place at the time of the demand, 
in that case, if it is destroyed or perished, it is not necessary 
for him to make compensation. 
'Return How Made" 
"Article 795" - The custodian returns and delivers the thing given 
into his charge, eithevpersonally or by some trustworthy person. 
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And in case he has returned and despatched it by a trustworthy 
person, if, before arrival, it is destroyed or perished, u/ithout 
fault or neglect, compensation does not become necessary. 
If the trustee ( ) brings the trust ( ) to the house of the 
depositor ( ) and is lost there, then trustee { ) u/ould 
be liable. Similarly if the trustee hands over the trust ( ) 
to the son or slave of the depositor ( ) or to someone u/ho is 
a family member ( ) of the depositor, and is lost or destroyed, 
even then the trustee ( ) is liable. Fatawa Qazi Imam Abu 
Hashim Aam^i-Rahmat-allah - JAWAHAR AFLATI). 
However, other jurists differ from the above fatawa. To some 
jurists (faqih) if the trustee gives the property to someone who 
is a member of his family ( ), the trustee ( ) would not 
be liable. (TATAR KHANIA). 
If the trustee sends back the trust ( ) to the depositor 
through his son who is not a part of his family ( ) but the boy 
is major, then any loss caused to the trust ( ) during transit, 
the trustee ( ) is liable otherwise not. If trust ( ) 
is sent back through a minor, the trustee would not be liable under 
conditions when the minor knows how to keep things safe or keep 
things. Safe but if he does not keep things safe, the trustee { 
) would be liable. (MUHEET) 
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•Return To One Of Two Depositors' 
"Article 796" - \Uhen tu/o persons have delivered to someone their 
common property to be kept, and one of those part owners, in the 
absence of the other, demands his share from the custodian, of the 
thing in his charge is of the sort Misly (Art. 145),' the custodian 
gives him his share of the thing. If it is of the sort Qiyami 
(Art. 146),^ he does not give it. 
'Place Of Return" 
"Article 797" - In the giving back of the thing entrusted, the 
place, where the delivery to keep was made, is regarded. 
For example - Merchandise, which must be returned at Istamboul, the 
custodian cannot be compelled to return it at Andrianpole. 
1 irt ic le !35 - "Kisly' is a tiiiig fowd is the Bazars ui seei l j lariets , tSat is fo say, i fhiDg to be latclied 
»it!io!it any difference cansija ai increase of Drice." 
2 Jrbical H6 - "Oiyaii"is a tMiig uliicli cannot be latciied iD tlie larkets or Bazars, or if t t i s fomd, tiere is 
a differesce ia tie orice." 
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•Usurfructs Belongs To Owner" 
"Article 798" - The benefits derived from a thing entrusted for 
safe keeping belong to the ovimer. 
For example, when an animal is an emanet, its young, milk and u;ool 
are for the account of the ovwier. 
•Payment To Person Dependent On CXuner In Owner's Absence" 
"Article 799" - When the ovmer of the thing delivered to be kept 
cannot be found, and the judge, on the application of a person, vuho 
has a right to support from him, has directed that provision be 
made for that person from the money being kept for the person u;ho 
cannot be found, if the custodian diverts it to the maintenance of 
that person, part of the money delivered to him to keep, which is 
in his hands, he is not liable. 
But if he diverts the money to this purpose, without the order of 
the judge, he is liable. 
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'Madness of Trustee" 
"Article 800* - If madness seizes the custodian, and there is fear 
that he \i;ill not recover and get rid of it, and if there does not 
exist the property itself, which has been delivered to him to keep 
before his madness, the ou/ner, on producing a satisfactory surety 
has a right to claim compensation from the property of the madman. 
But after he has got u/ell, if he declares, that the thing delivered 
to be kept was returned to his owner, or that it was destroyed, or 
perished without fault or neglect, he proves it by oath, and takes 
back the money which has been received. 
"Death Of Trustee" 
"Article 801" - \Ji;hen the custodian dies, in case there is clearly 
found to be property, delivered to him to keep, in his estate 
(tereke), it is returned to its owner, bu reason of its being an 
emanet (Art, 762), also in the hands of the heirs. 
But if it is not found itself in his estate (tereke), if the heirs 
prove that the custodian made a statement and declaration in his 
lifetime of the condition of the thing entrusted, as by saying "I 
returned Lhat thing delivered to me to its owner" or that it was 
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destroyed without any fault, it does not become necessary to make 
compensation. . 
Likewise, if the heirs say "\Ue know the thing which was delivered 
to be taken care of. It was like this. It was like that, 
describing and explaaining it, and if they assert that it perished, 
without fault or neglect after the death of the custodian, and 
affirm it on oath, compensation does not become necessary. 
And if the custodian has not declared the condition of the thing 
delivered to him, by reason of its being considered that he died 
in ignorance, like other debts, it is paid from his estate 
{tereke). 
Again of their heirs say • only "We know the thing which was 
delivered to be kept" and do not describe it, and say that it has 
perished, what they say has no weight. In case they have not 
proved the way in which it perished, compensation becomes necessary 
from the estate (tereke). 
If the trustee ( ) dies and the trust { ) thereafter 
subjected to identification or gets identified, the trust ( ) 
would become debt. It would be adjusted against the 'trustee's 
estate ( ), Trust debt would be treated at par with other 
debts of the period when the trustee was healthy. Whatever will 
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be the position of deceased's life time debts. Some will be of 
trust debt. 
(KAZA-FIL-TEHZEEB- ). 
This fatau/a is applicable in a situation u/hen the trustee ( ) 
dies and trust is not knovwi to anyone. 
If the trustee ( ) entrusted the trust ( ) to his wife and 
thereafter died, then trustee's u/ife would be responsible. If the 
wife said that the trust ( ) was lost or stolen, then, she had 
to give statement on oath. Her swearing would be acceptable and 
nobody would be responsible for. 
However, if the wife said that she returned the trust to the 
trustee before his death, she is to swear for. Her statement on 
oath in this connection would be acceptable but the trust would be 
a debt on the estate whatever she had inherited from her husband 
(trustee). Thus the extent of the value of trust debt would be 
taken out from the property succeeded from her deceased husband. 
(MUHEET SARKHASI ). 
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"Death Of The Onwer" 
'Article 802' - If the person, u/ho delivered the thing to be kept, 
dies, the thing is given to his heirs, but if the estate (tereke) 
is submerged with debt, application is made to the judge. 
And if, without making an application to the judge, the custodian 
gives it to the heirs and if it is destroyed, the custodian is 
responsible. 
In case when the Depositor's ( ) whereabout are not known 
whether he is alive or dead, the trustee should continue the safe-
keeping of the trust ( ) until he gets the information either 
of his death or comes to know the whereabouts of deceased's heirs. 
(KAZAFIL-WAJEEZ-IL-KARDARI). 
If the owner of the trust is deed, and has not left behind any debt 
due against him, the trust ( ) should be returned to the 
deceased's heirs. 
However, if he left behind debt ( ) due against him, then 
the trust { ) be given to executor { ) and not to his 
heirs. (WAJEEZ KARDARI). 
If the trustee ( ) gives the trust to the deceased's ( ) 
heirs and the estate ( ) is subject to the payment of debts, 
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then the trustee u/ould be liable to the creditors to compensate 
them. The trustee ( ) u/ould not be immuned from liability 
because of the fact that he returned the trust to the deceased's 
heirs. (KHAZANATUL-MUFTEEN). 
Theseare the detailed conditions under which the trustee is liable 
for breach of trust if he violates them in the manner above 
enumerated. 
•Arriyyat" 
Chapter III of Mejelle Ahkamae-Adliya, is devoted to' the discussion 
on Arriyyat, the property u/hich is lent gratuitously to be used. 
Arriyyat is an emanet (trust). Article 813, explains it as:-
"The thing lent for use is an emanet (Art. 762), in the 
hands of the borrou/er." 
The nature of Arriyyet ( ) has been explained as:-
"Arriyyet ( ) according to our doctors, signifies an 
investiture u/ith the use of a thing u/it'hout a return -
the person who so grants the use is termed as 'Moyeer' 
( ) or the lender, the person receiving it, 
210 
'Moostayar' ( ), or the borrou/er, and the article of 
u/hich the use is granted, 'Arriyyat' ( ) , or the loan 
- Koorokhee". 
Imam Shafei (Rahmat-ullahaleh) defines "Arriyyet to signify simply, 
a licence to use the property of another because it is settled by 
the u;ord IBAHIT, signifying licence or permission". (Hedaya). 
To quote Hazrat, Abu Baker Razi "To make a person ouner" of 
usufructs ( ) without consideration ( ), in Shariah is 
known as "Arriyyat" ( ). (SIRAJ-UL-WAHAJ). 
Arriyyat is an investiture u/here the borrovi;er is made entitle to 
use and utilise the usufructs arising from the property borrowed 
without return. There is no consideration. A loan gratuitiously 
given by the ( ), the person who grants it and received by the 
{ ), the borrowers. 
By proposal and acceptance, and by delivery a lending for use 
becomes a concluded contract. If someone says to another, "I have 
given this property to you as a loan for use" or "I have given a 
loan for use" and the other says "I have accepted", or, if he takes 
it without saying anything, or, if one says to another "give me 
this property as a loan for use "(Arriyet)", and he gives it, the 
giving of the proeprty as a loan for use is a completed contract 
and thus loan given is Arriyyet. 
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The silence of the person u/ho gives the loan is not regarded as an 
acceptance. 
Therefore, if a person asks from another for a thing as a loan for 
use, if the ovwier keeps silence, and the person takes it, he is a 
u/rongful appropriator. (Art. 805). 
The receipt of the property lent for use is necessary. Without 
receipt there is no right over it. It must be a definit and 
defined thing. There should not be an ambiguity. However, if the 
lender gives a choice to the borrower to take whichever he likes, 
the loan for use is good. The same rule is to be applied in cases 
of period for which the thing has been given in loan for use must 
be definite and defined. Without specification either of the thing 
or the period the full extent of the use cannot be ascertained, and 
an investiture with anything uncertain is invalid. 
The use of a thing without return is lawful as being a species of 
kindness because God has said, "Do kindness to each other" and also 
the Prophet (peace be upon him) borrowed a suit of armour from 
Si fwan. 
The loan (Arriyyet) as said earlier'is a trust. Both in Hedaya and 
Fatawa-e-Alamgiri, it has been recognized as trust (emanat). Now 
let us discuss conditions governing Arriyyet and violation thereof 
amounting to breach of trust. 
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'Liability Of The Borrower" 
The borrower is not responsible for the loss of value, or the thing 
perishes or destroys, without fault or neglect or the borrower does 
not make any transgression in respect of it. Under such conditions 
there is no necessity to make compensation. If, therefore, it be 
lost in the hands of the borrower, without any transgression on his 
part, he is not answerable for it, whether the loss happen, at the 
period of his using it, or otherwise. 
For example - if a mirror lent for use, by falling, accidentally, 
from the hand of the borrower, or by his knocking it himself in 
consequence of his foot slipping, is broken, borrower is not 
responsible. 
Similarly, in another situation where a carpet has been lent and 
the value of the carpet is diminished by its being spotted by 
something split on it accidentally, compensation is not necessary. 
(Art. 813). 
Hazrat Imam Shafei (Rahmatullahaleh) maintains that he is 
responsible for it in case the loss should take place at a time 
when he is not using it; because he has taken possession of 
property of the another without a right in it; and also, because 
as the borrower is liable to the charges of removal, in case of the 
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substance, as also he is ansu/erable for the value, in case of its 
destruction, in the same manner as an usurpur the article standing, 
in the same predicament u/ith merchandise detained u/ith a view to 
purchase - u/ith respect to the permission of seisin, established 
on the borrou/er's behalf that u/as granted merely u/ith a vieu/ to 
enable him to enjoy the use; and hence, where the use ceases it no 
longer operates; in other u/ords, u/here the loan is destroyed during 
his enjoyment of the use; he is not responsible, because of the 
existence of the necessity; u/here-as it be lost at a time u/hen he 
is not using it, he is responsible, because of the non-existence 
of the necessity at the time. The argument of our doctors is, that 
the term Arriyyat does not indicate responsibility, for (according 
to their exposition) it is an investiture u;ith the use u/ithout 
return or (according to Hazrat Imam Shafie (Rahmatullahaleh) and 
Koorokee), a permission of the use; and the seisin of it is not a 
transgression on the part of the borrou/er, since it u/as made u/ith 
the consent of the lender; and although that consent u/as merely 
u/ith a vieu/ to enable the lender to use the article, still to 
borrou;er did not make the seisin u/ith any other intention, he 
therefore, is not guilty of any transgression, and consequently is 
not responsible. (Hedaya). 
There are observations against Hazrat Imam Shafie (Rahmatullahaleh) 
also. The expense attending a removal of the article is incumbent 
on the borroa.ar, merely on account of the advantage he derives from 
it, in the same manner as the maintenance of a loan is incumbent 
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upon the borrower, on account of the advantage he derives from it, 
and not on account of any defect in his tenure. It is otherwise 
in the case of usurpur, where the charges of removal are due merely 
because of the defect in his tenure - with respect to seisin with 
a view to purchase, the responsibility in that instance does not 
arise from the seisin, but from the design with which it was made; 
for as seisin in virtue of 'a contract of sale induces 
responsibility, as also seisin with an intention of purchase 
induces responsibility, since seisin with a view to contract is 
subject to the same laws with that contract. (Hedaya). 
In Article 814, it has been explained that in case of fault or 
neglect on the part of the borrower, then, from whatever cause it 
maybe, whether the thing lent be destroyed, or its value 
diminished, borrower is respbnsible. 
Example may be referred that where the borrower goes for one day, 
with an animal lent for use, to a place of two days journey 
distance and the animal is destroyed or becomes weak and its value 
is diminished, the borrower is responsible for breac of trust. 
Likewise, where an animal is borrowed to go to a certain place, he 
has arrived at that place with it, and after he has gone beyond 
that place, the animal dies a natural death, the borrower is 
rfispnnsihie for breach of trust. 
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Again, if a necklace has been borrou/ed for use, put it in the neck 
of an infant and leaves the infant uyithout anyone to look after him 
and the necklace is stolen, the borrou/er is responsible for the 
loss. 
In cases where the thing borrou/ed is an animal than responsibility 
to feed - the borrowed animal lies upon the borrower. Therefore, 
where the animal dies because no fodder was given to it, the 
borrower is responsible. 
When a loan for use has been made without any restriction that is 
to say, in case the lender has not made any condition as to time, 
and place, or any way of user, the borrower can use it at any time, 
or place, he wishes, and in anyway, he wishes. But he is bound by 
use and custom. (Art. 816). 
However, where there is a restriction as to time and place, the 
borrower cannot use the thing contrary to the restriction. The 
violation would amount to breach of trust. 
In case where loan for use is restricted to one particular type of 
use, the borrower cannot use against - the restriction. For 
example, iron or stone cannot be loaded on an animal lent to be 
loaded with corn. But he can put on it a load equal to corn or 
lighten than it. 
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"Unrestricted User Power To Lend" 
Article 819, explain that if a loan for use is made, which is 
unconditional, without fixing the person who is to use it, the 
borrower has right to use of the thing in an unrestricted manner, 
that is to say, if he wishes, he uses himself, and, if he wishes, 
he causes, another to use it by lending it to him. Whether the 
thing lent for use, be one which is not changed by a change of 
persons who use it, like a room, or whether it be one that is 
changed, like a riding horse. 
For example - "when someone has said, "I have lent you my room to 
use", the borrower, if he wishes, stays in it himself, and, if he 
wishes, he causes another person to inhabit it. 
In another illustration jurists has taken a same view. For 
. example, when a person has said, "I have lent you this horse" the 
borrower, if he wishes, rides the horse himself, and, if he wishes, 
he makes someone else ride it. 
However, if the lender has prohibited its being given to another, 
the borrower, while the prohibition lasts, cannot cause the 
Arriyyet to be used by another. 
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•Loan By Wife" 
Article 822 lays dovun that soineone asks from a lady a thing, u/hich 
is the property of her husband, as a loan for use, and she, u/ithout 
leave, gives it, in case th^t thing perishes, "if it is one of 
those things u;hich in the hou^e by custom in the hands of the wife, 
then neither u/ife nor borrower would be responsible. If the thing 
is not found in the hands of the wife, like a horse,, the husband 
can make them - wife and the borrower, liable for breach of trust. 
"Letting Or Pledging Thing L^nt" 
The borrower cannot let or pledge a thing lent to him for use, 
without the leave of the lender. 
A property which lent to be pledged for a debt in one town, the 
borrower cannot pledge for d^bt in another town. If the borrower 
does and the thing lent is destroyed or perished, he become liable 
because it is a breach of trUst. 
Same view has been taken in Hedaya. It is not lawful for a 
borrower to let out a loan. If, therefore, he should let it out, 
and it be afterwards lost, he is in that case responsible for it. 
As the act of lending does not comprehend hire, it follows that 
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such delivery is an usurpation (misappropriation) leading to breach 
of trust. 
"Borrou/er Can Deliver Thing To Another To Keep" 
Borrou/er can deliver thing for use to another for safe keeping and 
if any harm caused to the property vuithout fault or ngelect, there 
is no responsibility. U/hen a thing en lent for use as conveyance 
for going and returning to a place and the thing has been handed 
over to another to keep that, the property so delivered if it is 
damaged u/ithout fault, then the borrower would not be liable. For 
example a horse is given for riding, the horse being tired stops 
and given by the borrower to another person for safe-keeping, dies 
a natural deeth. The Borrower is not responsible because there is 
no negligence or fault. 
"Return Of Thing Borrowed" 
Article 827 lays the law for the return of a thing lent for a 
particular purpose. When the purpose of lending is accomplished 
it must be returned to the ( ) lender. Because thing in hand 
is an 'emanat' (trust). Therefore "U/'hen a thing has been borrowed 
for use in a business, on the completion of that business, the 
thing lent becomes like a property deposited for safe keeping 
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(vedie) in the hands of the borrower. He must no longer use it. 
And he cannot keep it longer than it is usual to keep it. And, if 
he does and it is destroyed, he is responsible." Keeping longer 
would amount to breach of trust, for which the borrower would be 
liable. 
•Manner of Return" 
The borrower may return the thing lent for us to the lender either 
personally, or by someone he trusts that is hireling or his 
servant. Person through whom the borrower is returning must be a 
trustworthy person. If he sends through a person in whom he has 
no trust, any loss caused to the vedie ( ) before it is 
delivered to the lender, he is responsible. In cases where the 
thing lent for use are ornaments with precious stones, these must 
be returned to the lender personally. (Art. 829). "But other 
things lent for use, sending them to a place considered delivery 
by use and custom, and giving them to the servants of the lender, 
is a return and delivery." 
If a person has borrowed an animal from another, he should restore 
it to the stable of the lender, and if it is afterwards lost, in 
that case the borrower is not responsible. There is no breach of 
trust in such cases making persons liable. The animal may also be 
delivered to his groom as well. However, analogy would suggest 
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that he is responsible, since he has neither restored it to the 
proprietor nor his agent, but merely to his ground. The reason in 
favour to put an animal on the proprietor's stable is that a 
restitution has been made according to general custom, since it is 
customary to restore loans to the house of the proprietor as vjyhere, 
for instance, vessels or utensils belonging to a house borrou/ed, 
in u/hich case it is ususal to return them, not into the 
propreitor's hands, but merely to his house. Besides, if the 
borrower had returned the animal to the proprietor, he (proprietor) 
would have sent it to the stable and therefore his doing so at once 
is considered as a valid return. (Hedaya). 
If the borrower sends the animal borrowed for use through his 
servant getting yearly wages and is lost during transit in the way, 
he is not responsible. The reason is that a loan is in the nature 
of trust and the borrower may commit it, for the sale of 
preservation, into the hands, of any of his family, in which 
relation an yearly wage earner servant stands. It is otherwise 
with respect to a daily servant, as he is not held to be one of the 
family. 
If the borrower sends back the Arriyyat ( ) which is in the 
nature of Vedia { ) trust to the proprietor through his 
(proprietor's) servant and it be lost or destroyed on the way, the 
borrower is not responsible. It is subject to the condition that 
the thing so consigned should be one to whom the care and 
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management of it is always given. Other jurists are of the opinion 
that it matters not whether it be consigned to such a servant or 
to any other servant or slave of the proprietor.. This later rule 
is the most approved doctrine. 
However, in cases where the borrower returns the vedio to the 
proprietor by the hands of the stranger, he becomes in that case 
responsible for it, and must make good the value in the event of 
its loss, otherwise would be liable for breach of trust. 
•Expense Of Return" 
The charges or expense and care of returning a thing lent for use 
must be defrayed by the borrower. As he took the thing for his own 
benefit, therefore, the restitution is incumbent on him and 
whatever expenses maybe incurred, in such restitution, he is 
responsible for them. (Art. 830). 
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Revocation of Loans Or Arriyyat^ In the Nature of Trust for Building 
and Planting' 
I t i s lawful to borrou/ land as loans for building or for p lanta t ion 
purposes. However, i t i s permitted to the lender to resume the 
land and receive i t back in the s t a t e in which he lent i t , he i s 
therefore , empowered to compel the borrower to remove h is houses 
or t r e s s . If there has been a fixed time for the loan, and the 
buildings and t r ee s have been pulled down, whatever difference 
there may be between t h e i r value i f they had stood to the end of 
the time, and t h e i r p r i ce , as pulled up, a t the time when they were 
pulled up, the lender i s responsible for i t . J u r i s t s have observed 
that i f the removal of the t r ees and buildings be detrimental to 
the ground, the choice of the a l t e rna t ive r e s t s "with the proprietor 
of the ground, as he i s the p r inc ipa l , and the borrower the 
secondary, and a preference i s always given to the p r inc ipa l . 
In cases where the land has been borrowed for the purpose of 
t i l l a g e , i t cannot be taken back by the lender un t i l the crop be 
reaped from i t . 
Note: Arriyjat iU Qarz are, in coiioi coiversatioD, used iidiscriiiiiatel; to denote a loai, but tbere is a 
JistiictioB in la* nitli regard to thei. i r r i j je l is used nitli respect to sucb ti i igs as, aiter beiiq lent to 
aootber. are ideDticall;, but equal point of nuiber, teigbt, or leasureient of capaclt], Tims vhere a person, 
having borroned a book, and read i t , afterjards return i t , i t is considered Jrriy?et. Bnt if a person sbonld 
borroi one hundred d i n s , froi another, and after using thei sboald return another hundred d ins , i t is considered 
a Qarz ( ). 
English Language sakes no distinction betneen the tern Qarz.i i and Arriyyet ( ! although both are 
sssentiallv different on their effect. 
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"PLEDGE - REHN" 
We referred Ayat 283 Surah-al-Baqarah No. 3, earlier explaining the 
pledge deposited for safe-keeping is a trust. Law relating to 
pledge entrusted is elaborated belou;. 
Pledge is to make property a security for the return of debt 
borrovued. It is a security in respect of a right of claim. In 
case of default in repayment of the debt, it can be claimed or 
realised from property so pledged. 
The pledge becomes a concluded contract by the offer and acceptance 
of the pledger and the pledgee. But, until the pledged property 
is received by the pledgee, it is not complete and irrevocable. 
"Pledge Deposited With Trustee":- Pledge, like deposits, loans, or 
Mozaribat, or partnership stocks, cannot be taken as trust. 
Hou/ever, it is lawful, that both pledger and pledgee may agree to 
deposit the pledge with an honest, upright person. Such a person 
knoum as 'Adil' would act as trustee for both. But Imam Malik 
(Rahmatullahaleh) is of the opinion that it is not lawful. 
Imam Malik (Rahmatullahaleh) explains his view that taking 
possession by the trustee over the pledge is the same as that of 
the pledger. He argues that the trustee has recourse to the 
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pledger for indemnification where the pledge is lost in his 
possession, and another, having proved a right to it, takes a 
compensation from him for it's loss. He further says that such 
being the case, no account is made of taking of possession by the 
pledge. 
Contrary vieu/ of the jurists is that they argue that the possession 
of the trustee is apparently the same as that of the pledger, u/ith 
respect to preservation (substance of the pledge being a trust), 
and u;ith respect to u/orth it is the same as that of the pledgee. 
The reason given in support of the later argument is that the 
trustee is subject to responsibility in case of its loss, a pledge 
being insured vi/ith regard to its u/orth. Therefore, the trustee 
stands in the place of tu/o parties, the pledger and the pledgee. 
He strengthens the object of both, that is, the agreement of 
pledge. 
In short, the trustee acts as a deputy of the pledger for the 
conservation of the substance of the pledge, and as to the u/orth 
of the pledge he acts in the same may as pledgee. 
Once pledge is entrusted to the trustee, neither of them is at 
liberty to take it out of the trustee's hand. The pledgee is not 
at liberty to take the pledgee from the trustee, in as much as the 
right of the pledger is still connected u/ith it, in this u/ay, that 
the pledge is a deposit { ) in the trustee's hands. 
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Similarly, the pledger is not at liberty to take it, because of 
pledgee's right being connected vuith it for the purpose of 
obtaining repayment of his debt. Non of the parties can violate 
the rights of the other attached u/ith the pledge property so 
deposited or entrusted. 
•Responsibility Of The Trustee (For Breach Of Trusts)" 
In case the pledge is destroyed u/hile in the possession of the 
trustee, the pledgee is responsible for such destruction because 
the possession of the trustee is the same as that of the pledgee 
in regard to the u/orth of the pledge. The responsibility is 
attached with only on account of its' u/orth. Hou/ever, if the 
trustee has transgressed and violated the trust himself, then in 
that case he is responsible. 
Again, in case the trustee delivers the pledge either to the 
pledger or to the pledgee, he is responsible if any destruction is 
caused. The reason is that he cannot transfer the pledge to either 
of them. Trustee is the pledger's trustee u/ith-respect to the 
substance of the pledge, and the pledgee's trustee u/ith respect to 
its u/orth. Both the parties, that is, pledger and pledgee stand 
as stranger to each other. Thus delivering the pledge to either 
of them, is a transfer to a stranger. 
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It is further argued by the jurists that the trustee, therefore, 
being in such a situation responsible, cannot retain the value by 
way of pledge in his awn possession; because he becomes indebted 
for the value if he retains by way of the pledge, he becomes at 
once the claimant and claimee, and the payer and receiver, in which 
is implied an obvious inconsistency. 
Rules to be observed in this instance has been elaborated as 
follows:-* 
"The pawner and pawnee must therefore, in this case, 
concern to take the value from the trustee, and deliver 
again to him, or to any other person, in place of the 
original pawn. If however, they should not concern in 
so doing, either of them may in that case refer the 
matter to the Qazi, who may take the value from the 
trustee, and again deliver it to him, or to any other, 
in the place of the original pawn. If the Qazi does so, 
and the pawner afterwards discharge his debt, then, 
supposing that the responsibility for the value had 
attached to the trustee in consequence of his having 
restored the pledge to the pawner, the value in qviestion 
remains secure to the trustee, as, the pawner here appears 
hhn, D. 5U. 
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to have recovered his pledge, and the pavi/nee his debt. 
If, on the contrary, the responsibility had attached to 
the trustee in consequence of his having surrendered the 
pledge to the pavunee, the pavjuner, upon discharging the 
debt, is entitled to take from him the value in question; 
for as, in case of the existence of the pavwi, he vi/ould 
immediately on payment of the debt resume it, he is by 
consequence at liberty to take the substitute. It is 
to be observed, in this case, that if the trustee given 
the pledge to the pavwiee in loan or trust, and it has 
been destroyed u/ithout any transgression on his part, he 
(the trustee) is not entitled to take the value from him 
(the pavwiee), whereas, if the pau/nee has occasioned the 
loss, he is so entitled; for as the property of the thing 
has before vested in him in virtue of his having 
compensated for its loss, it was of course his own 
property that he lent; and the borrower is therefore 
liable for its loss when occasioned by himself, but not 
otherwise. If also, the trustee gives the pledge to the 
pawnee, "in order that he may preserve it himself as a 
security for, his debt", and it be afterwards destroyed, 
he is entitled to take the value from the pawnee, whether 
he (the pawnee), were the occasion of its loss or not, 
for it was not given to him in the nature of trust or 
loan, but on terms which implied a liability to make 
compensation." 
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Further the trustee cannot sell the pledge u/ithout such an 
authority given by the parties concerned. If he sells u/ithout such 
an authority, it urauld be a breach of trust. He u/ould be held 
liable for the pledge so entrusted to him for safe-keeping. 
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CHAPTER III 
PART A 
"SRRVAHT'S LIABILITY 1 IflfilM SSUUflAIi L&K" 
In the ealier chapters the offence of breach of trust 
generally was discussed under sections 405 and 406, I.P. Code. 
The remaining sections 407, 408, and 409 dealing with Criminal 
breech of Trust are confined to the coninission of crime by 
particular .classes of persons, such as, carrier, wharfinger, 
warehouse-keeper, clerk or servant, public servant, or banlder. 
merchant or agent. The scope of our study confines to assess ^ he 
peovisions releting to servant, public servant, agent s^ id 
partners. 
Servant is to be studied under two heads : servant 
under section 408, IPC, and public servant under section 409 IPC; 
'Who 2Ji 1 Servant" 
Servant is a person bound by an express or implied 
contract of service to execute the orders and submit to the 
control of his master in the course of business. It is his duty 
as a servant to transact the business a directed. The generally 
accepted test of the relationship of master and servant is that 
I 
of a control, and contract of service is thought to be one by 
I. Yewens V. Noakes (1880) 6 Q.B.O. 530. 
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virtue of which the employer "cannot order or require what is to 
I 
be done, but how it shall be done" The control test probably 
II 
retains a good deal of importance in cases to which it applied, 
but in modern conditions the notion that a roaster has the right 
to control the manner of work of all his servants, save perhaps 
III 
in the most attenuated form, contains more of a fiction than of 
fact. It is clearly the law that such professionally trained 
persons as the master of a ship, the captain of an aircraft and 
the house surgeon at a hospital are all servants for whose torts 
their masters are responsible, and it is unrealistic to suppose 
that a theortical right in a master, who is as likely as not to 
be a corporate and not a natural person, to control how any 
IV 
skilled worker does his job, can have such substance. It has 
therefore, not been recognised that the absence of such control 
is not conclusive proof against the existence of a contract 
V 
service. 
Various attempts, have been made to lay down a more 
suitable test. Often quoted statement is that of Lord 
Thankerton. According to him, there are four indicia of a 
contract of service: 
I. Collins V. Hertfordshire Country Council (1947, K.B. 598). 
II. Argent V. Minister of Social Security (1968, IWLR 1749). 
III. Whittaker V. Minister of Pensions and Rational Insurance 
(1967, 1 Q.B. 156) 
IV. Kahn-Freund, "Servant and Independent Contractors" (1951) 
14 MLR 504. 
V. Market Investigations Ltd. V. Minister of Social Security 
(1946, 62 TLR 427). 
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(a) The masters' power of selection of his servants. 
(b) The payment of wages or other remuneration. 
(c) The master's right to control the method of doing 
the work, and 
I 
(d) The master's right of suspension or dismissal. 
However, the above statement is subjected to criticism 
in Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd. V. Minister of Pension, 
II 
and National Insurance, on grounds that the statement does not 
carry the matter much further; the first and the last, and 
perhaps also the second, are indicia rather than of the existence 
of a contract than of the particular kind of contract which is a 
contract of service*. 
Denning L.J's statement is more helpful in this 
connection. To quote: 
"It is often easy to recognise a contract of service 
when you see it, but difficult to say wherein the 
distinction lies. A ship's master, a chauffeur and a 
reporter on the staff of a newspaper are all employed 
under a contract of service; but a ship's pilot, a 
taximan, and a newspaper contributor are employed under 
a contract for services. One feature which seems to 
run through the instances is that, under a contract of 
I. Short V. J & W Henderson Ltd. (1946, 62 T.L.R. 427) 
II. (1968, 2 Q.B. 497). 
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service, a man is employed as part of a business, and 
his work is done as an integral part of the business; 
whereas under a contract for services, his work, although 
done for the business, is not integrated into it but is 
only accessory to it** 
Another important judgement which elaborated the test 
was delivered by MacKennaj, where the learned judge held that for 
the existence of a contract of service three conditions must be 
fulfilled: 
(1) the servant agrees that, in consideration of a 
wage or other remuneration, he will provide his 
own work and skill in the performance of some 
service for his master; 
(2) he agress expressly or impliedly, that in the 
performance of that service he will be subject to 
the other's control in a sufficient degree to make 
that other master; 
(3) the other provision of the contract are 
consistence with its being a contract of service. 
This statement is also subjected to criticism. It is said 
that it is probable that no more complete general test exists. 
It is not possible even to compile an exhaustive list of all the 
^33 
I 
relevant considerations. 
However, the control will no doubt always have to "be 
considered, although it can not be said as only determining 
factor. One has not to minimise the significance of others 
factors such as: 
(1) the man performing the services provides his own 
equipment; 
(2) he hires his own helpers; 
(3) degree of financial risk he takes; 
(4) degree of responsibility for investment and 
management he has, and 
(5) the opportunity .of profitting from sound 
management in the performance of his task. 
Another important factor to be taken into consideration 
is that the criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust 
by the servant must be within the course of servant's employment. 
A wrongful act falls within the scope of employment if it is 
expressly or impliedly authorised by the servant, or doing 
something in an unauthorised manner or necessarily incidental 
thereto. It is difficult to decide whether an act is or is not 
within the course of employment. No single test can be claimed 
as appropriate to cover all cases. Question is ultimately one of 
fact differing from case to case. 
I. Market Investigations Ltd. Minister of Social Security 
(1969, 2 Q.B. 173). 
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After considering who is servant and course of 
oqployment let us examine the liability as enshrined in section 
408 IPC. The requisites for the application of section are: 
(i) Being a servant or accused employed as servant; 
(ii) K servant in any manner entrusted with property in 
such capacity; or 
(iii) Servant commits criminal breach of trust in 
respect of that property. 
The basic requirement is that the accused must be 
servant, if he is not a servant of the complainant, the section 
I 
will not be applicable. 
The offence is comnitted where the act of the servant 
is to cause wrongful loss to his master for a temporary period 
II 
even. 
Word 'whoever' used in the section includes a minor 
over 12 years of age, so long as his case is not covered under 
section 82 and 83 IPC. He can be guilty under this section. If 
the person is above 12 years of age, the question of sufficient 
maturity of understanding to judge the nature and consequences of 
their acts does not arise. The significant consideration for the 
application of this section is the actual entrustment of property. 
It is not material whether the property could have been legally 
I. 1919 Gi zj. 967. 
II. Tulsides Chhagaulal (1906, 8 Bom. L.R. 95) : 5) 
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entrusted or not, or doainim over the property could be given or 
I 
not, a person is liable when he disnonestly misappropriates it. 
A servant is bound to carry out all orders o£ his 
master subject that the orders must be reasonable, and in the 
course of the business. In fact a servant acts under the direct 
control and supervision of his master. 'A person hired by a 
market gardener to do a day's work, and sent by him to sell 
vegetables at market and who brings back proceeds is a servant' 
to his employer in respect of such employment*. 
Ill 
In Pyo Gyi, a Trading Firm employed a person on 
commission for making purchases for the firm as directed is a 
servant of the firm. 
A person is not a servant whose duty is to receive 
orders when and where he likes and forward them to the principal 
for execution. However, a person is a servant of the contract of 
employment is for a specified period but continue, even after the 
expiry of such a period because the presun^tion in such a 
situation would be that employment after the expiry is on the 
same terms as of the previous contract. 
I. KalKa Prasad (1959, Cr. L.J. 1264. 
II. 1920 Cr. L.J. 513. 
III. 1919, 10 L>B>R. 31. 
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Similarly a person is not less a servant because he is 
I 
working under others also or the servant gets the connission 
share of profits of a business, or works only on certain 
occasions. In all such situation a person so acts is a servant 
of his master. If he is dishonesty misappropriates whatever 
assigned to him would be liable under section 408 IPC. 'A 
commercial traveller was engaged by a shirt making firm on 
comnission basis. The person recieved samples and during his 
journey received the sums which he misappropriated. He never 
returned the samples'. He is liable under this section as 
servant. 
'A Director of company may be a servant of the company 
II 
if he is employed by the company as such. But, where a 
Director is not so employed, he cannot be charged under this 
section for criminal breach of trust with regard to the company's 
III 
money, alleged to have been entrusted to him'. 
'A, a Court Inspector, improperly delegated to a 
constable the custody of government money and the latter 
disnonestly converted the monye to his won use. It was held that 
the constable was employed as a servant of the Inspector and was 
IV 
guilty under this section'. 
I. (1861, 30 Ljrac 142 - Queen V. Tite. 
II. Rr. Stuart, (1894, IQ.B. 310. 
III. 1980 Chand L.R (Or) 18 (23) Delhi. 
IV. (1867) 8 Suth WR, Gr, 1 (2) (DB). 
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Where a person serves as servant, though there is no 
contract binding him to work, so long as he performs the duties 
I 
his acts would be covered by this section. 
Even in cases where an employer has no right to receive 
money or he is wrong-doer in receiving but if the servant on 
behalf of his master receives such a money and dishonestly 
II 
misi^propriates, servant would be liable under this section. 
Section 408 is general in its connotation and applies to 
servants whether 'public servant' or not. Section 409 deals with 
criminal breach of trust by public servant only. In considering 
the guilt of a person accused under section 408, it is irrelevant 
to consider whether the accused is a public servant within the 
III 
definition of section 21. In this view, the case in 
which it was held that the secretary of a co-operative society 
was not a public servant within section 21 and hence was not 
governed by this section does not seem to be correct. 
SfiCXi&l ffltrwted ILUII property 
For the application of section 408, it is necessary 
that property must be entrusted to a person in his capacity as 
servant otherwise a person would be liable under secion 406. 
I. Karimuddin (1918, 40 All 565). 
II. Beacall (1824, Ic IP. 454). 
III. 1974 BBcj (227) (Pat), 1975 Cr. Lj. 326 (Him. Pra). 
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Entrustment may be either express or implied. If implied 
entrustment is there then it is to be inferred from the 
circumstances of a case. 
Entrustment can be distinguished from control or charge 
I 
over the property. In Kesar Sing's case, it was held that of 
the property is found missing, the person entrusted with the 
property is liable without any further proof, but in the case of 
control or charge over the property he will be liable only when 
it is shown that he misappropriated it or was a party to criminal 
breach of trust conmitted by any other person. 
A servant under a legal contract made by him with his 
master to realise money on his behalf and render account to him, 
fails to give account inspite of such a repeated demand from his 
master and also uses the money in violation of service contract, 
II 
would be guilty under this section. 
Ill 
In an English case, 'if servant secrets money, which 
his master has marked and sent by a friend to make a purchase at 
his shop, with a view to try the honesty of the servant, it is a 
felonious breach of trust'. 
I. State V. Kesar Singh, 1969 Cr. Lj. 1595. 
II. Brj. Kishore V. Pandit Chandrika Presad (1936) 12 Luck. 77. 
III. Headge's case (1809) 2 Leach 1033. 
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A secretary of a cooperative society entrusted with 
society fund is a servant and any dishonest misappropriation 
would render him liable for criminal breach of trust. 
In Oina's case a person was employed as Tonga Driver on 
a fixed monthly salary. Further it was agreed between the 
employer and employee that the later would be driving the Tonga 
on hire basis within the Municipal locality of a particular city 
and was to bring back the tonga every evening and pay over his 
earnings to the complainant. He did not comply with the 
conditions, failed to return one evening. The next following day 
he was pursued and arrested at a place several miles away from 
that specified city driving tonga with fast speed. The accused 
was convicted under this section by the magistrate. However, 
acquitted by the session judge on ground that driver did not 
commit any criminal breach of trust as the accused had not 
disposed of the tonga. In appeal before the Hight Court, the 
learned judge held 'that there was no doubt that the accused 
intended to deprive his master of the tonga and that this intent 
or mental act of his was the gist of the offence of criminal 
breach of trust and he was therefore guilty of an offence under 
I 
this section'. 
Where the money is given to a person as loan there is 
no entrustment. Similarly money deposited with Bank cannot be 
considered as entrustment. 
I. Dina (1925) 6 Lah. 257. 
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In a case where accused had general supervision over 
the goods, and another person who was having a charge over those 
goods made a false report which was later endorsed by the 
accused, it was held that the accused was not liable under this 
I 
section. 
A mere entry in the account book showing payment to the 
accused, without any other proof, would not amount to 
II 
entrustment. 
A person employed in a firm not authorised to receive 
or encash cheques of the firm induced another employee to 
identify him as a partner before the Treasury officer so that he 
might deliver him money on certain cheques, held that his act 
III 
amounted cheating rather than the criminal breach of trust. 
When a person was charged for committing a criminal 
breach of trust on grounds that a mistake was made by entering a 
false figure in the account book, defence pleaded for oversight 
and prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, it 
IV 
was held that the person was not liable under this section. 
A servant who was instructed by his master to burn. 
Waste papers but he sold them, was held not guilty under this 
V 
section. 
'The entrustment to the servant must be in his capacity 
VI 
as such sevant. A charge which omits to state thisis imperfect. 
T. 1969 Cr. Lj. (1595) (Raj). 
II. A 1974 Sc 388; 1974 Cr. Lj. 447. 
HI. A 1955 NOC (Pat, 4900). 
IV. 1979 Gri. L.R. (Guj) 42. 
V. A 1930 All 449 : 1931 Cr. L.j. 865. 
VI. (1865) 3 Suth WR (Cr. Letters) 12. 
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with Dminiffi over property 
A servant having dominion over the property of his 
master in any manner misappropriates or converts to his own use 
such property is guilty of criminal breach of trust. In such 
cases physical possession of the accused is not necessary. All 
that is required is that he should have dominion over it and can 
be disposed of by him in violation of law laying the mode of 
discharge of such trust. Where a person has been empowered to 
operate on the funds in a Bank, it is said that he is entrusted 
I 
with dominion over it. Here a case of Municipal Water Works 
Inspector authorised to supervise and check the water 
distribution may be referred where he has dominion over water on 
behalf of his master. If he diverts water for his own use or his 
tenants without paying the tax and gives no information to the 
II 
employer of such use, he is guilty of criminal breach of trust. 
'Dominion over property must be as a result of 
entrustment, whereas dominion of a partner over partnership 
property is not an entrustment even when working as an employee 
of the partnership and he cannot be held guilty under this 
III 
section.' 
In mortgage cases where possession even after mortgage 
executed continues with the mortgagor, he has dominion over the 
I. 1962 SC (1821). 
II. Birmala Charan Roy (1913) 35 All 361. 
III. Abhai Singh 1980 Cr. Lj. (NOC) 98 (All) 
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property on behalf of the mortgagee and he allows the property to 
be fraudO/lently sold in default of payment of revenue and 
purchases benami in the name of another, the mortgagor is liable 
under this section. 
Where a police constable under lawful justification 
seizes property suspected to be stolen and later misappropriates 
to his own use, is said to have dominion over the property and 
for such misappropriation is liable for criminal breach of trust. 
Entrustment or dominion over the property must be in 
any manner either by operation of law or by act of parties. 
Mere dominion over property is not enough. President of 
cooperative society along with other office-bearers was charged 
for misappropriation of society-store on the ground that the Key 
of store at night used to remain with the President. In this 
case it was held that the circumstances of the case were not 
I 
sufficient to convict for the charge. 
Word property under this section includes movable as 
well as iimnovable property. The view that the property under 
this section includes, only movalbe property is incorrect. 
Controversy whether this section covers movable only and not 
immovable property was set al rest after the decision of Supreme 
Court in R.K, Dalmia V. Delhi Administration. Their lordships 
I. Jagan Nath 1976 Cr. L.J. 847 (SC), 
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have held that the word property is used in the code in much 
wider sense than the expression movable property. There is no 
good reason to restrict the meaning of the word property to 
movavable property only when it is used without any 
qualification in section 405 and other section of the Indian 
Penal Code' 
'Where a person receives a letter by post, and after 
reading the letter, throws away the envolop, the envelop cannot 
I 
be considered property. Another illustration may be given of 
rice which had become rotten and which had been ordered to be 
II 
destroyed is not a property. Where a Municipal Inspector was 
ordered to destroy certain begs of condemned rotten rice but he 
sold it and used the proceeds for himself, it was held that no 
property was entrusted to the Inspector and that he could not be 
III 
convicted for criminal breach of trust. 
IV 
However, in Moti's case, a different view was taken A 
currency note was cancelled by tearing off certain parts, but the 
further process of cutting it into pieces and then destroying it 
by burning remained, it was held that such a note though 
cancelled, was not resnullius (not property) and could be the 
subject matter of theft. The court observed ; "A very clear 
distinction must be drawn between to destroy and to abandon and 
an actual dfetruction 
I. 1919 Cr L.j. 174. 
II. (1898) 2 Cal WN 216 
III. Ibid. 
IV. Moti (1923) 17 SLR 260, 262: (1925), AIR (s)21. 
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and abandonment. The very fact that the owner < of the property 
intends to destroy or abandon that property and hands it over to 
some person to effect those purposes is in our opinion a clear 
indication that he still mantains his rights as the owner of 
that property and those rights subsist until the abandonement or 
destruction is completed .... as long as the destruction or 
abandonement is not fulfilled and as long as it is still in the 
hands of the owner to counter mand such destruction or 
abandonement the property is still the property of the owner and 
the taking it out of his possession is theft, and improper use of 
it is breach of trust" 
Ealier case was criticised and it was not based on 
sound reasons. But in the present case his lordship has given 
thought where there is no property, there is no loss and gain, no 
dishonest intention, hence no liability. 
In determining whether a thing is 'property' the value 
I 
of it is iiranaterial. 
CTOY?r8iro ^ servant ]iQjifi£ 8P?g»l iiuat 
When a servant deputed to receive money for a 
particular object and spent on did not utilize it for that object 
inspite of the fact that he was called to account for, but gave a 
false statement that he used the received money for that 
(1904) 1 Cr. LJ. 603 (605) All. 
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particular object was held to have coinnitted criminal breach of 
I 
trust. 
A salesman employed by a cooperative society was 
charged for shortage of clothes entrusted to him. He admitted 
the shortage of clothes as also his liability to pay the value of 
clothes. Further admitted that he alone was responsible fo r the 
II 
shortage. He was convicted under this section. 
In a case where a servant employed by a firm to 
purchase paddy of a specific quality on a specified price 
for which he was to receive conmission for the work and also was 
given the necessary money for such purchase and all expenses to 
be incurred in purchasing the paddy and bringing up to the mill, 
diverted the greater part of such money to his 
III 
own use, was held guilty under this section. 
A munsiff in a village authorised to collect the 
repayments of loan due to the government, failed to remit the 
money to the treasury for a few months. Government issued notice 
to him to collect and remit the same to the treasury. He denied 
any collection of repayment loans, and also demanded 
a second payment from the depositors. Munsiff under the 
I. Wallson & Co. V. Golab Khan (1868) lOWR (Gr.) 28. 
II. Ramchandaran A.K. 1972 Cr. L.j - 698 (Mad) 
III. Pyo Gyi (1919) ILBR 31 : 20 Cr. L.j. 513. 
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circumstances was held liable for misappropriation and breach of 
I 
trust. 
In Sapneshwar Thappa's case, a certain sum of money was 
with drawn from the Depositor's Account. The accused in this 
case admitted that he passed the necessary pay order. Entries in 
the register, and cash book also indicated the withdrawal. 
However, it was clear that the application for withdrawal was not 
moved by the depositor, instead by the accused himself. Accused 
failed to give any explanation about such entries and withdrawal 
application, it was held that the accused himself withdrew the 
II 
amount and misappropriated. 
'Where a railway servant was supplied with a water-
proof coat on condition that if it was damaged or lost it would 
be renewed at the cost of the railway servant. Delivery of water 
proof coat was an entrustment, and when he attempted to pawn the 
garment, he was liable to conviction under this section read with 
III 
section 511. 
An accused a paid servant, supervisor of a society, 
connected with the cooperative movement, debited RS 2/= as the 
pay of a sweeper woman, took the thumb impression of his nephew 
against the debit entry, certified the thumb impression to be 
I. Vijayaraghava Reddiar (1956) mwn 79. 
II. State V. Sapneshwar tappa (1987), G.Lj 612 (Ori) 
III. Nga Aung Thein (1933, 35 Cr. L.j. 788. 
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that of the sweeper woman, and appropriated the amount to 
himself, it was held that he committed the offence of criminal 
I 
breach of trust. 
Public ggrvant 
Section 409 deals with criminal breach of trust cases 
comnitted by public servant in the capacity of a public servant. 
A property entrusted to a person happens to be a public servant 
is not sufficient. For the application of section 409, it is 
necessary that the property must have been entrusted to a public 
servant and he has authority to receive the property in his 
capacity as public servant. 
Separate section has been devoted because the 
responsibilities of public servant are of highly significant 
character. It involves greater control and care because of 
secrecy and confidentiality. If there is breach of trust, it may 
lead to serious public and private calamities. 
I. Keshaoarao (1934), 36. Bom. LR. 1120. 
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"Who ia £iibli£ Servant?" 
I 
Section 21 Indian Penal Code enumerates the various 
functionaries who are designated as public servant. In fact the 
I. Section 21 - Indian Penal Code: 
"Public Servant" - The words "public servant" denote a person 
falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following, 
namely: 
First - Rep. 
Second - Every Conmissioned Officer in the Military, Naval or 
Air Force of India; 
Third - Every Judge including any person, empowered by law to 
discharge' whether by himself or as a member of any body of 
person,s any adjudicatory functions; 
Fourth - Every officer of Court of Justice (including 
liquidator, receiver or commissioner) whose duty it is, as 
such officer, to investigate or report, on any matter of law 
or fact, or to make, authenticate, or keep any docvunent, or 
to take charge or dispose of any property, or to execute any 
judicial process, or to administer any oath, or to interpret, 
or to preserve order in the Court, and every person specially 
authorised by a Copurt of Justice to perfom any of such 
duties; 
Fifth - Every juryman, or member of a panchayat assisting a 
Court of Justice or public servant; 
Sixth - Every arbitrator or other person to whom any cause or 
matter has been referred for decision or report by any Court 
of Justice, or by any other competent public authority; 
Seventh - Every person who holds any office by virtue of which 
he is empowered to place or keep any person in confinement; 
Eight - Every officer of the Government whose duty it is, as 
such officer, to prevent offences, to give information of 
offences, to bring offenders to justice, or to protect the 
public health, safety or convenience; 
Ninth - Every officer, whose duty is, as such officer, to 
take, receive, keep or expend any property on behalf of the 
Government, or to make any survey, assessment or contract on 
behalf of the government or to execute any revenue process, or 
to investigate, or to report, on any matter affecting the 
aA9 
section does not define the term 'public servant'. It may be 
said that the general characteristic of a public servant is that 
he performs certain public functions. The Supreme Court in G.A 
the pecuniary , interest of the Government or to make, 
authenticate or keep any document relating to the pecuniary 
interest of the Government, or to prevent the infraction of 
any law for the protection of the pecuniary interest of the 
Government. 
Tenth - Every officer whose duty it is as such officer, to 
take, receive, keep or expend any property, to make any survey 
or assessment or to levy any rate or tax for any secular 
common purpose of any village, town or district, or to make, 
authenticate or keep any document for the ascertaining of the 
rights of the people of any village, town or district; 
Eleventh - Every person who holds any office by virtue of 
which he is empowered to prepare, publish, maintain or revise 
an electoral roll or to conduct an election; 
Twelfth - Every person. 
(a) in the service or pay. of the Government or remtmerated by 
fees or comnission for the performance of any public duty by 
the Government. 
(b) in the service or pay of the local authority, or 
corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or 
State Act or a Government Company as defined in Section 617 
of the Companies Act, 1956. 
Illustration 
A Municipal Conmissioner is a public servant. 
Explanation 1 - Persons falling under any of the above 
descriptions are public servants whether appointed by the 
Government or not. 
Explanation 2 - Wherever the words 'public servants' occur 
they shall be understood of every person who is in actual 
possession of the situation of a public servant, whatever 
legal defect there may be in his right to hold that 
situation. 
Explanation 3 - The word 'election' denotes an election for 
the purpose of electing members of any legislative, municipal 
or other public authority, of whatever character the method 
of selection to which is by, or under, any law prescribed as 
by election. 
aso 
I 
Montario's case laid down the test whether a person is a public 
servant as follows: 
(1) Whether he is in the service or pay of the 
government, and 
(2) Where he is entursted with the performance of any 
public duty. 
Essential to be proved in a charge agaist a public 
servant under this section are: 
(1) Being entrusted with property, or dominion over 
property. 
(2) In his capacity of public servaint. 
(3) Commits crminal breach of trust. 
Criminal breach of trust under this section is to be 
construed in the light of the provisions of section 405. 
Dishonest intention, disposing of the property in violation of 
law prescribing the mode of discharge of such trust or violetion 
of terms of contract for the execution of such trust or 
conversion to one's own use of such property are all part of 
study under this section as well. 
Criminal liability under this section must be strictly 
proved. Initial entrustment of property and subsequent dishonest 
I. 1957 A.I.R. SC. 13 
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conversion by a public servant must be proved. The mistaken 
belief of the person delivering the property, or of the person 
accepting it, or of both, that the letter was authorized to 
receive it in his public capacity cannot alter the facts and 
supply the deficient and requisite authority so as to convert 
I 
simple breach of trust into breach of trust by a public servant. 
A public servant is not ip-so-facto guilty of the 
offence of criminal breach of trust if he is negligent in seeing 
that the rules about remitting money to treasury are not 
observed, but something more, that is, dishonest intention is 
required. If a person opens a current account in the bank it 
would not amount to entrustment because the relationship between 
the bank and the customer is one of creditor and debtor. Bank 
may invest the money so deposited in any project it likes. There 
will be no violation of any provision dealing with criminal 
II 
breach of trust. 
Misappropriation of property at a future date is not 
III 
covered by this section. 
It is not necessary that misappropriation should take 
place after the creation of a legally current entrustment of 
dominion over the property. 'Official capacity' of the public 
servant should also not be strictly construced. 'A legal defect 
T. Bhag Singh (1876) PR No. 24 of 1876, at p. 46. 
II. Gopesh Chandra V. Nirmal Kumar (1950, 51 Cr. L.j. 388. 
III. Ahmed Din (1934) 36 Cr. L.j. 165. 
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in the scope of ostensible authority of a public servant does not 
stand as a bar if the facts of the case establish a nexus 
I 
between his acts and capacity. 
::5ffigUfia iffia aad islatsd sipnaiQua" 
:iSfi£Ui2& ifi2 iBd SfisUsa M I££!l 
For an offence under section 409, physical presence for 
participation in the commission of crime is not an essential 
II 
ingredient. Where criminal breach of trust under section 407 
has been comnitted involving participation of number of persons, 
all such persons, shall be charged under section 409 read with 
section 34, penal code. Essential requisite to be established by 
the prosecution is the entrustment of the property to all 
III 
jointly . Where two persons participating in diverse acts that 
led to criminal misappropriation both accused held would be 
liable under sections 409/34 I.P.C. even though the other accused 
IV 
was not present when final 3ct was committed. 
"Section iQS. M d Section M}'^(c) Pr^yenUpn of C<?crUPU9n hsL. 
1947" 
Both section are limited to the offences committed by 
T. 1974 sec. (Cr.) 359 (SomNath), 1975 Cr. L.j. 1122. 
II. A 1960 Sc. 889. 
III. 1967 Cr. L.j. 1429 
IV. ILR (197^^ I EOTO. lOa C244), 
5^3 
the public officers. Question is whether Section 5(1)(c) of 
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 repeal or abrogate Section 409 
I.P.C.? Supreme Court has clearly laid down that section 
I 
5(1)(c) neither repeals nor abrogates section 409 I.P.C. The 
offence under section 5(1)(c) is distinct from the offence 
coimnitted under section 409 I.P.C. There can be a trial and 
conviction under section 409 of the code even though the accused 
may have been acquitted in a trial for an offence under section 
II 
5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 
In another case the Lordships of Supreme Court 
observed, "The preamble of Prevention of Corruption Act makes it 
clear that the intention was to make effective provisions for the 
prevention of bribery and corruption. From this itself, it is 
clear that the legislature was alive to the fact that something 
more stringent and drastic than section 409, Penal Code was 
necessary in the case of bribery and corruption by public 
servants and it was to effectuate that intention that the Act was 
III 
put on the statute book". 
"Conviction under section 409, I.P.C. and also under 
section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of 
IV 
Corruption Act is not illegal". 
I. A 1960 SC 889, 
II. A 1957 SC 593. 
III. A 1957 SC 458 (461). 
IV. 1978 Cr. L.j. (NOC) 175 (Goa). 
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Under section 5(l)(c) of prevention of Corruption Act, 
1947, a person is liable for misconduct if he dishonestly or 
fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own 
use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a 
public servant, or allows any other person so to do." 
Punishment for violation of above provision is provided 
in section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act. Further sub-
section 4 of that section clearly lays down that the provisions 
of section 5 shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any 
other law for the time being in force and that nothing contained 
therein shall exempt any public servant from any proceeding which 
might, apart from that section be instituted against him'. 'It 
is open to the prosecution to proceed against the accused under 
I 
either provision'. 
Under both the sections, that is, for prosecution of a 
public servant under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption 
Act, and section 409 IPC it is necessary that the 'sanction to 
prosecute' must be obtained from the government. Section 
section 409 I.P.C.is governed by section 197, Cr. P.C. which foays 
down that a public servant not removable from his office save by 
or with the sanction of the government is accused of any offence 
alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting 
to act in the discharge of his official duty, no court shall take 
cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction of 
either central or state government. 
A case under section 161 and 5(1)(c) was lodged. Police 
reported that no offence under section 161 I.P.C. and section 
T. A 1955 Bom 451 (454) (FB). 
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5(1)(c) had been made out against the accused. The special judge 
accepted the report but observed that an offence under section 
409 was made out. It was held by the High Court that the special 
judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence under 
I 
section 409. 
"Section 409 and Section 477 A" 
Section 477 A deals with falsification of books and 
accounts even though there is no proof of misappropriation. Such 
falsification of accounts or books must be by a clerk, officer 
or servant and is distinct from misappropriation and criminal 
breach of trust. However, an accused may be guilty under both 
the sections 409 and 477 A I.P.O. but a single charge is illegal, 
unlesss the offences form the part of same transaction under 
II 
section 235 of Criminal Procedure Code. 'The acquittal of a 
person of an offence under section 477 A is no bar to a trial 
III 
under this section'. Falsification of accounts may be an 
IV 
evidence of misappropriation or breach of trust.' 
When a clerk or servant is being prosecuted under 
senction 409, no sanction for prosecution is required. But a 
case falling under section 477A, sanction for prosecution is 
I. 1975 Cr. L.j. 978 (Raj.) 
II. A 1956 SC. 149 (153). 
III. A 1956 Mad 130. 
IV. 1955 Cr. L.j. 1520. 
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I 
required. 
ZSfisiifla IM and Ifl& ingwaag? hsL and ml 
Section 104 and 105 of Insurance Act are not identical 
in content and scope with section 409 I.P.C. Offence under 
section 409 is not the same offence as under section 105 
Insurance Act and hence Article 202, of the constitution or 
II 
section 26 of the general clauses (X of 1897 cannot be applied. 
For the prosecution under section 409 I.P.C. cannot be said to be 
instituted in order to by pass the requirement of sanction under 
III 
the Insurance Act. 
Section 242 of the Companies Act, 1956 is another which 
is distinct from section 409 I.P.C. 'If it appears to the 
central government that any person referred to there-in under 
section 242 of the Companies Act has been guilty of any offence 
for which he is criminally liable, the central government may 
prosecute the person for the offence. However, this section 242 
is an enabling section and does not deprive a Police Officer of 
his jurisdiction to investigate into a complaint of an offence 
under sections 406 and 409 I.P.C. and initiate proceedings in 
the court, even if the acts in respect of which the offences 
I. 2940 Cr. L.j. 463. 
II. 1961 Cr. L.j. 725 (SC). 
III. A 1969, Delhi 330 (349) (DB) 
as? 
I 
arise were committed in relation to the affairs of a company. 
::5a£Ufln m. L^ZJ^J. and Sfgtioa 52^ faat Qiilss. IsLLimi 
Both the sections above referred are different in nature 
and scope. A magistrate is not competent to try an offence 
under section 52 Post Office Act. While under section 409 I.P.C 
magistrate has jurisdiction to try the case. If a case under 
section 52 tried by magistrate, trial would be void as 
being without jurisdiction. Offence under the section falls 
within the juridiction of a Session Court. A retrial for the 
offence under section 52 Post Office Act would not be barred by 
II 
virtue of section 461 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 
Section 409 and Section X± ai jhs EmPl<?Y^e'g PlTPYi^ fflt fmJ Afit 
Offence under section 409 I.P.C. and section 14 of 
Employee's Provident Funds Act may not be considered as same 
III 
offence so as to bar fresh trial. 
"§9cU9B m. I.P.C. aad StgUon A2fl I.F,C." 
To constitute an offence of breach of trust property 
must come into the hands of the accused in a lawful manner or 
I. 1957 Cr. L.j. 205 
II. A 1970 Goa 7 (12) 
III. 1976 Cr. L.j. 868 (Pr. 5) 
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with the consent of the owner. Entrustment implies handing over 
in a lawful manner. It also implies that the person entrusting 
the property has confidence in the person taking the property. 
Thus it creates a fiduciary relationship between them. This 
confidence would be lacking if the property has been acquired by 
a deceit. If there is false representation or deceit applied for 
obtaining the property from the owner, it would not amount 
entrustment which is essential igredient for the offence of 
cheating. Instead the act would fall under section 420 I.P.C. 
Deception is the basic requirement for the application of section 
420 I.P.C. If the property is obtained for one purpose lawfully 
and later used for another, the offence is one under section 406 
I 
and not under section 420 I.P.C. 
As studied ealier under section 405 and 406 I.P.C, 
property must have been entrusted to the accused. Without 
entrustment section 409 would not be applied. Whether the 
property is entrusted or not depends upon the facts and 
circumstances of a case. If nature of the transaction is loan, 
even the parties to the transaction in writting call it a trust, 
it would not be covered by section 409. It is not a trust. For 
example A financed the accused B at his business of purchase and 
sale of gunny bags. As security the bags were stored in the 
I. 1974 Cr. L.j. 207 (Ker.) 
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godown of A for which B had to pay rent and the sale proceeds had 
to be paid to A. B had to pay interest to A on the loan 
advanced. It was held that neither the money advanced nor the 
I 
goods purchased were entrusted to B'; 
In another case the accused was working as a post-
delivery agent. "A postal insured cover allegedly containing Rs 
1000/= currency notes was handed over to the accused for delivery 
to the addressee. After delivery the cover was opened in the 
presence of the addressee by the accused but instead of the notes 
some pieces of paper were found therein. it was held that the 
conviction of the accused could not be sustained as the essential 
ingredient of entrustment was not proved by the prosecution by 
clear or cogent evidence that at the time the cover was handed 
II 
over to the accused it contained the notes". 
Similarly, in Tapan Kumar Mitra case, where a partner 
of firm was charged for criminal breach of trust, held not 
liable. Facts of the case were that the accused partner opened a 
bank account in the name of partnership firm in another bank 
showing himself as its sole propreitor and uncashed the cheques 
payable to the partnership firm and got the amount deposited in 
his account he cannot be charged under this section because in 
the absence of an agreement between him and the other partners 
I. 1938 Suid 57 (58); 39 Cr. L.j. 399. 
II. Fakria Nayak 1987 Cr. L.j. 1479 (Ori.). 
:j6o 
specifically authorising the accused to collect the money in 
question, there was no entrustment of property within section 409 
I 
I.P.C. 
Illustrative cases of breach of trust by public servant 
may be cited below: 
Money handed over to the money-order issue clerk in a 
II 
post office is money entrusted to him. 
Money given to the post-master for opening a new saving 
III 
bank account is money entrusted to him. 
Where under an agreement between the accused and the 
government, the accused is under a duty to sell to persons grain 
stored in government building and pay the sale proceeds to the 
IV 
government, the accused is entrusted with the property. 
An employee of the government bound to keep custody of, 
and to account for, the receipts and disbursement pertaining to 
government funds without any power of disposition over them is 
V 
entrusted with the property. 
I. 1987 Cr. L.j. 483 (Cal.) 
II. A 1957 Orissa 268. 
III. (1975) 1 All L.R. 166 
IV. A 1956 Hyd. 180. 
V. (1908) 8 Cr. L.j. 492. 
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Where the accused, a petty officer with salt department 
was empowered to sell salt at reduced prices only to ticket 
holders, but he really bought the salt himself at the reduced 
rates and entered the sales in the government books as if sold to 
ticket-holders, it was held that the accused was entrusted with 
I 
salt and that what he did was a breach of trust. 
V.P.P. articles handed over to a postman for delivery 
II 
to the addresses, are property entrusted to him. 
A constable who was given the pay of his Thana Police 
III 
is entursted with the amount. 
Where the President and sales clerk of co-operative 
society were entrusted with levy sugar for distributing it to 
ration-card holders, however, they sold it to persons other than 
the ration-card holders; they would be guilty of offence under 
IV 
this section. 
Where a sub-post-master had forged the thumb impression 
of a party and misappropriated the money order amount he would be 
V 
guilty under this section. 
I. I. Weir 467 (468( (DB). 
II. A 1959 Mys. 185. 
III. (1865) 3 Suth WR Cr. (44) (DB). 
IV. 1981 Cr. L.j. 258 (Mad.) 
V. Naujappa DC 1971 Sec (Cr.) II. 
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Entrustment implies: 
(1) handing over the property to another person. 
(2) placing confidence. 
(3) Creating fiduciery relationship between them. 
Above noted requirements must be proved for a valid 
entrustment. If entrustment with above regusites not proved, 
there would be no criminal breach of trust. Where the ownership 
has passed with the transfer of goods, a person cannot be said 
I 
entrusted with the property. 
II 
A purchaser of property is not a trustee. A booking 
clerk recovering in excess of legal charge and not crediting 
III 
excess to railway-excess amount not held entrusted to him. 
Where money or other property is obtained by practising deception 
there can be no question of entrustment because where the custody 
is made over, the property or right there in pass to the 
IV 
recipient. 
For entrustment it is not necessary that the property 
given possession should be the property of on whose behalf it is 
I. A 1967 Cal. 568. 
II. A 1968 SC 700. 
III. A 1923 Lah. 295 (1). 
IV. (1970) 36 Cut. L.T. 39(52) 
(All illustrative cases are noted from Indian Penal Code, 
Vol. 3, by V.R. Mohar and W.W. Chitaley page 349.) 
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received. Where the possession of the property given for a 
specific purpose or to deal with in a particular manner, the 
ownership of property being vested in some person other than the 
accused, he can be said to be entrusted with the property. 
'Where goods are entrusted to A for sale and A sells 
them, the sale proceeds also must be regarded as property 
I 
entrusted to him'. Similarly where money is given to a person 
to purchase paddy, the paddy purchased with the money can be said 
II 
to be entrusted to A. 
'The property must have been entrusted to the acussed 
personally. A person who is the manager of a firm cannot be said 
III 
to be entrusted with property which was entrusted to the firm'. 
As to property, concept should be clear, it must be a 
difinite property or sum of money than only the elements of 
criminal breach of trust, that is, entrustment of property, or 
dominion over property and dishonest misappropriation or 
conversion etc can be the basis for conviction. 'Property under 
IV 
this section does not include inmovable property.' Further 
property must belong to some one, not necessarily the entrusting 
person should be the owner of it. It is also not the aim of the 
I. A 1932 Sind 169; 34 Cr. L.j. 51 (DB) 
II. A 1955 Trav. Co. 271 : 1955 Cr. L.j. 1539 (DB). 
III. A 1930 Rang 332 : 32 Cr. L.j. 149, (1975) 1 Andh. Pra. L.j. 
119. 
IV. (1954) 56 Punj. L.R. 521. 
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section that the entrustment should fulfil all the legal 
formalities needed for the creation of a trust. It may be 
entrusted in any manner. Direct entrustment to the accused is 
also not necessary. it will be sufficient if a person recieved 
the control over the property under circumstances whereby he 
becomes entursted. Therefore, where a parcel registered and 
delivered at the post office for transmission each of the postal 
employeed authorised to receive and handle it for the purpose of 
I 
its transmission becomes entrusted with it. 
P<?miBiOB over Property 
The phrase dominion over property has earlier been 
discussed in detail. Here some cases selected to public servant 
would be discussed. A public servant is liable in case either he 
has been entrusted the property or has dominion over it and 
violates the conditions of his duties assigned to him in regard 
to such property. A public servant responsible for spending a 
certain sum of money for specific purpose but has no dominion 
over the money other then passing the orders for payment 
thereof. The person under whose the certain sum of money is, 
dies, and the public servant cannot produce voucher for the 
actual expenses incurred by him due to his death and owner of 
money himself is also satisfied with the payment made, there is 
no case of criminal breach of trust. 
I. 1973 Kash L.j. 79 (81) DB. 
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Capacity 2£ i £ubU£ Sfiixiai 
Entrustment of property must be to a public servant in 
his capacity as a public servant. If the entrustment is made in a 
private capacity of public servant section 409 I.P.O. will not 
apply. Receipt of the property may be fraudulant or improper or 
innocently made. The mode is not material what is significant is 
the enturstment to public servant than only the provisions of 
section 409 I.P.C. are attracted. 
"Although in order to bring a public servant within 
this section, the entrustment should have been made to him in his 
capacity of public servant, it is not necessary that the 
misappropriation should have been made in his capacity of public 
I 
servant. Even if a public servant in his private capacity 
misappropriates but entrusted property in his capacity of public 
servant, he would be liable under section 409 I.P.C. A Patwari 
in his capacity as public servant collecting various sums of 
money on behalf of state paid lesser amount in the treasury, 
would be liable under this section. 
Property entrusted to a public servant need not be a 
government property. In a case where a public servant is under a 
duty to receive money and enter the cash balance in the register 
day today but fails to do so and misappropriates the money, and 
I. (1962) 
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also does not hand over the money to his successor, he will be 
convicted for criminal breach of trust under this section. 
Where a public servant relinquishes his office and 
hands over the charge to his nominee who has not been appointed 
to the post, would not be considered a public servant, and any 
misappropriation made by such nominee would not under him liable 
for criminal breach of servant under this section because he is 
not a public servant. But if a person is appointed by the 
government for a temporary period, entrusted with property, 
dishonestly misappropriates, he would be punished under this 
section. 
"A Lambardar came to deposit amount collected by him as 
land revenue in the treasury and treasury officer was on leave. 
To avoid coming over again he paid the amount to the accused, a 
Jamadar, for depositing in the treasury. The accused did not 
deposit the amount. It was argued that since it was no part of 
the official duties of the accused to accept this type of money, 
hence the Lambardar wrongly paid this amount to the accused no 
criminal offence much less an offence under section 409 was made 
out". 
It was held that the requirement of the law is that a 
person should be a public servant and in that capacity he should 
receive property or dominion over property in the form of 
entrustment and in that situation it becomes his bounden duty to 
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discharge that trust in the manner undertaken by him or at least 
to deal with that property in an honest manner and, if he acts in 
violation of those directions or dishonestly misappropriates the 
same, he is guilty of the offence even of that entrustment was 
made to him under an erroneous assumption. The accused was thus 
I 
convicted under section 409 I.P.O." 
For the application of section 409 I.P.O. following 
persons, under different decided cases by different High Courts, 
have been held to be public servants. 
(1) h Naib Nazir. 
(2) an extra department branch post-master. 
(3) a person temporarily carrying on duties but under 
a letter of appointment from the government. 
(4) the officiating RulKarni of a village. 
(5) an employee of Shipping Corporation of India. 
(6) Railway material clerk in charge of stores. 
(7) a Mouzadar in Assam. 
(8) a Quirq Amin. 
(9) a Sanitary Inspector of Municipality. 
(10) Person appointed by government and his salary paid 
through the collector. 
(11) a patwari collecting various sums on behalf of 
state, etc. etc. 
State V. Wazira Ram (1986) Cr. L.j. 995 (HP). 
(Law of Crimes by Rataulal & Dhirajlal, Vol. II, 23rd 
Edition., p. 1564). 
.168 
The listing all by designation will become 
quite exhaustive. The test is that a person should have a letter 
of appointment. He should be under the control of government 
receives the salary from the government. Further he is entrusted 
with the property as a public servant, and dishonestly 
misappropriates or converts the same to his own use. 
Controversy i£ i^ i ] ^ apDlicabilitv QI ??<?U9B Ml t.PrC, 
io PMbiig sgrvants 
As discussed earlier controversy was arisen with Gurcharan 
I 
Singh's case, in which the Punjab High Court took a view that 
after the enforcanent of section 5 of the Pirevention of 
Corruption Act 1947, this section 409 I.P.C. concerning offences 
by public servants was "pro-tanto repealed". This view has been 
II III 
dissented by Madras High Court, Rajasthan High Court, Hydrabad 
IV V VI 
High Court, Bombay Hight Court, Calcutta High Court, 
VII VIII 
Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court, Pepsu High Court , 
IX 
and Madhya Bharat High Court. The gist of different dissenting 
I. Gurcharan Singh (1954), Punj. 35. 
II. Satyanarayane Murthy 1952 MWN 957. 
III. Gulab Singh (1954) U. Raj. 910. 
IV. Jayarama Iyer 1954 Cr. L.j. 464. 
V. Pandurang Baburao (1955) 57 Bom L.R. 868. 
VI. Amarendra nath Rao (1955) Cr. L.j, 784. 
VII. Om Prakash 1955 Cr. L.j. 754 (FB), 
VIII.Raj Kumar 1956 Cr. L.j. 100. 
IX. Madhoprased 1953 MLR Cr. 38. 
decisions is : Section 5 (l)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption 
6^9 
decisions is : section 5 (1) (c) of the Prevention of Corruption 
Act, after its enforcement does not repeal section 409 I.P.C. 
Pro-tonto. After the amendment of section 5 inserting sub-clause 
(4) it has been made abundantly clear that section 409 has not 
been repealed. Even before amendment section 5 (l)(c) cannot be 
held to have impliedly repealed section 409, as a special law 
does not repeal the general law unless the intention is made 
clear in that law. A public servant can be prosecuted under 
section 409, notwithstanding section 5(2) of the Prevention of 
Corruption Act. In case of criminal breach of trust by a public 
servant, it was open to the prosecution to launch prosecution 
either under section 409 or under section 5(2) of the Prevention 
of Corruption Act. 
The controversy ultimately rested with the decision of 
Supreme Court in Veereshwar Rao. It held "that the offence of 
criminal misconduct punishable under, section 5(2) of the 
Prevention of Corruption Act, is not identical in essence, import 
and content with an offence under section 409 of the Penal Code. 
The offence of criminal misconduct is a new offence created by 
that enactment and does not repeal by implication or abrogate 
section 409 of the Penal Code". Supreme Court further held, 
"that the view taken by the Punjab High Court in Gurcharan 
Singh's case is not sound and it has approved of the view taken 
by the Bombay High Court in Pandurang Baburao, by the Madras High 
I. 1957 SCJ. 519 : (1957) Cr. L.j. 892. 
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Court in Satyanarayana Murthy, and by the Culcutta Hight Court 
in Amarendra Nath Rao'*. With this decision the controversy has 
now been finally set at rest. 
•J71 
CHAPTER III 
PART B 
J i I M L U n SE SESl^MIfi SflfiSK I£IililiI£ L M 
Employing servant to work in accordance to the 
directions of the master is justified and legal under the Islamic 
law. Justification can be inferred from Allah's commandments in 
Qurane-Pak and Prophet's (peace be upon him), Sunnah. Allah-
Ta'ala in Ayah 26 and Surah 28 says: 
(n : ol ^^J».^\ Sj^^ 
"(No doubt) the best of men for you 
to employ is the strong, the trustworthy". 
(28 : 26). 
AHADITH - A VIEW 
Number of Ahadith are there in which it is made clear 
that Prophet (peace be upon him) himself, in his life time 
employed persons, and assigned different works to them to be 
performed. For example, he employed persons as treasurers, and 
persons to shepher sheeps. He employed not only Muslims but non-
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Muslims alan_^nd_ a35s4aaad_dif ^ er^nt works to them. He (peace be 
upon him) employed for short period as well as for long period 
to work. He engaged servants not only for doing ininediate work, 
but assigned works which were to be performed after passing 
specific times. For example, employed persons to work after 
three days, or after one month or after one year. The 
significance lies on the point that whatever contract entered, it 
was to be executed honourably. 
Prophet (peace be upn him) employed servants or 
labourers, for services to be rendered- during Holy battles. 
There were cases where persons were employed to work for specific 
period, without telling the nature of work to be performed by 
them. This is also justified by Quranic injuction '28 : 27' also. 
Prophet (peace be upon him) employed persons for house 
repair purposes, to work upto midday or up to Asr-prayer or even 
thereafter. Services of porters and brokers were also utilised 
by him (peace be upon him). 
Justifying the employment of the servants we will study 
I 
some of the relevant Ahadith as follows: 
XXXVI - 'THE BOOK OF HIRING', The Translation of the Meaning 
of SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, ARABIC-ENGLISH - Volume III, By Dr. 
Muhammed Muhsin Khan, I.U., Al-Medina .- Al-Munawwara. 
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L : JU ^ ^ <J* <JJI J - ^ 1 y^. .-c* ail ^ j S ^ ^ ^^ 1 
.pi : JUi Sc^lj : ^jU-l JUi .|LJJI ^^J "ilj L J aJI »i-u 
.;S- J*M i« j l> i JA L U J I . i j^ 
Narrated Abu Huraira (r.a.) : The Prophet (p.b.u.h) said, "Allah 
did not send any prophet but shepherded sheep." His companions 
asked him. "Did you do the same?" The Prophet (p.b.u.h) replied, 
"Yes, I used to shepherd the sheep of the people of Mecca for 
some Qirats." 
.*U-yi JAI -^jt fJ I^J jJ iljjjJJ\ x;^ Orr^ j-^ l jUiJi-l 
•-r?^  ^Ai f^J ^ ^' ih isr^^ <>^J 
The employment of pagans (by Muslims) if necessary, or if no 
Muslim is available for that purpose. had the Prophet (p.b.u.h) 
employed the Jews of Khaibar (for the purpose of land 
irrigation). 
^ ' J - iSt^^ J^^h • ^ ^^ tr^J '^^^ O^ Jtij^^ Oi hj^ 
KS'^ Oi '^ (ii O* f^ 'Ji^^ (S^ O" "^J J^ Jt^ J (^J ^ 
Oi iT"^ ' J t^ ^ ^ Otn U-** "^ * *i'*H^^ ^ ^ ^ *k^^ 
JU Uj--» L^t^l^ UbU .JU ^^^ j ^ j j i jU *lj* j l 
. J*LJI j - > _^j ^ JL-I ^ 
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Narrated 'Aisha (r.a.) : The Prophet (p.b.u.h) and Abu Bakr 
employed a (pagan) man from the tribe of Bani Ad-Dai1 and the 
tribe of Bani 'Abd bin 'Adi as a guide. He was an expert guide 
and he broke the oath contract which he had to abide by with the 
tribe of Al-'Asi bin Wa'il and he was on the religion of Quraish 
pagans. The Prophet (p.b.u.h) and Abu Bakr had confidence in him 
and gave him their riding camels and told him to bring them to 
the Cave of Thaur after three days. So, he brought them their 
two riding camels after three days and both of them (The Prophet 
(p.b.u.h) and Abu Bakr) set out accompanied by 'Amir bin Fuhaira 
and the Dili guide who guided them below Mecca along the road 
leading to the sea-shore. 
It is legal if somebody hires someone to work for him after three 
days or after one month or after a year. When that period 
elapses they should carry out their contract. 
'J^j^ j ^ t«-» J* >*J ^ > ^-^^ ik"^^ ij^ ir'^j J^ Ji^J fi-j tJ* *iJI t^ 
Narrated 'Aisha (r.a.), the wife of the Prophet (p.b.u.h) : 
Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) and Abu Bakr hired a man from the tribe 
of Bani-Ad-Dil as an expert guide who was a pagan (folljer of the 
religion of pagans of Quraish). The Prophet (p.b.u.h) and Abu 
Bakr gave him their two riding camels and took a promise from him 
to bring their riding camels in the morning of the third day to 
the Cave of Thaur. 
Employing labourers for services in Holy battles. 
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S^^l JLrt- |JLj <JU ail J - ^^1 ^ •^I'jjitJlS <:* ail ^ ^ j 
^ .UM J:Ui ^ 1 Jc,^ , ^ J jut ji^l ^ ^ l ^ 
jIliSU • Ls 1 o ,^:1 jO^U 4«^J ^ > ^ U «<^L> ^^J LAJA.! 
^ . * - - | 2,^1 g i5 j ,4i-:i jd^U ^ j 4Jit ail J - ^ 1 JJ 
.J*JJI ^ IS JU <--.t :JU ?l^ *JJC JLi 
Narrated Ya'la bin Umaya (r.a.) I fought in Jaish-al-'Usra 
(Ghazwa of Tabuk) along with Prophet (p.b.u.h) and in my opinion 
that was the best of my deeds. Then I had an employee, who 
quarrelled with someone and one of them bit and cut the other's 
finger and caused his own tooth to fall out. He then went to the 
Prophet (p.b.u.h) (with a complaint) but the Prophet (p.b.u.h) 
cancelled the suit and said to the complainant, "Did you expect 
him to let his finger in your mouth so that you might snap and 
cut it (as does a stallion camel)?" 
*lfc J i - *J-i. ^  .'SA» ^ t ^ 2^  ail ^ ^^J-.j :^j^ ^J JIS 
.c* aji 
Narrated Ibn Juraij from 'Abdullah bin Abu Mulaika from his 
grandfather a similar story: A man bit the hand of another man 
and caused his own toooth to fall out, but Abu Bakr (r.a.) judged 
that he had no right for compensation (fot thfe broken tooth). 
±,j] ^J < l ^ J ^ l ^ (J^ J^MI J ^ \j^\ j^\l^\ l i j 
j^k -J^j Jj^^ iM -"^y^ J) -c^^ 15^' ^-^i ^^^^ 0' 
.ail j j * r s i j > i i i ^^ cuj j * j - . i <-u- : L ^ 
If somebody employes someone and tells him the period for which 
he is employed, is it permissible for him not to tell him the 
nature of the work? (it is permissible, if he takes into 
consideration Allah's Statement: 
"I intend to wed one of these two daughters of mine to you'. Till 
the end of the Verse,' Allah is a surety over what we say. •" 
a 76 
O U o « ^ jl -liji U^l- l-S* o' J» Ijr^ ' J^l^l I^J 
It is permissible for one to employ someone to repair a wall 
which is about to collapse. 
:x-^ JIS ^ yJL, J x.^ U ^ '-^y l ^ ^ ••H--> U . ^ 1 J- 4JI 
Narrated Ubai bin Ka'b (r.a.) : Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) said, 
"Both of them (Moses and Al-Khadir) proceeded on till they 
reached a wall which was about to fall." Sa'id said, "(Al-Khadir 
pointed) with his hands (towards the wall) and then raised his 
hands and the wall became straiahtened UD." Ya'la said, "T think 
Sa'id said, 'He (Khadir) passed his hand over it and it was 
straiqhtened UP." (Moses said to him), "If you had wanted, vou 
could have taken waqes for it." Sa'id said, "Waqes with which to 
buy food." 
Employment up to midday, 
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JAI J L J ^ sJU ^ j <JU UJI J - ^^1 ^ .L4;i* Jil ^^ j ^ 
Jj jl|dl O-J cr- J J-e Or- '-JIS r -^^^ ^^^^ --^'-^ > J ^ ' 
.*Ui1 ^ <-;jt J-J *dJai :JU '^i 
Narrated Ibn 'Omar (r.a.) " The Prophet (p.b.u.h) said, "Your 
example and the example of the people of the the two Scriptures 
(i.e. Jews and Christians) is like the example of a man who 
employed some labourers and asked them, "Who will work for me 
from morning till midday for one Qirat?' The Jews accepted and 
carried out the work. He then asked, "Who will work for me from 
midday upto the *Asr prayer for one Qirat?' The Christians 
accepted and fulfilled the work. He then said, 'Who will work 
for me from the 'Asr till sunset for two Qirats7' You, Muslims 
have accepted the offer. The Jews and the Christians got angry 
and said, "Why should we work more and get lesser wages?" 
(Allah) said, "Have I with-held part of your right?" They replied 
in the negative. He said, "It is My Blessing, I bestow upon 
whomever I wish". 
. ^ ^ 1 i)L» JJ SjL)/l 
Employment upto the 'Asr prayer. 
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^jLxJij ^ ^ i j ^ u j : j i i ^ j <j* ail J - ail j ^ j J : L ^ 
1 1 ^ J* jl^JI O-J Jj J J ^ ^ :JUi .^/U J--I-I J - . ^ 
i»ljJi J^ ^jLajJI CJLC ^ -^Ijt^ ^'jt^ J^ ^.yki^^ cJrfjii ^ ^ i ^ 
J J I J ^ j i^ l ^ : I^Uj ^ jL *J l j i j^JI • ' : Vii -Or^' je i^t '^-rr^ 
Narrated 'Abdullah bin 'Umar bin Al-Khattab (r.a.) : Allah's 
Apostle (p.b.u.h) said, "Your example and the example of Jews and 
Christians is like the example of a man who employed some 
labourers to whom he said, :Who will work for me upto midday for 
one Qirat each?" The Jews carried out the work for one Qirat 
each; and then the Christians carried out the work up to 'Asr 
prayer for one Qirat each; and now you Muslims are working from 
the 'Asr prayer upto sunset for two Qirats each. The Jews and 
Christians got angry and said, "We work more and are paid less." 
cJjl J ^ dUJi :JIS .V :IJJIJ "jlLJi j.ii* ^ ^^Z,.\\y J* :J15 
The employer (Allah) asked them, "Have I usurped some of your 
right?" They replied in the negative. He said, "That is My 
Blessing, I bestow upon whomever I wish". 
.Ml 
'^^ ^ cr r\ 
The sin of him who withholds the wages of the employee. 
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^j. pi^ -jL lii «^ g u uii ju gu ^ j <j* uji J-, ^ 1 0* 
Narrated Abu Huraira (r.a.) : The Prophet (p.b.u.h) said, "Allah 
said, "I will be an opponent to three types of people on the Day 
of Resurrection:-
1. One who makes a covenent in My Name, but proves 
treachereous; 
2. One who sells a free person and eats his price; and 
3. One who employs a labourer and takes full work from him 
but does not pay him for his labour." 
.JJJI JJ ^ i ^ IjUf 
Employment from 'Asr till night. 
Jj^\ JJ U U U ^ .lyUi .JI4JI U-J J H l > - i ,^jL. ^ 1 J * J*UI J] L^ X - J ^ ^ ^ 
J \jf\i i ±.\S ^j^l I j j * ^ ^ cJL l>Ul .I>u3 ^ 1^ 4! JUi . JJiL l i U L j U JLLJA i5JJI 
'>f-^l «>- f i ' -s^j^ i^ JJ' f^J ' ' ^ (^>! *s^ 'jJ-^' «J*ii ' ^ J - ; t « > f ^ ^ ' j . l ^ p 
JlSJ .cyi U .rJ-* ^Ul ^'-^l ^ j JJtL LLx L ^ H^b _ ^ l S^U ,;;-» ^(^ (j( ^ ^ I^L-i 
.j>JI 11* ^  l_^l . J l - j ^ .iUli .L^JJ c«^>" ^ ^ l j i * l i - l j ,j-.iJI ^ U ^ ^ 
'A 80 
Narrated Abu Musa (r.a.) : The Prophet (p.b.u.h) said, "The 
example of Muslims, Jews and Christians is like the example of a 
nan who employed labourers to work for him from morning till 
night for specific wages. They worked till midday and then said, 
"We do not need your money which you have fixed for us and let 
whatever we have done be annulled." The man said to them, 'Don't 
quit the work, but complete the rest of it and take your full 
wages." But they refused and went away. The man employed 
another batch after them and said to them, "Complete the 
rest of the day and yours will be the wages I had fixed for the 
first batch." So, they worked till the time of 'Astr prayer. 
Then they said, "Let what we have done be annulled and keep the 
wages you have promised us for yourself." The man said to them, 
"Complete the rest of the work, as only a litle of the day 
remains," but they refused. Thereafter he employed another batch 
to work for the rest of the day and they worked for the rest of 
the day till the sunset, and they received the wages of the two 
former batches. So, that was the example of those people 
(Muslims) and the example of this light (guidance) which they 
have accepted willingly. 
c k v>* J^ ^^j* ^l2-il *-i J*-i Sj^l Jj2i l^ e^-t ^ L s - I ^ 
Whosoever employed a labourer (and after completing the work) the 
labourer left the wages and went away. The employer invested 
that money in some way and increased it thereby, or whoever 
invested somebody else's money in business and increased it 
thereby. 
X;aJ^ "^  tiltl^llj .jUN f^ ^J.^ J ^ l ^ *ja^ tSJjJ^ij . * ^ j j jli Jt .=.^1 i j j l , ^ 
. ^ I ^ ^U-^ ^ ^1 J ^IJ ^ . ^ J^j JUi . ^ U l jJU. *1» Ij^x: ^1 1^ S>-JI . i * ^ 
rjij -^i^j ' t i i i i dUJ <".!«> cj;^ Qt f^l . L | 3 ^ L j ^ L&SUZMI* , / A J I J_^ ^^ £» (.|ltltii7 J 
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^ ^ , .sjui l*-ii o«J irttf i " 0* J* jt^ -* ^ ^J C«J-^ ^ V ^ ^ 1^2*1^ iw^' <>- "*i- UJ 
LL* £ > U ^ ^ ^UsJ jUi cJ^ JUJ;S ^ | ^ « .142*1-1 ^ i^JI ^ JJJ ^ ^ j Jj ^ r^' *r»1 i^^ 
Narrated 'Abdullah bin 'Umar (r.a.) : I heard Allah's Apostle 
(p.b.u.h) saying, "Three men from among those who were before 
you, set out together till: they reached a cave at night and 
entered it. A big rock rolled down the mountain and closed the 
mouth of the cave. They said (to each other), "Nothing could 
save you from this rock but to invoke Allah by giving reference 
to the righteous deed which you have done (for Allah's sake 
only)." So, one of them said, "0 Allah! I had old parents and I 
never provided my family (wife, children, etc.) with milk before 
them. One day, by chance I was delayed, and I came late (at 
night) while they had slept. I milked the sheep for them and 
took the milk to them, but I found them sleeping. I disliked to 
provide my family with the milk before them. I waited for them 
and the bowl of milk was in my hand and I kept on waiting for 
them to get up till the day dawned. Then they got up and drank 
the milk. 0 Allah! If I did that for Your Sake only, please 
relieve us from our critical situation caused by this rock.' So, 
the rock shifted a little but they could not get out." 
The Prophet (p.b.u.h) added, : "The second man said, '0 Allah! I 
had a cousin who was the dearest of all people to me and I 
wanted to have sexual relations with her but she refused. Later 
she had a hard time in a famine year and she came to me and I 
gave her one-hundred-and-twenty Dinars on the condition that she 
would not resist my desire, and she agreed. Vhea I was about to 
fulfill my desire, she said : It is illegal for you to outrage my 
castity except by legitimate marriage. So, I thought it a sin to 
have sexual intercourse with her and left her though she was the 
dearest of all the people to me, and also I left the gold I had 
given her. 0 Allah! If I did that for Your Sake only, please 
relieve us from the present calamity." So, The rock shifted a 
little more but still they could not get out from there." 
J * j ^ (-k^l f4=ei-^ *^ >^ 1 *>»l i - l ^^ J ^ » «^»ifl J13^ i ^ j «JU *UI J - , ^ 1 JU 
J .*Ulju*L J JUi ^^^ J-; ^^ * L i Jl>**^' *^ •^j^ is^ • j * ' •='.;*i» v-A-ij *i JJJ' •^j^ J--lj 
-i .^i^ L . JUi .^yJiJj ^ I j yUij J;;il ^ .iU*) ^ ^ ^ L J i ,0 cJii . ^ ^ 1 Jj 
'ifj*^' ^y^j^ IjA^W c^jju\j . w ^foi LU« r j j l i <'l|'»j ^U^t >£UJ 
8^2 
The Prophet (p.b.u.h) added, "Then the third man said, '0 Allah! 
I employed few labourers and I paid them their wages with the 
exception of one man who did not take his wages and went away. I 
invested his wages and I got much property thereby. (Then after 
some time) he came and said to me : 0 Allah's slave! Pay me my 
wages. I said to him : All the camels, cows, sheep and slaves 
you see, are yours. He said : 0 Allah's slave! Don't mock at me. 
I am not mocking at you. So, he took all the herd and drove them 
away and left nothing. 0 Allah! If I did that for Your Sake 
only, please relieve us from the present suffering." So, that 
rock shifted completely and they got out walking." 
JLAJI lj^]j t<i J J ^ ^ . * j ^ Jf J - ^ 4--ii >i.I ^ 
One who employs himself to carry loads on his back and then gives 
in charity from his wages, and (what is said about) the wages of 
porters. 
. _ * - i J . U J j j - J i j j bd^i jiLii -oj-JL ^ 1 lis] ^j CJU aji 
.-uj; VJ *I^L :JU *^1 ^ a ^ 4 ^ J j JII 
Narrated Abu Mas'ud Al-Ansari (r.a.) : Whenever Allah's Apostle 
(p.b.u.h) ordered us to give in charity we would go to the market 
and work as porters to earn a Mudd (two hand-fulls) (of 
foodstuff) but now some of us have one-hundred-thousand Dirhams 
or Dinars. (The sub-narrator) Shaqiq said, "I think Abu Mas'ud 
meant himself by saying (some of us)" 
8^3 
.4, o-^ ^ *ili-fj ^ j1 ^  j4i p j 
Hages of a broker. Ibn Sirln,. 'Ata', Ibrahim and Al-Hssan did 
not see any harm in them. Ibn 'Abbas said, "There is no harm if 
one says (to a broker), 'Sell this garment for such a price and 
whatever more you get, is for you.'" 
Ibn Sirin said, "If one says to a broker, 'Sell it for such a 
price and if you get more, the profit will be for you or divided 
between us,' there is no harm in it." 
The Prophet (p.b.u.h) said, "Muslims should abide by their 
conditions." 
1 
Tawus : Ibn 'Abbas (r.a.) said, "The Prophet (p.b.u.h) forbade 
the meeting of caravans (on the way) and ordained that no 
townsman is permitted to sell things on behalf of a bedouin." I 
asked Ibn 'Abbas, "What is the meaning of his saying, 'No 
townsman is permitted to sell things on behalf of a bedouin.'" 
He replied, "He should not work as a broker for him." 
J18A 
It is permissible for a Muslim to work as an employee for paqans 
in a land of infidelity? 
^^  j^aUlI *iJL*i LJ V J C-li^  :JU C* <UI ^ ^j wU. Lij* :Jjj-~. 
^ c-J ^jjjj :JU «:sii «»i*j jii c,y; ^^i* 4iJlj LI :cJii .J.**--
. IJj^ ^L ^ ; v :Jl5j U:LL ^ ^jJI o^l^t JUS 
Narrated Khabbab (r.a.) : T was a blacksmith and did some work 
tor Al-'As bin Wa'il. When he owned me some money for my work, I 
went to him to ask for that amount. He said, "I will not oay vou 
unless you disbelieve in Muhammad." I said, "By Allah! I will 
never do that till you die and be resurrected." He said, "Will I 
be dead and then resurrected after my death?" I said, "Yes." He 
said, "There I will have orooerty and offsprinq and then I will 
pay you your due.". Then Allah s.w.t. revealed. 'Have you seen 
him who disbelieved in Our siqns, and yet says : I will be qiven 
property and offspring?' (19:77). 
* a - ^ Ofl J^ j • — ^ ' '^^^ v-r*" *L*a.I J * l^J\ ^^ j^ia-^ L. 
JlSj .<JUI ^[2^ 1^1 <Jfi j j ^ l L J * ! .pJLj Uft <JUI J ^ ^ 1 ^^ 
^ l^ ji fj .Ij^^ pAijA ^j--jJI ^^]J ..pJUl! ^ 1 * ^ loa-l ^*-.l 
^ \ J Ij^Jl :c:,^\ JUL ^l^ JlSj .LU pL^I ^l ^ ^ 
• u-J^^ J * O J ^ ^y^J 
what i s paid t o r Kuaya (T.P.. (livine .sneech rpc i tpn ar; a means ot 
curinq d i s e a s e s ) with Surat Ai.-Patiha, when ocac t iced over -m 
.'Irab t r i b e . 
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JU* o A c)' * ^ '^> <>SJJ' ^ ^ ' * ^ i * r^^ '^ . ( ^ 4«i; ^ i f 4 ^ JUi - ^ JS- J l,,A-J 
^ j l ^ Ui Li . l i^- is jJi |^U-ki-( ^ <Wj ^ j ^^ j ' i j^l *«j\ju,s tf^i^ JUi ^ j ^ ^ 
OIS ^ J l J ^ i ; i fL.j 4JL U« J - ^ ^ ^>:\i , ^ l > i= ^ ^ j 5^iJI JUi .\y^\ . ^ 4 ^ JUi 
1^  ? i j j iisl J L J J - L J t JUi J i j ^ i i ^ j 4jir an J-* a« j ^ j j * J^JJU .L^^L L j j^ i i 
Narrated Abu Sa'id (r.a.) : Some of the companions of the Prophet 
(p.b.u.h) went on a journey till they reached some of the 'Arab 
tribes (at night). They asked the latter to treat them as their 
guests but they refused. The chief of that tribe was then bitten 
by a snake (or stung by a scorpion) and they tried their best to 
cure him but in vain. Some of them said (to the others), 
"Nothing has benefitted him, will you go to the people who 
resided here at night, it may be some of them might possess 
something (as treatment)," They went to the group of the 
companions (of the Prophet (p.b.u.h) and said, "Our chief has 
been bitten by a snake (or stung by a scorpion) and we have tried 
everything but he has not benefitted. Have you got anything 
(useful)?" One of them replied, "Yes, by Allah! I can recite a 
Rugya, but as you have refused to accept us as your guests, I 
will not recite the Ruqya for you unless you fix for us some 
wages for it." They agreed to pay them a flock of sheep. One of 
them then went and regited (Surat-ul-Fatiha) j 'All the praises 
are for the Lord of tfte worlds' aBd^puffed"^ver the chief who 
became al^jcj-ght as if he was released from a chain, and yuL up 
and startedwa 1 king~ ishowing no signs ot sickness. They paid 
them what they agreed to pay. Some of them (i.e. the companions) 
then suggested to divide their earnings among themselves, but the 
one who performed the recitation said, "Do not divide them till 
we go to the Propeht (p.b.u.h) and narrate the whole story to 
him, and wait for his order." So, they went to Allah's Apostle 
(p.b.u.h) and narrated the story. Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) 
asked, "How did you come to know that Surat-ul-Patiha was recited 
as Ruqya?" Then he added, "You have done the right thing. 
Divide (what you have earned) and assign a share for me as well." 
The Prophet (p.b.u.h) smiled thereupon. 
a86 
• 1*^' £'> 
The wages of one who has the profession of cupping. 
(X.^ <JU 411 J - ^^1 ^ 1 :JIS L ^ 4JI ^j ^ U ofl O^ '<t*l 
. * ^ I |.UoJI ^ ^ I j 
Narrated Ibn 'Abbas (r.a.). When the Prophet (p.b.u.h) was 
cupped,, he paid the man who cupped him his wages. 
^ I ^ ^ y U * 411 J- ^ 1 .^^ 1 gU <:* 4JI ^ ^j ^ U ^1 
Narrated Ibn 'Abbas (r.a.). When the Prophet (p.b.u.h) was 
cupped, he paid the man who cupped him his wages. If it had been 
undesirable he would not have paid him. 
L J I C J U ^ gij j^U ^ jj*^ ^ t jA-m^ L^JA. 'f-s*^ jjt L2 JA. 
^, A ^J j-?-^  ^ j U P 4JI J- ^^1 ^ l^  g ^ OS 4JI ^j 
Narrated Anas (r.a.) : The Prophet (p.b.u.h) used to get cupped 
and would never withhold the wages of any person. 
,4-.l> ^  C^ l^ yii*. ^ I O-JI J l ^ ^ ^ 
Whoever appealed to the masters of a slave to reduce his taxes. 
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Narrated Ans bin Malik (r.a.) : The Prophet (p.b.u.h) sent for a 
slave who had the profession of cupping, and he cupped him. The 
Prophet (p.b.u.h) ordered that he be paid one or two Sa's, or one 
or two Mudds of foodstuff, and appealed to his masters to reduce 
his taxes: 
All these Ahadith above quoted make it clear that 
employment of servants is permissible under Islamic Law. The 
term used for servants is 'Hireling'. Categories of Hireling are 
noted below. 
CLASSIFIC&TIOM OF HIRELIMGS 
According to Islamic law hirelings (servants) can be 
classified under two heads: 
(1) Common hirelings, and 
(2) Particular Hirelings. 
Under the first category, are persons who are hired, 
and are not restricted by condition such as not to work for 
anyone other than the hirer. 
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In Hedaya, it has been explained as: 
"A comnon hireling is one with whom a contract of hire 
is concluded for work of such a nature as may be perceived by 
examining the subject:- and in this instance there is no occasion 
for any mention of a term; nor is he entitled to his hire or 
recon^ense until the work he has engaged for (such as dying or 
falling) be executed, because the work is the only thing 
contracted for, where he engages to perform it in person, or the 
effect of such work, when he has not particularly engaged ro 
perform it in person - It is therefore lawful for him to work for 
the public at large, since no particular person has any claim to 
his service; and accordingly, he is termed 'Ajeer Mooshtarik' 
( ^—^y^'^^y^^ )> that is, a general or common hireling". 
Examples may be cited of a 'porter' an 'Auctioneer', a 
'tailor', a 'jeweller', a 'port boatman', a lackney carriage 
driver, and a village shephered who are all common hirelings 
(servants). They are not confined to, or special to any specific 
person. Such hirelings servant may work for anyone who engages 
them for work. 
As refei^ed above, the right of the common employee to 
pay arises on the work being done. 
Under the second category are persons specially 
employed. They are hired to work for the hirer alone and not 
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anyone else. Persons getting monthly wages may be included under 
this class. The person who is specially employed for a specific 
period for the hirer alone, during that time, he becomes a 
private hireling. 
Similarly, when a porter, a carriage driver, or a 
boatman are hired to work particularly to the hirer, and not to 
work for anyone else upto a particular place or destination, are 
private hirelings until the specific assigned work completed. 
In Hedaya, a particular hireling has been explained as: 
"A particular hireling signifies one who is entitled to 
his hire in virtue of a surrender of himself during the term of 
hire, although he does no work; as for instance, a person who is 
hired as a servant for a month, or to take care of flock for a 
month, a certain rate, under a condition that he shall not serve 
or tend the flocks of any other person during that term - An 
hireling (servant) of this description is denominated an Ajeer 
Wahid, or singular hireling, because the advantage of his service 
belongs exclusively to a single person during the term of his 
engagement, and the wages he received are opposed to such 
advantage:- and as the hireling, in this instance, is entitled 
to his hire in virtue of his surrender of himself, for the term 
of hire, he is entitled to his wages although he does not work, 
or although his work be afterwards, undone, as where, for 
instance, a person is hired to make up a dress, and he sew it 
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accordingly, and the sewing be afterwards ripped out, in which 
case he is nevertheless entitled to his hire." 
Several persons also, being regarded as a single 
person, can be the hirer of a special employee in the same way as 
one person can be. 
Illustration can be given where the residents of a 
village have hired a shephered by a single contract to be special 
to themselves, that shephered becomes a private employee, but in 
case of their having made it lawful for him to watch the aminals 
of people other than themselves, he becomes a conmon employee. 
The private servant (particular hireling ) is 
entitled to reciept the payment of his wages only when he is 
found ready for the work at the time for which he has been hired. 
He should not refuse to do the assigned work at a proper time and 
place if so directed. If he does not comply with the direction 
and fails to perform his job, he is not entitle to receive his 
wage. 
In cases where the wage has not been determined prior 
to the work done by the servant, then if he is of the kind of a 
person who works for wages, he takes the equivalent wage. if 
someone asks another to work for him for some days and says to 
him that he would buy a pair of particular thing as his wage, 
^91 
giving of that thing is not necessary to pay hire equivalent to 
the work. 
Further when a person has been employed to do a work 
himself, then he cannot employ another to do the work on his 
behalf. Personal assignment is performed by the hireling 
personally. 
Where there is no condition binding on the hired 
person, in the matter of the thing which are consequences of the 
work, as regards those, the use and custom of the town is made to 
be observed. There is no necessity to feed the person hired 
unless there is a custom to this effect in the town. 
According to Islamic law, an article delivered to a 
common hireling is a deposit ( <:^j-'y- trust) in his hands. 
Imam Abu Haneefa (Rahmatullah aleh) said that if there is a 
damage or loss of property while it is in the possession of the 
servant, he is responsible for such loss or damage. But, 
according to him, there will be no liability in case where the 
article is lost or destroyed or damaged by any irremediable and 
irresistible acccident, such as fire conflegrations burning down 
his house, or robbers forcibly entered his house, looted the 
property and he was incapable to repel1 them. 
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Hazrat Ali (Razi-Allah-Dnho) and Hazrat Omar (Razi-
AUah-Onho) were also of the opinion that a comnon hireling was 
responsible for the loss or destruction of property while it is 
in his possession because the care of the property is incumbent 
on him; as without such case he cannot perform his work upon it. 
However, if there is no negligence on the part of the 
servant, if the property or article perishes, he would not be 
responsible. When the article is lost due to a cause which could 
be avoided, such as usurpation or theft of the property, this 
proves his negligence, and in consequence, he is "responsible in 
the same manner as a trustee who lets to hire the deposit (tl.^?) 
in his hands, - It is otherwise where the article is lost from 
some unavoidable cause, such as fire, sudden death, and so forth, 
since in this case he cannot be accused of negligence - The 
argument of Imam Abu Haneefa (Rahmatullah aleh) is that the 
article is merely a deposit in the workman's hands, the 
possession of which does not involved responsibility, in as much 
as he took possession with consent of the propreitor, and, 
accordingly, if it were lost from any unavoidable cause, he is 
not responsible, - where as, if his possession of it involved 
responsibility, he would owe a compensation for it at all events, 
in the same manner as in a case of usurped (misappropriated) 
property, - The care : moreover, of the article is incumbent upon 
the propreitor dependantly and not essentially, and accordingly 
no hire is due for such case. This case is different from that 
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of an hired trustee; for the care of the deposit ( i-l^>y ) is 
essentially incumbent upon a trustee who acts for hire, because 
of the wages he receives." (Redaya). 
Destruction sL Property iji ^^ Course of Employment 
Islamic jurists have two views on this point. The 
first view is : "a common hireling is responsible in case of loss 
or destruction of any article in the course of his work; as where 
a dyer or fuller tears the cloth entrusted to him, or a porter 
stumble, or the tying of his load breaks, or the girth of a camel 
breaks, and thus the goods with whch he is loaded fall to the 
ground, or a boat sinks from the mismanagement of the boatman". 
Those who advocate the second view maintain that the 
hireling is not responsible in those cases, -because the hirer had 
ordered him to work in an absolute manner, and hence his order 
extends as well to dangerous as to safe operations, - in other 
words, to operations which subject his property to damage, and 
also to perations under which it continues uninjured - The 
hireling in question, therefore, is the same predicament with a 
particular hireling, or any assistant of a workman. 
This has been criticised by the Islamic jurists as : 
"that the orders of the hirer do not extend to any operations but 
what are mentioned in the contract; and those are to be suppposed 
of a safe - nature, since in virtue of them is obtained the thing 
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contracted for, namely, the effect of them, hence it is that if 
this effect be obtained through the work of any other than the 
hireling, still the recompense is due. The orders of the hirer, 
therefore, do not comprehend any operations that may be 
injurious, since through such the thing contracted for, namely, 
the effect, cannot be produced. it is also otherwise with 
respect to a particular hireling, as shall be hereafter - (It is 
to be observed that the breaking of a camel's girth, or soforth, 
is supposed to originate with the hireling, in as much as the 
accident may be attributed to his want of care) - A comnon 
hireling, therefore, is responsible for any thing which may be 
destroyed in the course of his work, excepting, however, where a 
man is destroyed, either by the sinking of a boat, or falling 
from a camel or other aminal (although those accidents should 
have been occasioned by the driving of the camel or the 
navigating of the boat); for in this instance, the hireling is 
not responsible as responsibility of a man cannot be incurred in 
virtue of a contract, or in virtue of anything but a 'janayet', 
or offences against the person, hence, it would be due, in this 
instance, not from the hireling, but from his 'Akile' who 
however, cannot be made responsible by a contract." 
In cases where a porter has been employed for bringing 
some glass-jars, and the proter when bringing those jars with him, 
falls down on the ground, and in consequence breaks all the 
glass-jars. Under these conditions-porter is a trustee. The 
question is that in such a case, would he be liable for breach of 
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trust. The learned opinion in such a case is that it is a 
violation and the porter is responsible for breaking the glass-
jars. The hirer has two options in such a case : First, to take 
the value of jar in accordance to the cost which the jars had at 
the place from where it were taken. In this case the porter is 
not entitled to any recompence; or Secondly, the hirer has an 
option to take compensation for the value it bore at the place 
where it was broken, paying the porter a proportionate hire. 
Porter is liable because either due to his stumbling 
the things were fallen on the ground and damaged or the rope 
tiding thing proper was broken, in consequence of the property 
was destroyed. Both the things are attributed to him. It is his 
failure to take proper caution resulted in harm to the property, 
hence liable. 
In cases when due to servant's wrongful act or default, 
the property of the master in his possession is destroyed, he is 
liable, it is a breach of trust. 
It is a wrongful act of' the servant, if he removes or 
works contrary to the order of the hirer, clearly given or 
conveyed to him. If the servant has been assigned for a 
particular job and direction has been given to him to remain with 
the property entrusted at a particular place and do not carry the 
property to any other place, in case he carries to the other 
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place and damage is caused to the property, the servant is 
liable. 
Likewise if someone gives to the tailor a piece of 
cloth and asks him whether a particular style of coat can be made 
from the piece of cloth and he replies yes. . After cutting the 
cloth it is not possible to prepare that particular type coat, 
then whatever loss is caused to the owner, the tailor as trustee 
liable to compensate him. Here the tailor has both types of 
liabilities civil as well as penal. 
In cases where the servant is negligent in keeping the 
thing safe, any destruction caused to the property, the servant 
is liable. When a person has been employed as a shephered to 
look after the animals, if an animal is strayed from a flock and 
lost by reason of shephered not going to get it back or make a 
search of it, in consequence of his negligence and indifferent 
attitude, loss is caused, the servant is liable, because he has 
violated the trust reposed in him by his master. 
As to the responsibility ot a person specially hired or 
employed known as 'particular hireling' or 'Ajeer Wahid' or 
'Singular hireling', he is considered a trustee (custodian -
ilf^) ). If an article which is in his possession lost without 
his act, he would not be responsible. 
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Hence for determining the liability we may consider two 
different situations : First, an article is lost whilst in the 
hands of a particular hireling, without his act, that is, stolen 
by thief or taken away by the usurper. Second, an article is 
lost by his act. 
The particular hireling is not responsible in the 
former case because the article is a deposit ( •.lU3?<«> ) in his 
hands, since he took possesion of the article with the owner's 
consent. This is the learned view of Imam Abu Haneefo-
(Rahmatullah-aleh). His two diciples also agree with him because 
they hold that the obligation of responsibility upon a common 
hireling proceeds upon a favourable construction of the law, in 
order that men's property may be in securty; but as a particular 
hireling does not engage to work for every person, it is still 
more likely that the property is safe with such a hireling : and 
therefore, in this case, the law proceeds upon analogy. 
In the second case, the particular hireling (servant) is 
also not responsible because, as the advantage of this hireling's 
service is the property of the hirer, it follows that, where he 
directs him to act with his property, such direction is valid : 
consequently, the hireling is his deputy; his acts, therefore, 
are the same as the acts of his principal, the hirer, and of 
course he is not responsible.' 
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So much so that when the property is destroyed in his 
hands without his working on it, there is no liability. 
Likewise, when the property is destroyed or damaged or 
lost by the work done by him on it, without any fault or 
wrongdoing, there is no liability. Such a case is not treated as 
breach of trust or violation of rules governing deposits (*^ -^*t^ ?). 
In cases where the servants heve been employed jointly, 
then a servant is liable only for his own wrongs he has conmitted 
or acts negligently done. Whatever destruction, damage, loss or 
injury caused to the property by his own acts and deeds, he would 
be liable • to that act only and not for the joint injuries or 
destructions caused. 
^99 
CHAPTER IV 
PART A 
Word agent has not been defined in the Penal Code. For 
definition we have to see section 182 of Indian Contract Act. 
Section explains agent as: 
"ka agent is a person employed to do any act for 
another or to represent another in dealings with third 
persons. The person for whom such act is done, or who 
is represented, is called the principal". 
Emphasis is on the agent's representative character. 
He is to act on behalf of his principal in bringing about a 
contract between his principal and a third party. Vivian Bose 
I 
J., making observation on the definition said that the 
'definition is wide enough to embrace a servant pure and simple, 
even a casual employee, a man who is engaged by me in the street 
to black my boots; but it cannot for a moment be contended that 
they are all to be placed in the same category'. The term 
'agent' means a person whose object is to establish contractual 
relations between his principal and a third party. His representative 
capacity depends upon his relations with the principal and 
I. Kalyan-ji V. Tirkaram, AIR 1988 Nag. AT P. 255, 
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Imetio&s «nd responsibilities assigned to him as agent. 
The relationship between a principal and his agent is 
normally a consensual one. Such relationship may arise in the 
following ways: 
(1) By contract under seal; 
(2) By contract in writing or verbal; 
(3) By contract implied from the conduct or situation 
of the parties; 
(4) By consent express or implied where there is no 
contact as the agent is acting gratuitiously; 
(5) By ratification - this is where agent has no 
authority but purports to make a contract with the 
third party on behalf of the principal and the 
principal later ratifies expressly or impliedly 
what agent has done. 
Consent plays a vital role. The relationship of 
principal and agent can be established only by consent. It may 
be implied even. Although mutual consent of principal and agent 
is necessary for the creation of agency but there is no specific 
requirement that the agreement between the two should be in any 
particular form. Words and conduct may afford proof as to the 
creation of agency and relationship between the principal and 
agent. Ageng is not to be appointed in writing. Example may be 
given where an agent is orally appinted to obtain the lease of a 
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house. Normally the principal will pay the agent for his 
services. However, agent may agree to act gratuitously, without 
consideration to effect a contract on principal's behalf. 
Agent generally drops out of the picture once the 
relationship between principal and third party under the contract 
are established. Agents task completes when he brings the 
principal and agent close to each other. Thus the rights and 
obligation contained in the contract are created between the 
principal and the third party belong to them solely. Agent 
generally has no rights or liabilities under that contract. 
Agents may be of different kinds: 
(1) Agent may be a servant of his principal; 
(2) An independent contractor - estate agent; 
(3) Agents under contract of service with the 
principal may: 
(a) sales representatives; 
(b) canvassers, and 
(c) commercial travellers, if they are under the 
control of their principals as to how they do 
their work. 
(4) Dress agency; 
(5) Private inquiry agent; 
(6) Secret agent; 
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(7) Mechnical agent, washing or cleaning agent; 
(8) Factor, entrusted with possesion of goods for 
purposes of selling them; 
(9) Broker, a kind of mercantile agent - no possession 
is given - only negotiates on behalf of 
principal. 
(10) Del Credere Agent - another kind of mercantile 
agent. Function is to effect a contract between 
principal and third party. Then agent drops out. 
No liability or obligation on his part under the 
contract. 
Another important point is that it is not an ingredient 
for someone to have full contractual capacity in order to be 
agent. A minor can effectively bring about contractual selection 
between his principal and third party. 
However, for a principal it is necessary to be 
competent to contract and of sound mind. However, a minor 
principal can also appoint an agent to make a contract on his 
behalf if the nature of the contract is such which he could 
validly make himself. Such a contract may be a contract to 
purchase necessaries. 
A wife may also validly act as her husband's agent, 
provided she has been held out by the husband to others as having 
his authority to pledge his credit for necessaries or otherwise. 
i03 
by regularly paying his wife's debts to the creditors or traders. 
Husband will be liable for any contract made by her unless the 
traders has knowledge that the authority has been withdrawn, or 
husband has deserted her. In the later situation wife would not 
be considered as an agent of necessity. 
As to obligation of the agent to his principal, agency 
agreement may contain the. terms setting for the express 
obligations. If governs both the gratuitous as well as the paid 
agent. Some of the obligations may be sunmed up as follows: 
(1) To obey the lawful instructions of his principal; 
(2) To exercise due care and skill; 
(3) To act personally; 
(4) To act^in good faith; 
(a) not to permit a conflict of interest and the 
duty of disclosure. 
(b) not to take bribe or have secret profit. 
(c) no misuse of confidential information. 
(5) To account - to keep proper accounts of all 
transactions he enters into on his principal's 
behalf, and to keep agency money apart from bis own. 
With this brief statement aboutftgent, his powers and 
obligations, let us see his penal responsibilities. In the 
modern world where countless commercial transactions are being 
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carried out with the help of intermediaries or agents, it's role 
becomes very significant. 
The term agent in this section is not confined to 
those persons who carry-on the profession of agents. Hhat the 
section 409 requires is that there must be an entrUstment of 
property or dominion over the property in the course of 
conmercial transaction, to a person as agent. Entrustment of 
property in the course of consnercial transaction here means 
entrustment in the ordinary course of his duty or habitual 
occupation or profession or trade. Entrustment or dominion over 
the property must be to him in his capacity as agent. The 
ingredients of the section would be satisfied if the person is an 
agent of another and that another person entrusts the property or 
dominion over property for achieving particular purpose for 
which the person has been appointed as agent. The entrustment of 
property must be in the course of his duty as agent. If the 
property has been entrusted or dominion given over, for some 
other purpose than for which an agent is under a duty to 
perfor, such entrustment or dominion over would not be covered 
under this section. 
The accused must be the complainant's agent. If he is 
not professionally the complainant's agent, the present section 
I 
does not apply. A person who is to share profits and losses in 
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the business with another cannot be said as agent. A coiranission 
agent who has not been entrusted with property or any dominion 
II 
over property cannot be held guilty of breach of trust. In 
order that the section may be applicable accused must be an agent 
at the time of entrustment of property. The section does not 
require that he should be still an agent at the time of 
III 
committing the breach of trust or continue to be an agent at 
the time of breach of trust. 
Director of a company is its agent. The phrase 'in the 
way of his business as agent' is not limited to persons who 
IV 
carry on profession of agency. In some respects, the directors 
V 
are also the trustees. 
VI 
In Mohanty's case where an insurance agent, received 
some money from proposer*for making payment to L.I.C. and after 
depositing only a part thereof, kept the balance with himself, it 
was held that 'the offence was committed unless it was shown, 
that the balance money was paid back to the proposer. 
'The President of cooperative society who was also an 
ex-officio treasurer of the society was held to be an agent of 
I. ILR (1952) Hyd. 753. 
II. 1962 (1) Cr. L.j. L.j. 411 (DB). 
III. 1937 Cr. L.j. 877. 
IV. AIR 1962 SC 1821 (R.K. Dalmia). 
V. A 1962 SC 1821. 
VI. AIR 1967 Ori. 135 (B. Mohanty V. State) 
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society. 
In another case where a bank advanced loans to certain 
members of a cooperative society to be realised by the society 
and repaid to the bank, the secretary of the society who 
collected the amounts from the members for payment to the bank, 
II 
was held to be the agent of bank. 
Where the government appointed a transport company as 
carriers for whole year, a breach of trust committed by the 
III 
company, it was held that offence under section 409 coranitted. 
An agent though bound to execute the lawful instruction 
of the principal but he is not under the direct control or 
IV 
supervision of the principal. 
In a case where the 'accused was authorised to lend his 
master's money and he lent it to himself without his master's 
permission, it was held that he was guilty of criminal breach of 
V 
trust.' 
I. 1968 Cr. L.j. (AP). 
II. 1969 Cr, L.j. 780 (DB). 
III. 1967 Cr. L.j. 124. 
IV. 1955 (2) SCR 1035 (Chandi Prasad Singh). 
V. 1933 MWN 256 (Ramanathan Chattiar V. Duraisamy Ayyanger. 
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In Sultan Mahmud's case a lambardar collected money 
from landowners in discharge of their liability to government and 
lambardar converted that money into his own use, it was held that 
he was guilty for criminal breach of trust. 
'The accused an agent, who was in a fiduciary capacity 
was bound to accoimt for what he had received. He admitted the 
receipt of money in the letters he wrote to the petitioner and 
also agreed to return it. Inspite of a registered notice which 
was sent to him calling upon him to pay the amount, he did not 
pay the amount. It was held that a prima facie case in respect 
11 
of offence under section-409 was made out'. 
A debtor who borrowed money from another, returns the 
money to his creditor by cheque. The debtor hands over the 
cheque to the creditor's agent to pay the cheque to his principal 
the creditor, Here the person who receives the cheque cannot be 
considered an agent of the debtor merely because to pass over the 
cheque to creditor his principal. 
A retailer, inspite of an agreement between the 
government and him for the distribution of food grain through 
fair price shops, the retailer could not be regarded as agent of 
I. (1939) 20 Lah. 119. 
II. 1982 Cr. L.j. 1913 (Deh, (Jia Lai Gharma) 
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government in respect of the good grain received by him from 
I 
government. 
'A person who is the-manager of a firm cannot be held 
criminally liable for breach of trust where there is no personal 
entrustment of goods to him but to the firm in respect of which 
II 
the offence was alleged to have been committed'. 
'Where a conanission agent was employed to sell cotton 
and he acted according to the custom of the market which made 
him liable for the price of the cotton on demand being made, it 
was held that he could not be prosecuted under this section for 
III 
return of the cotton'. 
As the difference between agent and servant, supreme 
IV 
court has clearly ladi down that the two are different from 
each other. A servant acts under the direct control and 
supervision of the master and is bound to conform to all 
reasonable orders given to him in the course of his work. But as 
earlier referred that though an agent is also bound to exercise 
lawful instruction of the principal but he is not under the 
direct control and supervision. 
I. 1967 Cr. L.j. 1599 (Ghasi Ram). 
II. (1930) 32 Zr. L.j. 149 (Guha SC) 
III. (1943) N.L.j. 128 (Gan.garam). 
IV. AIR 1956 SC 149. 
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As to the distinction between agent and factor, 'a 
factor is an gent, but he has got a lien for his commission on 
the property entrusted to him for sale. The factor does not lose 
such right by reason of his acting under special instruction 
from his principal to sell the property at a particular price or 
I 
to sell in the principal's name'. 
Different kinds of agents as discussed earlier liable 
only when they are entrusted with property or any dominion over a 
property and violated the terms of agreement between them and 
their principals. Mere retention of money by an agent entrusted 
to him is not enough to make him liable unless it is proved that 
he retained the money with a view to misappropriate it. Similarly 
accounts have been wrongly kept by the agent would not amount to 
an offence unless misappropriation is proved. 
Broker another kind of agent. He is a mere negotiator, 
and is not, as a general rule, entrusted with the possession of 
the goods, and therefore, has no such special property or lien. 
He acts only as a midleman and takes no possesion. However, 
where money has been paid to share broker specially for the 
purchase of shares, but the broker neither purchases shares nor 
II 
returns money, would be liable under this section 409 I.P.C. 
I. (1883), 25 Ch. D. 31 (38), Stres V. Biller. 
II. 1957, Cr. L.j. 265. 
JIO 
CHAPTER IV 
PART B 
A person may lawfully employ another as his agent 
( cJu-' ) ^° represent him in dealing with third persons under 
the Islamic law. Prophet (peace be upon him) himself authorized 
persons to represent him (peace he upon him) in the distribution 
of things exchanging money and weighing goods, saving thing from 
spoiling. He also deputed persons to pay sadaqat-al-Pitr, and 
to pay debts. He permitted others to give gifts to an agent of 
some people or to their intercessor. He also deputed to give 
something on his behalf without restricting the power of the 
agent how much to pay. Prophet (peace be upon him) also 
permitted that women may depute the ruler in the matter of 
marriage. A person authorized to represent another was permitted 
by him (peace be upon him) to lend something of what is in his 
custody for specific time. However, he prohibited the sales, if 
the agent sold something in illegal manner. Prophet (peace be 
upon him) also authorized person to manage the wakf affairs. He 
(peace be upon him) deputed persons to carry out a (legal) 
Allah's ordained punishment. He (peace be upon him) deputed 
someone to sacrific Budn (camels for sacrifice). He (peace be 
upon him) also told his deputiese to spend wealth or property as 
Allah directs you. He (peace be upon him) also deputed 
trustworthy persons as treasurer to the treasury. 
iismm m. hssssi 
I 
Some of the Ahadith taken from SAHIH-AL-BUKHARI may 
be referred below to show that the agency is permissible and legal 
under the Islamic Law. 
"A partner can deputize for another while distributing things 
etc. No doubt, the prophet (p.b.u.h) shared his Hadis (i.e. 
sacrificing aniroal) with.Ali and then ordered Ali to distribute 
them" . 
Narrated 'Ali (r.a.) : Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) ordered me to 
distribute the saddles and skins of the Budn which I had 
slaughtered. 
I. JXXVIll The Book of Representation or Authorization - The 
Translation of the Meaning of SAHIL-AL-BUKHARl, Arabic-
Suhsin Khin T 1 • . ^ ^ ° ^ " ^ ^ "^ - ^y Dr. Muhammad 
Muhsm Khan, Islamic University, A]-Medina-AI-Munawwarah 
1^2 
. ^ 1 .. jw. :Jlii 
Narrated 'Uqba bin 'Amir (r.a.) that the Prophet (p.b.u.h) had 
given him sheep to distribute among his companions and a male 
kids was left (after the distribution). When he informed the 
Prophet (p.b.u.h) of it, he said (to him), "Offer it as a 
sacrifice on your behalf." 
. J ^ l ^ _^ o-J^j^ JSj ^j . oljrllj -ij-JI i^ "l^-^" 
To deputize one in exchanging money and weighing goods. 'Umar 
Ibn 'Umar deputized (a person) in money exchanges. 
i^jt, ^ iyj*-jii J-* £f{ Je*- en -A-*^' •!-* a* ''^^ ^^^ '*^ ".« t« *^^-^ ^•^ 
»Jlsi S l i i * _ , ^ J-:: J ^ I JUi . - - j i * _ ^ fjk*Ui .,-e- j * ^ j <>»*=-* f ^ J VfJ'* 'J'^ l 
fi f^ijjJL 2-»aJI ^ .J,ai:: ^ t JbLi . < ^ ^ L , ;^LJ I j . , ;^LJL Ilk ^ 2:^^' - ^ ^ '^ j 
Narrated Rbu Sa'id M-Khudri and Rbvi Hvktaira (r.a.) : RUah's 
Apostle (p.b.u.h) employed someone as a governor at Khaibar. 
When the man came to Medina, he brought with him dates called 
Janib. The Prophet (p.b.u.h) asked him, "Are all the dates of 
Khaibar of this kind?" The man replied, "(No), we exchange two 
Sa's of bad dates for one Sa' of this kind of dates (i.e. Janib), 
or exchange three Sa's for two." On that, the Prophet (p.b.u.h) 
said, Don't do so, as it is a kind of usuary (Riba) but sell the 
dates of inferior quality for money, and then buy Janib with the 
solfby weight "^**^ **' (P-b.u.h) said the same thing about dates 
1^3 
If a shepherd or a deputy saw a dying sheep or something which is 
going to be spoiled, he is allowed to slaughter the sheep and 
save the thing liable to be spoiled. 
Jl J -J ^j , i - j ^ <UI J - ^ 1 j U ^ l^li't; ^ . (^ JUi v k ^ ^ 1 ^ - .^-^ 
.ail X-* ^ 5 ^ «-,b . C--3 l4i1j i-1 kit i r e - * i «*!« - ^ J ^ ^^- '-^'^ 
Narrated Ibn Ka'b bin Malik from his father : We had some sheep 
which used to graze at Sala'. One of our slave girls saw a sheep 
dying and she broke a stone and slaughtered the sheep with it. 
My father said to the people,"Don't eat it till I ask the Prophet 
(p.b.u.h) about it (or till I send somebody to ask the Prophet 
(p.b.u.h)." So, he asked or sent somebody to ask to Prophet 
(p.b.u.h), and the Prophet (p.b.u.h) permitted him to eat it. 
'ubaidullah (a sub-narrator) said, "I admire that girl, for 
though she was a slave-girl, she dared to slaughter the sheep." 
^^ jii Jl J j ^ Ot ^^ -h^ ^J '^ i^ *^  -r^ '^j -^^l ^ '^-J 
It is permissible to depute a person whether he is present or 
absent. 'Ubaidullah bin 'Aror wrote to his representative who was 
not present, to pay (Sadaqat-al-Fitr) on behalf of the children 
both young and old. 
^ 1 ^ 
.4 JJI ^ ^ jl ^ ^ j] :JUi .*>1 :JlIi l^ iy LuV) Jl jO^^ 
Narrated Abu Huraira (r.a.) : The Prophet (p.b.u.h) owed somebody 
a camel of a certain age. When he came to demand it back, the 
Prophet (p.b.u.h) said (to some people), "Give him (his due)." 
When the people searched for a camel of that age, they both found 
none, but found a camel one year older. The Prophet (p.b.u.h) 
said, "Give (it to) him." On that, the man remarked, "Tou have 
given me my right in full. May Allah give you in full." The 
Prophet (p.b.u.h) said, "The best amongst you is the one who pays 
the rights of others generously." 
^ji Jl *U3 ^^ <il^ l^ 
To depute a person to repay debts. 
juft ^ i U L L I IT I IHW 1(^*4^ (ff <UJLM ^ i 4 f * « lMjy» > v ^ Cfi Q^'a^** ^-^^ 
fSj^ ^ ^U . *_^ i J JUi .«i- ^ Ji.1 1^ *iJI J ^ j L H^IJ .41- J * - L - *jJL*t 
Narrated Abu Huraira (r.a.) : A man came to the Prophet (p.b.u.h) 
demanding his debts and behaved rudely. The companions of the 
Prophet (p.b.u.h) intended to harm him, but Allah's Apostle 
(p.b.u.h) said (to them), "Leave him, for the creditor (i.e. 
owner of a right) has the right to speak." Allah's Apostle 
(p.b.u.h) then said, "Give him a camel of the same age as that of 
his." The people said, "0 Allah's Apostle! There is only a camel 
that is older than his." Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) said, "Give 
(it to) him, for the best amongst you is he who pays the rights 
of others handsomely." 
1^5 
It is permissible for one to give a gift to a deputy (of some 
people) or to their intercessor. This is confirmed by the 
statement of the Prophet (p.b.u.h) to the delegates of the tribe 
of Hawazin when they appealed to him to return the booty to them, 
the Prophet (p.b.u.h) said, "I give my share to you." 
<uk ail j ^ ail j ^ ^ ^ jtss |^^ ;tt-> j ^ M z^ feJj j ^ o^ ""J^ 
^ ^ <uk aji j ^ ail j^j ^\£ JS^ «^ A^l^oi iiu;^  jjki *jui 
i^saj tii : ipu , : ,^iyI ^j^j 1^ ji^ ^  ^ ^ «uk ail j ^ ail 
Uj aji jx. ^ i i :^;;^ jLii ^^ |JL,^  «uk ail j-a ail j ^ ^ ^ u^a . L««» 
^^j^ .Oit^ cr u^ ^^ u ^ p>fy^ ^1^1 ^ li * j - j ui :ji2r ^ a l^ ^ 
iiJc ail ^ u j^t ^ *u «u4«; 5^::- ai^ ^ , : ^ ^1 ^  *-*:.i 
^ • ^^ <uJL aji j ^ ail j ^ ^ UUJ UjjjL ai :^Lii jm ^JMU^ 
^^^/r^ o^lo*^ dL^^ ^ tj *r^j ^Jt aji j ^ aji j ^ ^ j s 
^Ul ^J .^^1 ^^U^ LJl 1 ^ ^ ^  i^^ii ,^3L / ^ 
oj ^1 . ^^ i i ^ ^ u^ ail j ^ ail j^^ J11^^ ^  ^^y^ ^^ jK^  
Narrated Marzan bin Al-Hakam and Al-Miswar bin Makhraroa : When 
the delegates of the tribe of Hawazin after embracing Islam, came 
^16 
to Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h), he got up. They appealed to him to 
return their properties and their captives. Allah's Apostle 
(p.b.u.h) said to them, "The most beloved statement to me is the 
true one. So, you have the option of restoring your properties 
or you captives, for I have delayed distributing them." The 
narrator added, Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) had been waiting for 
them for more than ten days on his return from Ta'if. When they 
realized that Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) would return to them only 
one of the two things, they said, "We choose our captives." So, 
Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) got up in the gathering of the Muslims, 
praised Allah as He deserved, and said, "Then after! These 
brethren of yours have come to you with repentance and I see it 
proper to return their captives to them. So, whoever amongst you 
likes to do that as a favour, then he can do it, and whoever of 
you wants to stick to his share till we pay him from the very 
first booty which Allah will give us then he can do so." The 
people replied, "We agree to give up our shares willingly as a 
favour for Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h)." Then Allah's Apostle 
(p.b.u.h) said, "We don't know who amongst you has agreed and who 
hasn't. Go back and your chiefs may tell us your opinion." So, 
all of them returned and their chiefs discussed the matter with 
them and then they (i.e. their chiefs) came to Allah's Apostle 
(p.b.u.h) to tell him that they (i.e. the people) had given up 
their shares gladly and willingly. 
If someone deputes a person to give something but does not 
mention how much to give, it is permissible for the deputy to 
distribute it amongst the people according to the conventional 
custom. 
; i 7 
^ ^ j 4-1* *lil J-» j ^ l J- cj;^ J J b L4::* *UI ^^_, alio-* ^ ^ U ^ . ^ J » j I^ K *iL; 
1^1* ^ . JUi ^ j U* Uil J-. ^ 1^ ^ ^ ^ .f^l >r ^^  ^  UjJUi J^ J* .::uii > -
ol i . ) *;-J1I ^ \Uy^ Uii .*~;ji.l Jl * ^ -tUj ^ b j iiwjl <5la.) OJ . «-ii.; ! Jl3 «lil J>-jl-
t.=J3 SdUlS j l4-63b i ; j U l | i « J I J t t i i - 2U.J3 Sl^l J :^J32 »cJ3 ? J - ^ ^ 1 «Jt3 .J»2ji 
4JUI J ^ j J.iLj tr^jlJ^ ^ ' ^ W J I J - l ^ ' ^ *-»l3j j^ili-* * ^ J * ^ ^ '*"*iJ *-^' J ^ L. ' J'J 
Narrated jabir bin 'Abdullah (r.a.) : I was accompanying the 
Prophet (p.b.u.h) on a journey and was riding a slow camel that 
was lagging behind the others. The Prophet (p.b.u.h) passed by 
me and asked, "Who is this?" I replied, "Jabir bin Abdullah." 
He asked, "What is the matter, (why are you late)? I replied, "I 
am riding a slow camel" He asked, "Do you have a stick?" I 
replied in the affirmative. He said, "Give it to me." When I 
gave it to him, he beat the camel and rebuked it. Then that 
camel surpassed the others thenceforth. The Prophet (p.b.u.h) 
said, "Sell it to me." I replied, "It is (a gift) for you, 0 
Allah's Apostle." He said, "Sell it to me. I have bought it for 
four Dinars (gold pieces) and you can keep on riding it till 
Medina." When we approached Medina, I started going (towards my 
house). The Prophet (p.b.u.h) said, "Where are you going?" I 
said, "I have married a widow". he said, "Why have you not 
married a virgin to fondle with each other?" I said, "My father 
died and left daughters, so I decided to marry a widow (an 
experienced woman) (to.look after them)." He said, "Well done." 
When we reached Medina, Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) said, "0 Bilal, 
pay him (the price of the camel) and give him extra money." 
Bilal gave me four Dinars and one Qirat extra. (A sub-narrator 
said): Jabir added, "The extra Qirat of Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) 
never parted from me." The Qirat was always in Jabir bin 
'Abdullah's purse. (1) 
The Prophet (p.b.u.h) did not mention how much extra money 
Bilal was to give, so Bilal gave according to convention. 
1^8 
.^1^1 J |.L)fl sl^ l ii\^j 
A women can depute the ruler in matter of marriage. 
:*sJUi JLj <Jtf JJI J- iJLII Jj-j J) Sl^l o^L. :JL5 J-L-
Narrated Sahi bin Sa'd (r.a.) : A woman came to Allah's Apostle 
(p.b.u.h) and said, "0 Allah's Apostle! I want to give up myself 
to you." A man said "Marry her to me." The Prophet (p.b.u.h) 
said, "We agree to marry her to you with what you know of the 
Qur'an by heart." 
Jj^ jft fJ^\ ^ ^Ll^ JUj . j L ^^-^ Ja.1 Jj <J>ji] 
If a person deputes somebody, and the deputy leaves something, and 
the owner agrees that, then it is allowed, and if the deputy 
lends something of what is in his custody, for a specific time, 
it is permissible (if the owner agrees). 
^19 
:JB 4it ail ^^^ i^^ ^] ^ 'CxL^ ot *^*** 0^ '^y- ^ - ^ 
j « j j^Ti ^^trti ^L^^ si^j isia- ^ ^ cuk ail j ^ ail jy^_j ^ j 
«uk aji j ^ aji jy^j Jj j^ji aii^ :JIJ3^ <j:jiii ^uyi cr^ ^^ 
.<tifc *£«JUJ :JB . *x* j ^ 4*k J^ J U Jt^ ^h^ ^^\ jJB t^ JL^  
J^^j^l J«iU ( ^ ^ ^ Li L :a-<*^  <uk ail J ^ ^^1 JGi .**.T. AIJ 
JuJ^ <il^J ^Lt^ Sj^^ji, 4*L. K*» all J ^ ^ L *rJI :JB ^ c^ ^LII 
J^^^ JyJ >^au«» a1 t:uij^ ^•^y^r* ^ ^ < ^ <^  aj Ul :JB ^4^^-^ 
^ u u i ^ >^<^ J*?^ t4ijbu»^ *jj'tt.i. <jj JL»^  <uic ail j i ^ ail 
^ j i ^ j j B . ^ ^ U t ail j ^ ail j ^ ^ Jj du«*y^ tjij^i CILU 
Jy^j J J*J^ *2*a-^ 1i »a**- J IJUJ «a«*^ « j^ l i^f t JLfc Jt^ g^li** 
J^^^ L tJiJB SJ f^d l^ Jjki U ^^ji^^ Li L t>L»^  <uJL ail J ^ ail 
dLo^ ^ 4:1 Li tJB fil.. „ r,A\* 41^ i :^ Lfr3 ^j^o^ 4a.L dL^  ail 
d L a i y ^ ; « £ j 2 i (<i!?<la^1i ^ U k l l ^ ^Aa.^> J A O J 4 ^ t ^ l <tlJw^ji i^yau^^ 
j ^ ^ ^ j : dCl j:Ay. ^)it JJl IIA^ ^ ^ «uk ail J ^ ail J ^ ^ Jj 
I j j :JB S^L :«2JB tl^. ail uUk* 4iUK uUkI ^ j JJB J ^ ^ 
^ - r ^ » ur-J« ^  :rfj ai ^ ail - ^ ^ i V U t i ^ i ^ Jj ^ 1 
^ ^ik^s, ui;?^ ^^ j y u ail ^ JJL j i ^ ^ *ii:ji V^i ^ 
L :>L*^ <uk a i l J ^ a i l J ^ ^ ^ J J I B rfca.„i.jtj * a^M.^ ta>Jlai tg^^al 
^^j-iij «:iUi ^^jjL. «:i ^ j tail j ^ ^ L tcjs *,^^yi j ^ <^ ui 
.dL^I^ Jj .=^1 m : J JB i ^ S ^ L :JB . a ^ juJLi i^ ail 
- f ^ > ^^« ^ ^j <Jj ^ ail - ^ ^ i^ i^ ^ ^ ^ 1 V i^B 
, j * ^ ^ ^ I k ^ u L ^ ^^  liiL. ail ^ JJL Jlj^ ^ :J JB^ 
^ <:\ Li tjju^ <JLc ail j ^ ^ ^1 jGj ^ 1 jx, ^ ^ ^ 1 i^ii^ 
:JB ^^l^nt^ Li L J U ^ife 1 . *-A,Uj ^ -JU: tw^j^ y>^ uBo^ 
,^tkji^ J I J : J B *^ 
Narrated Abu Huraira (r.a.) : Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) deputed 
me to keep Sadaqat (al-Fitr) of Ramadan. A comer (1) came and 
2^0 
started taking handfuls of the foodstuff (of the Sadaqa) 
(stealthily). I took hold of him and said, "By Allah, I will 
take you to Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h)." He said, "I am needy and 
have many dependents, and I am in great need." I released him, 
and in the morning Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) asked me, "What did 
your prisone do yesterday?" (2) I said, "0 Allah's Apostle! The 
person complained of being needy and of having many dependents, 
so, I pitied him and let him go." Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) 
said, "Indeed, he told you a lie and he will be coming again." I 
believed that he Would show up again as Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) 
had told me that he would return. So, I waited for him 
watchfully. When he (showed up and) started stealing handfuls of 
foodstuff, I caught hold of him again and said, "I will 
definitely take you to Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h). He said, 
"Leave me, for I am very needy and have many dependents. I 
promise I will not come back again." I pitied him and let him 
go. In the morning Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) asked me, "What did 
your prisoner do?" I replied, "0 Allah's Apostle! He complained 
of his great needji^ of too many dependents, so I took pity on 
him and set him free." Allah Apostle (p.b.u.h) said, "Verily, he 
told you a lie and he will return." I waited for him attentively 
for the third time, and when he (came and) started stealing 
handfuls of the foodstuff, I caught hold of him and said, "I will 
surely take you to Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) as it is the third 
time you promise not to return, yet you break your promise and 
come." He said, (Forgive me and) I will teach you some words 
with which Allah will benefit you." I asked, "What are they." 
He replied, "Whenever you go to bed, recite "Ayat-al-Kursi" -
'Allahu la ilaha ila huwa-i-Haly-ul Qaiyum (3) till you finish 
the whole verse. (If you do so), Allah will appoint a guard for 
you who will stay with you and no satan will come near you till 
morning." So, I released him. In the morning, Allah's Apostle 
(p.b.u.h) asked, "What did your prisoner do yesterday?" I 
replied, "He claimed that be would teach me some words by which 
Allah will benefit me, so I let him go." Allah's Apostle 
(p.b.u.h) asked, "What are they?" 1 replied, "He said to me, 
"Whenever you go to bed, recite Ayat-al-Kursi from the beginning 
to the end — Allahu la ilaha ilia huwa-1-Haiy-ul-Qaiyum — . " 
He further said to me, "(If you do so), Allah will appoint a 
guard for you who will stay with you, and no satan will come 
near you till morning (Abu Huraira or another sub-narrator) added 
Comer : satan 
Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) was inspired divinely by the whole 
story and this was the reason why he asked Abu Huraira 
though Abu Huraira had told him nothing. 
Surat-al-Baqara verse No. 255. 
2,21 
that they (the companions) were very keen to do good deeds. The 
Prophet (p.b.u.h) said, "He really spoke the truth, although he 
is an absolute liar. Do you know whom you were talking to, these 
three nights, 0 Abu Huraira?" Abu Huraira said, "No". He said, 
"It was Satan". 
'^j^j^ <*:^ \>^\i i^ J:^j^' ifi )^ ] 
If a deputy sells something in an illegal manner, the transaction 
is invalid. 
t ^ ,^1 ^ Ij^l** \±JA :^Lft ^ ^^^A^ b&^ J j i a«- j \±^ 
^ ^ .uk aji ^ ^ 1 jj JUL ^u :je <:^ ail ^^ ^ ^ i 
JI3 ^li* ,^ 1 <>* i^^ 4jt ail j - ^ ^^1 a J\M t^^ ^^ 
J ^ ^^1 .^sLJ ^L^ c^U 4i* «r»aji i j j ^ ^ ^,i^ ^i£ : J i l 
*4^ 1 4^ 1 :JJj jy;^  JL*^ 4dJL ail J ^ ^^ l^ll JGi 'AL*^ <uk ail 
• 4 *^1 fi ^ 1 2 ^ ^^1 
Narrated Abu Sa'id al-Khudri (r.a.) : Once Bilal brought Barni 
(i.e. a kind of dated) to the Prophet (p.b.u.h) and the Prophet 
(p.b.u.h) asked him, "From where have you brought these?" Bilal 
replied, "I had some inferior type of dates and exchanged two 
Sa's of it for one Sa of Barni dates in order to give it to the 
Prophet (p.b.u.h) to eat." Thereupon the Prophet (p.b.u.h) said, 
"Beware! Beware! This is definitely Riba (usury)! Don't do so, 
but if you want to buy (a superior kind of dates) sell the 
inferior dates for money and then buy the superior kind of dates 
with that money." 
322 
. J ^ > I L J ^ JGj j j^ ^ ^^ ,1^  <SM:^ J 3 ^ I ^^ 4llijJI 
The deputyship for managing the Waqf (religious endowment) and 
the expenses of the trustee. The trustee can provide his friends 
from it and he himself can eat from it reasonably (according to 
his work) 
O* (^ U i^^i <j^ ox* J:f ^  -^ 0*' 0 ^ -"^ ^ cP^ -^ 
Narrated 'Amr concerning the Waqf of 'Umar (r.a.) : it was not 
sinful of the trustee (of the Waqf) to eat or provide his friends 
from it, provided the trustee had no intention of collecting 
fortune (for himself). Ibn 'Umar was the manager of the trust of 
'Omar and he used to give presents from it to those with whom he 
used to stay at Mecca. 
AjO^JI 4^ IJI^^I 
To depute a person to carry out a (legal) Allah's, ordained 
punishment. 
2^3 
Narrated Zaid bin Khalid and Abu Huraira (r.a.) : The Prophet 
(p.b.u.h) said, "0 Unais! Go to the wife of this (man) and if she 
confesses (that she has committed illegal sexual intercourse), 
then stone her to death." 
0^ * ^' i5» O ^ Or* ^^ *-b iJJI J - 4JI Jj-j ^ U .LjLi 
Narrated 'Ugba bin Al-Harith (r.a.) : When An-Nuaman or his son 
was brought in a state of drunkenness, Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) 
ordered all those who were present in the house to beat him. I 
was one of those who beat him. He beat him with shoes and palm-
leaf stalks. 
UJALU J ^ J J I ^^ Ai\£ji\ 
To depute someone to sacrifice Budn (camels for sacrifice) and to 
look after them. 
Xlk 
J L j <-JU <UI J - , <JUI J ^ j ^^ J i ^ *iJis li l :lfLfr UJI ^ ^ j 
l ^ * 1 ^ |»i «OJ-^ ^ j cJc <JUI J - 4JUI J j - - j UdJS ^ ^ X j ; 
xDI 4k1 ^  pL-j <J* aJI J-» <UI J_^j Jft |.^p- jJi *^^1 ^ 
Narrated 'Aisha (r.a.) : I twisted the garlands of the Hadis 
(i.e. animals for sacrifice) of Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) with my 
own hands. Then Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) put them around their 
necks with his own hands, and sent them with my father (to 
Mecca). Nothing legal was regarded illegal for Allah's Apostle 
(p.b.u.h) till the animals were slaughtered. (1) 
:jSji\ J\3j <JUI J\J J ^ , ^ :dSji J^J\ Jli lij 
If a person tells his deputy, "Spend it as Allah directs you," 
and the deputy says, "1 have heard what you have said." 
1. Sending the Hadi to Mecca while one is somewhere else, does 
not require that one should be treated as a Muhrim. 
^25 
af.iat*>.ft 4rJi^ ^ ^^ .^.;:if *^j <^ i>^ ^ v^^ 6^^ *^^ ^ ^ ^ ^L»:'^ i 
l ^ AU ^  • - > ^ V *^*:? 1^^ **^ *^ ^ J-* **^ ' J ,^^ 0^-> * *****^ ' 
J j y L jLiT ail ^ j ail jy^j L : jtsi ^ ^ <JL ail j ^ aii 
1^ 1^  . A U ^ Jj *-**1 ^1^ -^^yi^ U lyik: ^ ^ 1 yb:: cP -ut:^ 
^ aJL ^1 i^ M-Jii .ail j ^ ^ L > i i g e .cnit^ ^ i^ ^^ M**: 0^ 
,^i^ : ^ U ^ 2;t t^^^ JtSy ,UUL» <2;t t J ^ U - j 4ajt: ,4«t ^ ^ <u^ ll1 
Narrated Anas bin Malik (r.a.) : Abu Talha was the richestman in 
Medina amongst the Ansar and Beeruha (garden) was the most 
beloved of his property, and it was situated opposite the mosque 
(of the Prophet (p.b.u.h). Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) used to 
enter it and drink from its sweet water. When the following 
Divine Verse were revealed : 'you will not attain righteousness 
till you spend in charity of the things you love' (3:93), Abu 
Talha got up in front of Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) and said, "0 
Allah's Apostle Allah Ta'ala says in His Book, 'You will not 
attain righteousness unless you spend (in charity) that which you 
love,' and verily, the most beloved to me of my property is 
Beeruha (garden), so I give it in charity and hope for its reward 
from Allah. 0 Allah's Apostle! Spend it wherever you like." 
Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) appreciated that and said, "That is 
perishable wealth, that is perishable wealth. I have heard what 
you have said; I suggest you to distribute it among your 
relatives." (1) Abu Talha said, "I will do so, 0 Allah's 
Apostle." So, Abu Talha distributed it among his relatives and 
cousins. The sub-narrator (Malik) said : The Prophet (p.b.u.h) 
said: 
"That is a profitable wealth," instead of "perishable wealth". 
That is perishable wealth and it is better for you to spend 
it in charity whereby you will get what will be imperishable 
(i.e. Allah's reward). 
2^6 
.IA^J Z\yiJ\ J j ^ ^ \ :Ul^j 
To depute a trustworthy treasurer for the treasury and similar 
things. 
^ 4 5 ^ t^ "^ ' 'J^ ^'JJ 'J*^ 
Narrated Abu Nusa (r.a.) : The Prophet (p.b.u.h) said, "An honest 
treasurer who gives what he is ordered to give fully, perfectly 
and willingly to the person to whom he is orderd to give, is 
regarded as one of the two charitable persons." 
With this authentic background recognising the agency 
^27 
( <JL-*)\p^ ) as legal, we will examine general principles 
governing it and conduct of the agent when amounts to breach of 
trust as envisaged by Islamic jurists. 
"Vekyalet is for someone to put business of his on 
another, and to make him stand in his own place in respect of 
that business. 
The person who appoints the other is called "mavekkil" 
and the person who stands in his place "vekyl" - Agent, and that 
I 
business is called "muvekkil beh." Art. (1449). 
A person may lawfully appoint another his agent, for 
the settlement on his behalf of every contract which he might 
have lawfully concluded himself, such as a sale, marriage and so 
forth; because as an individual it is not possible to do or 
attend each every matter personally. Sometimes a person is 
prevented from acting in his own person as result of some 
accident, sickness or the like. In business to attend every 
thing in person difficult. Obviously, someone may be employed to 
look after the business affairs on his behalf. He is therefore 
admitted of necessity, to appoint another person his agent so 
that he may expedite the business matters effectively. 
I. Hejelle page 239. 
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"The essence of the appointment of an vekyl - (Agent) 
is the proposal and acceptance. If the process of proposal and 
acceptance is complete, the 'vekyalat' (Agency) is a concluded 
contract. The acceptance may be express or may be inferred from 
the conduct of the Agent. But after the proposal the agent 
refuses it, the contract is not concluded. if the agent deals 
with the property after his refusal, the disposition by him of 
such a property is not valid. However, if a person who has no 
authority to deal with the property of another person and he 
sells it without permission and the owner later approves the 
sale, it would be considered that the person who disposed of 
property was the agent of the owner of the property. 
Ratification by the owner makes the sale as valid and the sellers 
"tands as his agent. 
Conferring of the powers by the principal ( (j-^ ) 
upon his agent may be limited or unlimited. If the authority 
given dependent upon a condition to be fulfilled, powers are 
limited. For example where the agent is appointed to sell a gold 
watch and the owner gives a direction that it should be sold for 
Rs 1000/=, then the power is limited by a condition. An agent 
cannot sale it less than Rs 1000/=. 
Sometimes appointment is made dependent on a time. For 
example, the owner says to his agent that property given 
possession over it to him is to be sold in the month of April. 
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Than in April he becomes an agent. He can sale it in April and 
not before April because the power is limited by time. 
Competency si ?nn<;inl Afid MS&t 
It is a necessary condition that the person who 
appoints the agent should be a competent person capable to do the 
work for which the agent is appointed. If a madman appoints an 
agent, such appointment is not valid. Similarly, an infant 
incapable to understand the nature of the transaction appoints an 
agent, such appointment is not valid. 
'An infant who has understanding even if his guardian 
gives permission, caimot appoint another vekyl for matters which 
are pure loss as regards himself, like a gift or giving alms, but 
he can appoint another vekyl for matters, which are purely 
beneficial to him, like the acceptance of a gift or alms, even if 
he has not the permission of his guardian'. 
However, if he is freed from restrain (me'zun) for 
trading, he can appoint another vekyl in matters which may be 
beneficial or the cause of loss, like selling and buying'. 
'If he is not, the appointment of the vekyl is a 
concluded contract subject to the permission of the guardian o'f 
the infant'. 
po 
As to the competency of the agent, the requirements are 
that the agent should be capable to have reason and understanding 
(mumeyyiz). Age of puberty is not the requirement. 
Therefore, an infant can be an agent if he has 
understanding capabilities. Further when he is released from 
restrain (me'zun). But rights under the contract do not affect 
him. These rights relate to the person who appoints him vekyl. 
"Subject Matter in Respect si which Mfi&l Appointed" 
i 
An agent may be appointed for doing and discharging of 
9 
every duty related to the transactions (mu'amalat - <-^JJL^^), 
and for matters which he would be capable to do personally. An 
agent may be appointed for: 
(1 
(2 
(3 
(4 
(5 
(6 
(7 
(8 
(9 
(10 
Selling or buying; 
Letting or hiring; 
Giving or taking a pledge; 
For depositing or receiving a thing for safe 
keeping; 
For making or receiving a gift; 
For making a compromise; 
For giving an acquittance; 
For making an admission; 
For bringing an action; 
For claiming a right of premption; 
pi 
(11) For claiming partition; 
(12) For paying and receiving debt; and 
(13) For the receipt of a thing. 
However, appointment of an agent to discharge the 
duties assigned to him in connection with the transactions is 
subject to the condition that it is necessary, the thing for 
which he is appointed, should be a certain and known thing. 
Contract made by an agent sometimes is incumbent upon 
the principal, and sometimes not. Under the following condition 
contract would be incumbent upon the principal otherwise contract 
would not be good: 
(a) In gift, 
(b) In loan, 
(c) On deposit ( «-r:-o^ -3.? ), 
(d) On lending money, 
(e) On entering into a partnership, 
(f) In mudareba, and 
(g) In compromising a matter denied by the other side. 
Under condition, where there is no provision in the 
contract that the contract would be incumbent on principal, or 
p2 
the agent contends himself with making it incumbent on himself, 
contract is good. In the following cases of: 
(a) Selling and buying, 
(b) Hiring, and 
(c) A compromise on the admission of the defendant 
making a contract made by agent incumbent on the 
principal does not render the contract invalid. 
The rights under such contract acrues the 
contracting party i.e. the vekyl - (agent). 
However, if it is made incumbent upon the 
principal, the rights under the contract concerns 
the principals, and agent (vekyl) in such a case 
is like a messenger (a person who makes the 
communication - (Rasul). If a messenger (Rasul) 
is sent, the rights under the contract affects the 
person who sends him and not the messenger. 
I8SS1 
Property handed over by the principal to the agent, and 
when received and taken possession over on behalf of the 
principal is a deposit (Trust - vJl-^js-^jl^U), Article 1463 
elaborates the law as follows: 
"Property received, under his appointment as vekyl 
(agent) by a person, who is vekyl to sell or buy, or to 
p3 
pay or receive a debt, or to receive an existing 
specific thing is like a thing deposited for safe-
keeping" 
Similarly, "property in the hands of a messenger for 
the performance of his message is also like a thing so 
deposited ( C:,^^^ )". 
•/ 
Breach of Trust 
If the property deposited with the agent either to 
sell, or buy or to pay or receive a debt on behalf of the 
principal, is destroyed without any fault, indifference or 
neglect on the part of the agent, he is not liable. 
In case of the agent does not return the assigned 
property to the principal nor does he discharge his duties 
concerning it, instead misappropriate it, he would be liable for 
breach of trust. 
An agent cannot purchase for himself any specific 
article which he is directed to purchase for his principal. If a 
person employees another person as his agent to purchase for him 
some specific article, in that case agent is net entitled to 
purchase the article for himself; because this is a breach of 
trust reposed in him by his principal, and also because it is a 
dismissal of himself from his appointment which he is not 
empowered to do, unless in the presence of his principal. 
3 
If the agent purchases a thing different in nature from 
the price specified by his principal, the agent would not be 
liable. For example, when the principal has specified the price 
ot the article and the agent purchases it for his own use for a 
price of a different species from that asked by the principal to 
purchase for him or that the principal not having specified the 
price, the agent purchases the article not in exchange of money, 
but for something estimatable by weight or measurement of 
capacity, the agent under such situa.tions would not be liable for 
breach of trust. 
If the agent delegates his power to purchase to another 
agent, and the second agent purchases, the article in the absence 
of the primary agent; in all such cases the purchase is held to 
have been made on behalf of the agent himself, and not of his 
principal, because of the deviation from his principal's orders -
if on the other hand, the secondary agent concludes the bargain 
in the presence of the primary agent, the purchase is in that 
case considered as made for the principal, because the wisdom and 
judgement of the primary agent is held (in consequence of his 
presence) to have exerted : and hence there is no deviation from 
the orders of his principle. 
In cases of loss of money by the messenger to pay debt, 
if the messenger is of the debtor and the money returned to the 
creditor is lost while still in the hands of the messenger, 
before it is received by the creditor, in such a case loss would 
^35 
be considered of the debtor. But on the other hand if the money 
handed over to creditor's messenger and during transit is lost, 
then it would be considered a loss of the creditor. In both 
cases if there is no faults or neglegent of either of the agents 
or messenger, they would not be liable. 
If someone appoints persons as his agents together, one 
of them cannot act in the matter for which they are appointed 
vekyl (agent) i.e. one cannot perform the vekyalat. 
But if they are appointed agents in cases of:. 
(a) vekyl for litigation, or 
(b) for returning a thing entrusted ( ^Jl^i*} ) for 
safe-keeping, or 
(c) for paying debts. 
One alone can carry out the vekyalat, there will be no 
breach of trust. In case if the agent has appointed another 
person vekyl especially for that either of the above noted work, 
whoever of them carries out the vekyalat, it is lawful. However, 
the law is that in matter in which a person has been appointed 
vekyl, he cannot appoint another person vekyl unless specific 
permission is obtained for this purpose from the principal. 
Violation would amount to breach of trust. If permission is 
given by the principal, then such an agent becomes the agent of 
the principal. 
In cases when the vekyl (agent) buys thing of a 
different genus, not ordered by the principal, it is considered 
that the thing is bought by the vekyl (agent), for his own use. 
It has not been bought for the principal, it is not necessary to 
emunerate its qualities of that for which the vekyl is appointed 
to buy. The only requirement is that when the vekyalat is 
limited by a limitation or specification of an article, the vekyl 
(agent) must not go contrary to it. If the agent acts contrary, 
the property bought remains on his account, because of the fact 
that the act is violative of trust reposed in him. 
A vekyl (agent) for sale, without limitations imposed 
on his powers to sale, can sell the property of his principal for 
a small or large sum, i.e. for the price which he has seen fit 
unless the principal has fixed the price. If he sells contrary 
to .the price fixed by the principal, the sale is concluded 
contract, subject to the approval of his principal. 
When the agent sells the property on his own accord for 
a less sum than that fixed by the principal, he would be liable 
for breach of trust. 
Further the agent authorised by his principal to sell 
his property and the agent himself buys it, it is not good. 
Again a vekyl cannot sell the property of principal to persons, 
who are not allowed by law to give evidence on his behalf. But, 
it he sells for more than its value, the sale is good. Again if 
p7 
he is made vekyl by a general vekyalat, the principal has 
authorised to sell to anyone he likes, in that case, a sale by an 
agent to them for an equivalent price is permitted. In such a 
case it would not amount to breach of trust. 
In case where the person who gives the order has money 
to receive from the person to whom he gives the order, or when 
there is money of his deposited ( ) with him for safe 
keeping, if he makes an order to pay his debt from it, the person 
ordered is compelled to pay the debt. 
But in case the person who gives the order has said, 
"sell such a property of mine and pay my debt," the person who 
receives the order, if he is a vekyl (agent) without pay, cannot 
be compelled. 
And if he is a paid vekyl (agent), he is compelled to 
sell that property and pay the debt of the person who gives the 
order. Non-cmpliance would be breach of trust. 
On the completion of the work for which the vekyl 
(agent) has been appointed, there is an end of the vekyalat, and 
the vekyl (agent) is naturally released from his vekyalat. 
CHAPTER V 
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PARTNERSHIP 1 ITOIM gPmiWft^ hM 
PARTNERSHIP DEFINED 
Section 4 of the Partnership Act, 1932, defines 
partnership as: 
"Partnership is the relation between persons who have 
agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by 
•all or any of them acting for all". 
Inference which one draws from the definition is that 
there must be the following elements which are needed to 
establish a partnership: 
(1) A relationship between persons to carry on a 
business; 
(2) An agreement to create partnership; 
(3) Business to be carried on in common; 
(4) With a view to share the profits of the business; 
and 
(5) The business is to be carried on by all or any of 
them acting for all. 
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As to the term 'business', it has been explained by 
section 2 as: 
"business includes every trade, occupation and 
profession". 
If the above definition is taken literally, it would 
create problems because every occupation cannot be called a 
'business'. For example a landowner.does not carry on a business 
although the management of his estate and the collection of the 
rents may be his only occupation which keeps him to be extremely 
busy man. 
Thus the term business must be considered in the 
practical sense which the men of business use it in their day to 
day business routines. It refers to all such activities which if 
I 
successful would result in profit. In Coope V. Eyre, it was 
observed that where certain persons jointly purchased wheat and 
oil with a view to divide and pay for it equally, they being not 
interested in profit or loss, were not partners. 
If certain persons are co-owners of a land, a mere co-
ownership, does not create a partnership although they make all 
possible efforts to develop the land for their mutual benefit. 
What is required here is the proof that they go further and carry 
on business with respect to it. 
I. IBl H 37; (1788) 2RR 706. 
^40 
I 
In Smith's case James Lj, said that 'where members of 
society formed to purchase investment for their common benefit 
are not partners because there is nothing to be done by such 
societies that comes within the ordinary business, any nore than 
what is done by the turstees of a marriage settlement who have 
large properties vested in them, and who have very extensive 
powers of disposing of investments, changing the investments, and 
selling them and reinvesting in other investments, according to 
their discretion and judgement'. 
Other illustrative cases of partnership may be: 
Where the owners of a ship use it in the business of 
carriers of either the goods or the passengers. They become the 
partners in business. 
A partnership is constituted where two persons have 
II 
agreed to produce a film and share the profits of hiring it out. 
If a society is constituted 'to speculate in 
investments with a view to make profits by selling and buying 
again securities whenever, in the opinion of the management, in 
turn of the market should make it advisable to do so, then no 
doubt a partnership would exist because that would be a business, 
I. Smith V. Anderson (1880) 15 Ch D. 247 at 276. 
II. Monek V. Roslan Lai Shorey, AIR 1931 Lah. 390. 
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i.e. a buying and selling of property with a view of profit as 
distinguished from jurist or common ownership.' 
To be precise the term business has been used in the 
partnership Act, in a limited sense as to commercial and 
professional businesses, callings in which men hold themselves 
out as willing to sell goods or to provide skilled assistance or 
other service. 
Another important elements is the agreement for 
creating partnership. Section 5 of the Partnership Act evisages 
that a partnership is created by contract and not as a result of 
status by operation of law. For example joint family carrying on 
business, which does not arise as a result of contract rather 
than by status, operation of law, succession or inheritance. 
i:. 
In Minck 's case, it was held that a partnership may 
exist in a single business deal. Where two persons agreed to 
produce a film and share the profits of lending it on him, it 
would be sufficient to constitute-a partnership. 
Apart from business, another el^nent is to carry on 
business in cononon. Section 4 of the Partnership Act envisages 
that the business may be carried on 'by all or any of them acting 
r . Supra N. p. 
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for air. It may create the relation like principal and agent, 
but still they are partners. For example A carries on the 
btisiness not only for himself but for others also. 
Further the business must be c arried on with a view of 
sharing of profits. Merely two or more persons carry on business 
jointly with a view of sharing of profits is not enough to make 
them partners, infact, division of profits is essential for the 
existance of partnership. Partner should have a right to share 
the profits. 
As to rules for determining the existance of a 
partnership section 6 of the Indian Partnership Act provides two 
explanations the list of persons who might be interested in the 
profits of a business, such as, joint-tenants and tenant-in-
coinnon, those who share the gross-profit, and the receipt by a 
person of a share of the profits, but they do not by such 
relation become partners. They may at best be called as holders 
of non-partnership interests. 
Some of the other cases of receipt of a share of the 
profits may be, 'a payment of a debt by instalmetns, a contract 
for the remuneration of a servant or agent, a widow or child of a 
deceased partner, a loan to a partnership and the sale of the 
good will of a business'. Such accruing profits do not itself 
determine the partnership or make them partners in the 
partnership firm. 
To constitute a valid partnership as to maximum number 
forming the firm, we may have two different categories. In 
carrying on banking business there cannot be more than ten 
partners while in all other cases twenty is the maximum limits or 
partners forming the partnership. 
For the formation of partnership it is necessary that a 
person must have the capacity to enter into a partnership. As to 
the form of agreement there are no requirements which have to be 
fulfilled. Minor, and unsoundness of mind of a person are 
exceptions to the general rule for the formation of partnership. 
Further the partnership must not be for an illegal 
purpose. It is also necessary that the number of partners' should 
not exceed the limit laid by law. 
Next important issue is the relation of partners to one 
another. It has been given in section 11 of Indian Partnership 
Act. According to this section the relations of partners to one 
another is governed wholly by the terms of the partnership 
agreement. This gives the partners the liberty to settle their 
mutual rights and duties by their own voluntary agreement. 
The terms of the partnership agreement may be varied 
with the consent of all partners. Mutual trust and confidence 
among partners is an assential condition of their relations. 
Section 9 recognises this principle that the partners are bound 
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to be just and faithful to each other. The statutory obligation 
thus created cannot be .warded off by any agreement to the 
contrary. 
Certain rights are given to every partner of a firm, 
e.g. as to capital and profits, and as to right to take part in 
the management of the partnership business though the agreement 
to these effects is absent between them. 
The relation between partners results in certain duties 
e.g. to render true accounts and full information to each other, 
account to the firm for any benefit derived by him without the 
consent of the other partners from any transaction concerning the 
partnership, or from any use by him of the partnership property, 
name of business connection, account for profits from competing 
business, liability of a partner for misappropriation of property 
entrusted under section 27 of Indian Partnership Act, account for 
improper employment of trust property for partnership purposes, 
etc. 
"Breach of Tryigt" 
From- such relations and duties of the partners result 
I 
the criminal liability also. Decision of R.K. Dalmia V. Delhi 
Administration has now settled I" T' that sections 405 and 506 
(1970) 3 SCR 765. 
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are quite wide enough to include within their purview the case of 
a partner if it is proved that he was in fact entrusted by 
agreement with the partnership property or with dominion over 
property, and that he dishonestyly misappropriated the property. 
'A partner can be held liable for criminal breach of 
trust li entrustment of partnership property to him i-s proved or 
if it is shown that he was given authority to collect monies or 
property of the firm. Partner is liable only if entrustment in 
I 
any form is proved.' 
'Where a sum of money is entrusted to a partner 
specifically for being deposited as a security for tenders, the 
partner is given exclusive dominion over that money and if he 
misappropriates the same, the offence under section 406 is prima 
II 
facie made out against him.' 
'In the absence of a specific agreement entrusting a 
partner with a specific item of property, a partner cannot be 
held to be guilty of an offence of criminal breach of trust even 
III 
in respect of a partnership assets." 
I. 1972 Cr. Li. 945 (Guj) 
II. Ibid. 
III. 1968, Cr. Li. 1074. 
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'Where a person, who was working partner was in charge 
of the assets of the partnership and he, contrary to the 
provisions of the partnership agreement prohibiting him from 
withdrawing the money for his personal use before the settlement 
of account at the end of the year, misappropriated certain 
I 
amount, he was held guilty under section 406 Penal Code.' 
A partner in the absence of such a special agreement 
II 
cannot be convicted of criminal breach of trust. 
For an offence of criminal breach of trust, an 
entrustment of dominion over property is essential and in 
partnership there is no entrustment unless there is a special 
ni 
agreement.' 
'Where a partner is given authority by other partners 
to collect money, he is entrusted with dominion over that 
property and if he dishonestly misappropriates it, he comes 
IV 
within section 405.' 
Where a partner has been authorised to withdraw from 
only up to Rs. 100/= at a time withdrawing Rs 3000/= without 
consulting other partners and misappropriates the same. He will 
I. 1959, CR. IJ. 1302. 
II. (1970) 3 SCR 765; 1980 Cr. Lj. 1030 (Cal.) 
III. AIR 1965 SC 1433; 1970 SCC (Cri) 221. 
IV. AIR 1962 SC 1821 (RK Dalmia). 
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be liable under section 405. 
II 
In Lok Nath V. Jagri Suri, it was observed that like 
joint owner who cannot coninit misappropriation of property which 
he holds jointly with other co-owners, the partner also cannot 
misappropriate partnership's property belonging to him/other -. ., 
co-partners. 
Ill 
In Debi Prasad Bhagat's case where a partner was 
asked to give account of the expenditure of money which he 
received, and had power to spend the money received, failed to 
make out the accounts satisfactorily, it was held that there was 
no dishonest conversion making him liable under section 406 Penal 
Code. 
IV 
In Koorathalvar Chetty it was observed : 'In the case 
of a charge of criminal breach of trust against a partner, the 
criminal court should not entertain the case if the prosecution 
is unable to prove clearly and beyond reasonable doubt that the 
accused has acted dishonestly and with a view to enrich himself 
clandestinely at the expense of those with whom he was working 
and with whom he was bound by fiduciary relationship. 
I. 1954 Cr. Lj. 1202. 
II. 1982 Cr. Lj. 1328 (JSK). 
III. Devi.Prasad Bhagat V. Nagar Mull. (1901) 35 Cal. 1108. 
IV. (1920) mil 346; 1921 Cr. Lj. 309. 
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'A partner cannot be held guilty of criminal breach of 
I 
trust even in respect of partnership assets.' 'A partner not 
rendering account and withholding share of property of other 
II 
partners is not liable under section 406 I.P.O. In cases of 
disputes regarding the liabilities of the partners the court will 
not interfere under this section 406. The court has to be 
cautious and careful in proceeding against partners for charges 
of criminal breach of trust. 
Ill 
In Chiranji lal V. Raja Ram Singh, it was held that a 
partner received money on behalf of the partnership did not 
receive it in a fiduciary capacity. Consequently, where a 
partner alleged to have had with-held the share of the profits 
of the partnership business said to be due to another partner, 
could not be prosecuted under this section. 
'Where a partner holds property belonging to the 
partnership he holds it as one of the partners entitled to hold 
it and until dissolution and accounts it cannot be said that he 
holds the property in a fiduciary capacity. Unless the 
relationship of partnership imposes on one partner holding 
property fiduciary obligations, it cannot be said that the 
partner, if he holds property of the partnership with the consent 
I. ILR (1969) Delhi 178. 
II. AIR (1964) Raj. 257. 
III. (1964) II Cr. Lj. 730. 
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of the others, has been entrusted with it, and that he is guilty 
of a fraud on his trust in not accounting to his co-partners for 
I 
the property. 
II 
In Jai Krishna (1950) it was held that no criminal 
prosecution is sustainable against a partner for misappropriating 
partnership money. 
Ill 
Similarly, in State V. Gopal C. Poddar, 'The money due 
to the partnership was required to be deposited in bank in the 
name of the firm. A partner, however, deposited money in the 
name of a third party. It was held that there was no breach of 
trust as in the absence of a special agreement a partner 
receiving money belonging to the partnership cannot be held to 
have been entrusted with dominion over partnership properties.' 
A partner may be a working partner, not contributed 
money or capital, even does not share the losses, only shares the 
profits, his only contribution is his labour. It all depends 
upon the terms of agreement entered between different partners. 
IV 
In Devkinandan, 'the accused was a working partner and manager 
of a partnership firm, was in charge of the assets of the 
partnership agreement he was debarred from making any with-
I. Raghubir Singh (1966) Cr. Lj. 202. 
II. 1950, Nag. 379; Shridher. 
III. 1978 Cr. Lj. 425 (Bom). 
IV. (1958) 60 Bom LR 1413; 1959 Cr. Lj. 1302, 
drawals for personal use before the settlement of accounts at the 
end of the year. The accused misappropriated a certain amount 
belonging to the partnership and for this purpose he brought 
about false credit and debit entries in the books of accounts of 
the partnership showing that he had paid a certain amount to his 
financing partners. It was held that the accused was guilty of 
criminal breach of trust.' 
To be precise to make a partner liable for breach of 
trust under sections 405 and 406 of Indian Panel Code, following 
rules must be taken into consideration: 
(1) Mere dominion over property of a partner is not 
enough; 
(2) It must be established that his dominion was the 
result of entrustment; 
(3) To prove that dominion over the assets or a 
particular asset of the partnership was by a 
special agreement between the partners, entrusted 
to the accused partner. In the absence of such a 
special agreement, no fiduciary relationship can 
be established and cannot be held to have been 
entrusted with dominion over partnership 
properties. In order to attract section 405 and 
406 the entrustment must be alleged and 
proved. 'The fact that the partnership property 
belongs to the firm does not in any way indicate 
that any partner has entrusted his share to the 
other partners. Such entrustment cannot be read 
I 
in the mere relationship of partners.' A special 
agreement entrusting the dominion over the 
property and dishonest misappropriation make a 
partner liable under section 406, I.P.O. 
Raja Kumar G.S.V. Subramaniam Foti 1979 Cr. Lj. 738. 
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CHAPTER V 
PART B 
PARTNERSHIP t ISLAMIC CRIMIHAL LAB 
Islam exhorts man to make efforts, do strive for 
earning his livelihood, and exert himself in production and 
exchange of useful goods. He may strive for the welfare in this 
life but subject to the condition that he should be consistently 
loyal to the Islamic way of life, individually and socially. The 
economic activities and the economic ends she 
direction to achieve Falah as has been evisag 
* * i 
please the Lord ( 
Allah says, 
It ^ ^ II ^ ^ 
"They are sure to prosper who purify themselves and 
manage to grow (develop)". (87:14). 
Islam is opposed to the materialistic approach but it 
does not mean that to achieve economic wellbeing or to devote to 
productive efforts, in any way opposed by Islam. Material 
wellbeing is an essential constituent of ?alah. 
^53 
Prophet (peace be upon him) once advised: 
\jiya ^ ^ .-k Jil J - ail J ^ ^ JU JIS Ijijx rJ ^-^ 
...jJL: j \ ^  J j Uiilj UUIj ^ 1 ^ dJL 
"Seek God's refuge from poverty, scarcity and 
ignominy". 
To earn a livelihood is an obligation. However, when 
the man indulges in economic activities, he is required to 
safeguard his religion in belief and practice. Earnings should 
be rightful, by honest means and inconsonance with the religion. 
The Prophet (peace be upon him) has emphasized one's obligation 
to earn a livelihood: 
J%J\ w-T *-JL , ^ j U* <iJI J- . iUI J^j JU JU *M\^ ^ 
.1^1-^1 . . - i : ^ j ie U l ^ J5UI 
"To strive to earn a livelihood through right means is 
an obligation after the main duty (prayer)". 
Economic activities pursued in consonance with 
teachings of Islam, by proper means and for the proper ends are 
highly venerated and regarded as devout and pietic as devotional 
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prayers. Trustwortliiness and honesty should be the basic 
requirements of business transactions under Islamic concept. 
Prophet (peace be upon him) once gave the incentive to 
the traders: 
:JIS ^j <J^ iSil J^ ^^\ ^ ^jdiJI ^ J - — ^1 ^ 
"The honest, trustful Muslim trader shall have his rise 
with Martyrs (on the Day of Judgement). 
In the Holy Quran it has been repeatedly emphasised 
that all the natural resources have been created by Allah with a 
view to provide man unlimited possiblities of satisfying his 
wants and thus maintain his life in reasonable manner. Allah 
says: 
"And We have given you (mankind) power in the earth and 
appointed for you there in a livelihood. Very little 
255 
do you thank". (7:10). 
(^0 : o l < dUUll Ijj^) 
"He it is Who has made earth subservient unto you, so 
walk in the paths thereof and eat of His providence". 
(67:15). 
In another ayat Allah'says: 
"And We have appointed the day for livelihood". (78:11) 
Thus Islam exhorts a man to endeavour for earnings but 
within Islamic concept. Economic activities beyond and without 
limits laid down by the religion would be deemed to be 
contrary to the Islamic Fiqh. Economic activities are not 
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separate from religion. With this brief statement we will 
examine the concept of partnership in Islam, whether the 
obligations resulted by partnership agreement are trusts, if so, 
does violation thereof amount to breach of trust or not? 
i<zA Definition of Partnership ^SHIRKAT - ^cT^pC/j. 
"Shirkat in its primitive sense, signifies the 
conjunction of two or more estates, in such a manner, that one of 
them is not distinguishable from the other. The term Shirkat, 
however, is extended to contracts, although 'here be no actual 
conjunction, of estates, because a contract is the cause of such 
conjunction. In the language of the law it signifies the union 
of two or more persons in one concern." (Hedaya). 
Partnership under Islamic law is lawful because in the 
time of the Prophet (peace be upon him) men were accustomed to 
have transactions in partnership, and the Prophet confirmed their 
I 
transactions. 
Kind QL Partnerships 
In Mejelle, three Chapters, VI, VII and VIII are 
devoted to this subject. These Chapters are sub-divided into 
number of sub-sections. These sections defines the different 
kinds of partnerships and have elaborated the detail rules 
I. Ibid. 
pi 
governing them. Similarly, in Hedaya also Book XIV - has been 
devoted explaining the Islamic concept o€ partnership and general 
principles governing it. According to Mejjelle following is the 
classification of partnership: 
First, partnership by contract ( 
shirkat-i-Aqd). 
Jl^cJ// 
"Shirkat-i-Aqd is further sub-divided between 'Shirkat-
i-Mufaveza, that is complete equality in all aspects, and 
'Shirkat-i-inan, without a condition for complete equality. 
Again partnership whether Mufaveza or Inan is divided 
into 'Shirkat-i-emwal (partnership in property), Shirkat-i-
A'mal', (partnership for working together), and Shirkat-i-Vujuh, 
(partnerships for many accounts). 
Shirkat-i-A'mal, is sub-divided as : "Shirkat-i-Ebdan", 
(partnersnip of persons - where labour is the capital), Shirket-
i-Sanai" (partnership of Art), and Shirket Taqabbul (partnership 
for undertaking). 
Secondly, Mudarabe, (capital to be found by one, and 
labour and work by the other); and- Thirdly, 'Muzara'a', and 
'Mu'saqat'. 
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In Hedaya, a different approach has been adopted in 
explaining the different kinds of partnerships under the Islam. 
According to it, partnership may be divided between two kinds : 
First "Shirket-i-Milk', by right of property, and secondly, 
Shirkat-i-Aqd. 
By right of property, Shirket-i-Milk, is divided as : 
(1) Optional, and (2) Compulsive. 
Partnership by contract is classified as: 
(1) Shirket-i-Mofavizat, partnership by receiprocity, 
(earlier explained as complete equality in all 
respects); 
(2) Shirket-i-Inan, partnership in traffic (same as 
explained earlier - without a condition for 
complete equality); 
(3) Shirket-i-sinnaie, (partnership in art); and 
Shirket-i-Woodjooh, partnership upon personal 
credit; and lastly Mazaribat. 
The difference between Mejjelle and Hedaya explaining the 
classificatioan of partnership is that in Hedaya, under Shirket-
i-A'mal, only Shirket-i-Sannai has been discussed. There is no 
reference to two other kinds of partnerships Shirket-i-Ebdan and 
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Shirket-i-Taqabbul. Purttor ffudarabe, and Musaqat are not 
discussed in. He will briefly discuss these partnership and 
then will examine the concept of breach of trust in relation to 
partnership under the Shariah or Islamic law. 
Partnership by Contract - --/ - ^ ^ - — ^ i 
'Partnership by contract consists of an agreement for 
association, on the condition that the. capital and its benefit be 
cononon between two or more persons'. (Art. 1329). 
The essence of partnership by contract is an offer and 
acceptance expressed or implied. For example, if one says to 
another "I am partner with you to trade with so many piastres", 
and the other also say "I have accepted". There is a concluded 
agreement for partnership by an express offer and acceptance. 
And, if one gives the other 1,000 piastres, and says, 
"You also put, 1000 piastres to this, and buy property" and the 
other do what he was told; by reason of there having been an 
Shirket-i-Aqd or partnership by contract, is effected by 
proposal and consent - that is, by one person saying to 
another, "I have made you my partner in such a property," 
and the other replying "I consent" : and it is a condition 
of the contract that the concern respecting which it is made 
£r^ of such a nature as to admit of delegation in order 
that the acquisition arising from it may be participated in 
by both parties, and thus the effect and design may be 
established - in other words, the acquisition may become 
equally the property of both. (HEDAYA, page 217). 
6^0 
implied acceptance, there is a concluded partnership by contract. 
(Art. 1330). 
The gist of the 'partnership by contract' is that there 
should be a contract between the parties forming the association. 
Offer and acceptance by the partners are the basic requirements. 
Offer and acceptence may be either express or implied. 
Acquisition, arising from such a contract should be participated 
in by the both parties. 
Further every kind of partnership by contract contains 
a contract of agency and condition for reason and discernment as 
followed in contract for agency are to be applied in partnerships 
as well. In other words partners should have reason and being of 
understanding, that is, Mumeyyiz, capable of knowing that by a 
sale rights of ownership are lost, and that by purchase they are 
acquired, and being able to distinguish from a small deeceit, a 
deceit which it is clear has been an excessive deceit, like 
deceived five in ten. In brief a young person who can make such 
distinctions. In brief partners should be competent to contract. 
It should also be made clear in the contract how the 
profit is to be divided among the partners. If it is not clear, 
doubtful or unknown to the partnership than such partnership 
would be fasid. It is a condition that the shares of the profit, 
to be divided between the shareholders, be known by division, 
like a half, or a third or a fourth. 
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If it is agreed that so many piastres, as a fixed 
amount, be fiven from the profit to one of the partners, the 
partnership is void (batil). (Art. 1337). 
As regard the capital of the firm, it is a condition 
that the capital be some kind of silver or gold money. Brass 
coins which are currently in use are by custom considered to be 
silver or gold. It does not mean that the present currency notes 
cannot be used as a capital investment of the partners in the 
partnership firm. If there is a use and custom amongst the 
people to transact their business with gold and silver, which has 
not been coined, this also is regarded as gold and silver coins. 
If there is no such use and custom they are regarded as 
merchandise ('aruz). It is a condition that the capital be a 
thing, which is known and individually perceptible ('Ayn). A 
debt which will be received being on accounts of debts due from 
people, cannot be the capital of a partnership. And if the 
capital of one is corporeal property ('Ayn) and the capital of 
the other is a debt, again the partnership is not good. 
'A contract of partnership in respect of property 
which is not considered gold and silver coins, like merchandise, 
and iiranmovable property, cannot be good, that is to say, these 
things cannot be the capital of a partnership. 
But when two persons wish in this way to make their 
property, which is not of the nature of gold and silver coin,, the 
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capital of partnership, each of them sells to the other the half 
of his property, and after they have become their common 
property, they can make a contract of partnership in respect of 
this property held in common between them. 
Likewise, when two persons have mixed together 
I 
properties, which they have of a kind which is misly, like a 
quantity of wheat, which each of them have, after it has become 
'Shirket-i-Mulk' between they can use as capital that mixed 
property and make a contract of partnership about it'. (Art. 
1342). 
If the partners enter into a contract of partnership, 
with an stipulation in the contract that there is to be a 
complete equality between the partners, and when they have 
introduced into the partnership their properties, which are to be 
the capital in the partnership, if their shares in the capital 
introduced by them and the profits are equal, there is a Shirket 
Mufaveza. 
Similarly, where someone has died, and his sons use, as 
principal, the whole of the proeprty left by their father, they 
can make a contract of 'Shirket-i-Mufaveza', upon the condition 
to buy and sell every kind of property, and to divide the profits 
I. Misly ( ) is a thing found in the Bazars and weekly 
markets, that is to say, a thing to be matched without any 
difference causing an increase in price. (Art. 145) 
Mejjelle). 
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equally between them. But the occurence of partnership on the 
terms of complete equality on this way are rare. 
And if there is a partnership by contract, without a 
condition for complete equality being made, it is a Shirket-i-
Inan*. A partnership whether it be 'mufazefa' or 'Inan' is 
either a partnership in property (Shirket-i-emwel), or a 
partnership for working together (Shirket A'mal), or it is a 
partnership for mapy accounts (Shirket-i-Vujuh). 
WQITH valued li Us. WPfth 
'Work is constituted by the way in which it is done. 
In other words, work is valued by its value which is made known. 
And the work of one person can be more valuable than the work of 
another'. 
For example - 'When it has been agreed, that the 
capital of two persons who are partners by a 'Shirket-i-Inan' are 
to be equal, and that the two of them are to work, if a condition 
is made to give a larger share of the profit to one, it is 
lawful. Because the one can be more skilful in business, and 
more able to work and useful'. (Art. 1345). 
In Article 1346, responsibility for work is a kind of 
work has been elaborated. If someone puts a person who is a 
skilled artisan in shop, and makes him do work which he has 
accpeted and undertaken; if they make a contract of partnership 
in skilled labour (shirket sannai), upon the terms, that they are 
to divide between them, the profit which shall be produced, that 
is to say, the payment, it is lawful. And the right of the owner 
of the ship to the half share is by reason of his having become 
responsible for the work alone, although included in this he 
takes also for the use of his shop. (Art 1344-1346). 
Further elaborating the point that the right to profit 
has come sometimes from property or work, so sometimes it arises 
in consequence of responsibility. 
In Mudarebe, the partner who supplies the capital, by 
the property, and the party who supplies the labour, by the 
labour, becomes entitled to the profit. 
And when one is the apprentice of a skilled workman, if 
he makes him do the work, which he has undertaken, for half pay, 
it is lawful. 
And as the apprentice is entitled by his work to half 
the profit, i.e. half the pay taken from the owner of the work, 
so also by reason of his responsibility and undertaking his 
master, is entitled to the other half. (Art. 1347). 
In cases where property, work and responsibility are 
absent, there is no right to share the profits. If one says to 
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another, "Trade with your jft«|«rty and let the profits be shared 
between us," in such a ca««r no partnership is constituted, and 
he cannot take a share of thm profit. 
Division gi FfpfUs 
Article 1349 deals with the division of profit. The 
right to profit is determined in accordance to the terms of the 
contract. The stipulation made part of the contract is alone to 
determine the shares of the partners. It is not according to the 
work done. Article further explains that even if the partner, 
who it was agreed should do the work, does not do the work, he is 
considered as if he had done the work. Where partners have 
stipulated that both should work, but only one works and the 
other, with or without any excuse, does not work, by reason of 
their being agents for one another, it would be considered as if 
he has done work. His work is presumed on the basis of 
performance of the other partner who had done the work and thus 
the profit in the way stipulated is divided between them. 
Partnership ^ siahL Sl PrPP^y^Y - PPU<?nal i M gQWPylgJV? 
In Hedaya, partnership by right of property (Shirket-i-
mulk) has been explained under two different heads - optional, or 
compulsive as - 'where two or more persons are proprietors of one 
thing; and it is of two different natures, optional and 
compulsive:- optional, where two persons make a joint purchase 
m 
of one specific article; of Hbere it is presented to them as a 
gift, and they accept of If^ or where it is left to them, 
jointly, by bequest, and tlMf aeeept of it; - or where they both 
obtain possession, by c(Hi9fM^t, of one specific article in an 
enemy's country; or where thef unite their respective properties 
in such away is that one is not distinguishable from the other 
(such as the mixture of wheat with wheat) - or where it may be 
difficult to distinguish thran (as in a mixture of wheat with 
barley): and compulsive, where the properties of two persons 
become united without their act, under such circumstances as 
render it difficult or impossible to distinguish between them; or 
: where two persons inherit one property. In this species of 
partnership, therefore, it is not lawful for one partner to 
perform any act with respect to the other's share, without his 
permission each being as a stranger with respect to the other;s 
share. It is, however, lawful for either partner to sell his 
own share to the other partner, in all cases here stated : - and 
he may sell his share to others without his partner's consent; 
excepting only in cases of association or a mixture of property, 
for in both these instances one partner cannot lawfully sell the 
share of the other to a third person without his partner's 
permission.' 
UafrilitY SL Partner I S L ?\tgt<?dY SL partnership property 
Partners are persons entrusted (EMIN - Cj^) ) the one 
by the other. The partnership property in the possession of each 
of them is like a thing ^ t r i M i ^ - (Trust, - Article 
762). (Art. 1350). 
In Hedaya it has been stated that each partner holds 
the stock in the manner of a trust. The possesion of each of two 
partners, by reciprocity or in traffic, over the partnership 
stock, is considered as the possession of a trust - ( ), 
since each posesses the property with consent of the proprietor, 
for this reason, that he is to give something in lieu of it, in 
the same manner as where a person takes possession of a thing 
with a view to purchase it (not because it is a pledge, as in 
pawnage). The stock is therefore a deposit (Trust - *--^-»5 )• 
Either of the partners^ is at liberty to lodge his 
capital as a deposit (Trust - *--^ J>-? ) with the other partner, 
as this is customary, and sometimes necessary, among merchants, 
or entrust it to the care of a manner, by Mozaribat - each of 
them is also at liberty to give his capital in the way of 
Hozaribat, because, as Mozaribat is subordinate to partnership 
either by reciprocity or in traffici, it follows that a contract 
of partnership comprehends Mozaribat. 
When we consider the consequences of Mudarebe, the 
'Mudarib' is a person entrusted (Emin). The capital in his hands 
is like property deposited for safe keeping (Vedia-Trust -•^-*»). 
And as. regard his disposing of the capital, he is the agent 
(vekyl) of the owner of the capital. And if he makes a profit he 
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is a partner in it. Mudarib can deposit the property of the 
partnership for safe-keeping and make it abid^and pledge and 
take as pledge, and let and hire it. 
In case of partnership by contract, if the property in 
hands of one of the partners is destroyed without fault or 
neglect, he is not responsible for the share of his partner. In 
other words it would not be considered as breach of trust. 
All the partners in the partnerships have right to 
deposit (Trust - '^-•*^>) the partnership property for safe-
keeping. Each of the partners may give the property for this 
purpose to another on the condition that all the profit comes to 
himself. He can hire a ship and a man to keep the partnership 
property but except so far as he has the leave of his partner, he 
cannot mix the partnership property with his own property. Such 
act of the partner would amount to breach of trust for which he 
would be accountable to the othe partner. Further he cannot make 
a partnership with another. If he does, and the partnership 
property is lost, he is responsible for the share of his partner. 
Again such a case is covered by breach of trust. 
Other cases of breach of trust by the partners may be: 
In cases of right of partner to borrow and lend, if one 
of the partners makes loan of partnership property without the 
leave of -other partners, he would be liable for. But when he has 
# t 
such a consent of other ^ irtpits ^ ^ lends a loan to another from 
partnership property there is iio breach of trust. 
Further one of the partners may borrow loan for the 
partnership, for the partnership, and if one has borrowed any 
amount of money, it becomes also the debt of his partners 
jointly. 
In cases where each of the partners leaves the business 
of the partnership to the discretion of the other, and says, 
"work according to your discretion" or, "Do what you like," each 
of them can perform the work which is the subject of their trade, 
so tha-t-each of them can pledge the partnership property, or take 
a pledge on behalf of the partnership, and can travel with the 
partnership property^ and mix the partnership property with his 
own property, and can make a contract of partnership with 
another. However, the above referred conduct of the partner is 
subject to one condition that the use of partnership property 
should not be in such a way that the property is destroyed, such 
a partner would be liable and accountable and may be prosecuted 
for such damage or destruction caused to the property. Again for 
lending the partnership property or giving part of the 
partnership property to another there must be express leave or 
consent of all the partners. Doing act without such express, any 
damage caused to the property, makes liable for. 
PQ 
Acts done by oat of the partners in violation of 
express prohibition would also amount to breach of trust. If a 
partner says to other partner, "Do not go to another country with 
the partnership property," or "Do not sell on credit," and the 
other, while he is prohibited, does not obey, and goes to another 
country, or sells the property on credit, he is responsible for 
his partner's share in any loss which takes place. 
The admission of a debt by one of the partners in a 
Shirket-i-Inan does not affect the other partner. If one of the 
partner admits that a debt has arisen, out of his own contract 
and transactions alone, he must bear the burden himself. In 
other words he must pay the whole of it. 
In cases when the debt has arisen from transactions, 
carried out together with his partner, he must pay his half. If 
the debt is due in consequence of transactions carried out by his 
partner alone, nothing is necessary. 
'Under Shirket-i-A'mal,' liability is based on the 
different principles. If the property is delivered to be worked 
upon is destroyed, or damaged, by the work of one of the 
partners, he becomes jointly liable with the other partner. The 
lialibity is determined among partners according to their respect 
responsibilities. 
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If they make a contract of partnership with a condition 
to accept and undertake on equal terms, the loss also is divided 
half to one and half to the other. And if they have made a 
contract of partnership to accept and undertake work by way of 
two thirds to one, and one third to the other, the liability of 
the partners is accordingly determined. 
In case where partnership is constituted by way o f 
Mudarebe, that is, on condition that the capital is to be found 
by one, and the labour and work by the other, the liability of 
Mudarib would be based on the nature of transaction - unlimited 
mudarebe, and limited mudarebe. For example, where the Mudarebe 
is not restricted to time, or place, or to one kind of trade, or 
by fixing the persons from whom he is to buy and to whom he is to 
sell, it is unlimited Mudarebe. But if it is reverse, 
restrictions have been imposed, then it would be a restricted 
Muderebe. Violation of such restrictions would amount to breach 
of trust, as the Mudarib, according to Article 1413 is person 
entrusted (Emin). The capital, as said earlier, in the hands is 
like a property deposited for safe keeping ( \-ll-<>|i>d). 
In accordance to the terms of contract of Mudarebe, the 
Mudarib is authorised to do all necessary things arising out of 
Mudarebe. He can buy and sell property to make gain. But if he 
buys property at an excessive loss, . he would be liable for. 
Property shall be deemed to have bought for himself and not for 
Mudarebe's account. He can deposit the property of the 
pi 
partnership for safe-keeping but not so as to cause destruction 
or damage. if his acts result in destruction of Mudarebe, he 
would be liable. In brief, in a Mudarebe limited by 
restrictions, whatever may be the restriction and condition made 
by the owner of the capital, the Mudarib,.roust respect it. Acts 
contrary to such restriction's imposed would, as the Mudarib is a 
person entrusted (Emin) and the property deposited ( .«-^ i-o>>^ ) 
for safe keeping, create liability for breach of trust. 
To precise the discussion, under Islamic law 
different kinds of partnership are there, and the partners are 
(Emin), the partnership property a trust - deposit ( <JL^^^ ) , 
liability of the partners would be based upon the nature and kind 
of each partnership and effect of violation of conditions 
governing such partnerships. 
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CHAPTER VI 
PART A 
"PRODECTRE ; INDIAN CRIMINAL LAW" 
"Cognizance" 
Section 2 (c) Criminal Procedure Code explains the 
cognizable offence as offence for which, and a cognizable case 
means case in which, a police officer may, in accordance with the 
First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in 
force, arrest without warrant. As such word cognizance, has not 
been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. In fact 
taking cognizance is a mental act. It is also judicial act. 
A magistrate is said to have taken cognizance of an 
offence when he applied his mind to the contents of the petition 
with the purpose of proceeding in a particular way. When the 
magistrate has come to the conclusion that there is a case to be 
I 
inquired into. (Shivangowda V. Veerappa). 
According to First Schedule, Criminal Procedure Code, 
criminal breach of trust under sections 406, 408 and 409, is a 
cognizable offence triable by the magistrate of the first class. 
I. AIR 1964, Mys. 129. 
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"Maaiatrate to £2JC£ cognizance" 
First class magistrate under section 190 may take the 
cognizance of the offence under the following conditions: 
(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which 
constitute such offence,-
(b) upon a police report on such facts; 
(c) upon information received from any person than a 
police offider, or upon his own knowledge, that 
such offence has been committed. 
Thus section 190 Criminal Procedure Code envisages 
three contingencies upon which magistrate takes cognizance of an 
I offence. In R.R. Chari V. State of UP, Supreme Court observed 
that the first contingency apparently is in respect of non-
cognizable offences that is, on receiveing complaint of the 
aggrieved party. Second contingency relates to where the 
magistrate receives the police report on completion of police 
investigation, and the third is where the magistrate himself 
takes notice of an offence and issues the process. 
In a case where a complaint is pending before a 
magistrate, he may either after conducting a judicial enquiry 
I. AIR 1951 SC. 207 : (1951) SCR 612. 
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under section 202 Criminal Procedure Code or even without holding 
such an inquiry, merely by scrutinizing the case diary and other 
relevant material before him may place the accused on trial. In 
such a situation he may adopt either of the following two 
courses: 
(1) he may call for charge-sheet from the police and 
take cognizance under section 190 (1) (b); or 
(2) he may take cognizance on the complaint under 
section 190 (1) (a). 
Where a 'Magistrate takes cognizance on the ground of 
the charge-sheet, he may say that no further action is necessary 
I 
on the complaint petition and vice-versa.' 
For taking cognizance under clause (a) on a complaint, 
prior investigation is not necessary. 
Taking cognizance of an offence does not require any 
formal action or action of any kind. It may happen as soon as 
the magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an 
II 
offence. 
I. AIR 1953 Orissa II. 
II. AIR 1965 Mad. 349. 
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Vord 'may' in section 190 should not be considered as 
must because it is discretionary with the magistrate to take 
cognizance of an offence alleged to have been committed refered 
in the complaint. He is not bound to take cognizance of an 
offence merely because there is a complaint petition alleging the 
commission of an offence. But there may be circumstances when 
magistrate may exercise his discretion and take cognizance of a 
cognizable offence. If he uses his discretion he has to proceed 
in accordance to the provision under Chapter XV, Criminal 
Procedure Code. 
Magistrate may take cognizance of an offence at any 
stage. However, the examination of the complainant, conducting 
of enquiry under section 202 and section 156 (3), are all aimed 
with a view to assist the magistrate to form an opinion whether 
cognizance should be taken or not. Actually when the cognizance 
is to be taken or not all depends upon the facts and 
circumstances of the case. 
Magistrate under section 190 (1) has been empowered to 
take cognizance of an offence upon a police report of facts of 
the case. A magistrate may also take cognizance of an offence 
under section 190 (1) (b), even on receiving a negative report 
from the police. But the magistrate must act in a judicial 
manner. Conducting of enquiry and trial must be fair to the 
accused. 
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Once the magistrate takes cognizance of the offence, it 
is his duty to find out who the offenders are. Summoning of the 
additional accused is part of the proceedings initiated by his 
taking cognizance of an offence. In fact the cognizance of an 
I 
offence is not the cognizance of offenders. 
Section 201, Criminal Procedure Code lays down the 
procedure where the magistrate is not competent to take 
cognizance of the case. In a case where a complaint has been 
made to the magistrate who is not competent to take cognizance of 
the offence, two courses are open to him, that is, he shall -
(a) If the complaint is in writing, return it for 
prosecution to the proper court with an 
endorsement to that effect; 
(b) If the complaint is not in writing, direct the 
complainant to the proper court. 
"Magistrate to take Cognizance of. Offences Committed b^ Public 
Servants" 
In cases of public servant liable for breach of trust 
under section 409, a different procedure has been laid in section 
I. AIR 1967 SC. 1167.. 
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197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. When any person who is a 
public servant not removable from his office save by or with the 
sanction of the government is accused of any offence alleged to 
have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in 
the discharge of his official duty, ^  .no court shall take 
cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction. 
(a) 'in the case of a person who is employed or, as 
the case may, was at the time of commission of the 
alleged offence employed, in connection with the 
affairs of the union, of the central government'. 
(b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the 
case may be, was at the time of commission of the 
alleged offence employed, in connection with the 
affairs of a state, of the state government. 
Some exception under clause (2) has been extended to 
any member of Armed Forces of the Union acting in the discharge 
of his official duty. No magistrate may take cognificance of an 
offence unless previous sanction of the central government is 
obtained. 
I 
In Ram Kishan's case it was held that the conviction. 
of a public servant under section 409 without prior obtaining 
1982 Cr. Lj. (NOC) 21 (P & H) 
379 
sanction, from proper authority would be illegal. His trial 
under such conditions would be considered a nullity in law. 
Ommission to take sanction necessary for prosecution 
from a proper authority is not an irregularity but an error fatal 
to the case and is incurable. 
The object of the present section 197 CrimiixaL-
Procedure Code is to give protection to responsible public 
servants against possible vexatious criminal proceedings while 
acting under colour of their office. However, this exception 
does not apply to all public servants. Its application is 
restricted to offences committed by public servants of higher 
ranks. Section 197 provides protection to certain classes of 
I 
public servants against vexatious and harassing proceedings. 
Discussing the significance and efficacy of provision 
dealing with sanction necessary for prosecution in Indu Bhushan 
II 
Chatterjee B. State, his Lordship observed: 
"The provision of sanction is a most salutary 
safeguard. The sanctioning authority is placed somewhat in the 
position of a sentinal at the door of the criminal courts in 
order that no irresponsible or malicious prosecution can pass the 
I. Shilal V. Manmath Kumar Misra, AIR 1960 Raj. 173. 
II. AIR 1955, Cal. 430 : 1958 Cr. Lj. 1169. 
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portals of the court of justice. It is essential that persons 
charged with the responsible duty of granting sanction which is a 
duty of deciding whether or not the credit and reputation of 
another citizen should be put in peril by means of criminal 
prosecution, should bring to the discharge of their duty a sense 
of responsibility and the industry required to examine the 
relevant material". 
Sanction authority should consider all circumstances 
and evidences before it, and to give due thought to them before 
approving the sanction for prosecution. 
Further the act complained should be within the purview 
of the official duty of the accused. Mere fact that a person is 
a public servant is not sufficient to avoid the protection given 
I 
under section 197 Criminal Procedure Code. 
'If the acts complained of are so integrally connected 
with the duties attaching to the office as to be inseperable from 
them, then sanction under section 197 (1). will be necessary, but 
if there was no necessary connection between them and the 
performance of those duties, the official status furnishing only 
the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction will 
II 
be required'. 
I. Mukand Singh V. Vishnu Prasad, 1956, Alj. 337. 
II. AIR 1955 SC. 309, Vaidya Nath Ayyar V. State of Kerala, 
AIR 1961, Ker. 175; 1961 Ker. Lj. 52. 
^81 
Illustrative cases in which to obtain sanction prior to 
prosecution is necessary may be noted below: 
I 
In Amrik Singh V. State of Pepsu, a public servant, 
whose duty included the disbursement of wages to workmen, drew 
the amount from the treasury/ but falsely entered the name of a 
fictitious person in the acquittance roll and utilised the amount 
for himself, their lordship of the supreme court held that 
sanction under section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code was 
necessary for the prosecution against him for an offence under 
section 409*. Their lordship observed as follows: 
"The result of the authorities may thus be summed up : 
It is not every offence committed by a public servant that 
requires sanction for prosecution under section 197 (1) Criminal 
Prodecure Code, nor even every act done by him while he is 
actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but 
if the act complained off is directly concerned with his official 
duties so that if questioned/ it could be claimed to have been 
done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary; 
and that would be so, irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a 
proper disdharge of his duties, because that would really be a 
matter of defence on the merits which would have to be 
investigated at the trial, and could not arise at the stage of 
I. A 1955 SC 309 (313). 
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the grant of sanction, which must precede the institution of the 
prosecution." 
I 
In another case a Famine Relief Supervisors were 
charged for dishonestly misappropriating government money 
entrusted to them. It was held that sanction for their 
prosecution was necessary. 
Where the President of a Municipality, a public 
servant, committed criminal breach of trust, sanction for his 
II 
prosecution under section 409 was held necessary. 
If it is established that the offence under section 409 
was committed in the discharge of official duty by a public 
III 
servant, prior sanction for his prosecution becomes necessary. 
Where the breach of trust by a public servant has no 
connection with the performance of his official duty, no sanction 
for prosecution under section 409 Criminal Procedure Code is 
IV 
needed. 
I. 1973 Cr. Lj. 1447 (1450) Raj. 
II. A 1961 Guj. 57 (59, 61) : 1961 (1) Cr. Lj. 499. 
III. A 1950 Raj. 51 (53). 
IV. A 1967 SC. 1590. 
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In the following cases of embezzlement or 
misappropriation by the public servants, sanction for prosecution 
was not required: 
I 
In Saha SB V. Kochar HS, a public servant was charged 
for the offence of conversion of goods and dishonest 
appropriation sanction to prosecution was not required. 
II 
Similarly a Sub-Postmaster was accused of embezzlement 
of funds entrusted to him by various depositors for credit into 
their savings bank accounts, prior sanction for prosecution was 
not held necessary because in the commission of offence he could 
not be^id acting in the performance of his official duty. But 
in fact performed acts in direct opposition of his duty. 
Ill 
In Gurushidayya Shanti Vivayya, an officiating village 
official Kulkarni collected land revenue. He instead of 
depositing the collected money in the government treasury 
converted that in his own use. He was charged under section 409 
without obtaining the sanction for prosecution under section 409 
Criminal Procedure Code. It was held 'that the offence was not 
committed by the accused while acting or purporting to act in the 
discharge of his official duty and therefore no sanction of the 
I. 1979 Cr. Lj. 1367 (SC). 
II. Manzur Ali, (1939) 20 Lah. 227 Sannaya (1941) Had. 258. 
III. (1938) 40 Bom. LR 1286. 
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state government under section 197 of Criminal Procedure Code was 
necessary'. 
Contents of section 197 Criminal Procedure Code 1973 
and old section of 197, under Criminal Procedure Code 1898 are 
the same, hence all old cases similar in nature applies under the 
present section also. 
In brief the discussion may be summed in the light of 
supreme court observation as : 'Whether sanction is necessary to 
prosecute a public servant on a charge of criminal 
misappropriation, will depend on whether the acts complained of 
hinge on his duties as a public servant. If they do, then 
sanction is requisite. But if they are unconnected with such 
I 
duties then no sanction is necessary*. 
"Arrest with Warrant" 
Though the offence under sections 406, and 408 is 
cognizable in which case a police officer may arrest a person 
without warrant, but for breach of t rust a warrant of arrest is 
to be issued by the magistrate. A police officer, like as in 
non-cognizable offence, has no authority to arrest without warrant. 
I. Supra N, P. 
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Under section 41 Criminal Procedure Code any police 
officer has been authorised, without an order from a magistrate 
and without a warrant, may arrest any person who has been 
concerned in any cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable 
complaint has been made. 
Vhereas in non-cognizable cases under section 155 
Criminal Procedure Code when information is given to an officer 
incharge of a police station of the commision within the limit of 
such station of a cognizable offence, he shall enter or cause to 
be entered the substance of the information in a book to be kept 
by such officer in such form as the state government may 
prescribe in this behalf, and refer the information to the 
magistrate. No police offider shall investigate a non-
cognizable case without the order of a magistrate having power 
to try such case or commit the case for trial. On receiving 
order from the magistrate such police officer would arrest the 
accused without the warrant for arrest. The magistrate has to 
apply his judicial mind before issuing the warrant of arrest. 
Later case is applicable in cases of criminal breach of trust. 
A person was arrested at Banglore by the Police Sub-
Inspector of Tiruvattiyar (Madras Province) for an offence under 
section 406 Indian Penal Coce committed within the jurisdiction 
of the magistrate of Saidapat (Madras Province). He was produced 
before the sub-magistrate of Saidapat and released on bail. He 
then went back to Bangalore. On summons being taken for his 
^86 
appearance he appeared on his ovn accord before the court and 
pleaded that his arrest at Banglore was illegal and the court had 
no jurisdiction to try him for the offence under this section. 
It was held that the illegality of the original arrest cannot 
affect the jurisdiction of the court to inquire into the offence 
I 
committed within its jurisdiction. 
Offences under section 409 Criminal Procedure Code are 
also cognizable but arrest without warrant cannot be made. A 
magistrate on receiving the complaint against the accused of an 
offence if after consideration of the facts is of the opinion 
that there is no ground for proceeding, may dismiss the complaint 
II 
under section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code. ' However, if 
there are sufficient grounds to proceed with the case, the 
magistrate may issue the warrant for arresting the accused. it 
is discretionary with the magistrate not to issue warrant, 
instead issue summons for the appearance of the accused under 
section 409 Indian Penal Code. But an accused cannot be arrested 
for an offence under section 409 Indian Penal Code, by a police 
officer, without the warrant of arrest. 
I. A 1941 Mad. 181 (181) : 42 Cr. Lj. 320. 
II. (1887) ILR 9 All 666 (671). 
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"Offence non-bailable" 
In the first schedule, column five. Criminal Procedure 
Code, criminal breach of trust has been shown as an offence which 
is not bailable. Chapter 33 contains the sections which provide 
for bail. These sections contempletes and provides for two kinds 
of security -
(a) Simple recognizance of the principal; and 
(b) Security with sureties. In vernacular the first 
is known as 'muchalka' while latter is called 
'Zamanat'. 
Bail is aimed to set the accused at liberty from his 
arrest and imprisonment on receiving security for his appearance 
on a day and at a certain place. Such security is known as bail. 
Under such security a person arrested or imprisoned is delivered 
into the hands of those who bind themselves for accused 
appearance on the due date and place as required. The purpose of 
the bail is to protect the accused from imprisonment and also 
secure from the fear of escape of the accused. 
In other words bail means "the setting at liberty of a 
person arrested upon other becoming sureties by recognizance for 
his appearance on a day and at a place assigned, he also entering 
into his own recognizance. The party accused is delivered or 
^ 3 
bailed by law to be in their custody, they may, if they will 
surrender him to the court before the date fixed and thus free 
themselves from further responsibility. The word bail is 
properly applicable to second kind of security and that is the 
meaning which has been attached to the word in the practice and 
I 
procedure of the courts." 
The dictionary meaning of the word bail : "to set free 
or liberate a person arrested or imprisoned on taking security 
for his appearance." In fact it is a release from restrains with 
a view to save a man from being in custody during trial, before 
the conviction, where there is a reasonable doubt as to the 
allegations made against the accused. 
Criminal breach of trust is a non-bailable offence, 
where the bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right but section 
437 lays down certain conditions keeping in view of them the 
accused may be released on bail. When any person accused of or 
suspected of the commission of any non-bailable offence is 
arrested or detained brought before a court, other than the High 
Court or Court of Session, he may be released on bail. An 
accused cannot be refused bail mostly on the ground that he may 
be required during investigatiaon for being identified by 
witnesses. 
I. 15 C.W.N. 736 : 12 Cr. Lj. 358. 
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If the court at any stage of the investigation, inquiry 
or trial, as the case may be, that there are not reasonable 
grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-
bailable offence, but there are sufficient grounds for further 
inquiry into his guilt, the accused shall, pending such inquiry, 
be released on bail, or, at the discretion of such officer or 
court, on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his 
appearance. 
A court releasing any person on bail under sub-section 
(1), or sub-section (2) of section 437 Criminal Procedure Code 
shall record in writing his or its reasons for so doing. 
If in any case triable by magistrate, the trial of a 
person accused of any non-bailable offence is not concluded 
within a period of sixty days from the first date fixed for 
taking evidence in the case, such person shall, if he is in 
custody, during the whole of the said period, be released on bail 
to the satisfaction of the magistrate, unless for reasons to be 
recorded in writing, the magistrate otherwise directs. (Clause 
(6), section 437 Criminal Procedure Code). 
Further in clause (7) of section 437 Criminal Procedure 
Code it has been provided that if at any time after the 
conclusion of the trial of a person.accused of a non-bailable 
offence and before judgement is delivered, the court is of 
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opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the 
accused is not guilty of any such offence, it shall release the 
accused, if he is in custody, on the execution, by him of a bond 
without sureties for his appearance to hear judgement delivered. 
The court also taJtes into consideration the following 
matters in non-bailable cases in granting the bail: 
(1) Whether or not there is reasonable ground for 
believing that the accused has committed the 
offence, 
(2) the nature of accusation and the gravity of the 
charge, 
(3) The severity of punishment which the conviction 
will entail, 
(4) The dangers or likehood of the accused absconding 
if he is released on bail, 
(5) The character, means, behaviour and standing of 
the accused, 
(6) The danger or, likelihood of the alleged offence 
being continued or repeated. 
(7) The danger of prosecution witnesses being 
3^/ 
tempered with or preparation of false defence. 
(8) The accused has already been in jail for several 
months. 
(9) The old age and sex of the accused. 
(10) The state and health of the accused. 
(11) The social status or his position which an accused 
person occupies in relation to other members of 
his family. 
(12) The severity of the punishment which the 
conviction will entail. 
(13) The nature of evidence in support of the 
accusation. 
(14) The opportunity to the applicant for preparation 
of his defence and access to his counsel. 
These are some of the factors which the court takes 
into consideration for granting the bail in non-bailable cases. 
But these considerations cannot be claimed as exhaustive. There 
may be other considerations which may be weighed by the court 
before granting the bail. All depends upon the facts and 
circumstances of the case. 
The object of bail is to protect the interest of the 
administration of justice and to prevent its being hampered in 
any manner. A bail granted may be concelled also and the accused 
be recommitted to fail if the circumstances in the opinion of the 
court so demand. 
Under section 438, Criminal Procedure Code when a 
person on reasonable believe that he may be arrested on an 
accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may 
apply to the High Court or the court of session for a direction; 
and that court may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of 
such arrest, he shall be released on bail. 
The direction may include such conditions in the light 
of the facts of the particular case as the court may think fit -
(a) That the person shall make himself available for 
interrogation by a police officer as and when 
required; 
i>ri 
(b) That the person shall not, directly or indirectly, 
make any inducement, threat or promise to any 
person acquainted with the facts of the case so as 
to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the 
court or to any police officer. 
(c) That the person shall not leave India without the 
previous permission of the court. 
(d) Such other conditions as may be imposed under sub-
sectiuon (3) of section 437, as if the bail were 
granted under that section. 
If the magistrate taking cognizance of non-bailable 
offence decides that a warrant should issue in the first instance 
against that person, he shall issue a bailable warrant in 
conformity with the direction of the court under suc-section (1). 
Section 439 Criminal Procedure Code gives special 
powers to the High Court or court of session regarding bail. 
Uncer this section any condition imposed by a magistrate when 
releasing any person on bail may be set aside or modified. A 
High Court or court of session may direct that any person who has 
been released on bail under this chapter be arrested and commit 
him to custody. Section also lays a limitation with a view to 
make it more difficult for persons arrested of grave offences to 
if 6 
get released on bail by an exparte order, and be in position to 
hamper investigation. No court shall grant bail except after 
giving notice in writing of the application to the public 
prosecutor. In the absence of such a notice the reasons for not 
giving such notice are to be recorded in writing. 
In brief the grant of bail in non-bailable offences is 
discretionary, but the discretion is a judicial one and must be 
I 
exercised in accordance with the well established principles. 
'It may be stated that the object of the detention of the accused 
person during trial is not punitive; it is merely to secure his 
appearance to abide and serve out the sentence to be imposed by 
the court and, except where a statutory privision specifically 
lays down, the principal consideration to weigh with the court in 
the exercise of its discretion in granting or refusing bail is 
the probability of the accused appearing to stand the trial and 
II 
not his supposed guilt or innocence'. 
"Compounding of Offences" 
Offences under sections 406 and 408 of the Indian Penal 
Code are compoundable. Section 320, Criminal Procedure Code lays 
the law relating to offences committed under the above refered 
I. Emperor V. Abhai R.J. Kumar, 1939 O.W.N. 791 : 1939 
A.W.R 144 : 40 Cr. Lj. 841 : AIR 1940, Oudh 8. 
II. Krishnan Singh V. Punjab State - AIR 1960 Punj. 307. 
s-fr 
sections 406 and 408. Clause (2) section 320 Criminal Procedure 
u 
Code reads as: 
The offences punishable under the sections of ° the 
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), specified in the first two 
columns of the Table next following may, with the permission of 
the court before which any prosecution for such offence is 
pending, be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third 
column of that Table.' Table is noted below: 
II III 
Offence Section of Indian 
Penal Code 
Criminal breach of 406 
trust, where the 
value of the 
property does not 
exceed two hundred 
and fifty rupees. 
Criminal breach of 408 
trust by a clerk or 
servant, where the 
value ofthe property 
does not exceed two 
hundred and fifty 
rupees. 
Persons by whom 
offence may be 
compounded 
The owner of the 
property in 
respect of which 
the breach of 
trust has been 
committed. 
Ditto. 
Table above refered shows that the offences under 
sections 406 and 408 are compoundable subject to three 
conditions. 
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Firstly, Prosecution for such offences may be 
compounded where the value of the property which is the subject 
matter of breach of trust does not exceed'two hundred and fifty 
rupees; 
Secondly, Prosecution for ' such offences may be 
compounded with the permission of the court before which the 
prosecution is pending; and 
Thirdly, Prosecution is compoundable by persons 
refered in the third column of the Table, and by non-else. Here 
the person refered in the third column is the owner of the 
property in respect of which the breach of trust has been 
committed. 
Further a case which is legally compoundable can be 
compromised even where the case has been sent by the police. A 
compromise petition, after it is filed, cannot be taken back by 
the parties. A case can be compounded at any stage before the 
judgement is pronounced. It can even be compromised when 
revision is pending. The High Court has jurisdiction to allow 
the parties to compromise the dispute. It is not necessary that 
proposal for compromise should be initiated before the lower court. 
I 
In Kumaraswami V. Kuppuswami, it was held that 'a case cannot be 
I. 1941, Mad. 685. 
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compromised without the permission of the court if the law so 
requires'. Where the allegations related to matters of serious 
public interest, require thorough investrigation and trial, the 
I 
order sanctioning compromise can be set aside. Once in a 
legally compoundable case a compromise has been submitted, the 
court should order the acquittal of the accused. 
When an offence is compoundable under section 320, 
Criminal Procedure Code, the abetment of such an offence or an 
attempt to commit such offence (when such attempt it itself an 
offence) may be compounded in the like manner. (Clause 3). 
In cases of minor under the age of eighteen years or 
idiot or lunatic, who would otherwise be competent to compound an 
offence, any person competent to contract on his behalf may, with 
the permission of the court, compound such offence. (Clause 4 
(a). 
In cases when the person who would otherwise be 
competent to compound an offence under this section is dead, the 
legal representative, as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, 
1908, of such person may, with the consent of the court, compound 
such offence. (Clause 4 (b). 
I. Provincial Govt. V. Bipin Singh, • AIR 1945 Nag. 104. 
3'PS 
Where the accused has been committed for trial or when 
he has been convicted and an appeal is p'ending, ho composition 
for the offence shall be allowed without the leave of the court 
to which he is committed; or, as the case may be, before which 
the appeal is to be heard. (Clause 5). 
Under clause 6, section 320 Criminal Procedure Code a 
High Court or court of session acting in the exercise of its 
powers of revision under s ection 401 may allow any person to 
compound any offence which such person is competent to compound. 
Again under this section an accused is not competent to 
compromise if by reason of a previous conviction, he is liable 
either to enhanced punishment or to a punishment of a different 
kind for such offence. (Clause 7). 
Lastly under clause 8, of section 320 Criminal 
Procedure Code, compromise of an offence shall have the effect 
of an acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has been 
compounded. 
However, offences committed under section 409 of the 
Indian Penal Code cannot be compounded. Where public servant is 
an accused for the committing of the criminal breach of trust, 
there is no law allowing any compromise. Offence in such a case 
is not compoundable. 
"CIVIL LIABILITY" 
It is significant that when dealing with cases of 
criminal breach of trust the difference between civil and 
criminal liability must be kept in mind because of the fact that 
every breach of trust is not criminal. An act done may be 
intentional without being disnonest or apparently may appear to 
be dishonest without in fact being so. The general tendency is 
that the aggrieved party seeks speedy remedies by recourse to 
criminal proceedings. Results under criminal law is speedier in 
comparision to civil remedies. In such circumstances it is the 
responsibility of the courts to move slowly with cautious 
attitude. it is the mental element of dishonest intention 
accompanied with the act of misappropriation which constitutes 
the offence of criminal breach of trust. Whereas the same act 
done without a dishonest intention would be a civil wrong or tort 
rendering a person liable under the civil laws. 
'Every offence of criminal breach of trust involves a 
civil wrong in respect of which the complainant may seek redress 
in a civil court, but every breach of trust in the absence of the 
I 
requisite mens rea is not criminal.' 
(1951) 52 Cr. Lj. 1178 (1182) Lah. 
Uca 
However, merely on this ground that a civil remedy for 
breack of trust is available a complaint for criminal breach of 
I 
trust cannot be refused a fair trial. 
'Where there is no dishonest intention but only an 
illegal demand no criminal breach of trust is committed, and the 
remedy of the aggrieved person is only on the civil side. A case 
of n<»--payment of dues demanded at a higher rate is merely a 
I 
breack of contract. If a banker dishonours depositor's demand, 
he has got his remedy by way of damages. Where there is no 
entrustment in a fiduciary capacity the remedy of the aggrieved 
II 
party is only on the civil side. In another case where a 
dispute is in the nature of accounting, the proper remedy is a 
III 
civil suit and not a complaint for breach of trust. 
As to pending civil suits between the parties whether 
criminal proceeding be stayed till the civil court decides the 
issue? It has been held in different cases that pending civil 
suits, criminal proceedings cannot be stayed as the dispute in a 
civil suit would be between the complainant and the accused, 
while the criminal case would be one between the crown and the 
I. If80 BLJR 145. 
II. (1926) 27 Cr. Lj. 949 (2) (950) Punj. 
III. (1951) ILR 3 Assam. 63 (67) DB. 
itei 
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accused. In practice use of criminal courts to litigate civil 
claims has been condemned and discouraged. 
"INVESTIGATION" 
Chapter XII containing sections 154 to 176 Criminal 
Procedure Code is relevant which deals with the information to 
the police and their powers to investigation. Section 154 
relates to the recording of the 'First Information Report', and 
information of the commission of crime given with the object of 
setting the police in motion. Information indicates that a crime 
has been committed and thereafter on the basis of receiving such 
II 
information is bound to start investigation. No enquiry can be 
contempleted before the information is recorded by the police. 
Such an information is usually made by the victim of 
crime known as complainant or by someone on his behalf. It is 
I. 1980 All Lj. (NOC) 84; Pannalal (1943) All 27 
(Contract for supply of machines - contract rescinded but 
but money paid as part - price not refunded - it is not a 
case under section 406 but is a dispute of civil nature). 
Prosecution under section 406 queshed). (1978 45 Cut LT 
338. (Religious endowment - Accused managing affairs of two 
dieties and applying funds belonging to one deity applying 
them to the uses of the other diety - No Criminal liability 
- dispute was of a civil nature). 1973 Cr. Lj. 727, Mad. 
(Refusal of the mortgagee to return little deeds remediable 
in civil court does not constitute an offence under section 
405 or section 415) 1972 All Cr. LR 2. 
II. Bhanuhal Das V. State of Tripura, AIR 1958 Tri. 40. 
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essential that the information be given by a person who has 
personally seen the occurance of crime or has the personal 
I 
knowlege of the incident reported. 
II 
In Hohanlal V. State, two fold objects of the 
information were observed: 
(1) to make a report to the police to set the criminal 
law into motion, 
(2) to obtain early information of an alleged criminal 
activity to record the circumstances before there 
is time for such circumstances to be forgotten or 
embellished. 
Information to police must be clear and definite. 
Under section 154, it must be an information about the commission 
of a cognizable offence with an object to set the investigating 
machinery in motion. 
If the information about the commission of crime is 
oral it must be reduced to writing by the officer incharge of 
the police station or under his direction by a subordinate police 
I. Hallu V. State M.P. AIR 1974 SC. 1936. 
II. AIR 1960 Bom. 146. 
4^3 
officer. It must be read over to the informant and signed by 
the informant. The substance of such an information shall be 
entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the 
state government may prescribe in this behalf. A copy of the 
information as recorded shall be given forthwith, free of cost, 
to the informant. 
Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an 
officer incharge of a police station to record the information 
may send the substance of such information, in writing and by 
post, to the superintendent of police concerned who, if satisfied 
that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable, 
offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an 
investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to 
him,- in the manner provided by this code. Such an officer shall 
have all the powers of an officer-in-charge of the police station 
in relation to that offence. 
I 
In Dwarka V. State, it was held that a confidential 
information received by a police party that some bad character 
have assembled at a certain place, is not an information of the 
commission of an offence and therefore it is not necessary that 
it should be recorded under section 154 (1), Criminal Procedure 
Code. 
I. 1953 ALJ, 580. 
HtM 
Failure on the part of the police to observe the 
procedure does not make a statement in admissible, but renders 
I 
more difficult to prove it. 
Essentials are : It must be an information, and must 
relate to a cognizable offence. If no cognizable offence is 
disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an 
investigation. If the police without a cognizable offence 
undertakes investigation. High Court may interfere with under 
section 482 Criminal Procedure Code. 
To determine whether an information amounts to be a 
report or not, all depends upon the facts and circumstances of 
each case. A telegraphic message cannot amount to first 
information report. Similarly a telephonic information is not a 
first information report as envisaged by section 154 (1) of the 
Criminal Procedure Code. Neither the telegram nor the telephonic 
message are signed by the informant. It is difficult to place a 
reliance as to its genuinness. However, in telephonic message 
received by the police station may be recorded by the station 
writer who recieves it and he himself sign it as the person 
giving the information because a first information report may be 
merely hearsay. It is not necessary that the person giving the 
I. Mir Rahman V. Emperor AIR 1935 Pesh. 165. 
II. AIR 1941 Rang. 209. 
I 
information must have first hand knowledge of the facts. In 
II 
State V. Rambali, where a person after giving information on 
phone died after some time, for determining the authenticity, it 
was held that 'a report was made is relevant, but it cannot be 
said with confidence that it was made by the person who is said 
to have made the report or that the contents of the report were 
correct.' 
First information report is, in fact, an important 
document. It is an information made soon after the occurrence, 
when the memory is fresh, and when there is no opportunity to 
febricate or make' consultations to improve upon or add to. The 
fact that from which source the information came, whether from a 
stranger, aggrieved person or an eye witness, adds to its 
significance also. Law attaches great significance to its 
contents. But it cannot be made a basis either for conviction or 
acquittal. However, it may be used only for corroboration under 
section 157 or for contradiction under section 145 Evidence Act. 
First information repoft is different from complaint. 
It is given in writing to police officer while the complaint, 
whether oral or in writing, is made to the magistrate. 
Information can be given by any person whereas complaint can be 
made by a person authorised under sections 195, 136., 137 and 
I. AIR 1341 Rang. 209. 
II. AIR 1953 All 163. 
198, Criminal Procedure Code. First information empowers only 
the police officer to commence the investigation. On the other 
hand the report by the police of the same information to the 
magistrate empowers him to take cognizance of such offence. 
Thereafter he may direct an investigation or, if he thinks fit, 
at once proceed, or depute any magistrate subordinate to him to 
proceed, to hold a preliminary inquiry into, or otherwise to 
dispose of the case in the manner provided in Criminal Procedure 
Code. 
Police officer's power to investigate also include 
within it's scope to require attendance of witnesses and 
examination of witnesses. No statement made by any person to a 
police officer in the course of investigation under Chapter XII, 
Criminal Procedure Code shall, if reduced to writing, be signed 
by the person making it. Statements recorded during police 
investigation under section 162, Criminal Procedure code are 
wholly in admissible in evidence except for the limited purpose 
stated in proviso thereto. Under the present amended section 162 
both defence as well as prosecution (with the permisson of court) 
may make effective use of such s tatement to contradict witnesses 
or to confront hostile witnesses. Such statements are not to be 
used either by the accused or the prosecution for the purpose of 
corroboration. Such statements recorded by the police are not to 
be used as substantive evidence in favour of or against either 
<tCl 
I 
the accused or the prosecution. 
The object of section 162, Criminal Procedure Code is 
to protect primarily the interest of the accused against the use 
of such statements recorded by the police during investigation at 
the trial on the presumption that such statements were not made 
II 
under circumstances inspiring confidence. 
Section 162, clause (2), Criminal Procedure Code 
exempts from its operation the dying declarations which are 
admissible under section 32 (1) Evidence Act. 'A dying 
declaration made to a police officer during the course of 
investigation is not subject to the limitation of section 162 
III 
Criminal Procedure Code. 
'Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code enacts a r ule of 
evidence. This section, is so far as it is material, prohibits, 
but not so as to affect the admissibility of information to the 
extent permissible under section 27 of the Evidence Act, use of 
statements by any person to a police officer in the course of an 
investigation, in any inquiry or trial in w hich such person is 
charged for any offence under investigation at the time when the 
IV 
statement was made.' 
I. Dhaneshawar Thakur V. The State, AIR 1958 Pat. 412. 
II. Tahsildar Singh V. State of U.P. 1959, SC. 1012. 
III. Rahman V. Emperor, AIR 1932 Lah. 14. 
IV. State of U.P. V. Deoman Upadhaya, AIR 1960 SC. 1125. 
Analysing of sections 24 to 27, Evidence Act, and 
section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, together, one may draw the 
following inferences: 
(1) A confession made by a person to a police officer 
either in custody or outside under inducement, 
threat or promise having reference to the charge 
against him eminating from a person in authority 
cannot be proved against the accused in any 
proceeding; 
(2) A confession made not to a police office but to 
some other person while in police custody cannot 
be proved in any proceeding against him unless 
made in the presence of the magistrate; 
(3) An information which distinctly relates to the 
fact thereby discovered while in police custody 
whether the information amounts to a confession or 
not may be proved; 
(4) A statement which amounts to a confession or not 
made by a person when he is not in police custody, 
to another person who is not a police officer may 
be proved against him if it is otherwise relevent; 
(5) When a statement is made to a police officer 
during the investigation of an offence under 
Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, may 
not, except to the extent permitted by section 27, 
Evidence Act, be used for any purpose at any 
enquiry or trial in respect of any offence under 
investigation at the time when the statement was 
made in which he is concerned as a person accused 
of an offence. 
A confession may be admissible in evidence in a 
criminal proceeding if made by a person not in police custody 
subject to : that the statement has not been procured in the 
manner mentioned-in section 24, of the Evidence Act, and is not 
made to a police officer. Section 163 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code clearly lays down that no police officer or other person in 
authority shall offer or make, or cause to be offered or made, 
any inducement, threat or promise as is mentioned in section 24 
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872). 
Another important procedure laid down in section 165, 
Criminal Procedure Code relates to the power of search by police 
officer making the investigation. If the investigating officer 
has reasons to believe, that anything necessary for the purpose 
of his investigation may be found in any place within the limits 
of the police station of which he is in charge, or to which he is 
attached, and that thing cannot in his opinion be otherwise 
obtained without undue delay, such officer may, after recording 
in writing the grounds for his belief and specifying in such 
writing, so far as possible, the thing for which the search is 
to be made, search or cause search to be made, for such thing in 
any place within the limits of such station. The copies of the 
search list shall be sent to the nearest magistrate empowered to 
take cognizance. On application a copy of search list shall also 
be supplied to the owner or occupier of the premises. No cost 
for such a copy shall be charged from the owner or occupier whose 
premises has been searched. 
The investigating officer may also require an officer-
in-charge of another police station to cause a search to be made 
in any place within the limits of his own station. (Section 
166). 
A police officer in investigating the offence cannot 
detain a person in custody for more than twenty four hours in the 
absence of the special order under section 167, Criminal 
Procedure Code. When the investigation cannot be completed 
within the period of twenty four hours and these are grounds that 
the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer-in-
charge of the police-station or the officer making the 
investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub-inspector, 
shall forthwith transmit to the nearest judicial magistrate a 
tit! 
copy of the entries in the diary and shall at the same time 
forward the accused to such magistrate. Investigating officer 
would show the time of arrest of the accused, the grounds for 
believing that he committed the offence with which he is charged 
and the reasons why the investigation could not be completed 
within twenty four hours. The magistrate ordering the detention 
I 
of the accused must record his reasons in writing. 
The magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded 
under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to 
try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the 
accused as such magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding 
fifteen days on the whole. (Section 167 (1)). 
If the magistrate has no jurisdiction to try the case 
or commit it for trial, and considers further detention 
unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a 
magistrate having such jurisdiction. 
The magistrate may authorise detention of the accused 
even beyond fifteen days if he is satisfied that adequate grounds 
exist for doing so. However, no magistrate shall authorise the 
detention of the accused person in custody for total period 
exceeding sixty days. (Section 167 (1) (a)). 
I. 1933 Oudh 315, Dhrew Dev V. Emperor, 32 Cr. Lj. 464. 
Ufi. 
On exceeding sixty days the accused would be released 
on bail. A magistrate shall not authorise detention in any 
custody under section/Cr. P. C , unless the accused is produced 
before him- (Section 167 (1) (b)). 
A magistrate of second class, if not specially 
authorised by the High Court, shall not order detention in the 
custody of the police. (Section 167 (1) (c)). 
Article 22 (2) of the Constitution of India also 
requires that the accused has to be produced before a magistrate 
within twenty four hours of his arrest. For further detention in 
custody the accused should be conveyed the charges for which he 
is going to be detained. The magistrate before authorising 
further custody of the accused person should apply his mind 
judicially. He should determine after scruitinizing whatever 
material is in record before him whether the detention of accused 
person is necessary for the investigation of the case against 
him. 
The object of producing an accused person before a 
magistrate is to ensure that the arrest and detention of the 
accused is, at any rate, prima facie justified. Law does not 
place reliance upon the judgement of police. it is the 
magistrate who is to decide, though prima facie, on certain 
material contained in the diary relating to the case, whether 
or not the detention in prison of an accused is necessary. 
I 
In Re Raju Thevan, it was held t hat at every stage 
when remand is asked for, the police must satisfy the magistrate 
i"^  AIR 1966 Mad. 349. 
that there is sufficient evidence against the accused and that 
further evidence must be obtained and then, if the magistrate is 
satisfied, he can direct remand. 
Under section 168 Criminal Procedure Code when 
subordinate officer has made any investigation he shall report 
the result of such investigation to the officer in charge of the 
police station. 
Sections 169 and 170 lay down the procedure of release 
of accused person when evidence is deficient, and cases to be 
forwarded to magistrate when evidence is sufficient. Section 171 
mentions that the complainant and witnesses are not required to 
accompany police officer and not to be subjected to restraints. 
Section 172 deals with the diary of proceedings in 
investigation. Significance of the diary lies in that it is a 
record of facts ascertained by a police officer during the 
investigation of cognizable offence. It is absolutely 
privileged. but it ceases to be so when the statement by a 
station house officer under section 162, Criminal Procedure Code 
is entered in it. It is very effective tool in the hands of the 
court to check the methods of investigation, the omissions and 
errors committed by the investigating officer during the 
I 
investigations. In Local Government V. Mt. Guji, it was 
I. AIR 1935 Nag. 59. 
observed : 'a delay in making an entry is calculated to throw 
suspicion on the dairy.' 
The accused as of right is not entitle to see any 
portion of the diary that he may wish to see. However, in two 
cases the accused may use the diary. Firstly, when diary is used 
by the court to contradict the police officer who made it, or, 
secondly, when it is used by the police officer to refresh his 
memory. 
Section 173, Criminal Procedure Code deals with final 
stage of investigation. it requires that every investigation 
shall be completed by the police officer, authorised to 
investigate the offence in cognizable offences, without 
unnecessary delay. As soon as it is completed, the officer 
incharge of the police station shall forward to a magistrate 
empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a 
report in the form prescribed by the state government. Report 
may be of two kinds - in the form of charge-sheet, or a final 
report. Charge-sheet is submitted when it appears to the said 
officer that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground 
ofsuspicion to justify the forwarding of an accused to a 
magistrate and requesting him to take cognizance of the offence. 
Such a report is known as 'positive report'. Final report is 
submitted when it appears to the said officer or to the police 
officer making the investigation that there is no sufficient 
evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the 
forwarding of the accused to the magistrate. Such a report may 
be called a 'negative report'. 
Persons accused of the offences are entitled that the 
case against them should be investigated as quickly as possible 
so that they may know what they are being charged with. 
To facilitate a fair and speedy trial copies of all 
material documents and statements in the possession of the 
prosecution are furnished to the accused under this section so 
that the accused may prepare himself to meet the evidence to be 
advanced by the prosecution at the trial. However, if the copies 
of all relevant documents have been supplied to the accused in 
advanced, it does not mean that prosecution is barred from 
relying on any additional evidence that may be subsequently 
I 
discovered by them. 
The investigation is not incomplete merely because that 
the investigating officer when he submitted his report to the 
magistrate still awaited the reports of the experts or by some 
chance, in advertently or by design, he failed to append to the 
police report such documents or statements recorded under section 
AIR 1960 Andh. Pra. 253, Sriram Reddi Sinhachalam, in re. 
Ifl^ 
161 Criminal Procedure Code, though all such documents were with 
I 
him when he submitted the police report before the magistrate. 
On receipt of the report magistrate is not bound to 
accept it. He is to scruitinize the material as to whether the 
facts disclosed will warrant the issue of a process against the 
II 
accused. If the police submits the final report magistrate may 
disagree and proceed to take cognizance of the offence or may 
direct further investigation. But once the magistrate takes 
cognizance- on police report he cannot direct further 
III . 
investigations. 
If cognizance has been taken on police report in 
breach of mandatory provisions relating to investigation, the 
result which follows cannot be set aside unless the illegality in 
investigation can be shown to have caused miscarriage of justice. 
An illegality committed in the course of investigation does not 
IV 
affect the competence and jurisdiction of the court of trial. 
I. State of Haryana V. Mehal Singh, 1978 Cr. Lj. 1810 (F.B). 
II. Abhindandar V. State, 1968 Cr. Lj. 97. 
III. Jitendra Nath V. State, 1976, Cr. Lj. 1296. 
IV. Manilal V. Delhi Administration, 1971, Cr. Lj. 1153. 
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"Recording of. Confessions" 
If an accused or a suspected person during 
investigation volunteers confession, the investigating officer 
should present him before a magistrate for recording the 
confession under section 164 of Criminal Procedure Code. It is 
immaterial that the metropolitan magistrate or judicial 
magistrate to whom the accused or suspected person has been 
refered, whether or not he has jurisdiction in the case, may 
record any confession made to him under Chapter XII, Criminal 
Procedure Code or under any other law for the time being in 
force. Such a confession should be recorded in the course of 
investigation at any time afterwards before the commencement of 
the inquiry or trial. A police officer, although any power of a 
magistrate has been confered upon him under any law for the time 
being in force, cannot record a confession. 
The magistrate before recording the confession must 
administer a caution to the accused or suspected person who 
volunteers to make confession that he is not bound to make a 
confession and that, if he does so, it may be used as evidence 
against him. 
The magistrate shall not record any such confession 
unless he is satisfied and has reasons to believe that it is 
being made voluntarily. Any such confession shall be recorded by 
Uf9 
the magistrate in full himself or where he is unable to do so 
owing to a physical or other in capacity, undr his direction and 
superintendence. The manner of recording the confession shall be 
the same as laid down in section 281 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code. The record shall be, if practicable, be in the language 
in which the accused is examined or, if that is not practicable, 
in the language of the court. The record shall be shown or read 
to the accused. If he does not understand the language in which 
it is written, shall be interpreted to him in a language which he 
understands, and he shall be at liberty to explain or add to his 
answers. 
The confession so recorded shall be signed by the 
person making the confession, and the magistrate shall make a 
memorandum at the foot of such record to the following effect: 
"I have explained to (name) that he is not bound to 
make a confession and that, if he does so any confession he may 
make may be used as evidence against him and I believe that this 
confession was voluntarily made. It was taken in my presence and 
hearing, and was read over to the person making it and admitted 
by him to be correct, and it contains a full and true account of 
the statement made by him." - (Signed) - Magistrate." 
I 
In Ram Charan V. State of U.P., the magistrate recorded 
the confession under section 164 Crimimal Procedure Code and 
certified at the foot of statement as : "Certified that the 
statement has been made voluntarily. The deponent was warned 
that he is making the statement before the first class magistrate 
and can be used against him. 
Recorded in my presence, there is no police here. The 
witness did not go out until all the witness had given the 
statement". The supreme court in the case held that endorsement 
at the foot of statement was not proper. 
The language should be simple to explain and not to 
warn the person volunteering his confession. Here the language 
and manner adopted by the magistrate is not the same as has been 
envisaged by Clause (4) of Section 164, Criminal Procedure Code. 
"Confession Admissible in Evidence" 
The investigating officer in the course of 
investigation gets valuable information from the confession 
recorded by the magistrate. But he should not unduly rely on 
confession. He should try to find out and obtain all 
circumstancial and oral evidences available in support of the 
prosecution case. If the xnvestige^ting officer succeeds in 
obtaining the all such corroborative evidences it will help him 
I. AIR, 1968, SC 1270. 
(fit 
judging the nature and character of the confession. 
I 
In Raja Ram V. State, it was held that 'a confession 
recorded by a magistrate under section 164 after the police 
completed its investigation and submitted a charge-sheet, but 
before the magisterial enquiry has commenced, is admissible'. 
But it should be proved beyond reasonable doubt that at 
the time of recording the statement or even before when the 
accused is in custody of police, no police officer or other 
person in authority offered or made or caused to be offered or 
made, any inducement, threat or promise in violation of the 
provisions of section 163 Criminal Procedure Code and section 24 
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 
Further that the confession recorded was voluntary, 
made on his own free will and due caution was administered by the 
magistrate before confession was recorded. The manner and 
language used was proper as mentioned in section 164 Criminal 
Procedure Code. It is also essential that confession was 
recorded in accordance to the Procedure laid in section 281 
Criminal Procedure Code. 
I. AIR 1966 All. 192 (F.B.) 
Confession made by the accused to police officer while 
in police custody is irrelevant. When any fact is deposed to as 
discovered in consequence of information recieved from a person 
of any offence in the custody of a police officer, so much of 
that information, whether the information amounts to confession 
or not as relates distinctly to that fact thereby may be 
admissible. 
If the above noted conditions are satisfied then 
confession is admissible in evidence. If the confession is made 
under threat or promise or inducement, such confession would not 
be missible in evidence. 
In cases if any court before which confession of an 
accused person recorded or purporting to be recorded under 
section 164 or section 281, is tendered, or has been received, in 
evidence finds that any of the provisions of either of such 
sections have not been complied with by the magistrate recording 
the statement, it may not withstanding anything contained in 
section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1372), 
satisfied that such non-compliance has not injured the accused in 
his defence on the merits and that he duly made the statement 
recorded, admit such statement. (Section 463, Criminal Procedure 
Code). 
Non-compliance with the provisions of section 164 or 
section 281 under this section 463, makes the confession 
admissible only when it is established that the expediency of 
justice so requires and the accused in his defence is not 
prejudiced. 
"Charge" 
"If there be any principle of criminal law and justice 
clearer and more obvious than all others, it is that the offence 
imputed must be positively and precisely stated, so that the 
accused may certainly know with what he is charged and may be 
I 
prepared to answer the charge in the best way". It is a first 
step in the criminal prosecution process of an offence. The 
charge is aimed at to warn the accused person of the prosecution 
case against him which he is to answer. The charge is to enable 
the accused of the allegations which he will have to meet. It is 
a notice of the matter of which he is accused. It must convey to 
the accused clearly and accurately the allegations which the 
prosecution is to prove against him and which he will have to 
defend himself. Charge is also an information to the trial court 
of the allegations against the accused person to which evidence 
is to be directed. In fact it is a basic principle of criminal 
law to convey to the accused with sufficient clearness and 
I. Norris R. J. in Lim Beh V. Opium Farmer, (1842) 3Ky 110, 
112. 
d-i-^ 
certainty what the precise accusation against him is, before he 
is asked to defend himself. 'An accused is entitled to know with 
accuracy and certainty the exact nature of the charge brought 
against him. Unless he has this knowledge, he will be prejudiced 
in his defence, specially in cases where it is sought to 
implicate him for acts not committed by himself but by others 
with whom he is in company'. 
A charge includes facts and law both. Its 
significance lies in the fact that the charge is a safeguard to 
the accused against injustice. It consists of the facts or 
allegations which the prosecution undertakes to prove against the 
accused and the offence constituted by them in accordance with 
the law. Chapter XVII of Criminal Procedure Code deals with the 
charge. According to the requirement of section 211, Criminal 
Procedure Code, a charge states the offence with which the 
accused is charged. If the law which creates the offence gives 
it any specific name, the offence is to be described in the 
charge by that name only. If there is no specific definition of 
the offence in the law with which an accused person is charged 
then so much of the definition of the offence must be stated as 
to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is 
charged. Charge will also include the law and the section of law 
against which there is a violation. 
The charge shall be written in the language of the 
court. In cases where the accused person has been previously 
convicted and by reason by previous conviction enhanced 
punishment or a punishment of a different kind is to be awarded 
for subsequent offence and it is intended to prove such previous 
conviction for the purpose of affecting punishment, the fact, 
date and palce of the previous conviction shall be stated in the 
charge, and if such statement has been omitted, the court may add 
it any time before sentence is passed. Sufficient particulars of 
the previous conviction should be mentioned so that the accused 
may understand why he is liable to enhanced punishment. 
The charge shall contain such particulars as to time 
and place of alleged offence. It will also mention the person, 
if any, against whom or thing in respect of which, - it was 
committed, as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused 
notice of the matter with which he is charged. 
In cases when the accused is charged with criminal 
breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of money or other 
moveable property, it shall be sufficient to specify the gross 
sum or, as the case may be, describe the movable property in 
respect of which the offence is alleged to have been committed, 
and the dates between which the offence is alleged to have been 
committad, without specifying particular items or exact dates, 
and the dharge so framed shall be deemed to be a charge of one 
Air 
offence within the meaning of section 219 subject -to the 
requirement that the time included between the first and last of 
such dates shall not exceed one year. 
Provisions of section 212 (2) are important and must be 
I 
strictly observed in framing a charge under sections 405 and 406. 
It must indicate which of the several ingredients of the offence 
was intended-
(1) 'Whether the accused dishonestly misappropriated 
the property, or 
(2) Whether he dishonestly coverted it to his own use, 
or 
(3) Whether he dishonestly disposed it of in violation 
of any direction of law, or 
(4) Whether he disnohestly disposed it of in violation 
of any legal contract express or implied, or 
(5) Whether he wilfully suffered any other person to 
do any of the acts (1) to (4) referred to above'. 
(1913) 14 Cr. Lj. 219 (222) (Cal.). 
^ 1 ^ 
'The charged must state who made the alleged 
I 
entrustment or who suffered from the alleged breach of trust.' 
As we have noted earlier charge must also mention the 
dates between which the offence is alleged to have been 
II 
committed." 
Ill 
In R.K. Dalmia V. Delhi Administration, it was 
observed that a charge for criminal breach of trust in different 
modes is really a charge for a single offence. The charge was: 
"That you being entrusted with the funds of. B committed 
breach of trust, by wilfully suffering C to dishonestly 
misappropriate the said funds and dishonestly use or 
dispose of the said funds in violation of the direction 
of the law and the implied contract between you and B 
prescribing the mode in which such trust was to be 
discharged." 
In this case though the mode of committing was not 
precisely stated, however, their lordship of the supreme court 
were of the opinion that the charge was in respect of a single 
I. (1936) 37 Cr. Lj. 439 (440) (DB) (Cal.). 
II. A 1957 Madh. Pra 225 (226) : 1957 Cr. Lj. 1411, 
III. Supra N ?. 
4'i? 
offence and vagueness of charge did not make the trial illegal 
particularly under the circumstances when no prejudice was 
caused to the accused. 
Where the accused embezzled Rs 1-11 and Rs 5/- on 5th 
August and Rs 1-3 on 20th Hay which he had collected from 3 
persons but was not charged with three separate offences but with 
one offence under section 409 Indian Penal Code, the court held 
I 
that the charge was valid, satisfied the requirement of law. 
In another case an accused realised Rs 103/- by 23 rent 
receipts and misappropriated Rs 67/- out of it was tried for it 
under section 408, Indian Penal Code in one trial for offences 
falling within the period of one year. It was held that the 
charge was valid covered by the provisions of section 222(2) old 
Criminal Procedure Code (Present equivalent section is 212(2) of 
II 
the Criminal Procedure Code 1973). 
A charge in respect ofan aggregate sum of moeny alleged' 
to have been misappropriated within one year relating to three 
III 
items specified as composing the total, was held valid. 
I. (1906) 3 Cr. Lj. 138 (DB), Cal, A 1936 Bom. 154. 
II. (1905), 1 Cr. Lj. 791 (DB) (Cal). 
H I . (1902) All W.N. 44. 
V25 
A charge.under sections 405 and 406 or 408 cannot be 
I 
joined with a charge for an offence of extortion, or with a 
charge of falsification of accounts though in respect of the same 
II 
items. 
In criminal breach of trust cases a charge must 
indicate and specify the gross-sum of money, and dates on which 
III 
such crime committed. A charge under section 405 is defective 
if it does not set out the time and the manner of entrustment 
IV 
alleged with sufficient particularity. 
'Where the accused has been charged under section 409, 
in respect of three separate entrustments of paddy in kind, it 
would be better if the dharge were framed regarding each of the 
deliveries showing the date and the quality of each entrustment 
separately. But the failure to do that cannot vitiate the trial 
unless it is shown that such a defect has occasioned a failure of 
V 
justice'. 
I. A. 1936 Sind 29 (30) : 37 Cr. Lj. 457 (DB). 
II. A. 1926 Bom 110 (111) : 27 Cr. Lj. 305 (DB). 
III. AIR 1957 MP 225 
IV. 1960, Cal. 1316. 
V. AIR 1958 Pat. 27. 
I 
In Umar Saheb's case their lordship of supreme court 
held that 'where the charge under section 406 said to have been 
committed by the accused persons in pursuance of a criminal 
conspiracy was with respect to the gross-sum embezzled within the 
period bwetween 6-3-1949 and .30-6-1950, the charge contravenes 
the proviso to section 222(2) (S. 212(2) of the new Code); but 
the defect does not cause prejudice to the accused and does not 
vitiate the tiral as the charge could have been split up into two 
charges with respect to periods from 6-3-1949 to 5-3-1950 and 
from 6-3-1950 to 30-6-1950 and the two charges could be tried 
together at one trial-' 
Section 213 Criminal Procedure Code specifically lays 
down that when the nature of the case is such that the 
particulars mentioned in sections 211 and 212 do not give the 
accused sufficient notice of the matter with which he is charged, 
the charge shall also contain such particulars of the manner in 
which the alleged offence was committed as will be sufficient for 
that purpose. 
In every charge words used in describing an offence 
shall be deemed to have been used in the sense attached to them 
respectively by the law under which such offence is punishable. 
(Section 214). 
I. AIR 1962, 1 Ker. LR, 544. 
Under section 215, errors or omissions in the charge 
cannot be regarded as material unless it is shown by the accused 
that he had in fact been misled or that there had been a failure 
of justice as a result of such error or omission. 
I 
In Rajindra Singh V. State of U.P. the court convicted 
the accused for an offence constituted by. the facts mentioned in 
the charge even though not charged with it. It can invoke the 
aid of section 215 and ignore the error in stating the offence in 
the charge or in the omission of stating the offence of which be 
is found guilty. 
'A general charge of embezzlement showing the gross sum 
misappropriated is sufficient under section 212(2) of the 
Criminal Procedure Code and the conviction would not be bad 
II 
unless the accused was prejudiced thereby'. 
I. AIR 1960, All 387. 
II. (1907) 6 Cr. Lj. 137 (Lah) 
I 
In K. Kunhahammad V. State of Madras, their lordships 
of the supreme court made observation as folloifs: 
"The failure of the prosecution to split up the first 
count into sub-counts cannot obviously be regarded as introducing 
a fatal infirmity in the validity of the trial. . It would be 
noticed that this argument is not one of misjoinder. It is based 
on the formal requirement prescribed by the proviso to section 
222(2) as to how charges of breach of trust should be framed. 
There is no difficulty in holding that such an irregularity can 
be cured both under section 225 and section 537 of the code 
provided of course no prejudice has been thereby caused to the 
appellants' case". 
A. 1960 SC 661 {663)_ : 1960 Cr. Lj. 1013 : Charge 
contravening proviso to section 222(2) old (New - 212(2) -
defect held did not cause prejudice to accused - Trial not 
vitiated - 1962 (2) Cr. Lj. 259 - Where the accused person 
is charged under section 408 for misappropriation of the 
gross amount during one year and the charge also sets out 
items with necessary dates and amount it falls within the 
privisions of section 222(2) equivalent 212(2) Criminal 
Prodecure Code. If the items are more than 3 inthe number, 
the jury should be asked to give their verdict in respect of 
the charge under section 408 I.P.C and not in respect of 
charge on several items. (A 1929 Cal 457 : 31 Cr. Lj. 74 
(DB) - Trial involving offences under section 406, I.P.C. 
committed on 5 distinct dates is not bad - (1926) 42 TLR 57. 
Section 215 clearly mentions that no error in stating 
either the offence or the particulars required to be stated in 
the charge, and no omission to state of the case as material, 
unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission 
and it has occasioned a failure of justice. However, each case 
has to be judged on its own specific facts and there cannot be 
any general presumption that every error or omission in a charge 
has materially affected a trial or occasioned a failure of 
justice. 
Section 216 of Criminal Procedure Code deals with the 
alteration of charges. Any court may alter or add to any charge 
at any time before judgement is pronounced. 
Whenever a charge altered or added to the court after 
the commencement of the trial, the prosecutor and the accused 
shall be allowed to recall or re-summon, and examine with 
reference to such alteration or addition, any witness who may 
have been examined. However, the court if it is of the opinion 
that either the prosecutor or the accused desires to recall or re-
examine such witness for the purpose of vexation or delay or for 
defeating the end of justice, may refuse such recall of 
witnesses. The court refusing the recall witnesses is to record 
its reason for such refusal. Court may also to call any further 
witness whom the court may think to be material. 
As to joinder of charges, sections 218 to 223 of 
Criminal Procedure Code provide different conditions under which 
accused persons may be charged with jointly. In fact these 
sections are also exception to the general law relating to place 
of inquiry and trial as given in section 177 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code. Where in the course of the same transaction, 
different offences are committed by different accused persons and 
where they are tried jointly, the court will have jurisdiction to 
try all the offences together whether they have been within the 
I 
territorial jurisdiction of that court or not. 
For every distinct offence of which any person is 
charged is accused, there shall be a separate charge and every 
such charge shall be tried separately. This proviso is subjected 
to that if the accused person by an application in writing 
desires, and the magistrate is of the opinion that such person is 
not likely to be prejudiced thereby, the magistrate may try 
together all or any number of the charges framed against such 
person. Sub section (1) of section 218 shall not effect the 
operation of the provisions of sections 219, 220, 221 and 223. 
Two offences falling under different sections of Indian 
Penal Code are considered distinct offences. Misappropriation of 
money on different dates are distinct offences. For different 
I. AIR 1957 Mys 44 (Venkatesh V. State of Mysore). 
V34r 
offences though committed in the same transaction, separate 
charges should be framed. It may be that those charges will be 
tried together under sections 218, 219 and 220. Three offences 
of the same kind within a period of one year may be charged 
together in one trial (Section 219). 
Sections 219, 220 and 221 provide where separate 
charges are framed for the circumstances in which those charges 
could be tried together and not separately as required under 
section 218. 
If, in one series of acts so connected together as to 
form the same transaction, more offences than one are committed 
by the same person, under section 220 Criminal Procedure Code, he 
may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, every such 
offence. When a person is charged with one or more offences of 
Criminal breach of trust or misappropriation of property as 
provided in sub-section (2) of section 212 or in sub-section (1) 
of section 219, is accused of committing, for the purpose of 
facilitating or concealing the commission of that offence or 
those offences, one or more offences of falsification of 
accounts, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, 
every such offence. For certain acts forming one transaction 
there must be one continued thread of common purpose running 
through the acts to support a joinder of charge. The question 
that different offences are committed in the course of same 
V5^ 
transaction must be determined on the facts of each particular 
case. There must be sufficient unity of time, place, purpose 
and action as to so connect the different acts to make them one 
transaction. 
In cases where the charge of criminal conspiracy to 
commit criminal breach of trust is followed by a substantive 
charge of criminal breach of trust in pursuance of such 
conspiracy, there is nothing to prevent the court from convicting 
an accused under the second charge even if the prosecution fails 
to establish conspiracy. In such a case no prejudice is caused 
to the accused as he is aware that there is a substantive 
I 
charge against him under section 409 Criminal Procedure Code. 
Under section 409, it is essential that a charge for 
criminal breach of trust must indicate the several ingredients of 
the offence and also that the accused was entrusted with property 
in his capacity of a public servant in the course of his 
employment. 
A charge alleging 3 different acts of criminal breach 
of trust and three different acts of falsification of accounts 
under section 477 A is an illegelity though all acts committed 
II 
within 12 months. 
I. 1967 Cr. Lj. 1401 : AIR SC. 1590. 
II. A 1926 Bom. 110. 
Cf'^h 
Again two charges under section 409 and two alternative 
charges under section 420 in respect of the same transaction 
, I 
cannot be validly joined together. 
Joint trial of offence under section 5 (1) (c) read 
with section 5 (2)) of Prevention of Corruption Act (which is the 
same offence as under section 409, I.P.C.) and offence of 
falsification of accounts under section 477 A both in respect of 
II 
several items is illegal. 
Under section 221 where it is doubtful what offence has 
been committed an accused may be charged with having committed 
all or any of such offences, and any number of such charges may 
be tried at once or he may be charged in the alternative with 
having committed someone of the said offences. In a case where 
the accused is charged with one offence and evidence shows a 
different crime committed, he may be convicted of the offence 
which he is shown to have committed, although he was not charged 
with it. 
For the application of section 222 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code the following conditions should be proved: 
I. A. 1952 Bom. 177. 
II. 1970 Raj. LW 529. 
(1) When a person is charged vith an offence 
consisting of several particulars, a combination 
of some only of which constitutes a complete minor 
offence,' and such combination is proved, but the 
remaining particulars are not proved, he may be 
convicted of the minor offence, though he was not 
charged with it. 
(2) When a person is charged with an offence and facts 
are proved which reduce it to a minor offence, he 
may be convicted of the minor offence, although he 
is not charged with it. 
(3) When a person is charged with an offence, he may 
be convicted of an attempt to commit such offence 
although the attempt is not separately charged. 
In cases where the conditions requisite for the 
initiation of proceedings in respect of that minor offence have 
not been satisfied there cannot be any conviction of any minor 
offence under this section. 
Section 223, Criminal Procedure Code, gives a list of 
persons who may be charged jointly for offences committed, person 
is accused of abetment or attempt to commit, such offences. 
Person accused of an offence which includes theft, extortion, 
cheating, misappropriation, and persons accused of receiving or 
retaining, or assisting in the disposal of, concealment of, 
property possession of which is alleged to have been transferred 
by any such offence committed by the first named persons, or of 
abetment of or attempt to commit any such last named offence may 
be charge jointly. 
Splitting up of the case into several trials should be 
avoided to where such a course is likely to prejudice the accused 
in their defence. 
The last section 224 of chapter XVII Criminal Procedure 
Code relating to charge deals with the withdrawal of remaining 
charges on conviction on one of several charges. When a charge 
containing more heads than one is framed against the same person, 
and when a conviction has been had one or more of them, the 
complainant, or officer conducting the prosecution, may with the 
consent of the court, withdraw the remaining charge or charges, 
or the court of its own accord may stay the inquiry into, or 
trial of such charge or charges, and such withdrawal shall have 
the effect of an acquittal on such charge or charges, unless the 
conviction be set aside, in which case the said court (subject to 
the order ,of the court setting aside the conviction) may proceed 
with the inquiry into, or trial of, the charge or charges so 
withdrawn. 
In brief the object of joint trial is to avoid 
multiplicity of trials. The only limitation which can be placed 
on joint trials is that justice and fairness should not be 
prejudiced. Where prosecution desires a joint trial it is for 
the prosecution to justify. The magistrate has a full discretion 
to try the accused jointly or separately keeping in view that 
justice should not be effected and accused's interest is not 
prejudiced. 
PART B 
ISQSSSSS& L ISJMK OmSMk IM 
"QURANIC VIEW" 
The Holy Quran is, no doubt, the fundamental and 
unchangable source of Islamic lav. Crimes are to be determined 
in accordance to the commandments and injunctions of Holy Quran. 
Next comes the Ahadith. Ahadith as discussed in earlier chapters 
are the interpretations and elaborations of Holy Quran. After 
these two basic sources of Islamic law comes the other sources. 
In this chapter, a systematic attempt is made to examine the 
procedure for the administration of justice keeping in view the 
different sources of Islamic law. 
Administration of justice is the basic responsibility 
of every Islamic state. Justice must be executed in accordance 
to Quranic commandments. Allah-ta'ala in Surah Sad ( says: 
^"Ij jJL ^Ul Ore ^ U ^j^\ ^ -UJi dd*^ bl :^j\si 
"0 David ( »>*^ )! We did indeed make thee a 
vicegerent on earth : So judge thou between men in 
truth (and justice) : Nor follow thou the lust (Of thy 
heart), for it will mislead thee from the path of 
Allah: for those who wander astray from the path of 
Allah, is chatisement grievous, forthat they forget 
the Day of Account". (38:26). 
This ayat ( ) has laid down the basic concept 
of administration of justice under Islamic law. God has made us 
His viceroy on the earth, so follow His commands only, and decide 
the matters with justice and fair play according to Divine 
Sbariah. It gives direction to those who are responsible for 
administering justice that never an infinitesimal part of the 
wish of the soul should come in the way of judgement of any 
affair or matter, because this thing leads astray from the way of 
God. And when a man went astray from the way, then where would 
be his resort? Reference to David here means a man just and 
upright, endowed with all the virtues, in whom even the least 
thought of self-elation has be be washed off. Assuredly those 
who go astrary from the way of God - for them there is a terrible 
chastisement for that they forget the Day of Reckoning. 
Generally the wish is followed because a man forgets 
the Day of Reckoning. If this thing is present before his soul 
that one day he will have to go before God and give an account of 
(>•* 
minutest actions, then he cannot go astray from the path of God. 
He cannot prefer his wish contrary to the achieving of pleasure 
of God. 
Disputes among believers should be decided in 
accordance to the commandments of Allah-ta'ala and sayings of 
Prophet (peace be upon him). There should be no hesitation in 
accepting the commandments and sayings of Prophet (peace be upon 
him). Allah-ta'ala in Sura Noor commands: 
"The answer of the believers, when summond to Allah And 
His Messenger, in order that he may judge between them, 
is no other than this : They say, "We hear and we obey. 
It is such as these that will prosper." (24:51) 
The affairs of true Muslims should be subject to the 
commands of God and His Messenger. In any matter if they are 
directed to follow they should never hesitate even for a moment 
whether there is loss or gain to them in it outwardly. At once 
say : 'Ve heard and we obeyed'. They should always keep ready to 
obey the order. In it alone is hidden the secret of their 
prosperity and abiding welfare. Fraud, hypocracy, and duplicity 
are of no use. Better way advised to believers by Allah-ta'ala 
in this Ayat ( ''--^^ ) is to listen good counsel attentively 
and carry out in their lives. 
This is a general guiding principle commanded by Allah-
ta'ala for the administration of justice, that is, hear and obey 
Allah-ta'ala and His Messenger (peace be upon him) when they may 
judge their disputed matters between them. The following Ayat 
( $%£> ) will V!A\^ it more clear: 
"But no by thy Lord, they can have no (real) Faith, 
until they make thee judge in all disputes between them 
and find in their souls no resistance against thy 
decisions, but accept them with the fullest 
conviction". (4:65). 
In earlier Ayat ( < - ^ ^ ) there was command to obey 
the directions of Allah-ta'ala and His Messenger both. But in 
the present Ayat there is specific advice to believers to obey 
the judgement of Prophet (peace be upon him) in their disputed 
matters. This is very significant verse which presents the 
criterion of a full and perfect believer. A perfect believer is 
that who believes in the authority of the Holy Prophet (peace be 
upon him) perfectly in all matters of life. The true momins 
accept the decision of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) from 
the depth of his heart. They do not find any impediments or 
narrrowness in their souls at the admonitions, instructions, 
directions and orders of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) 
given in the true traditions. Like hypocrates, they do not claim 
by tongue and reject by heart. Unless hearts are fully satisfied 
with the finality of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), Eman 
) cannot attain perfection. The principle which can 
be inferred here that justice in matters of disputes should be 
administered in accordance to Ahadith. Believers have to obey 
whatever the decision is whether there is gain or no gain from 
it. 
Allah-ta'ala, again in Sura-Maedah, from verse 48 to 
50, commands how to decide disputes arising among the believers. 
He says: 
titt€ 
Lu^j S.J:S>1\ ^ O J ^ ^^ U lja.A« j»JL w±SJi JUI U^^lj 
"To thee we sent the scripture in truth, confirming the 
scripture that came before it, and guarding it in 
safety : so judge between them by what Allah hath 
revealed, and follow not their vain desires, diverging 
from the truth that hath come to thee, to each among 
you have we prescribed a law and an open way. If Allah 
had so willed, He would have made you a single people, 
but (His plan is) to test you in what He hath given you 
: so strive as in a race in all virtues." (5:48). 
In verse 49, Allah-ta'ala commands: 
•0-^*—*^ ^ U l ^ \ j ^ ^Ij |4*jii ^ja*- j»irr*i 
"And this (He commands) : Judge thou between them by 
what Allah hath revealed, and follow not their vain 
desires, but beware of them lest they beguile thee from 
any of that (teaching) which Allah hath sent down to 
thee. And if they turn away, be assured that for some 
of their crimes it is Allah's purpose to punish them. 
And truly most men are reirellious". (5:49). 
tfO"? 
In verse 50, Allah-ta'ala says: 
'OJ^ji ^j^^^^\ o* 0—' o^j oj^. V^^J' r^' 
(o* : ol **diUI Sj^^) 
"Do they then seek after a judgement of (the Days of) 
Ignorance? But who, for a people whose faith is 
assured, can give better judgement than Allah? (5:50). 
In these verses Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) is 
advisded to execute and judge according to the Divine Laws 
revealed to him and pay no heed to the criticism and objection 
raised by different people of the world. In other words Muslims 
are advised to follow the constitution of Holy Quran and execute 
and judge according to the Quranic law. 
There may be various laws in the world - some secular 
and some ecclesiastical - but the Muslims should not pay heed to 
them. The political leaders and statesmen of the Modern Muslim 
States should know that the modern laws cannot vie with the 
Quranic laws. A momin should please the God and His Messenger, 
he should not please the rebellious infidels of God and His 
Messenger. 
If they turn away and do not execute and judge 
according to Quran and Sunnah and do not promulgate Quran 
constitution and laws, it means they are plunged into sins and 
God wants to punish them for some of their heinous sins in the 
world and hereafter. 
Those who believe in the absolute sovereignty, 
boundless mercy and unlimited knowledge of God cannot pay heed 
to order and law of anyone except God. So do they want to go to 
the darkness of ignorance, whims and caprices, godlessness and 
infedility. Obedience to lowly desires and disobedience to 
Divine commands, always detract the believers from the open way 
and throw them into dark pits of error and infedility. 
Allah-ta'ala, again commands in verse 44 : 
^j,^\ ^ dJjU dJI Jjil L, ^  ^ ^j 
tt : oi .SaiUI Ijj^) 
(^t,i} 
"If any do fail to judge by what Allah hath revealed, 
they are unbelievers". (5:44). 
Those who do not adjudicate or execute according o 
Divine Revealations are unbelievers. In the first case if the 
excecutive or judicial authority denies the Revealed Order or 
Revealed Law and promulgates or judges according to his own wish 
or other laws, t-hen that authority shall be infidel without 
doubt. In the second case if the executive or judicial authority 
has faith in the Divine Order but promulgates or judges according 
to a law other than Divine Law, then he shall be considered as an 
infidel in action. 
Again Allah-ta'ala says: 
"And if any fail to judge by what Allah hath revealed, 
they are wrong-doers". (5:45). 
^ftf 
Again in verse 47, Allah commands: 
"And if any do fail to judge by what Allah has revealed 
they are those who rebel". (5:47) 
The seeming repititions at the end of verses 44, 45, 
47, 48 and 50 are not real repetitions. The significant words 
used in these verses are : Unbelievers, wrong-doers, and 
rebellions. If any one tampers with the revealed law, he is 
unbeliever. If gives false judgement contrary to the revealed 
law, he is a wrong-doer. And lastly, if he does not follow the 
commandment of Allah, he is a rebel. The gist is to obey the 
commands of Allah-ta'ala in all walks of life. Whatever law is 
revealed judge your disputes accordingly. 
The righteous man seeks no other standard of judgement 
but Allah's will. Allah-ta'ala says in Holy Quran: 
(fSl 
"Say : "Shall I seek for judge other than Allah? - When 
He it is who hath sent unto you. The Book, explained 
in detail". (6;14-15). 
It is not possible for believers to listen the talks of 
others than God, when God has given a perfect and miraculous Book 
which contains the necessary details and explanation of all 
fundamental principles. Its tidings are all true, its laws are 
moderate and just and no one has power to change them. Laws of 
God possess a universal character and application. In the 
presence of such Holy laws, perfectly just and truthful, 
beleivers need not to listen the conflicting ideas of the modern 
thinkers. 
As to the administration of justice. Islamic concept is 
what Allah-ta'ala commands. Allah-ta'ala says: 
tf^Z 
,,jj^jii\ .-^ ail J .iwjuu ^ ^Li .z^ J, 
(IT : o l .SoiUI S j j - ) 
"If thou judge, judge in equity between them. For 
Allah loveth those who judge in equity". (5:42). 
Command of Allah-ta'ala in this verse is to decide the 
cases according to the principles of justice whether the 
contending parties are foes or friends, wicked or virtuous, 
oppressed or oppressors, relatives of strangers, citizen or 
aliens, all immaterial. Allah-ta'ala loves those who do justice 
in their mundane. 
In verse 58, noted below, Allah-ta'ala says: 
^1 ^ U l ^  ^ lilj l4kl Jl ^ ^ 1 lj:^ iS o' l^-r*^ ^' o' 
.Ij--, l * ^ ^ l^ 4iil ^ 1 4, j.iL« L-i <UI J JoJL 1,^.^ 
vs? 
"Allah doth command you to render back your trust to 
those to whom they are due; and when ye judge between 
people that ye judge with justice : verily how 
excellent is the teaching which giveth youl For Allah 
is He who heareth and seeth all things". (4:58). 
Here in the verse God has again commanded for 
administering justice. Justice in fact, is the basis of the 
Islamic law. 
Allah-ta'ala in Sura-Nahl, verse 90, advises agains.for 
doing justice: 
. ^ ^ / ^ ^ ^ ^\j > i l j 
"Allah commands justice, the doing of Good, and giving 
to kith and Kin, and He forbids all indecent deeds, and 
evil and rebellion : He instrucks you, that ye may 
receive admonition." (16:90). 
tfS'^ 
Allah again commands: 
"Say : My Lord hath commanded justice". (7:29). 
Further Quran has laid down an ideal of justice by 
refering to Divine Balance - the Balance of Justice. It says: 
"And the Firmament has He raised High and He has set up 
the Balance (of justice), in order that ye may not 
transgress (due) balance. So establish weight with 
justice and fall not short in the balance". (55:7-9). 
Again Allah says: 
v5r 
(To :ol <J.{daJI *j^) 
"Ve sent aforetime our Messengers with clear signs and 
sent down with them the Book and the balance (of) right 
and (wrong), that men May stand forth in justice". 
(57:25). 
Here Divine balance stands for justice. Revelation 
commands good and forbids evil, justice which gives to each 
person his due. Men in these verses have been advised to act 
justly to each other and observe due balance in all their 
actions. Men should be straight,just and honest. Administer 
justice even handedly without partiality. Justice is the central 
virtue, and avddence of both excess and defect in conduct keeps 
the human world balanced. The idea presented here is the doing 
of justice and equity in their dealings with one another. The 
ideal has not been kept confined within the domain of abstract 
theory. The Muslim Monarch and rulers tried to imitate it and 
act upon the Divine plan in practice also. In fact implemented 
the plan in practice as well. 
l<^6 
God does not command unwise things and indecent deed 
unrecognized by human nature and just wisdom. God commands just 
path and administration of justice. Where we say justice, it 
covers all laws of Shariat dealing with human affairs. Thus it 
is necessary for administration of justice to act upon all laws 
of Shariat. For not doing justice, those involved would be 
recreated and accounted for their deeds. 
Now we turn to Sunnah to show how much significance 
attached by Prophet (peace be upon him) to the administration of 
justice. It is not possible to refer all Sunnah relating to 
administration of justice in this Chapter. Only few selected are 
referred below: 
Hazrat Aaesh (r.a.) explaining the accountability of 
just and honest Qazi for his deeds on the Day of Decision 
narrated that Prophet (peace be upon him) said: 
"That on the Day of Accountability even a just and 
justice loving Qazi would have to face a moment when he 
would wish - that it would have been better if he had 
not decided a dispute even about a date between two 
persons". 
This Hadith shows the significance which Prophet (peace 
be upon him) attached to the administration of justice. Even an 
honest Qazi responsible for administration of justice, decides 
cases justly would be subjected to severe scruitiny by Allah-
ta'ala on the Day of Decision. Just imagine what would be the 
position of a Qazi when Allah-ta^ala subjects him to such an 
examinations of his deeds. A wish not to had decided a dispute 
even about a single 'date' shows the severity of the examination. 
This is in fact a limit of a person's wish. 
In another Hadith Hazrar Abu Hurera (r.a.) quoted 
Propeht (peace be upon him saying: 
^9S 
"A time would soon come when a person would wish that 
it would have been better if he had fallen from a star 
( } rather than taking upon the responsibility 
of deciding the disputes among the people". 
This Hadith also, reflects on the severe accountabity 
of Qazi on the -Day of Decision and the significance of 
administering of justice. Those who are responsible of 
administering justice would have no escape unless completely 
accounted for their deeds before Allah-ta'ala on the Day of 
Decision. 
These two Ahadith r_truely represent the spirit, 
significance, and importance islamic law attaches to the doing of 
justice. In fact, justice ( <—» is the first and the 
foremost principle. Quran has ordained us to observe this basic 
concept of justice throughout our lives. Though justice has its 
impact upon private and individual lives, however, its .~ain 
concern is social life in general. Whenever we enter into some 
relationship with others, the question of justice inevitally 
comes in. 
Under Islamic concept of justice, it visualises 
equality of all persons before law and refutes birth and descent, 
wealth and possessions, or colour and creed as claims to social 
distinction and special consideration. It is in these respects 
justice appears to be synonymous with equality. 
A balanced approach be adopted in determining the 
rights of the people and every one's due share should be 
conscientiously rendered to him. This is, in fact, the Islamic 
concept of justice. 
PLACE OF TRIAL 
The Ruler of the state will appoint a Qazi's court at a 
distance which a person may cover in a day on foot. Distance of 
a day includes going from and coming back to his house. 
Considerations before the ruler are: complainant and his 
witnesses should not cover long distances, mere snouia ce no 
inconvenience in approaching the courts. Easy access for seeking 
redress is the purpose behind. 
As to Mufti, th^ tiliiiMr o£ State should appoint him at a 
distance where salat-i-^Qastr (' becomes due, i.e. 
which a person may cover thft distance going from his house on 
foot within three days. In other words the distance from the 
house of the litigants should not be more than 48 miles. 
Thus the residence of the litigant (plaintiff) and his 
witnesses is a factor in determining the -iurisdiction of the 
Shariah court. The suit lies in the court within the 
jurisdiction of which they, reside, even if the defendant resides 
in, or the subject matter of the suit situated within the 
jurisdiction of another Qazi. Preference is to be given to the 
complainant's (plaintiff) residence because the complainant is 
the aggrieved party. 
If the complainant institutes a suit at a different 
court not satisfying the above requirements, his plaint or 
complaint may not be heard. 
Another factor to determine the jurisdiction is the 
powers of a Qazi contained in his letter of.appointment. Qazi's 
powers be limited to try only a particular class of cases, or to 
cover only specific area. 
I. Adab-ul-Qazi, p. 434. ( v / ' ^ V V^»^ ) 
Thus the complainant (plaintiff) should file his suit 
in a competent court having jurisdiction over the matter and the 
area. 
"Appointment of Qazi" 
Appointment of Qazi is a duty incumbent ( ) on 
mankind. It is because that administration of justice is also 
Ferz ( O ^ ) - a duty incumbent. 
Allah-ta'ala says: 
"0 David ( j>9>>^ ) \ We did indee,d make thee a 
vicegerent on earth : so judge thou between men in 
truth (and justice)". (38:26). 
Similarly Allah says to Prophet (peace be upon him): 
U6^ 
"Thus decide according to law, revealed by God". 
t* " 
Qada ( > i ^ ) means decide cases with justice among 
mankind and in accordance to God revealed laws. 
Institution of Qazi is most important and significant. 
Qazi is ornamental in the due discharge of justice to all 
irrespective of status, dignity, wealth, colour or caste. 
Administration of justice is the basic need of the society which 
Qazi honestly executes it. For controlling litigation, giving 
protection to poor and weak against the cruels and aggressors, to 
promote good and prevent evils, to control and prevent 
malpractices, for all this Qazi's services are required. 
Qazi is appointed by the King or Khalifa or President 
of a State. He must be a qualified and honest person, a 
deserving person who can perform the responsibility with honour 
and dignity. 
"QUALIFICATIONS" 
The authority of a iltxi-is not valid, unless he 
posseses the same qualificatiaia ' .- ' as required for a witness. 
The qualifications are: 
(1) Free man. 
(2) Sane person. 
(3) Adult. 
(4) A Musalman 
(5) Never convicted of Had-e-Qazaf (Not convicted of 
slander). 
(6) Capable to speak. 
(7) Capable to see. 
(8) Capable to hear, and 
(9) A Mujtabid (a learned scholar in Quran and 
Ahadith). 
Whoever possesses competency to be a witness is also 
competent to be a Qazi., and also, that the qualifications 
requisite to a witness are in the same manner requisite to a 
Qazi. 
Qazi must be a justman at the time of his appoinment. 
If afterwards, by taking bribes, proves himself an unjust man, he 
is not discharged by such conduct from his office, but he is. 
nevertheless, deserves ^initlsiion This is the 'doctrine of 
Zahir Rawayet.' 
However, tc Imam Shafi'i, an unjust man is incapable 
for the office of Qazi, in the same manner as he is incompetent 
to give evidence. 
It is related in the Nawadir, as an opinion of our 
three doctors, that an unjust man is incapable of discharging the 
duties of a Qazee. 
The appointment of an ignorant man to the office of 
Qazee is valid. Imam Shafi'e differs with this view. He argues 
that such appointment supposes a capability of issuing decrees 
and of deciding between right and wrong. These acts cannot be 
performed without knowledge. 
On the other hand it is argued that the Qazee "s 
business may be to pass decrees merely on the opinions of others. 
Moreover, he is to render to every subject his just right and 
this object is accomplished by passing decrees on the opinions of 
others. 
However, it does not mean that an unfit person be 
appointed. It is the responsibility of the sovereign to appoint 
a fit person, capable of discharging the duties and passing 
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decrees. He should also in a superlative degree just and 
virtuous. 
Prophet (peace be upon him) has said: 
"Whoever appoints a person to the discharge of any 
office, whilst there is another amongst his subjects 
more qualified for the same than the person so 
appointed, does surely commit an injury with respect to 
the rights of God, the Prophet (peace be upon him), and 
I 
the Musalmans". 
This Hadith makes it clear that the sovereign in 
appointing a person as Qazi has to take all precautions. He 
should appoint a qualified, learned person, a Mujtabid, having 
knowledge of Ahadith, Quran, and also of social customs and 
traditions as many laws are founded upon them. 
There is no impropriety in selecting for the office of 
Qazee a person who has a thorough confidance in his ability to 
discharge the duties assigned to him because the companions of 
the Prophet (peace be upon him) accepted this appointment; and 
also, because the acceptance of it is a duty incumbent on 
mankind. 
I. Hedaya, p. 615. 
Further, selection of an unfit person would be a cause 
of the propagation of evil. 
t 
It is also said that the acceptance of the office of 
Qazee without compulsion.is abnominable. As Prophet (peace be 
upon him) has said: 
"Vhoever is appointed Qazi suffers the same tortune 
with an "animal, whose throat is mangled, instead of 
being cut by a sharp knife." 
That is the reason that many of Prophet's (peace be 
upon him) companions used to decline to accept this appointment. 
In fact, the post of Qazi is full of responsibiliJ:ies. Any 
person not fit should not offer himself to accept it. Qazi's 
accountability in the next world is very great. 
WOMAN QAZI 
Can there be a women qazi? 
A woman can be appointed as Qazi, She can hear and 
decide cases. However, she is not competent to hear cases where 
the liability is covered either under Hud or Qasas. In Qasas and 
Hudud cases she is not competent and her decision would not be 
valid. (Adab-e-Qazi, p. 431). 
Uil 
"Invest^g^ti^n" 
In Saudi Arabia it is difficult to draw a line between 
investigation and enquiry. Police makes the investigation. 
Interrogation or the enquiry is aimed for establishing the 
suspicion, and preliminary enquiry or investigation for 
establishing the allegations. This preliminary investigation of 
crime before the trial is purely administrative in nature and is 
not subject to any form of judicial restrains. 
On a complaint to Qazi, he also makes enquiry into the 
case with a view to give cognizance to the suit. 
Practical difficulties are there. Judges often do not 
receive the minutes of police investigation. It was suggested in 
'Draft Law of the Judicial Authority, that the power of police to 
investigate crime should be with drawn and handed over to the 
prosecution. Instead of police the prosecution should conduct 
the investigation. Here we may notice that changing hands do«s 
not materially alter the position. Prosecution and police both 
are responsible for the trial of accused. Transfer of 
investigating power from one to other makes no change. It should 
remain vested with police. As to enquiry it should be the part 
of the court's power. The only thing is that police should 
forward the minutes expeditiously. 
AHTISAB 
Ahtisab is connected with Amar-bil-Maroof ( C^j/i/S), 
and Nahe-anil-Munkir ( i^^/cy-G^ ), that is, when people leave 
doing good deeds ( *—^Jr' ) ^^^ indulge in doing evil deeds 
Under such conditions, the Ruler of the State 
appoints 'MOHTASIB', an officer to check, control, and prevent 
spreading evils ( ) in the society, and promote goods 
and virtuous things ( *—*>^ ), it has relations with 
investigations also. 
Although to check, contol and prevent spreading evils 
in the society and promote virtuousness is the responsibility 
( ) of every Musliji, but in Islamic state a separate 
officer Mohtasib is made responsible to take care of all these 
matters. He is duty boun^ ( (Jy* ) to attend all 
complaints made to him. He should investigate prevalent evils in 
the society. He is also authorised, to take such measures 
necessary to eradicate the eviis. He may order the people to do 
goods deeds and follow the religious and righteous path, and 
prohibit them doing evil deeds ( ^^Hf(S^). 
Amar-bil-Maroof ( tjj'jtj^y/') ) are of three kinds: 
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(1) r^^i^J^ - (Haqooq-Allah) ; 
(2) P U ^ ' C X ^ " (Haqooq-ul-Ibad) ; 
(3) C^O^^ - (Common-Haqooq). 
Again Haqooq-Allah ( are divided into two 
categories: 
(1) Applicable to a group of people not less than 
forty in number, a congragation which is 
sufficient to perform ( c*^. 64i>^ ) Sala-te-
Juma'a. For example a group of people migrating 
from a place. 
(2) Matters connected with individuals, such as 
individual is indifferent in performing-( ^ ^i/i ) 
salat intime, delaying it intentionally. 
In these matters the Mohtasib may interfere and issue 
orders as deem necessary. 
Haqooq-ul-Ibad { >^ ^Oj^^ ) may also be classified 
under two heads: 
(1) OlsfylJ^ijy' - (Haqooq-ul-Ibad-Khas), and 
(2) / U j » U P V ^ ^ - (Haqooq-ul-Ibad-Aam. 
Haqooq-ul-Ibad-Khas ( C u > ^ l « ^ l o « ^ ^ " ® conncected 
with mutual dealings, rights and duties of individuals to each 
other in the society. If any person owes any material thing to 
another and that person has right or claim to take back that 
thing from him, the person concerned intentionally avoid or 
delays in the returning of that thing, the Mohtasib may order 
such person to return the thing so claimed. But this power is 
subject to one limitation that Mohtasib may order the returning 
only when the claimant specifically requests him. Without a 
demand from the claimant, Mohtasib cannot interfere. 
Cases relating to 'breach of trust' {o^i^iHaJ'VS') are 
also covered under this Head of Haqooq-ul-Ibad-Khas. But 
ailiyanat-ul-amanat case relatiang to Baitul-mal ( (jO'^*'^^^'^ ) and 
wakf "s { L 'a \j:i^ ) may be covered under Haqooq-ul-Ibad-Aam 
also. On breach of trust, if a demand is made to the Mohtasib 
for recovery of cJl^^-^-^ (trust), then he would order the 
violator for return of it. He cannot imprison the violator. 
That part is covered under the jurisdiction of regular court of 
Qazi. 
Haqooq-ul-Ibad-Aam ( C^'>\^Ux}^ ) are matters 
connected with the general welfare of the masses. For example 
supply of water in any river is effected due to any obstruction, 
and the masses are adversely effected by the shortage of water, 
then Mohtasib may take suitable and reasonable steps for removing 
sush obstructions. 
As to Mushtrak-Haqooq { O^'^y^ ) , such matters as 
arranging marriages of widow, if they so desire, ordering for the 
observance of Iddat ( Sjif' ), ordering peope not to take more 
labour from animal beyond their capacity or order to provide 
feeders to the animals as sufficient for satisfying their hungers 
are covered under this right. 
Nahi-Anil-Munkir ( means evil spreading 
in the society. It may be divided into three parts: 
(1) Evils connected with ^^Sojsr^ (Haqooq-Allah) ; 
(2) Evils connected with ^ \fJ*^C>^> (Haqooq-ul-
Ibad); and 
(3) Evils connented with Mushtarik { * — y ^ ^' 
Again evils connected with Haqooq-Allah are divided 
into: 
(1) Evils connected with the method of worship, 
effecting changes in Sunnah, etc., for example 
changing ( C)'j>3 ) Azan pattern, or not 
observing purity of cloths. Coming wearing impure 
cloths in the Mosque etc., Muhtasib may order them 
to make corrections. 
(2) Evil^ connected with ( ) doubts and false 
allegations about others, for axanpie doubting 
^7? 
upon the character of male and female talking in 
suspicious circustances or in privacy. Muhtasib 
may warn them in such condition because it may 
give rise to doubts and false allegations about 
their integrities. 
Under (^j^W^O^^ i^^oJ^ (Haqooq-Allah and 
haqooq-ul-Ibad in common) evil includes looking into neigbours 
houses, etc. 
There is one more category, that is, 
(Mun-ke-rat-Haqooq-ul-Nas, includes when a person constructs 
something in the neighbour's courtyard or put a slipper over the 
walls of his neighbour with out his permission. Muhtasib may 
prevent such construction but only when neighbour makes a 
complaint to him. He cannot take an initiative in such a matter 
on his own. 
In brief, it may be stated that powers vested in 
Muhtasib in cas«s of Ahtisab, that is, <—-^j^//^) (amar-bil-
Maroof, and ^y^ Uj^{p^ (Nahe-anil-Munkir) are very wide. 
Not only investigation of evils, but prevention and control of 
< 
evils are all included within his_4iower. In Saudi Arabia, where 
Shariah law is in force, there is no such designation as 
Muhtasib, but his powers are performed by different committees 
formed under the Royal Regulations, such as. Forgery Committee, 
Bribery Committed, Grievance Board, etc, etc. 
Under Islamic lav Kubtasib in enforcing his orders for 
preventing the evils may take the assitance of police also. But 
evil doers cannot be imprisoned by him. Such powers are vested 
in the courts only. 
"Securing the Appearance of. parties jn the Court i Islamic Law" 
Crimes are divided into two categories with regard to 
the procedure for bringing action before the Shariah courts. 
First, those which are tried only on a demand by a private 
claimant, and are therefore called crimes of private right or 
haqq-al-'abd. 
Secondly, those in which action can be brought by 
anyone, and therefore, are called crimes of the public right, or 
haqq-Allah. 
The claimant or complainant has to file a 
(petition) in the Shariah court. Thereafter the court must 
notifying if the action is of private right, and to inform the 
prosecution if the action is a public right. The person against 
whom allegations have been made is to be summoned on a fixed date 
before the court. 
If a person on receiving summons does not appear on the 
fixed date, it is to be presumed by the court that Us case 
is weak and the opponent's complaint has force in it. But if the 
summoned person gives reasons for his absence, those reasons must 
be taken into consideration. 
Hazrat Hasan reported that Rasool-Allah (peace be upon 
him) said: 
J ^^ ^ .^^ U ^ <UI J- ail J ^ j JiS :J15 Cf-^l CJ^ 
cruel person and he should not be given any ri^ht". 
It makes it clear that if a person is summoned by the 
court which he has received and does not comply with the court's 
order, fie forfeits all his rights. Prophet (peace be upon him) 
has called such a person cruel- No right be given to him if he 
makes any claim. 
In another hadith, narrated by Hazrat Abu-Musa-Ashari 
(r.a.) that Hazrat Ma'wia-bin-Abi-Sufian (r.a.) told to him that 
the procedure which Prophet (peace be upon him) adopted in cases 
where two persons came to him with a case or dispute, and any 
date fixed for hearing in consultation with them, and on that 
fixed date, one of them appeared and the other not, then Prophet 
(peace be upon him) used to decide the case or dispute in favour 
of the person appeared and against that person who did not 
appear". 
This also shows the signification of courts' summons. 
If any one does not appear, knowingly the date fixed for hearing, 
he loses his right. Prophet (peace be upon him) did decide the 
Aase against such an absentee. Islamic law does not favour 
delaying in delivering the judgement. It must be expedited 
unless there is a valid ground for delay in delivering the 
judgement. Thus appearance in the court when summoned is 
binding. 
"Arrest and Bail" 
In cases of complaint if the Shariah court is of the 
view that person be detained or arrrested, it may order to this 
effect. The accused may be taken into custody. But this is 
required only' in cases of serious nature, and where the 
possibility is that the person may abscond or would avoid 
attending proceedings in the court against him. If an accused is 
summoned, does not appear before the court on a fixed date for 
^*J{, 
hearing, the court may compell his apprearance. Warrant may be 
issude against him. Police may arrest and bring him before the 
court. 
Jurists justify the arrest of the accused on the basis 
of the following hadith: 
"Hazrat Abu Hurera (r.a) narrated that Prophet (peace 
be upon him) ordered a person accused of a crime to be 
detained in custody for one day and night with the 
purpose to know the reality of the fact and as a pre-
cautionary measure." 
But detention and arresst should be only on serious 
charge. In breach of trust cases, arrest and detention of an 
accused may be ordered only when the nature of the offence is 
serious. 
lilt 
In another Hadith Haarat Nehreen-Hakeem narrated that 
his father quoted his father (grand father) that: 
•'^ J h-j u^ r^^ ^ 
"Prophet (peace be upon him) detained a person, who was 
charged for an offence, in custody". 
Mulla Ali Qari making observations upon the hadith says 
that the person was detained either because he gave a false 
evidence or someone complained against him for the commission of 
crime or made a claim for debt against him. Prophet (peace be 
upon him) detained that person so that it might be ascertained 
whether there was any truth in the claim ( ) of the 
complainant. He was released because no proof could be given 
against him. For detaining a person in custody it is necessary 
that the court should take into consideration whether there is a 
possible prima facie case against him or not. In other words 
Mulla Ali Qari is of the view that an accused person is not to be 
arrested or detained in every case. It is necessary that there 
must exist the possiblity of a prima facie case against him. 
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Arrested person may be asked to furnish bail or 
KAFALIT. "It literally means junction. In the language of the 
law it signifies the junction of one person to another in 
relation to a claim-.' 
In other words the person who renders obligatory on 
himself the claim of another, whether it relates to person or 
property, is termed kafeel, or surety. Thus under Islamic law 
for release of a person from custody the accused be asked to 
furnish bail. If the possibility in breach of trust cases is 
that he would damage the trust property court may ask bail for 
securing the property also. 
It makes clear that bail may be of two descriptions: 
(1) Bail for the person, which is known as 'Hazir-
Zaminee', and 
(2) Bail for property, termed as Mal-Zaminee. 
It is all discretionary with the court to release a 
person on bail. If the circumstances warrant that he should not 
be released even on furnishing the sureties, the bail may be 
refused. Court may grant the bail or may not grant the bail, 
but it is not arbitrary with the judge. Decision either to grant 
bail or not to grant bail depends upon^e seriousness of the 
allegations and surrounding circumstances. Refusal to grant bail 
must be based on reasons. 
"TRIAL" 
During Caliph Hazrat 'Umar (r.a.), Farmans were issued 
to the governors for the guidance of Shariah courts. Once such 
Farman sent to Abu Musa Ashri, the governor of Kofa, reflects the 
interest the Caliph/taking in procedural matters of court trial. 
The purpose was that no one should suffer, and justice be done to 
all. Farman is noted below: 
"(1) The administration of justice is essential : Treat 
all men justly and on equal footing when' they 
appear before you in your court so that the weak 
may not be disappointed from justice and the well-
to-do may not hope to get any advantage from you; 
(2) The burden of proof is on the person who puts 
forward a claim and oath on the person who denies 
it; 
(3) Compromise is allowable provided it does not make 
a lawful thing illegal, and the illegal thing 
lawful; 
(4) A decision passed yesterday regarding a dispute 
may be revised on the next day so that you may 
arrive at a correct decision; 
(5) If there be any doubt on a point and no text 
or tradition is available, then ponder over it and 
again ponder over it and try to find out 
precedents, then try to solve it by ratiocination; 
(6) When a party desires to produce evidence, fix a 
date of hearing; 
(7) If he adduces proof, adjudge his rights in his 
favour, otherwise dismiss his claim; 
(8) All Muslims are competent witnesses amongst 
themselves except those who have suffered the 
punishment of Hadd or have been characterized as 
liers by the court, or whose clientage is 
doubtful." 
These were some of the preliminary instructions issued by 
the Caliph for guidance of the court. The law at the time was on 
initial stage. Since then Islamic jurisprucence and rules 
I. Shibli : "A-Faruq", Part II, pp. 49-50. 
relating to trial procedure have gone tremendous changes. We 
will examine some of the Rules governing trial procedure in next 
following paragraphs. 
"IHSTITOTION or SPITS IH SIARIM COHSI!! 
Institution of \suits"in Shariat court depends upon the 
nature of crime committed and the category under which it falls. 
Broadly speaking crimesfL/be covered either under Haqooq-Allah 
{ ^^}6^)' or Haqooq-ul-Ibad ( ^L^\0^ )> or 
Mushtareq-Haqooq ( ( J ^ - " - ^ / ^ ) . Again Haqooq-ul-Ibad (^IO>V3J^ ' 
are divided into: 
(1) Haqooq-ul-Ibad Khas ( (>l!'->i^Uj.^ ) and 
(2) Haqooq-ul-Abad-Aam ( (^ji^io^^'i-
Cases under Haqooq-ul-Ibad Khas or Jara'im-al-haqq-al-
Khas can be tried by the court of Qazi only on a demand by a 
private claimant. While in Haqooq-al-Ibad-Aam, action can be 
brought by anyone. These are crimes of public nature. 
Criminal breach of trust as referred earlier comes 
under private right, i.e. Haqooq-al-Ibad Khas as well aw Haqooq-
ulIbad-Aam. The procedure followed in institution of suit is 
simple. Plaint { iS:^> ) is filed by the complainant in the 
competent court of jurisdiction. In cases of Haqooq-ul-Ibad-Aam 
any person amy file a complaint. 
Breach of trust, under Islamic concept, is civil in 
nature. But it depends upon plaintiff, if he is interested to 
have criminal trial, then he is to move an application to this 
effect before the Qazi. As such there is no bar of criminal 
trial in breach of trust cases. 
The plaint ( 0-/-^ ), to be filed in Shariah 
court should fulfil the following requirements: 
(1) it'ifc*^(plaintiff), who files the suit, and 
^If'jt^ (defendant), against whom suit is filed, 
both should be major and of sound mind. A minor 
not having maturity of understanding cannot file a 
suit. Similarly, if plaintiff and defendant, both 
are minors with immature understanding 
capabilities or insane, there can be no suit filed 
against either of them. Even if under such 
conditions a suit is instituted against them, they 
are not bound to file written statementi' { 
) in their defence. The rule is that the written 
statements from the defendants is asked only when 
the plaint satisfies all procedural and pleading 
requirements. When plaint is itself, ib-initio 
defective and illegal, written statement of the 
defence cannot be asked to be filed. 
(2) Cause of plaint should be known, definite and 
ascertained. Without which it is difficult to 
produce witnesses and also to give the judgement. 
In cases of debt or financial claims, the gross-
sum or value of property, the nature of loss, and 
manner how loss caused should also be given in the 
plaint, then only 'Den ( tT-' ) ' may be 
determined. 
(3) If the issue relates to an immovable property, it 
must be mentioned in the plaint that the property 
in dispute is in the possession of the defendant 
( ii^ if>j/^ ) so that he may be made party to the 
suit. 
(4) The plaint should also include cause of action and 
redress be specifically demanded by the plaintiff, 
then only the claim can be determined. If he 
demands penal action, then court will take into 
coinsideration accordingly. 
(5) The plaintiff should demand redress in his own 
language unless some disability makes it 
impossible. 
(6) The plaint should be instituted in the court room 
itself and be submitted before in the presence of 
Qazi. Witness in support should also be presented 
before Qazi sitting in the court. 
(7) Hearing ot plaint ( iT/^ ), and proof there to 
can be only in the presence of the defendant. His 
presence is necessary. 
f 
(8) Plaint ( (jJ'^ ) relating to any matter 
previously decided by the Qazi, cannot be 
entertained again on the same issue. Matter 
should also not be pending in another court 
relating to the same subject matter. 
(9) Plaint relating to the subject matter which is 
humanly impossible to attain, for example a claim 
of a father about a boy as his son, who is older 
than the father, cannot be heard. 
(10) Plaint { ( S T ^ ) should also include names 
addresses of the plaintiff and defendant, and 
should be entered in the court register. Register 
should also have the date and names and addresses 
of the witnesses. 
/ 
The plaint ( /SJ'^) should fulfil the above 
requisites. if these requisits are absent then plaint would not 
be considered legally valid and sound, and would not be heard by 
the Qazi. Qazi on receiving the plaint orders to call the person 
against whom plaint is filed to appear before him and answer the 
allegations. The defendant is given full opportunity to prepare 
the defence and file the answer. With this simple procedure the 
trial begins. 
The same procedure is followed in Shariah courts of 
Saudi Arabia. Crimes are divided into two categories, public and 
private claims. Party effected under privais^claim is to file 
the suit while under public claim anyone can take action. 
Since the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
most crimes of the public right have been brought to court by the 
executive authorities. In Mecca, the vice royalty used to refer 
such crimes to court. In 1927, King Abdul Aziz objected to the 
way in which the grand Shatiah court of Mecca accepted cases 
without their first being referred to it by the vice royalty. 
He explained that the vice royalty could possibly have some 
information regarding the case in issue which no private person 
or other authority had. In 1928, the consultative council 
decided that the magistrate court must not hear criminal cases 
until they had been referred to it by the vice royalty. 
But the vice royalty was not the only authority which 
used to bring criminal actions of the public right before the 
ifB6 
courts in Mecca. The police used also to do so in crimes falling 
within the jurisdiction of a magistrate court, especially if they 
I 
were related to minor offences. 
When a crime is refered to the court by an executive 
authority, it must be handled by the appropriate public 
prosecutor, an authority which is competent to prosecute the 
defendant in a criminal case. 
If a private claimant brings an action and the court 
discovers that he himself has in some way participated in tthe 
crime, the court may take the initiative and try him, without 
asking the public prosecutor to handle the prosecution- But if 
the case is so complicated that it requires a preliminary 
investigation the court must refer it to the police, and after 
the investigation has been completed the public prosecutor may 
prosecute the accused. However, Shariah Judjes decline to look 
into any case unless they deem that they are able to do so with 
complete impartiality. 
As to cognizance of the charge, the court do not 
restrict the receivability of an action to -any formal measure. 
However, the acceptance of an action by the court is subject to 
three conditions: 
I. Statute of Directorate of Public Security, Articles - 8. 71. 
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(1) Tahrir i.e. stating the case adequately, 
(2) The accused must be s till alive, 
(3) The time prescribed for trying the charge has not 
lapsed. 
When the court gives cognizance to the charge, then it 
must immediately fix a date for the hearing. Hovever, adequate 
consideration to the conditions of defendant be given in fixing 
the date for hearing. The hearing may be postponed if the 
parties need long time than that already fixed to produce his 
evidence. 
The law of 1^52 Ck) also lavs down provisions relating 
to the dropping of a case if the claimant fails to appear the 
first session without a reasonable excuse. Case may be restored 
if the claimant moves the court for fixing hearing date again. 
Even if he does not appear, then case would be dismissed, and can 
be restored only on High order. The dropping of a case does not 
mean it's dismissal. 
'Charge" 
When the defendant appears in the court, the plaintiff 
or his advocate will explain the allegations to the defendant. 
Qazi also explains the allegations and ask the defendant to 
reply. if the defendant accepts the claim, Qazi will decide the 
case accordingly. If he denies the allegations, he will be given 
an opportunity to prepare the defence and reply the allegations. 
Bu£ifia 9l Proof 
The general rule about the burden of proof is that a 
person who alleges a fact must proof it. Thus it is the 
responsibility of a ( ) plaintiff or complainant that 
he should proof his allegations. 
( v--*j^0^t-jyil> ) Hazrat Umar bin Shoeeb quotes his 
father, and father quotes his father Hazrat Abdul bin Umar bin 
Aas (r.a.) ( 0<^dijO^^^^JlP-) that Prophet (peace upon him) 
during his address ( said: 
"Responsibility of burden of proof is on plaintiff, 
and Oath is on defendant". (Tirmizi - P. 280, Vol II). 
jc c ^ i 1^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 4jb ail J - <ui j^j J ^u ^j ^ 
|.UI JAI ^ loA J^ J*ai j c e - Cr-* • ^ J - ' 'J* ^r^ 15*-^ ' 
^ j l l Jp - ^ 1 J ^ ^ j ^ j U^ <UI J - ^ 1 ^U- l Or-
(^ Aj^ -ill liaJ ^ YA* _^;. «^jA JJL. ^ ^1.>JI ^ L . ) 
Hazrat Abdullah bin Abbas narrated that Prophet (peace 
be upon him) said: 
"Oath taking is on Defendant". 
He further says that it is a correct hadith that it 
has been in practice among the followers of Prophet 
(peace be upon him) and all other learned scholars that 'burden 
of proof is on plaintiff and "oath is upon defendant'. 
These words that 'burden of proof 'is on plaintiff and 
'oath on defendant' have been repeatedly used in Ahadith and have 
no doubt about it's correctness. 
Men is greedy by nature. If the courts start giving 
whatever is claimed without proof, there would be chaotic 
conditions. Therefore, allegatiaons and claims are subject to 
limitations. Complainant must proof beyond reasonable doubt his 
allegations. If the plaintiff or complainant has no proof than 
the matter would be decided on the oath of the defendant. , Oath 
taking is only when the complainant has no proof in support of 
his allegations and demands oath be given to the defendant. 
JUi ^ j <JU <UI J- <JUI JJ-.J JI l^ 0- i>JJ ic^^j^ 
JUi -^^ ^^ ^j\ J . ^ I I . o' <^ ' J-^-J^ •  e r - -^ ' 
^^1 JUi - J * t4-i <l ^ <\^yj\ ^x; ^ ^j\ ^ x^^\ 
-4L^ ai i :JU -i :J13 Sli- Jyi '^^J'i^^ ^ j <JL ilJI J -
^ ^ j ^ ^ .Uk L JLj ^ . ^ U <;! 1<UI J ^ j L JU 
.dLli -ill 4JU JU ^ ^ JUi - j ^ 
We may refer here a hadith, where two persons, one 
belonging to Haz-re-Mot, and another resident of Kunda, 
approached the Prophet (peace be upon him) and person belong to 
Haz-re-Mot told to Prophet that : "the other one along with him 
has forcibly taken his land from him. Person belonged to Kunda 
denied the allegation and said to Prophet (peace be upon hio) 
that land belonged to him and he was cultivating. The Hazrani 
had no right in the land. Then Prophet (peace be upon him) asked 
Hazrani, "Do you have any proof about the land!". 
Hazrani replied "No". Then Prophet (peace be upon him) 
told him: 
"Then you can ask defendant to take oath". 
Hazrani replied to Prophet (peace be upon him) that 
'Kundi is a bad character person. He has no regard for his 
statements. Taking oath is immaterial for him. He is not afraid 
of God also. He never hesitates doing anything". The Prophet 
(peace be upon him) said: 
"Whatever may be, you have the only right to take oath 
from him"^ 
This Hadith makes it clear that if the complainant has 
no proof in support of his allegations than on the oath of 
defendant case will be decided. It is not of significance that 
the possibility is that defendant may take a false oath. Only 
the oath of defendant under such circumstances would determine 
the suit. 
A similar Hadith has been narrated by Hazrat Abu Hurera 
(r.a.). He narrated that Prophet (peace upon him) said: 
:jii jjLj <ju ail J - ail j ^ j o' ' "'jtj^ d^^ o* 
"Burden of proof is on person who makes the claim, and 
oath taking is the responsibility of a person who 
denies such a claim. But « 1/* l^J (Qasamat) is free 
from it". 
(Qasamat) is a kind of (forming 
opinion on analogy). It is free from this general law. 
(Qasamat) applies only in situations when other strong proofs are 
absent. Thus Qasamat is different from the rule of burden of 
proof. 
These Ahadith make it abundantly clear that 'Burden of 
Proof is on the complainant. He is to prove it and then court 
would determine the liability of the accused. 
In Pakistan Islamic Law of Evidence has been codified. 
This general rule relating to burden of proof has been 
I 
incorporated in section 81. It reads as: 
The burden of proof shall rest with the person who 
asserts a right and desires a court to give judgement 
in his favour in respect of that right". 
As to oath taking from the defendant or refusal to 
take oath, and their effect on the proceeding has been 
elaborated in Chapter 12, of Draft Ordinance Islamic Law of 
Evidence. 
Section 56, explains oath taking or refusal of oath 
taking by the defendant as follows: 
"If the plaintiff ( fails to proove his claim 
the defendant shall, subject to demand by the plaintiff 
be given oath, and if the defendant denies on oath the 
claim of the plaintiff shall be dismissed". 
When the complainant fails to prove the allegations 
than he may demand an oath be given to the defendant. Thus oath 
taking is subject to the demand made by the plaintiff. If the 
defendant takes the oath on his own, it would not be covered 
under this section. Once oath taken by the defendant on demand 
by the complainant and he denies the allegation, complainant's 
case would be dismissed. 
Procedure of oath taking is further elaborated under 
the explanation attached to the section. 
Explanation Elaborates 
"Oath may be demanded in every such case where oath or 
refusal to take oath can be made basis of decision". 
Exception to the explanation when oath cannot be 
demanded. 
Exceptions 
(1) "Oath cannot be demanded in case liable to Hadd 
except in the case of Sariqah ( <^J'-^ - theft) 
where it can be demanded to make a decision in 
respect of property stolen on the basis of refusal 
to take oath". 
Mode of taking oath is given in clause (2). It 
says: 
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(2) "Oath shall be given in the name of Allah or 
attributive names of Allah, such as one should say 
"Wallah, Billah, Tallah or Birrahmanirrahim 
In administering oath under clause (2), no 
discrimination is to be made on the basis of religion. Same 
method of oath taking is to be applied to Muslim and non-Muslim 
alike. 
Explanation I reads : 
"The method provided in sub-section (2) above shall be 
adopted in all cases whether the party is a Muslim or 
non-Muslim". 
The court keeping in view the nature of the case and 
circumstances if considers proper and also in order to put force 
in oath, may take the oath at a specific time which Muslims 
consider sacred, and at a sacred place also. Similarly the 
court may ask the defendant to take oath by putting hand on 
Quran-e-Majid. 
Explanation II elaborates as: 
"The court, if it deems fit and the nature and 
circumstances of the case demand, may, in order to put 
force in oath, take oath from Muslim at sacred time 
like that of 'asr ( > ^ _ ) or at a sacred place (like a 
Mosque), and likewise a Muslim may be made to take oath 
putting his hand on the Quran-e-Majid and a non-Muslim 
on his sacred book". 
Clause (B), explains persons who are competent to 
demand oath on behalf of the plaintiff or complainant, and 
persons who cannot be subjected to oath. It reads: 
(3) "The demand for oath may be made by a 
representative of a party but he, in his 
representation capacity, cannot be subjected to 
oath (yamin)". 
This point has been further clarified under the 
explanation. 
Explanation: 
"The vakeel ( ^J^-'- Agent) of a plaintiff ^^a.^ 
demand oath from the defendant { r v ^ i ^ V ) but in 
place of defendant his vakeel or representation shall 
neither take oath nor have the authority to refuse it". 
The effect of refusal to take oath are given in section 
60 as: 
"In cases relating to au'amlat ( il>U^{^ ) dealings if 
the party, from whom oath has been demanded by the 
court, clearly refuses to take oath or remains silent 
without due excuse, the court shall dicide the case 
against him on the basis of his refusal to take oath, 
and he shall have no option to take oath afterwards". 
Silence due to natural disability would not amount to 
refusal. In such a case court will resort to other means of 
ascertaining the intention of the defendant. Explanation I below 
makes it clear. 
Explanation I: 
If the defendant remains silent due to his being deaf^T 
dumb, his silence shall not be regarded as refusal to 
take oath unless the court is satisfied by resorting to 
other means such as writing etc. that the defendant 
does not want to take.oath. 
In oath taking court has to warn the defendant of 
consequences of his refusal to take oath. This warning is to be 
given thrice repeatedly. Even after explaining the consequences 
of his refusal and repeated warnings' if he adheres to his refusal 
to take oath, the court would decide the case against him. 
Explanation II given below makes the point clear. 
Explanation II: 
"The party concerned be warned by the court thrice and 
each time informed of the consequences which may arise 
from his refusal to take oath, but if he, inspite of 
all this, persists in his refusal, the matter shall be 
decided against him". 
Section 63 deals with oath in cases of Tazeer : "The 
accused shall on demand by the complainant, be given oath when no 
proof is available in a case liable to Tazeer, and if he refuses 
to take oath shall be liable to Tazeer. 
Provided that no oath shall be given in cases where 
Tazeer is imposed as a 'haqqul-ul-Allah ( i^^^Ojr^ the right of 
Allah). 
Criminal breach of trust cases would be covered under 
section 63, because in such cases the punishment awarded is 
Tazeer. Further breach of trust is covered under 
(Haqqul-ul-Ibad Khas). 
It has also been made clear under section 58 that oath 
is to be given by court. 'The oath shall be given by the court. 
If the defendant ( x*^(fy) on demand by the plaintiff took 
oath on his own accord, before it was asked by the court, it 
shall not be valid, and he shall be given oath again by the 
court'. 
The established rule according-to Hedaya is that the 
right of demanding an oath from the defendant rests upon the 
lack of evidence on the part of the plaintiff. To a Western 
trained lawyer, this law may be strange and unique in nature, or 
unusual or harsh. A law may be unusual or harsh, but the law is 
law. Further it should be kept in mind that Islamic law is not 
separate from one's faith or religion. Under Islamic law the 
presumption is that no Muslim would tell lie upon oath by putting 
hand on'Quran or swearing in Allah's name. To a Muslim lying 
under oath is considered to be the most serious sin which a man 
may commit. If the defendant on demand takes the oath, the 
complaint's case is dismissed. 
Here we may discuss a situation which may arise during 
litigation that after the complaint made, it is the 
responsibility of the complainant to prove the allegations. 
Suppose he produces one witness only whereas the requirement 
under Islamic law is that there should be two male witness or one 
male and two female witnesses be produced in support. Qazi asks 
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the complainant to produce -the other witness also. The 
complainant regrets his inability to produce the second witness. 
Question is : Can he demand an oath to be taken from the 
defendant? 
Answer is : "According to Shafi-i, Maliki and Hambali 
schools of law, "If the plaintiff has only one witness, he may 
complete his evidence by taking an oath". 
"According to Hanafi School of law and some Muslim 
jurists, the court in its discretion, may disregard the testimony 
of the witness, and instead may require the defendant_to_iak6 an 
I 
oath". 
It seems that in case whe witness 
in support of allegation, then the alternative is that the 
complainant may be given an opportunity to demand the oath to be 
given the defendant. 
Those who are accustomed to the common law system, this 
simple procedure of proof makes them surprise. Here we may refer 
a trial in which an American was made accused and the plaintiff 
presented only one witness before the Qazi. 
I. Fiqh-al-Sunnah by Sayeed Sadiq : Vide, Article : 'The 
Shariah Court : Their Relation to the Development of Islamic 
Law in the Philippines', - by Judge Corocoy D. Mason' p. 81. 
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Qazi says to the plaintiff: 
"To prove your claim under our law (Islamic Law), you 
are required to produce two witnesses to testify to the 
truth of your complaint. You have presented only one 
witness. Do you have the second one too?". 
The complainant said he had not. "Then you have one 
right left to you," the Qazi said, "You may demand the oath". 
"I demand the oath", said the complainant. 
The accused then turned to the ARAMCO lawyer 
representing him and whispered. 
"What is oath". 
The lawyer hesitated, wondering if, in just a few 
seconds, he could adequately explain this ancient, solemn 
cornerstone of the Shariah law. 
"It is like this". He said finally ; "To a Muslim 
lying under oath is one of the most serious sins that a man can 
commit. So, he is asking you to swear that you are innocent, if 
you do not take oath you will be immediately found guilty. But 
if you do so, it will be the truth". 
The defendant quickly decided, "I will take the oath", 
he said. A moment later, in English, he repeated after the Qazi 
the oath orescribed for Christians: 
"I in the name of God who gave Jesus, son of 
Herry, the Holy Bible and, with His Will, cured the 
sick, the leper and the deaf, swear that I did not kick 
(complainant's name) in the right leg nor did I call 
him 'son of a bastard". 
As soon as he finished the oath the American was 
adjudged not guilty and released - freed by an unusual aspect of 
an unusual system of law, the noble Shariah, a Code of Law that 
I 
has guided Muslim courts for 1300 years". 
In Saudi Arabia, Shariah courts are following this 
rule. It can be said that the burden of proof with regard to a 
particular fact lies on the party who alleges the fact. The 
party on whom lies the burden of proof of the issue has the right 
to begin; that is to say makes the opening speech and renders his 
evidence first. The proof here has to be evidence introduced to 
make out a prima facie case. The plaintiff or the complainant 
must render the minimum evidence sufficient to prove his 
allegations. 
I. Supra N, p. 
Burden of proof on defence may be lighter especially in 
regard to Hudud. The person who alleges has more responsibility. 
Burden of proof is heavy upon him. He is to proof the 
allegations beyong reasonable doubts. 
The burden of proof can be dispensed with in cases 
where the respondent or the accused makes a confession or by a 
presumption. In cases where the defendant denies the 
allegations, then the burden of proof to refute the charges, and 
establish his innocence, and legal inability to commit crime 
would be upon him. But this burden, as said earlier, in 
comparison to the responsibility of the complainant or plaintiff 
is lighter in the sense that he is suppose to create a doubt 
about the truthfulness of the allegations. If he succeeds to 
create doubt in the mind of the judge, benefit will go to him. 
Under English law evidence are categorised under two 
categories: 
(1) Evidences as means of proof; and 
(2) Evidence as not means of proof. 
This categorisation is not recognized under the Shariah 
law applied in Saudi Arabia. Law sometines recognizes the 
evidence which is a means of proof and evidence which is not so 
under one category. Example may be given of real evidence which 
comes under the evidence of presumptions. Further, under Saudi 
Arabia law relating to formal confession as means of proof and 
informal confession as not means of confession are treated on 
equal footing. 
"Confession" 
The Islamic law method of proof includes three things: 
(1) *ir^0*1/ - Qarain-e-Qat'iyyah -
Irrebulattable presumptions. 
(2) Oath or refusal to take oath; and 
(3) Iqrar ( ^Ir' ) Confession of Admission. 
The first, Qara-in-e-Qatijfyah relates to such 
inferences as are inferred from the circumstances reaching the 
degree of certainty. Example can be given where a man agitated 
with fear comes out of a vacant house with a blood stained dagger 
in his hand. Soon after, the dead body of a man, who is 
recently killed, is found in that house. Here from the facts and 
circumstances as above noted a strong presumption to the degree 
of certainty may be infered that the person thus came out was 
the killer of the deceased. 
!Ct» 
As to the second method of taking oath or refusal to 
take oath ire have already made necessary references in the 
earlier paragraphs. It measn that if the plaintiff ( o < ^ ) 
fails to prove his claim, the defendant shall, subject to the 
demand by the plaintiff, be given an oath and if the defendant 
denies on oath, the claim of the plaintiff, shall be dismissed. 
Oath can be demanded in every case where oath or refusal to take 
oath can be made basis of decision. 
The third method of proof is ( 'V ) iqrar 
(confession). 
Before giving the details about the confession we will 
refer some Quranic verses here to show the significance of 
testimony. If a person is a witness to a fact when invited to 
narrate the incidence he should tell the truth, it is obligatory 
on him and should not conceal anything. Allah commands: 
(TAT :t.I . ijJUl Ijj^) 
"The witnesses should not refuse - when they are called 
on (For evidence) (2:282). 
Thus Allah makes it obligatory on witness not to refuse 
to tell whatever they know about any particular fact. 
Again Allah says: 
(TAT tXA i SjlJI *j^) 
"Conceal not evidence for whoever conceal it. His heart 
is tainted with sin. And Allah knoweth all that ye 
do". (2:283). 
Thus to Allah-ta'ala whoever conceals the testimony 
knowingly he is a sinner. Allah makes it obligatory to give the 
testimony if you know the facts of a case. Confession is one 
such testimony upon which the decision depends. 
In Hedaya it has been explained that it is incumbent 
upon witnesses to bear the testimony, nor is it lawful forthem to ' 
conceal it, when the party concerned demands it from them. The 
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requisition of the party, however, is a condition; because the 
delivery of testimony is the right of the party, and therefore 
rests upon his requisition of it, as is the case with all other 
rights. 
Confession is most significant because on the basis 
this testimony the judje is to pronounce the judgement. After 
confession it is essential on the judge to give decision. It is 
infered from Hadith noted below: 
Prophet (peace be upon him) says: 
"Anees go to this woman. If she makes confession of 
her guilt, execute /^> (rajam) on her". 
From this Hadith it is made clear that confession will 
be the basis of judgement. Judge is under obligation to give 
his decision. 
Confession is defined as: 
"Giving of information by a person that he is under 
some obligation to another person in respect of some 
right". 
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"The person making confession (admission) is called 
Muqirr ( ^ ^ ) whose right is admitted is called 
Muqirr lahu ( r y ^ >' ^'^^ the right which is 
admitted is called Muqirr-bihi ( C/^ )" 
"The saying of a Muqirr that Zaid owes nothing to him, 
or that he has absolved him of his debt, or right, or 
that he has relinquished his right, or that he has 
discarded his right, fall under the definition of Iqrar 
I 
(confession)". 
Valid lorar 
Under the following conditions confession would be 
valid -
(1) The person who makes the confession should be of 
sound mind; 
(2) Person should be adult; and 
(3) Independant or Free person. 
If a confession is made by an infant, not capable to 
judge things rightly or wrongly, such a confession would be 
illegal. Similarly confession made by insane is also not valid. 
I. Section 64, Draft Ordinance, Islamic Law of Evidence of 
Pakistan, 1982. 
Prophet (peace be upon him) says: Three persons are 
not competent to make confession. They are: 
(1) An infant till he becomes major or adult; 
(2) k person sleeping, till he is not awaken; and 
(3) C A J ^ (unconscious or insane) till gets into 
senses or gains consciousness. 
Thus insane person or person who is unconscious or 
sleeping, when gains consciousness then can be competent to make 
confession otherwise not. 
If an infant reaching near toe adulthood makes a 
confession and at the time of confession claims to be adult also, 
then his confession would be admissible. Muqirr-lahu ( c*/*^ ) ' 
whose right is admitted, would give proof of his adulthood. The 
person who makes the confession under a situation would not be 
governed oath because it has already been declared as minor. 
Section 65 of Pakistan Islamic Law of Evidence lays 
down the following condition for a valid confession: 
Clause (1) : "Iqrar must be made by a person who is 
Aqil and Baligh" 
Exception : "A minor who has been authorised by his 
wali ( O ^ ) or guardian to carry on 
business and deal with people shall be 
regarded an adult for the purpose of 
this section and an Iqrar ( ) made 
by him shall be accepted as valid." 
Conditions validating Iqrar confession have further 
been elaborated by three explanations attached to the section. 
Explanation I says: 
"Iqrar made by such a minor who has been authorised to 
do business and deal with people shall be treated like 
that of an adult in respect of matters relating to 
business and dealing such as Dain ( (S-^ debt), 
Amanat («.^t^ ' ), Ariah ( r^-^^ ) , Muzarabah 
( r'^i^ ), and Ghasb ( t_.-^ ) etc." 
Explanation II lays down that matters not connected 
with trade and business such as dower, offences liable to fine 
and security matters, a minor's confession would not be valid 
even if the minor has been authorised to make such confession by 
his guardian. 
Explanation II says: 
"In matters not relating to trade and dealings, such as 
aahr ( y)^ Dower), Jinayat { cJl> I / > ) - offences 
liable to fine) and Kifalah ( ^ A : ^ security) 
Iqrar made by a miAor ishall not be accepted even if so 
authorised by his WAli"> 
Explanation third declares that an Iqrar by a minor, 
lunatic or insane, and by a guardian against the interest of his 
i^-tkOT "«^T4' sli^ l.'L "ikOt. b% ^^ kli.^  ^^ C9jaa/it. Iw. %4<!Li.t,t.%d.. 
Under clauses (2), (3) and (4), it further lays down 
that for ( <\/'^ ) Muqirr^lahu it is not a condition that he 
should also be adult and sane* Coercion is another ground which 
makes confession in admissible. An Iqrar of a person who is 
under the influence of intoxication would not be valid in cases 
where liability is under Hudud. 
Explanation III -
"Iqrar made by a mipor or a lunatic or an insane person 
shall not be admissible, and if the Wali or guardian of 
such persons makes an Iqrar which is adverse to the 
interests of such persons, such an Iqrar also shall not 
be admissible. 
Clause (2) : "BeiAg 'Aqil' { (/^^ sane) and 
Bali^h ( Z^ \/ adult) is not a 
condition for Muqirr lahu { '^/ ) . 
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Clause (2) Iqrar made under coercion shall not be 
admissible. 
Clause (3) : "Iqrar made under the influence of 
intoxication shall not be admissible in 
cases liable to hudud". 
Thus a person who makes the confession satisfies the 
above requisites, his confession would be valid and admisssible 
in evidence. Judge is to pronounce judgement on such a 
confession. 
In Saudi Arabia confession (or admission) is divided 
into two classes: 
(1) Formal confession, and 
(2) Informal confession. 
Formal confession is one which is made before the trial 
court. Whereas informal confession is usually made out side the 
court. The later one must be proved in the same way as a fact is 
proved in the court. 'It is not considered a hearsy evidence. 
It is considered a confession, when proved as conclusive as the 
I 
formal one is. 
I. Al-Mughni, Vol. XII, pp. 87-88. 
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"Requisites of, a Valid Confession" 
In Saudi Arabia formal or informal confessions are to 
be made only by a party, or his representative subject to the 
condition that lav permits such a representation. 
Confession made must be by a sane person so that it may 
I 
have an effect on him. 
In cases where a party or his relatives, claim that 
the person is not mentally sound, court takes necessary steps to 
enquire about and if claim is found correct, it does not accept 
II 
as evidence. Court may reject the claim also if it believes 
that there is reasonable ground not to recieve the confession. 
The confession made about a crime outside the court 
under a sudden shock is also admissible although he may claim 
III 
that he was not aware what he said due to sudden shock. 
Attainment of age of majority for making confession is 
another requirement, that is, when a person attains puberty. 
Under Islamic law fifteen year is supposed to be the age of 
I. Al-Yamani V. Al-Zahrani, G.S.C. (M), R. of 1381 (1961-62) 
Vol. II, p. 9. 
II. PP V. ai-Yami, P.J., D. No. 447 of 1360 (1941). 
III. Al-Subay 'I V. Al-Subay' !, G.S.C. (R), S. No. 169/1 of 
1388 (1969). 
majority. In proceedings regarding Tazeer, the confession of a 
mume3fyiz, i.e. minor who knows reasonably the consequence of his 
action, may be admitted in the Shariah courts of Saudi Arabia. 
Ability to speak is another ground to determine the 
validity of confession. Confession by a dumb person is 
controversial. In Tazeer and Hudud, jurists differ on the 
admissiblity of such a confession. However, in Saudi Arabia an 
admission of a dumb person by signs is not valid, except in 
Tazeer. 
In Shariah court confession of an unconscious person 
has no evidential value at all. Ilustrative cases may cover : 
statements made during sleep or unconsciousness, or under the 
effect of anaesthetics or drugs, would be not admissible in 
evidence. 
Confession must be made by a party voluntarily. There 
should not be any inducement, threat or compulsion. It must be 
made freely. Judges are very cautious about statements made 
voluntarily. Unless inducement is proved out of question then 
only they act upon. There should not be any extortion. 
Confession must be express. A statement which falls 
short of a plain acknowledgement of a fact is not to be attached 
any weightage. Saudi Arabian law also does not recognize implied 
I 
confessions. 
In cases where the confession does not appear to be 
completely consistent with the fact in issue, the court on 
grounds of doubts or suspicion will not receive it as valid 
confession. 
If a confession is made to the police, while in police 
custody, in such a case police will immediately take him to the 
nearest Shariah Court where his statement of confession will be 
recorded. If the arrested person makes the confession not 
during court working hours, he is to be detained in custody alone 
not with other arrested persons. The next morning he is to be 
produced before the court for recording his statement. He is 
kept alone because if mixed with other persons then possibility 
is that others may persuade him not to confess his guilt. 
Generally recording of cofession before the Shariah court is in 
II 
cases of serious crimes covered under Hudud and Qisas. 
Statement may be recorded by any court. It is not 
necessary that it should be recorded in the trial court. if 
recorded in any court the trial court will receive it during the 
trial. 
I. Al-Amudi V. Bakarim,C.C., D. No. 12 of 1325 (1933) 
II. L. of Saud to Faisal No. 713 of 18/1/1373 (1953). 
&s a caution the court is to ascertain whether the 
statement of confession made outside was voluntary and duly made 
on his own. Further where there is no way invalidating the 
confession, the court has to be absolutely sure, and to satisfy 
its conscience that the confession is an authentic one. 
Apart from cases covered under Hudud, the confession in 
majority of cases even made outside the court are admissible in 
evidence. In such 'extra-judicial confession' the procedure 
followed is that such statements are to be collaborated by 
witnesses. In other words so long as confessions are proved by 
the witnesses, they would not be admissible. Generally, 
confessions made to police during its custody are denied in the 
court. When trial commences, the police officer before whom the 
confession was made, would appear before the court as witness. 
He would give his evidence that the accused made confession 
before him. If the court is satisfied with the truth of the 
police officer's evidence, it would accept the confession. 
Likewise confessions made to ordinary persons are to be treated 
in the same manner. 
In Hudud cases the accused may also retract his 
confession. Even the judge may hint to the confessor to recall 
I 
his confession. Ahmad b. Hanbal is one the supporter of this 
view. other jurists are of the opinion that it is not only 
Al-Mughni, Vol. X, p. 294. 
unobjectionable for a judge to make a hint recalling the 
confession, but it is preferable. Jurists give the Badith in 
the support that Prophet (peace be upon him), himself warded a 
man off several times when he was making confession before him 
that he had committed 'Zina' ( * ' - > ) ; that the Prophet (peace 
be upon him) hinted for the man to retract his confession as 
follows: 
"Perhaps you just touched"; 
That Prophet (peace be upon him) said to a thief who 
had confessed: 
"I do not imagine that you have done so". 
On the basis these Ahadith , later Caliphs Hazrat Umar 
(r.a.) and Hazrat Ali (r.a.) followed this practice. 
Hanbali law does not concretely prefer or reject the 
allusion, the judges in Saudi Arabia are left to use their own 
discretion as to this matter. In judicial practice this rule of 
allusion to retract confussion is,limited to Hudud of Zina ( ^ i^ ) 
and theft. 
Retraction or calling back the confession is not by 
words but it may be infered from the conduct of the accused 
5-/5 
also. An accused who intends to flee when he is being prepared 
for the execution of his sentence or after he has recieved part 
of the sentence, is to be regarded as having retracted his 
confession. 
If the convicted person recalls his confession before 
the punishment is implemented, the punishment should not be 
enforced and the person must be committed back to the trial court 
to consider his retraction. 
In cases of crime of Hudud where the accused retracts 
his confession, the crime may be commuted into a crime of Tazeer, 
and the retracted confession may then be admissible. The reason 
is that the rule of retraction of confession does not apply to 
Tazeer. As the breach of trust cases are covered under Tazeer, 
hence any confession made in such a case would not be retracable. 
In Tazeer cases repetition of confession for its 
admissibility is not required. Confession may be admissible when 
it is made even once only, except where it is in regard to the 
hudud of Zina, theft and highway robbery. 
EYIDEWCE 
Abundant literature on Shahadah ( '^^W^ Evidence) 
is available. Jurists belonging to all prominent schools of 
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Islamic law have made their observations and comments on 
evidential law. Even to refer summarily is difficult. The 
purpose refering Islamic lav on (Shahadah) evidence here is to 
acquaint with the preliminary part of it only. A brief statement 
on significance, quantum of evidence, its basic requirements and 
order of examination of witness has been refered here. 
Shahadah ( tf>t^»-*^ ) means to give true information 
for the purpose of proving any right or fact, in or before a 
court. Such an information should be recorded in the presence of 
both the litigant parties or their legal representatives. The 
procedure is that the witness should utter a word "ASHHADU" 
( ^i/<^) ) or use any synonymous expression. 
The significance lies in the fact that it must be a 
just and honest information. Justice is Allah's attribute, and 
to stand firm for justice is to be a witness to Allah, even if it 
is detrimental to our interest (as we conceive them) or the 
interest of those who are near and dear to us. 
Allah-ta'ala says: 
SU-O 
^ 1 j ^ ^j uj *\^ iwXJii ot-y ^y^ '>•' oi"^ » ^^ 
"0 ye who believe! Stand out firmly for justice, as 
witnesses to Allah, even as against yourselves, or your 
parents, or you kin, and whether it be (against) rich 
or poor. For Allah can best protect both. Follow not 
the lusts (of your hearts), lest ye swerve, and if ye 
distort (justice) or decline to do justice, verily, 
Allah is well aquainted with all that he do". (4:135). 
This verse shows the significance of Shahadah 
(evidence) in relation to Islamic concept of justice. Justice in 
Islam is even more penetrative than the subtler justice in the 
speculations of the other human laws. It searches out the 
innermost motives, because a witness is to act in the presence of 
Allah, to whom all things, acts and motives are known. Some 
people may be inclined to favour the rich, because they expect 
something from them. Some people may be inclined to favour the 
poor because they are generally helpless. For a witness 
partiality in either case is wrong. Allah commands : Be just 
without fear or favour. 
In another verse Allah again commands: 
^ <UI ,^ 1 ail l ^ l j ^^jiilJ ^^1 jx l^j*l l^j-:VI J * |.y 
(A : o I «SJiUI * j ^ ) 
"0 ye who believe! Stand out firmly for Allah, as 
witnesses. To fair dealing, and let not the hatred of 
others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from 
justice. Be just : that is next to piety : and fear 
Allah. For Allah is well-acquainted with all that ye 
do". (5:8) 
^ 2 2-
For a witness to do justice and act righteously in a 
favourable or neutral atmosphere is meritorious enough. However, 
real test comes when he has to do justice to people who hate him 
or to whom he has an aversion. In all situations the witness 
must be just, honest and firm. 
Allah in another verse again commands: 
• 0 ^ ^ ^H^ ^ Oi^^J 'OJ^J j^ -H^ J | 4 ^ "^  (^ Oi-^h 
(TT-TO :ol igjUl Sj^) 
"And those who respect their trusts and covenants, and 
those who stand firm in their testimonies, and those 
who (strictly) guard their worship; such will be the 
honoured one in the garden (of Bliss)." (70:32-35) 
If a person knows any truth of any kind, to that he 
must bear witness, as affecting the lives or interests of our 
fellow-beings; - firmly, not half-heartedly, without fear or 
favour, even if it causes loss or trouble to him, or if it loses 
his friends or associates. 
^>3 
These verses show the significance of evidence in 
social dealings. A witness must adhere to truth. He should be 
just, honest, firm and impartial in telling the truth. Allah 
will reward for his just acts. 
"Quantum oi Evidence ^ i ^-^UiA_ai^ I 
As to quantum of evidence we will refer the codified 
Islamic law of Evidence of Pakistan. In criminal cases different 
(d^U^K^i^ ) quantum of evidence is required. 
According to section 4, the offence of Zina where the 
accused is liable to hadd ( AP ) , four male witnesses are 
required. if the number is less than four there would be no 
conviction. 
The eye-witnesses may be non-Huslims who are credible 
according to their own religion or faith. 
The offence of Zina liable to hadd may also be proved 
by the confession of the accused before a court of competent 
jusrisdiction provided that all the requirements of valid { ) 
confession are satisfied. 
According to section 5, in other offences, such as { 
theft, Harabah {^fi^/) Qazf ( <—^jJ) Shurbe-Khamr 
^^^y^'^' Qasas ( < / U ; ) evidence of two male witness is 
required. 
Si** 
Section 6 lays down that except for offences liable to 
Hudud ( jji^ ) and Qisas { ifl^ ) and the matters covered by 
sections 7 and 8, all other matters, including fiscal matters, 
shall be proved by the evidence of two male witnesses, and in the 
absence of two male witnesse by the evidence of one male and two 
female witnesses. Cases relating to breach of trust are covered 
under this head. 
The evidence of one teacher, male or female shall be 
admissible in respect of assault having taken place amongst the 
children studying in an institution. 
Under section 7, evidence by a single female witness 
shall be admissible in cases relating to birth, virginity and 
such other matters concerning women as are not usually seen . by 
men. 
If the defendant is a non-Muslim the female witness may 
be non-Muslim who is credible according to the fiath or religion 
she professes. 
The condition of a female witness in this section does 
not exclude the evidence of male witnesses. 
Under section 8, there can be a single male witness, 
and his evidence shall be admissible in the following cases: 
(1) to determine the amount of compensation for the 
damage caused; 
(2) to translate the statement or the evidence of a 
party or a witness in a court of law; 
(3) to decide, when there is a difference of opinion 
regarding bai-e-salam { (J^ZJ' ^ * ^^^^ °^ 
X.' 
commcercial transaction) whether the article sold 
is useable or not; 
(4) to determine, when the period specified for the 
payment of amount of a decree has expired, whether 
the debtor under custody has become insolvent; 
(5) to decide whether an article, which is a subject 
of dispute between the seller and the buyer, is 
defective or not; and 
(6) to determine the amount of compensation for the 
injuries caused. 
Apart from, there may be a situation where evidence of 
a single witness coupled with oath by the plaintiff may be 
admissible . Section 9 deals with such a situation. It arises 
when the defendant fails to appear before the court although 
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summons were duly served to him. Plaintiff under such condition 
may be permitted to produce one witness and may take oath in 
support of his claim. 
In a case where the plaintiff fails to produce a 
witness but produces documentary evidence the court may, if it is 
of the opinion that the plaintiff's claim appears to be probably 
true, decide the matter by giving an oath to the plaintiff. But 
this is subject to one limitation, that is, the defendant must 
have been served with the summons three times and the defendant 
inspite of receiving the summons without any uzr-e-Sharai ^^j^-) 
fails to appear in the court. 
Jurists belonging to different schools have difference 
of approaches as to the quantum of evidence (<i^ u^i»j>i^ ). 
Refering all the views is not possible. It requires a separate 
study all together. A brief reference noted from Adab-e-Qazi is 
given below: 
Under Hanafi School the order of quantum is as follows: 
(1) Four males withness in case of rape ( t-* ). 
Evidence of women witnesses not admissible. 
However, Ata ( ) and Hamad ( ), 
both belongs to Hanbali school are of the view 
that three males and two females witnesses are 
,07 
admissible in rape cases. It is only a matter of 
interpretation. 
(2) The second category under Hanafi School is 
relating to matters in which liability is Hudd or 
Qasas, two male witnesses are needed. Here also 
woman's evidence is not admissible. 
(3) Under third category, according to Hanafi School, 
comes the cases not covered by the earlier to 
categories. Here there may be two male witness or 
one male and two female witnesses. Two female 
witnesses whould be considered equal to one male 
witness. This category covers the financial 
cases, divorce and bequeath cases, etc. But Imam 
Shafi'i differs with this view. According to him, 
women witness may be admissible in financial cases 
or related thereto. In other matters it would not 
be admissible. 
(4) Fourth category includes cases relating to child 
birth, and ot her confidential matters connected 
with women, of which male witness cannot be aware 
of, in such cases according to Hanafi School, 
evidence of single woman would be sufficient. 
Shafi'i School differs on this point. According 
sr2 8 
to Shafi'i jurists four female witnesses are 
needed in such cases. 
It seems that minor procedural differences exist among 
jurists of different schools as to the quantum of evidence. 
Qualifications oi Admissible Witness 
Characteristic of witness admissible in evidence, 
"oi ^ 
according to Adab-e-Qazi { G^^i__>l*) ) are to be determined 
according to the stages of Shahadah ( ) . Stages are: 
(1) - Tahammul-e-Shahadah" - means having 
J , 
knowledge of Mashhud Bihi (facts - cf>^-^) by 
the Shahid (witness), and 
(2) "Ada-e-Shahadah - a^l^<^hi » - means giving of 
evidence m the court by a Shahid ( ^'— -
witness) in respect of mashud bihi ( ^>/^^) • 
Capability of a witness to give evidence at the time 
of Tahammul Shahadah includes such conditions as: 
(1) witness should be (of sound mind), 
(2) witness should not be blind, 
(3) witness should be an eye witness. 
He should himself inspect the ( f* s j ^ ) Nashud 
bihi. But in specific cases Tahammul-Shahadah can also be by 
hearsy. In other words a witness be a person who has witnessed 
the Mashud bihi except such matters as are proveable by hearsy 
evidence. 
On a blind witness there is a difference of approach 
between Hanafi and Shafi'i \vi^ According to Imam Shafi'i, at 
the time of ( ^^c^u ^ Tahammul-Shahadah, it is not 
necessary that a witness should not be blind. Witness may be 
even blind. It would not effect the Tahammul-Shahadah. Same is 
the position at the time of giving evidence ( 6J> ( ^ ) . 
Because a witness may have knowledge of Mahshud bihi ( c^^ii^y^ ) 
even by listening, if his listening capabilities are perfect. 
Thus a blind man may be a legally sound witness. However, Hanafi 
point is different. A blind man cannot be a witness. Sounds may 
resemble with each other. Unless a person has knowledge by 
seeing a fact by his own eyes, his witness cannot be sound in 
law. 
For the second stage of Ada-e-Shahadah {^>Cy<i-h^) the 
conditions requisites are: 
(1) Baligh (adult - *^. ), 
(2) Sane person, 
(3) Baseer { ^ / V ^ ) - having eye-sight, 
(4) Independent - (not slave), 
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(5) Adil - ( J>i^ ), 
(6) Natiq ( Cri' ) - having the faculty of talking, 
and 
(7) Muslim. 
The above conditions must be fulfilled otherwise an 
evidence would not be sound in law. The last condition would not 
apply in cases where non-Muslims are involved. A non-Muslim 
evidence according to Shariah is admissible. 
Similarly if the minor witness is Muslim, sensible and 
intelligent enough to understand thing and not has a reputation 
of a lier, his evidence would be admissible in law. 
Under Pakistan law - for proof of actuality of trust, 
lineage, death etc, and such matters as may be proved by 
Shahadah-e-samai ( ) the condition for a witness to 
have eye-sight shall not apply (Section 12, Exception (2)). 
Samai-Shahadah ( <^ -* hearsy evidence), 
means evidence that is given on the basis of tawatur { y'W ) 
or information of two Aqil, Baligh, Adil, male persons or one 
male and two female persons being a^qil, baligh and adil. 
(Section 12 Explanation ), provided such persons have given 
this information by using the word 'Shahadab'. 
Exception 3 to section 12 of 'Pakistan Islamic Law of 
Evidence' ~ relates dumb witnesses. Evidence of a dumb person 
shall be admissible, except in cases relating to Hudud, only when 
it is written by the witness himself in the presence of the 
presiding officer of the court. 
Two more exceptions are there which relate to cases 
where evidence by a non-Muslim against a Muslim shall be 
admissible only when it relates to will ( *—^-> ) made during 
the course of a journey when no Muslim Shahid is available, and 
if the Mashhud' alaih { « ^ ' - ^ ) is a non-Muslim the witness 
may be a non-Muslim. 
M / -
"Tazkivah al-shuhud - i ^y<^^i^ H 
(Tazkiyah-al-shuhud) is a special 
feature of Islamic law of evidence. This authority is vested in 
the court. The court proceeds with Tazkiyah-al-shuhud after the 
statements of the witnesses are recorded. 'It is a mode of 
inquiry adopted by a court for the purposes of declaring a 
witness Adil ( ^ - > ^ ) or Ghair-'Adil { cj^^'t/i ) 
Tazkiyah al-Shahud shall be obligatory in cases 
punishable with Hadd or Qisas, even if Mashhud alaih (c-^-rT^ ) 
. 5y> 
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raises no objection as to the witness being an adil or not. 
In all cases of Tazirat and monetary and non-monetary 
matters, Tazkiyah-al-Shuhud shall be conducted by the court only 
when the opposit party so demands for it. 
On enquiry by the court, if Mashhud alaih ( t^^^^*^) 
acknowledges the witness being adil { (;)^^ )' ^^®Q ^^ shall 
not be necessary to conduct Tazkiyah-al-Shuhud. 
In respect of Tazkiyah-al-Shuhud, two persons, 
reliable, well-informed and belonging to the same walk of life to 
which the witness belongs, shall be consulted either openly 
( f*^ ) or confidentially ( ^ ). It is the 
discretion of the court to adopt any mode of Tazkiyah-al-Shuhud. 
Court while adopting any mode, that is, open or confidential, has 
to take into consideration the circumstances of the case also. 
In open Tazkiyah-al-Shuhud the court shall, in its 
S 
discretion, summon two persons as (muzakkis - referea) 
and shall, in the presence of the parties, inquire from them 
about the witness being an adil ( O^-^ ) or Ghair-Adil 
' / / ^ ^ ' • 
I. (Adil) means a Kuslim who is known for performing 
prescribed religious duties and abstain from major sins; 
provided that if the witness is a non-Muslim he should be 
credible according to his own faith or religion. (Section 
2 (j). Islamic Law of Evidence of Pakistan. 
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In case of inability of ffluzakki to appear in court, a 
suitable person shall be nominated by the court for conducting 
Tazkiyah-al-Shuhud, and the Muzakki, in the presence of such a 
nominee, the parties and the witness, express his opinion about 
that witness being an adil or Ghair adil. 
The procedure adopted in confidental-Tazkiyah-al-
Shuhud, the court writes letter to the Muzakki asking his opinion 
about the witness to be an adil or Ghair-adil. The letter will 
contain all detailed particulars about the parties, the witnesses 
and the nature of the case, so that Muzakki may easily identify 
them. 
The confidential letter, duly sealed, shall be 
delivered to the Muzakki. He will then write down his own 
opinion about the witness whether adil or Ghair Adil. Then he 
will seal the letter and without making his opinion known to 
anybody, would return back to the court. If the integrity of the 
witness, either in express words or impliedly is effected by the 
opinion or no-opinion has been given by the Muzakki, creating 
doubts, the court shall ask the party concern to produce another 
witness. 
The confidential letter shall be sent to two Muzakkis, 
but may be sent to one Muzakki only. In case the opinions of the 
Muzakkis differ the letter shall be sent to a third Muzakki 
( ). 
The Muzakki must fulfil the following requirements: 
(1) Muslim, 
(2) Aqil, 
(3) Baligh, and 
(4) Adil. 
Further requirement is that the Muzakki of a non-Muslim 
witness may be a non-Muslim who is credible according to his own 
faith or religion and not has open enemity with the witness. 
This enemity principle applies to all irrespective of the 
religion of the witness. 
In Adab-e-Qazi, observations of Imam Abu-Yusuf and Imam 
Muhammad have been quoted. According to them in all matters 
Tazki3^ah-al-shuhud must be conducted. It may be either open or 
confidential. It is necessary because judgement is based on 
reasons and reasons are infered from the evidences of Adil { ) 
witnesses. Therefore, Qazi must conduct Tazkiyah-al-Shuhud to 
know whether witnesses are adil or not, and thus Qazi'z judgement 
may be saved from being batil ( (j^*^, ) • 
It is also said that at the present era adil witnesses 
are rare. Tazkiyyah-al-shuhud become most essential. In the 
early period of Islam Tazkiyyah-al-Shuhud was generally open 
( r '-^  ) but gradually, it was converted to confidential 
Tazkiyyah-al-Shuhud to avoid any problem which might result from. 
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In Shariah court procedure for recording the statement 
of plaintiff, defendant and witnesses is as follows: 
Firstly, the statement of the plaintiff or the 
complainant is recorded in his own words. 
Secondly, the statement of the defendant or the accused 
is recorded in his own words. 
Thirdly, on denial of the claim or charge by the 
defendant or the accused, the court orders the plaintiff or 
complainant to produce evidence in support of claim or charge. 
Thus the witnesses are examined at the third stage. 
Their statements are recorded in their own words separately one 
after the other. When statement of a witness is being recorded 
by the court the other witnesses cannot be present there. 
However, if the witnesses are two women their statements may be 
recorded jointly separation is not required. 
The court for purpose of knowing the truth, after 
it has recorded the statements of parties to the litigation and 
their witness may put questions as the court likes, and after 
that the defendant will have to cross-examine the parties and 
witness. 
Parties here include plaintiff and defendant or complaint and the 
I 
accused. 
II 
The court may, if it deems necessary, for the purpose 
of exploring the facts, re-examine a party or witness after 
cross-examination. 
It shows that it is the responsibility of the court to 
cross-examine and re-examine the parties and witness for knowing 
the truth. As such there is no examination-in-chief, or cross-
examination or re-examination by the parties. But in practice it 
is not so. Parties may be cross-examined and re-examined. 
Similarly witness may also be subjected to the examination-in-
chief, cross-examination and re-examination. However, among 
jurists differences of opinion are there. Some are of the view 
that court only 'may cross-examine and re-examine. There is 
nothing like examination-in-chief. Statements ^re to be 
recorded in the .words of plaintiff or complainant, and defendant 
or accused person. Statements of the witnesses are also to be in 
their words. Further the judges should also be reluctant in 
putting too many questions to the parties so that it may not 
create doubts of partiality in the minds of any of the parties. 
The second view is that for the sake of justice court 
may allow parties to conduct examination-in-chief, cross-
examination and need be to re-examine witnesses of each other. 
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If by cross-examination of witnesses any thing which is false may 
be proved, the court may allow the party. Generally for 
impeaching the credibility and integrity of witnesses, the 
procedure of examination is allowed by the court. 
Two words are used for examination-in-chief and cross-
examination, they are: 
(1) Izhar - J L ^ ^ {examination-in-chief). 
c 
(2) Jirah - ^^^ (cross-examination). 
This procedure of examination was first adopted by the 
I 
fourth Caliph Hazrat Ali (r.a.) in his period of Caliphat. The 
witnesses were examined and cross-examined separately so that one 
may not hear the statement of the other. Since then jurists are 
using this method. Leading questions are not allowed to avoid 
the implication that the court is trying to help one party to the 
prejudice of the other. However, Qazi himself may put question 
as to remove his confusion though the questions may be leading, 
but not in such a manner as partiality may be imputed to him. 
In Saudi Arabia Shariah court judges have very wide 
jurisdiction which cannot be said to be restricted to any 
particular method of examination. Examination-in-chief is not 
Al-Faraq-ul-Hukamia, p. 48. 
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the feature of Saudi Arabian Law. Judges themselves may assume 
this responsibility. Due to this it is said that there is no 
cross-examination of witnesses in Saudi Arabian judicial system 
except by the judges themselves. But an indept study of the 
judical system may bring this inference that the cross-
examination, not only by the judges but also by the opposing 
party or his representative, does exist in practice. However, it 
is subject to this restriction that the cross-examination is 
permissible when either a request to t he court to this effect is 
made or the court itself orders for. 
In practice, the judge of a Shariah court does permit a 
party to cross-examine a witness of the opposite party for 
testing the integrity. Those who have occasion of observing the 
Shariah court proceeding say that the flexibility of the judge to. 
permit not only the parties but also their advocates to cross-
examine the witnesses for the opposite is quite noticeable. 
In actual practice, a party finds more room in a 
Shariah court to attack the probity of the witnesses. The role 
of the judge in cross-examination lies mostly in question which 
may effect the truth of the evidence, and, to a less degree, the 
probity of the witness. The Shariah court judge may invite a party 
against whom an evidence has been given by the witness to attack 
the probity of the witness. The party may prove by such attach 
on probity that the witness has an interest or motive behind his 
S3f 
testimony or he is not a witness of any credibility or integrity. 
The testimony of any witness is subject to challenge of a 
personal motive or interest lies behind his evidence. Thus rule 
of challenging probity of witness (Adil) is common in Shariah 
court. 
As to re-examination of a witness the judge usually 
asks questions when doubts are created after the cross-
examination of the witness or ( ) probity of a witness 
becomes doubtful. However, re-examination is not a common 
practice. 
In brief, the order of examination-in-chief, cross-
examination, and re-examination is not strictly adhere to in the 
Shariah court. However, use of examination-in-chief, cross-
examination, and re-examination do exist in' practice. 
1 - Agents for Litigation" 
Under the Islamic law, a person may lawfully appoint 
another his agent or representative or vakeel to act on his 
behalf for the settlement of every contract which he might have 
I 
lawfully, concluded himself. 
I. Supra N, p. 
f«« 
Authority to appoint agent is derived from Ahadith 
reported in 'Nakl-Saheeh'. 
In Nakl-Saheeh 'it is reported that Prophet (peace be 
upon him) appointed Hakeem-bin-Khiram his agent for purchase, in 
order that he might buy for him a camel to sacrifice*. 
Similarly on another occasion Prophet (peace be upon 
him) 'appointed Amir~bin-aum his agent for marriage'. 
The reasons given for appointing vakeel or agent is 
that an individual is sometimes prevented from acting in his own 
person, in consequence of accidental circumstances (such as 
sickness, or the like), he therefore admitted of necessity to 
appoint another his agent. It is also aimed to expedite his 
wants by means of the powers which he derives from such 
appointment. 
It is also lawful for a person to appoint another bis 
agent for the management of suits or criminal prosecutions or for 
the payment or exaction of all rights (even to corporal 
punishment or retaliation). However, Hadd and Qasas are 
exceptions to this general rule. 
Justification to this general rule is Same as earlier 
noted. Further it is argued that every person is not himself 
rv/ 
capable of managing a business of t his nature. 
In'Nakl-Saheeb' it has been mentioned that Hazrat Ali 
(r.a.), fourth Caliph appointed Hazrat Aqeel his agent for the 
management of his suits, and when Hazrat Aqeel became old he 
dismissed him, and appointed Hazrat Abdul-bin-Jafar in his place. 
It makes it clear that for management of suits civil or 
criminal an agent or vakeel may be appointed who may represent 
the interests of the parties to the litigation or prosecution. 
But cases covered under Hudud or Qasas are made exceptions 
thereto. Appointment of vakeel in such cases is invalid. The 
reason given is that the "punishment or retaliation are remitted 
in the existence of doubt; and the absence of the principal 
creates a doubt; may, the forgiveness of the prosecutor is 
probable in such a circumstance, for this reason, that it is 
praiseworthy and laudable to pardon; contrary to where the 
witnesses only are absent (from the execution), as their non-
retractation is most probable; and contrary, also to where the 
prosecutor is present, as in this case t here is no apprehension 
I 
of his having forgiven". 
However, differences among the jurists exist on this 
point. 
I. Supra IT, p. 
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According to Imam Abu-Haneefa, an agent or vakeel 
cannot be appointed without the permission of the opposit party 
in cases where the client is not sick or on journey which may not 
be for three days or more. 
But according to Imam Mohammad, and Imam Abu Yusuf, a 
vakeel or agent may be appointed in such conditions even without 
the consent and permission of the opposite party. Imam Shafi'i 
is also of this view. 
This disagreement does not relate to the legality of 
the agency itself, but to the necessity which operates upon the 
adversary to answer an agent to whose appointment he has not 
assented. Hazrat Abu Haneefa being of the opinion that he is not 
under such necessity; and the two disciples think otherwise. 
The argument of the two disciples is that the 
appointment of an agent is the act of an individual in regard to 
a right purely his own. Therefore, it should not depend on the 
consent of another in the present instance, any more than in a 
case exacting payment of debt. 
Hazrat Imam Abu Haneefa on the other hand, argues that 
the constituent is himself under the,necessity of giving an 
answer, and must attend in case the magistrate should summon him. 
Individuals differ with respect to their capacities of managing 
5r'/3 
suits. Therefore, if it were admitted that the appointment of an 
agent is absolute with respect to the adversary, this would be 
injurious to the adversary. Hence the validty of the appointment 
must be suspended on his consent. It is otherwise where the 
person is sick or absent, for in this case his appointment of an 
agent is valid without the consent of the adversary, since he 
cannot himself be compelled to appear under such circumstances. 
It is to be noted that in the same manner as Hazrat 
Imam Abu Haneefa holds the appointment, in this particular, of an 
agent by an absent person to be valid, so also does he holds the 
I 
appointment by one who is immediately about to travel. 
There is a consensus of all modern jurists on the point 
that a woman may appoint an agent for litigation in all cases. 
According to Hazrat Abu Baker (r.a.), the first Caliph, a woman 
who remains in privacy, and is not accustomed to go to the court 
of the Qazi, can appoint an agent for the management of her suit, 
and acquiescence is incumbent on her adversary. 
A person under accusation may employ an agent to 
conduct his defence, and agent may make replies and rejoinders, 
and the doubt with respect to deputation does not prevent this. 
If an agent confesses anything against the interest of his client 
I. Supra N, p. 
4^f 
or constituent before the court, his confession is valid and 
enforceable. Hazrat Imam Abu Haneefa and Hazrat Imam Mohammad, 
both are of the same view on this point. However, such 
confession should be in the court and not outside the court. If 
the acknowledgement has been made outside the court and not 
before Qazi, immediately after such a confession, the vakeel or 
agent shall be dismissed. 
According to Hazrat Imam Abu Yusuf even if such a 
confession is not in the court would be valid and legally 
enforciable. 
But Hazrat Imam Zafer and Hazrat Imam Shafi'i have a 
different view. According to them such a confession under both 
conditions - made in the court or beyond court, is not valid. 
Further it is said that an agent without the consent of 
his client cannot make any settlement with the adverse party nor 
can discharge the opposite party from his liability. 
The appoint of agent is the discretion of the client. 
He can also remove him at his will. When a person accused of an 
offence appoints an agent or vakeel to represent him in 
litigation or defend him against the accusation, it is implied 
that such an agent is empowered to make concessions on behalf of 
his client. 
5"*^ 
"Although in Islam, a suit can be conducted through a 
vakeel, it is difficult to ascertain from the history of the law 
court whether there was any practice of appointing vakeels as 
'professional lawyers'. In some book it is mentioned that when 
Isa bin Abban, a contemporary of Imam Shafi'i was appointed the 
Qazi of Basra, two brothers came to him. They used to appear as 
vakeels in cases. Apparently it shows that the practice of 
'professional lawyers was in vogue from remote time. This 
I 
practice is no innovation in Islam". 
Qazi Tajuddin Abu Nasr Abdul Vahab observes thus: 
"The view is this - those vakeel who are lovers of 
justice, deserve praise, although they charge fees for 
their labour. But those who desire to encourage 
litigation and defeat the rights of others are liable 
to condemnation. The duty of the vakeel is to grasp 
the facts from the client ( J 4 5 * ), to acquaint 
himself with the circumstance, and to find out on which 
side is the truth between the parties He should 
present such documents as he deems to be genuine, 
or those documents which the client places before him 
and the vakeel places reliance upon them without the 
I. Al-Qaza-fil Islam, p. 19 (Administration of Justice during 
the Muslim Rule in Indiaa, by Waheed Husain). 
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knowledge of the real state of affairs. But if the 
vakeel after discovering them to be false uses them, 
I 
his place is in the hell" 
Under Islamic law, judge of a Shariah court, gives preference to 
the parties to suit to present their cases on their own. Because 
parties are the best persons to place their cases. However, if 
they are unable to represent their cases properly either due to 
nervourness or get confused, or any other inability rendering 
them unable to meet the points of law raised during litigation,. 
they can entrust their cases to their lawyer (vakeels). But Islam 
does not favour that professional lawyers be engaged with a view 
to confuse the real issues, to delay the proceedings, and to 
avail the best talent for defeating the claim of the opposit 
party. 
"Compounding of Litigation and Arbitration" 
Islamic law prefers compromises and compounding of 
disputes rather than parties contesting in the court. Allah also 
prefers it. The following verses of Holy Quran will show the 
significance. 
Al-Huqarinat-wal-maqabile, pp. 51, 52. 
Allah says: 
- - ^ <il Ull J . .J-.U jJ- l j U ^ l^lt. u _ , L L - l j > j 
"The recompense for an injury is an injury equal 
thereto (in degree) : but if a person forgives and 
makes reconciliation, his reward is due from Allah : 
For allah loveth not those who do wrong." (42:40). 
This verse relates to criminal cases of Qasas. 
Whatever injury is caused, that much injury can be caused to the 
wrong-doer. However, if the victims forgives or compromises 
with, it is far better. His reward is with Allah. Allah does 
not love the wrong doers. 
In another verse Allah says: 
S'tfS 
"The believers are but a single brotherhood : So make 
peace and re^OTiciliation between your two (contending) 
brothers; and fear Allah, that ye may receive Mercy". 
(49:10). 
In this verse also Allah commands to be just and try to 
compromise the quarrel, for peace is better than fighting. 
In family disputes whatever may be the nature Allah 
commands for making amicable settlement of them. In the 
following verse Allah says: 
J L ^ ^ 1 ^ : ^ u i^ l 1^ I^^L: I ^ ^ ^ L sl^l j ^ 
l>L-^ Jj j ^ l ^^\ ^jj^lj jJL jJLJIj UJ- L ^ U k j 
"If a wife fears cruelty or desertion on her husband's 
part, there is no blame on them if they arrange an 
amicable settlement between themselves; and such 
settlement is best; even though men's souls are swayed 
by greed, but if ye do good and practice self 
restraint, Allah is well acquainted with all that ye 
do". (4:128). 
In this verse Allah also commands for self-restrained 
practices, and do what we can to come to an amicable settelement. 
Islamic law not only allows compounding of cases, but 
prefers also to refer the matter to arbitration for settling the 
disputes even out side the courts. But refering to arbitration { 
) and to compound ( ) offences depends upon the nature 
of offences. Criminal breach of trust is an offence which is 
both compoundable and may be refered to arbitration if the 
parties so desire. 
About compounding of cases Hazrat Maharib-bin-Disar 
narrates that Hazrat Umar-bin-Kitab (r.a.) said: 
$5a 
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"That the parties to litigation at the initial stage be 
returned back so that they may mutually compound 
( } their cases. Because sometime just 
decisions of the court give birth to enimities among 
them". 
This shows the significance attached to the 
compoundability of the cases. Caliph second preferred 
compounding of cases rather than contending in court and get 
judement thereupon. 
Hazrat Sufian Sura commenting upon the observation of 
Hazrat Umar (r.a.) says: 
S5f 
grounds: 
That in our opinion Hazrat Umar (r.a.) by this above 
refi^red observation means that efforts be made for 
compounding the litigation at a time when there is a 
suspicion or doubt or parties are related to each 
other. If it is not so and decision seems to be quite 
clear, it is not proper for Qazi to return the 
parties". 
Hazrat Sufian Suri made this comment on following 
(1) That if all the cases refered to the court, 
irrespective of knowing the nature of dispute, are 
returned for compounding the cases, it will result 
in losening the confidence in efficacy of courts; 
and 
?5a 
(2) It would also lower down the honour and dignity of 
Shariat ( <SjJlr^ ) and Shariah courts. 
In the period of Hazrat Umar (r.a.) there was no such 
fear that is why he gave such a general direction. But to Sufian 
Suri, now it should restricted only to cases where there is no 
legal ambiguity or the matter refered to the court is not too 
complicated, or court considers that past relations between the 
parties were such that compounding of the case be prefered. In 
such cases there is no hitch in refering back for compounding 
the cases. But if it is otherwise than court should decide 
itself. 
As to Arbitration Allah commands in Sura-al-Nisa: 
J 1^1 ^ L l w j <kl ^ L ^ 1 ^ 1 ^ ^ H ^ J ^ f - i ^ o'j 
Aj^ L J U ^l^ UJI ^1 ^L-e <JUI j i ^ Ul-,1 \x.ji 
(To :oT < « L J J I *J,>->») 
"If ye fear a breach between twa-in, appoint (two) 
arbiters, one from his family, and the other from hers; 
if they seek to set things a right, Allah will cause 
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their reconciliation : For Allah hath full knowledge 
and is acquainted with all things. (4:35) 
Allah comnands that if there is a dispute between 
husband and wife, refer the matter to the arbitration ( ). 
The law confers the right upon the litigant parties to refer 
their disputes to an arbitrator of their choice. Each party may 
also select arbitrators of its own and if they agree, the 
arbitrators so selected may decide the dispute refered to them. 
The decision of arbitrators will be the same as of Qazi. The 
arbitrator has the power to examine witnesses and administer oath 
like a court, and give awards according to the facts of the case 
and in accordance with the law to which the parties are subject. 
However, there is difference between the decision of arbitrators 
and a Qazi. The difference is as follows: 
(1) Matters covered under Hudud and Qasas arbitration 
is not valid { ). 
(2) Till the arbitrators pronounce their judgement, 
it is not enforceabe. Before the judgement if any 
party withdraws from arbitration, such withdrawal 
is allowed. But if the arbitrators have 
pronounced their judgement, withdrawal is not 
valid. 
(3) If the arbitrators give judgement on any Ijtihadi 
issue ( ) and the matter thereafter is 
referred to the court where the judge differs with 
the opinions of arbitrators, the judge may reject 
or set aside the judgement. If no difference of 
opinion exists between the judge and the 
arbitrators, then the judge will pass an order 
confirming the terms of the award. 
The Islamic law requires that the arbitrators should 
posses the qualifications of a Qazi on the ground that the 
arbitrator virtually performs functions of the Qazi. 
Criminal breach of trust is both compoundable and if 
the parties desire may be refered for arbitration. 
"Non-Muslims and Islamic Law" 
Islam is often said to be a totalitarian-religion. It 
is an inevitable result of the very faith in God. .A believer 
surrenders to Almighty completely. His prayers, sacrifies, life 
and death all are surely for God. He has subjected totally to 
the commandments of Allah. Thus his faith in God and his social 
life are not separate. They are intervovine. Law is one part of 
that integrated self. In other words law and religion are not 
separate. The question is that when law and relition are 
integrated self, then what is the position and status of those 
who do not subscribe to Islamic faith? Are the non-Muslims 
subject to law to which they have no faith in? 
Anwser requires an elaborate discussion. Non-Muslims 
membership of the nation in an Islamic state is based on 
contracts or compromises reached between them and the Islamic 
state. That is the reason that non-Muslims are called 
'almu'ahidun', means the contractees. Another term used is "ahl-
al-dhimmah, or dhimmis," an Arabic word which means "those whose 
obligations are a trust upon the conscience and pledge of the 
state of the nation". 
It may be said that their rights and obligations are 
determined according to: 
(1) basic texts in the Quran and the Sunnah; and 
(2) treaties or compromise entered between them 
or their ancestors and the Islamic state. 
"Holy Quran and Non-Muslim" 
Let us examine the position of non-Muslims in the light 
of Quranic commandment. 
Quran says: 
(A :<^ T (^ laJUli "ijj-^^ 
"Allah forbids you not, with regards to those who 
fight you not for (your) faith nor drive you out of 
your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them : 
For Allah loveth those who are just". (60:8) 
Allah clearly commands that you should be kind and just 
while dealingwith non-Muslims unless they are rampant and out to 
destroy you and your faith. 
In verse 1, Sura-al-Maida Allah commands that the 
believers should fulfil their covenants and compromises entered 
with others. Allah says: 
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"0 ye who believe! Fulfil (all) obligation". (5:1). 
Vord ^.^"^ (uqud) has been used m this verse m a 
very wide sense. Treaties entered by the state with its non-
Muslims inhabitants are parts of the wide ranged covered under 
it. Every individual living in state and the state itself are 
bound to see that all obligations express or implied resulted 
from covenant or treaties or compromises entered into are 
faithfully discharged. Every man of faith must discharge all 
such obligations conscientiously. This is how Allah in Quran 
commands. Non-Muslim are not to be discriminated. Just anii 
honourable treatment and respect to the obligations and discbarge 
thereto is the basis education of Islam. Thus law must be such 
which discharge the obligations with honour and respect. 
In another verse Allah commands: 
"Whenever ye speak, speak justly, even if a near 
relative is concerned; and fulfil the covenant of Allah 
5sa 
: Thus doth He conu&and you, that ye may remember". 
(6:152). 
In this verse again Allah commands that if you give 
words, you should honour those words and do justice there unto, 
even if it is against a kinsman, and fulfil the covenant of 
Allah. This is what Allah has commanded and we should happily 
remember that. Again to honour words and and doing justice to 
the compromises are basic to Islamic law. Laws can be framed 
only keeping in consideration the basic principle of justice 
commanded by Allah. In other words non-Muslims are all well-
protected and 'have honoured place in the light of above noted 
command. 
In another verse Allah says: 
"(But the treaties are) not dissolved with those Pagans 
with whom ye have entered into alliance and who have 
not subsequently failed you in aught, nor aided anyone 
against you. So fulfil your engagements with them to 
the end, of their term : For Allah loveth the 
righteous". (9:4) 
The sacred duty of fulfilling all obligations of every 
kind, to Muslims and non-Huslims, in public as well as in private 
life, is a cardinal feature of Muslim ethics. The question what 
is to be done with those who abuse this principle by failing in 
their duty but expect the Muslims to do their part is not to be 
solved (in the case of treaties) by a general denunciation of 
treaties but by a careful consideration of the cases where there 
has been fidelity and not treachery. There we are enjoined to 
give t he strictest fidelity, as it is a party of righteousness 
and our duty to Allah. 
Allah agaiji commands: 
(v :lLl <5^_^l Sjj--) 
S6o 
"As long as they stand true to you, stand ye true to 
them : for Allah doth love the righteous". (9:7). 
This ayat { * ) again relates to covenant 
with non-Muslims. Muslims should not break the covenant which 
they have made with non-Muslims. If non-Muslims respect their 
covenant Muslims should also reciprocate to them. The character 
of Muslims should be just in all dealings with non-Muslims. No 
treachery, no fraud, no dishonesty, no infedility is permissible 
in the observance of their commitments with non-Mulims. God 
loves those who are very cautious in the discharge of their 
commitments and obligations. Islamic law is based on such ideal 
principles. 
To do justice and act righteously in a favourable or 
neutral atmosphere is meriWious enough, but the real test comes 
when you have to do justice to people who are oppose to your 
faith. In this connection Allah says: 
^Li (^ j^ -ij L^it '1^ ^ Cr-y •>/ ly-^  Orf^ J ki^ f 
^6t 
0 ye who believe! Stand out firmly for Allah, as 
witness to fair dealing, and let not the hatred of 
others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from 
justice. Be just : that is next to piety : and fear 
Allah. For Allah is well-acquainted with all that ye 
do". (5:8). 
Such a justice, which cannot be disturbed by any ill-
feeling, if rightly adopted, can be attained to only by the fear 
of Allah and His retaliation. When this thought is strongly 
deep-rooted in the heart of a believer that nothing of our deeds 
and actions is hidden to God, and this idea is always present in 
his heart and mind, his heart will tremble by the fear of God 
resulting in total justice in all matters of life and in total 
submission to the orders of God and His Messenger. 
These are some of the golden rules up-on which the 
Islamic law is based. Muslims and non-Muslims, under such a law 
are all safe and well-protected. No injustice can be done to any 
person irrespective of caste creed or colour. All stands on 
equal footing. So far administration of justice is concerned no 
discrimination is to be meted out to any citizen in Islamic 
state. Islamic law is based on highly moral ideals. 
"Prophet jjeace be upon ^ia) ^ d Non-Muslias" 
Treatment of non-Muslims by the Prophet (peace be upon 
him) himself is based on such highly moral ideals preached by 
Holy Quran. 
Prophet (peace be upon him) says: 
"Beware! Whosoever is cruel and hard on a contractee, 
or curtails his rights, or burdens him with more than 
he can endure, or takes anything of his prophet against 
his free will. I shall myself be a plaintiff against 
him on the Day of Judgement". 
Just imagine, the consequences for a believer, there is 
nothing more worst than when the Prophet (peace be upon him) 
would stand as plaintiff against him on the Day of Judgement, if 
he is cruel and hard on a contractee, that is, non-Muslim, and 
takes his property without his free consent. 
?Topbet Ipeace be upon him) again says: 
"And once they (non-Muslims) are willing to conclude 
the dhimmah contract, then let it be clearly known to 
them that all rights and duties are equal and 
I 
reciprocal between you and them". 
From the above Sunnah of Prophet (peace be upon him), 
it is obvious now that once a contract is concluded with non-
Muslim living in Islamic state, law would make no discrimination 
on the basis of religion. All rights and duties of non-Huslims 
become at par with Muslims. They stand on equal footings. Among 
Muslims and non-Huslims rights and duties become reciprocal based 
on principles of equity. 
Prophet (peace be upon him) further says: 
"Only faith fulness, no treachery, with every given 
II 
pledge". 
In this Hadith Prophet (peace be upon him) has given a 
very highly honourable moral sermon advocating that there should 
be faithfulness with one's promises, covenants, compromises and 
pledges with others. Treachery in such matters is prohibited. 
Islamic law dealing with non-Muslim is based on such honourable 
I. Abdullah Mustafa-al-Maraghi, Al-Tashri'al-Islami li-Ghairi-
Muslimin (Islamic Legislation for Non-Muslim, Egypt, p. 64. 
II. Said Ramadan, Islamic Law - its scope and equity, p. 123, 
Edition Published by Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1987, Malaysia. 
and dignified principles. 
Said Ramadan, in his book Islamic Law, has high lighted 
some of the Prophet's practices and dealings with non-Muslims 
after his migration from Mecca and settling in Madinah. He 
elaborates: 
"In Madinah, only a few weeks after his arrival, he 
established a kind of city state embracing those who believed in 
him as a Prophet and those who were willing to accept his 
authority as a political head. The best outlook and objective of 
that state were to realise a co-existence between those who 
choose to have it and a collective defence against any sort of 
aggresion, external or internal. The constitution of that state 
was in the form of a long written document designing the inter-
relations between Muslim tribes and clans among themselves, on 
the one hand, and between the Muslim and the Jews, on the other. 
It was a state of a confederal type due to the multiplicity of 
populations - groups. A recognition was granted to every group 
within a common bond that applied in two ways ; to Muslims upon 
the authority of their faith in Islam, and to Jew upon whatever 
provisions a mutual agreement would include". 
Some translated extracts from this constitutional 
document are noted below: 
Said Prophet : "All Jews who choose to join us shall 
have all the protection that Muslims have. Neither will they be 
oppressed, nor may there be a Muslim communal agitation against 
them. To the Jews their religion, and to the Muslims their 
religion. The Jews of Bani Awf' constitute a community with the 
believers. Between all there should be benevolence and justice. 
Responsibility for any act of oppression or wickedness shall 
always be personal. Between them there shall always be a mutual 
council and advice. There shall also be a joint responsibility 
for defence against every attack on Madinah and against every 
aggression directed towards any of those who adhere to this 
written document. Jews shall share with Muslims the expenditure 
of war as long as fighting continues. None shall leave the city 
except upon an 'exit permit' issued by the Prophet (peace be upon 
him). Other Jewish clans (eight of whom were specifically 
mentioned) and their associates and defendants shall have, with 
this document, the same status as Bani Awf. This written 
document, however, should by no means be a shelter for any 
transgressor. Those who choose to leave can leave in safety, and 
those who choose to settle in Medina can settle in safety, except 
I 
if held responsbile for injustice or transgressions". 
I. Ibn Hisham, 2nd ed., Cairo, 1950, 1, pp. 503-504. 
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The principles we infer from this first important 
constitutional document are: 
(1) Equal protection to Muslim and non-Muslims. 
(2) No communal agitation from Muslims against the 
convenant. 
(3) Jews and Muslims were to practice and follow their 
religions respectively. 
(4) Personal responsibility for acts of aggressions. 
(5) Joint responsibility for defence. 
(6) Both communities to share the war expenses 
jointly. 
(7) If any non-Muslim to leave, was to take exist 
permit from the Prophet (peace be upon him). 
(8) Associates and defendants of non-Muslims were all 
guaranteed protection. 
(9) If any non-Muslim wanted to leave Madinah, could 
leave safely. 
(10) any non-Muslim could settle in Madinah. However, 
if found responsible for injustice or 
transgression, would not be permitted to settle in 
Madinah. 
These are some of the inferences from the covenant 
entered between Prophet (peace be upon him) and the non-Muslims. 
Equal status in all respect was guaranteed by the Prophet (peace 
5^7 
be upon hiia). 
In the later part of Prophet's period number of such 
other covenants were entered into. Full protection and equal 
status to the non-Muslims was guaranteed. 
Another outstanding treaty is which the Prophet (peace 
I 
be upon him) entered with the 'christians of Nairan'. Main 
principles of this covenant were as follows: 
(1) For Najran and its defendants they have God's 
enjoined protection and the pledge of His 
Prophet (peace be upon him). 
(2) Protection to : Property, life, religion, absent 
and present, kith and kins, churches, all that 
they have in hands, little or much. 
(3) No interference by Muslims in their Church manage 
ment. 
(4) No humiliation. 
(5) Military service not compulsory to them. 
(6) Justice shall prevail. 
Hamidullah, Al-Watha'iq-al-Siyasiyyah (Political document), 
2nd Ed. Cairo, Lajuat-al-Taalif Wa'l Tarjumah Wa'l Nashr, 
1956, pp. 111-112. 
(7) Usurious dealings declared act of rebellion, 
and 
(8) Tax upon non-Muslim was introduced in this 
document. 
(9) Responsibility for transgression personal. No one 
else was responsible for the acts of others. 
The another important thing is that in later years, 
after the Prophet (peace be upon him), all Caliphs had honoured 
this covenant with the Christians of Najran. 
Both the above documents are very important. They 
clearly indicate that in social dealings Muslims and non-Muslims 
are all equal. In religious matters they are independent and 
free. Islamic law guatantees full freedom to the non-Muslims. 
These documents are important guaranteeing equal status to non-
Muslim as an authentic text of Islamic law. 
During Prophet's (peace be upon him) time, non-Muslims, 
in practice, were accorded complete judicial authonomy. They 
were to be judged with equity and in accordance to their 
religious laws. Religious Muslim law was not to be applied to 
them. 
During the rule of second Caliph, different nations 
and races came under his reign. Hazrat Umar (r.a.), the second 
Caliph issued various ordinances ( (i)^ - Farman) determining 
and guaranteeting the status of non-Huslims which supplied 
literature to the Fuqahe (jurists) for developing the law and 
jurisprudence. Many of the Farmans were collected by Hazrat Imam 
Abu Yusuf (r.a.) in his book entitled Kitab-ul-Khiraj. One such 
Farman issued by him to Abu Ubaida, the commander of Army, after 
the conquest of Syria is noted below: 
"Forbid the Muslims so that they may not oppress the 
non-Muslims, nor commit any damage to them, nor seize 
their property without a valid cause, and fulfil all 
the terms and conditions which you have convenanted 
with them". 
There were other covenants also entered with the non-
Muslims. In all non-Muslims were guaranteed full freedom of 
religions, customs and other social matters. They were not to be 
discriminated. 
The most recent example is of Malaysia. After 
independence-, constitution was framed. Before that a compromise 
reached between the state and non-Muslims residents of Malaysia 
guaranteeing all types of freedoms. Article 3 (1) of the Federal 
constitution of Malaysia provides that Islam is the religion of 
the Federation; the other religions may be practised in peace and 
harmony in any part of the Federation. Malaysian government 
respects the agreement based on the understanding and friendship 
between various communities. Non-Muslim, are sharing all sorts 
of facilities. Even they are sharing power as Ministers of 
Cabinet. They are given civil services also. As to law, they 
are being governed by secular laws. Their disputes are decided 
by secular courts. 
Fron the above discussion jurists have developed law as 
follows: 
(1) That Muslims and nonrHuslinis are equal in the .eve 
of Laws. The blood of the Dhimmi is like the 
blood of the Muslim, 
(2) Non-Muslims living in an Islamic state are all 
secured, in matters of right to property, life, 
freedom of religion, to be governed by their own 
religious laws or community customs or by secular 
laws. 
(3) No molestation or humiliation on the basis of 
religion. 
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(4) Non-Huslims are not to be governed by Islamic 
Law which is purely religion in nature. They are 
to be regulated according to the precepts of their 
own faith. 
(5} Secular portion of the Islamic Legal Code is 
applicable to non-Muslims. Secular law in the 
sense that the law which is commonly followed by 
all nations irrespective of their religion, caste, 
creed or culture. Islamic law does not interfere 
in non-Muslims, customs and tradition which they 
follow as a matter of their faith. 
In brief, there is nothing to alarm non-Muslims living 
under an Islamic state. During Mughal period in India, non-
Muslims were not only to be governed by their own laws but were 
having courts where Brahmines and Pandits were sitting as judges 
and deciding their cases. 
However, they are subject to the Islamic criminal law 
which is secular in nature as explained above. As to criminal 
breach of trust, non-Muslims' cases under the Islamic state would 
be governed by Islamic criminal law if the nature of dispute is 
secular but if it relates to religion, such as religious 
endowment, would be governed by their religious precepts. 
I 
Dr. Muhammad Muslehuddin explains Ijtihad as: 
"Ijtihad (interpretation) in its literal sense in 
making an effort and technically it is an effort to 
discover law, from its sources. It is just the opposit 
of 'taqlid or imitation, i.e., following the opinions 
of others without scrutiny as to their sources". 
Ijtihad is an Arabic word which is delivered from the 
Arabic verb, Ijtihada, literally means 'to exert oneself. 
Under these two different definitions, one is connected 
with efforts to discover law from its sources and Interprete it, 
and other one to exert oneself. We will examine which is more 
near to Islamic concept. 
On view is that law is contained in the text of Holy 
Quran and the Sunnah. By Ijtihad means interpretation of the 
Holy Text and Sunnah, and it's enforcement and to extend it to 
given social situations. Thus legistation in Islam is not law 
making in the modern sense. Further such interpretation should 
I. Dr. Muhammad Muslehuddin, 'Philosophy of Islamic Law and 
the Orientalists', p. 125 (Ph.D, London). 
not be the result on one's own reason or personal opinion but by 
analogical deduction, i.e. reasoning by way of analogy. 
Scope of reasoning by analogical deduction is further 
sub-divided into two parts: 
(1) Matters relating to religious observance and 
worship Clbadat/,' and 
(2) Social affairs (Mu'amalat). 
In the first case, according to Ghazali there can be no 
scope for legislation, no reasoning in such matters. While in 
the second legislation or law-iaking is possible, but it cannot 
take the form of law-making in the modern sense, for laws are 
already revealed by God. 
The second view to e^ cert oneself has been explained by 
Prof. Asaf Fazee as : "Creative in nature which functions in the 
I 
absence of Quranic and Prophetic texts". But this view does not 
seems to be correct. 
Source of Ijtihad i$ the following Hadith. it is an 
authentic tradition narrated by Hazrat Mu'adh Ibn Jabal. He was 
I. Asaf A.A. Fazee, Outlines of Muhammedan Law, 2i\d ed. London, 
Oxford University Press, 1955 
appointed by the Prophet (peace be upon him) as a judge in Yemen. 
On the eve of his departure to assume his office there, the 
Prophet (peace be upon him) asked him: 
"According to what shalt thou judge?" 
He replied : 
"According to the Book of God." 
"And if thou findest nought therein?" 
"According to the Sunnah of the Prophet of God." 
"And if thou findest nought therein." 
"Then I will exert myself to form my own judgement." 
And thereupon the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: 
"Praise be to God who has guided the messenger of His 
I 
Prophet to that which pleases His Prophet". 
Prof. Fyzee, interpretes the last part of the above 
hadith, that is, "then I will exert myself to form my own 
judgement," as of a creative nature. 
Al-ijtihad in no way implies, as some modernists would 
like to believe, freedom of judgement. Its very nature is a 
mental process which derives its impetus directly from the 
I. Abn 'Abd-al-Barr, Jar-i-Bayan al-Ilra !7a-Fadlih, Arabic, II, 
p. 56; Khallaf, 'Ilm Usui al-Fiqh, p. 62. 
Shariah and implies no more than individual opinion. It is in no 
way creative in the sense of legislation or law making. It only 
opens gate for intelligent and brilliant reasoning. 
'The concept of "individual opinion" was even 
recognized and applied by the Prophet (peace be upon him) with 
reference to himself. Only what he said, did or agreed to in his 
capacity as a Prophet (peace be upon him) is to be considered a 
binding Sunnah. The context of a particular tradition usually 
indicates the legal bearing involved. In the absence of such an 
indication and in cases of ambiguity, it becomes for the Muslims 
a matter of consideration, in which spiritual factors as well as 
individual and collective reasoning should play the decisive 
I 
role'. It is said that on some occasions Prophet (peace be upon 
him) consulted Hazrat Abu Bakr (r.a.) and Hazrat Umar (r.a.), and 
II 
asked : "Advise for in the absence of revealation I am like you". 
The jurists from this may infer that consultations and reasoning 
in worldly affairs are part of the Prophet's (peace be upon him) 
traditions but does not mean to go beyond the limit of Shariah. 
Again Ijtihad may be in two ways: 
(1) The Ijtihad or interpretation of the text by way 
of analogy or qiyas which may be described as 
I. Said Ramadan, ' Islamic Law, its scope and equity.' pp. 76-
77. 
II. Kashf al-Asrar, Arabi, II p. 930. 
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strict analogy if the cause is apparent; and 
(2) Sound analogy or 'tawil' if the cause is not 
apparent. It means to reach a thing or come to 
the point, that is, to probe into the inner 
meaning of the text and discover its intents and 
purposes. In otehr words tawil as the 
interpretation where the possiblity of doubtful 
meaning is dispelled by resourse to some authority 
or proof. 
To Mr. Muhammad Muslehuddin : 'Tawil has an amazing 
capacity to cover the growing needs of society, for the text may 
be interpreted with reference to its words and the meaning 
implicit therein, its context and the traditions of the Prophet 
(peace be upon him). In this way the text is open to useful 
interpretations to cope with the situation and to accomodate the 
various needs and transactions of the modern world. And if 
anything essential is not covered by such interpretation, 
recourse may be had to the 'Rule of Necessity and Need*. 
To him, 'an analogy, to be sound, must be supported by 
some proof and for this purpose proper understanding of not only 
the word and its meaning but also of the circumstances in which 
the text came into existances is necessary*. Mujtabid (person 
qualified to exercise ijtihad) must, therefore, be fully equipped 
with the proper knowledge of Arabic, its grammer and literature, 
principles of jurisprudence and of the sources of law, of 
repealing and repealed text , of the circumstances in which the 
text was revealed, of the methods of ascertaining Sunnah, 
sufficient acuteness, sound mind, intelligence and legal acumen 
to be able to grasp the drift of a speech and its purpose'. 
'In view of the difficulty in finding a mujahid of 
these qualifications, matters may be decided according to the 
theory enunciated by Ghazzali - consensus of the community on the 
fundamentals, leaving the matters of detail to the agreement of 
I 
the scholars.' 
Critics point out that this narrow interpretation of 
ijtihad, later, resulted in different schools and in blind 
pursuit of imitation what different Imams had interpreted. 
Further the qualification required for a Mujtabid also closed the 
d oors of Ijtihad suiting to the needs of new arising problems in 
the progressive and developing society. Critics rely more on 
one's judgement and in support say that the early jurist (i.e. 
companions of the Prophet (peace be upon him), in default of 
relevent text, relied on their own judgement. But, to them, this 
liberty of judgement later became progressively restricted to a 
strict process of analogical deduction. 
I. Ghazzali, Wajiz, Vol. 2, p. 216. 
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But this is an erroneous view. It is also baseless. 
Companions of Prophet (peace be upon him) never relied on their 
own judgement in disregard to the revealed text. In fact, they 
were the first and foremost to adopt analogical deduction to 
preserve the text in its ideal form. Under the rule of 
'necessity and need' some departures at times made by the 
Caliphs, but in reality it is not so. For example, penalty for 
committing theft was suspended in time of famine by Hazrat Umar 
(r.a.). It was all because of necessity. Consensus of jurists 
followed this rule. 
This procedure of 'Necessity and Need', is most 
appropriate and best calculated to accomodate the needs of the 
society, preserving at the same time the stability and ideal form 
of Shariah. 
In brief Ijtihad does not mean freedom of judgement. 
j 
Mi^tahahid must be qualified and must have faith m God and His 
Prophet (peace be upon him). When Quran and Sunnah on any point 
are silent, then the Qazi may use his intellectual abilities to 
come to a just conclusion within the frame work of Quran and 
Ahadith. Qazi if makes Ijtihad keeping in view these guiding 
principles, Allah will reward him. Hazrat Umar-bin-Al-Aas (r.a.) 
narrated that he heard Prophet (peace be upon him) saying: 
"When a Hakim ( r ^ ) makes Ijtihad when pronounces 
judgement o£ the ^ ourt, and attains correct approach, 
he gets double reward, and if he commits error in 
making Ijtibad during judgement, he gets a single 
reward". 
Revaxd t o jMdge ^su^ V^iftti I j t i t a^ dti^s liot m a^ii 
creativeness contrary to Shafiah. 
CHAPTER VII 
PART A 
In India there are three categories of criminal courts, 
i.e. courts contituted by the Constitution of India, courts 
constituted by Criminal Procedure Code, and by other special 
statutes: 
Courts consituted by the Constitution of India are: 
(i) Supreme Court - it exercises its juridiction as 
provided by the Constitution, 
(ii) Hi|hCourta_r their powers have been laid down by 
the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
Courts constituted under criminal procedure are: 
Section 6 of Criminal Procedure Code lays down that 
besides the High Court and the courts constituted under any law, 
other than this, there shall be, in every state, the following 
classes of Criminal Courts, namely: 
(i) Courts of Session, 
(ii) Judicial Magistrates of the first class and, in 
any metropolitan area. Metropolitan Magistrates, 
(iii) Judicial Magistrate of the second class, and 
(iv) Executive Magistrates. 
The revised set up of Criminal Courts and allocation of 
Magisterial work are intended to bring about separation of the 
judiciary from the executive. As a consequence of separation 
there are two categories of Magistrates, namely, the judicial 
Magistrate and the executive Magistrates. Judicial Magistrates 
are under the control of High Court and functions assigned to 
them are essentially judicial in nature. 
Offences relating to criminal breach of trust are 
triable by the court of Magistrate of First Class. Clause III of 
Section 26, Criminal Procedure Code as shown in the First 
Schedule of Cr. P.C, empowers the Magistrates for such Trials. 
In every district (not being a metropolitan areas), 
there shall be established as many courts of judicial Magistrates 
of the First Class and at such places, as the State Government 
may, after concultation with the High Court, by notification, 
specify. 
The presiding officers of such courts shall be 
appointed by the Hight Court. The High Court may, whenever it 
apprears to it to be expedient or necessary, confer. The powers 
of ajudicial Magistrate of the First Class on any member of 
judicial service of the State, functioning as judge in a civil 
court. 
In every district apart from Magistrates of the First 
Class there will be chief judicial Magistrate and Additional 
Chief judicial Magistrates. The High Court shall appoint a 
judicial magistrate of the First Class to be the Chief Judicial 
Magistrate and also may appoint Additional chief judicial 
Magistrate who will have all or any of the powers of a chief 
judicial Magistrate under Criminal Procedure Code or under any 
other law for the time being in force as the High Court may 
direct. 
The High Court may designate any judicial Magistrate of 
the First Class in any sub-division as the Sub-Divisional 
Judicial Magistrate and relieve him of the repsonsibilities 
specified as occasion requires. 
Subject to the general control of the chief judicial 
Magistrate, every sub-divisional judicial Magistrate shall also 
have and exercise, such powers of supervision and control over 
the work of the judicial Magistrates (other than Additional Chief 
Judicial Magistrates) in the sub-division as the High Court may, 
by general or special order, specify in this behalf. 
Territorial division under the Criminal Procedure Code 
is: 
(i) Every state shall be a Sessions Division, shall 
consist of sessions divisions. 
(ii) Every sessions division shall be a district or 
consists of districts, 
(iii) Metropolitian area shall be a separate sessions 
division and district. 
(iv) State Government may, after consultation with the 
High Court, divide any district into sub-divisions 
and may alter the limits or the number of such 
sub-divisions, 
(v) The State Government may, by notification, declare 
that, as from such date as may be specified inthe 
notification, any area in the state comprising or 
toim whose population exceeds one million shall be 
a Metropolitan area. 
(vi) The State Government may, by notification, extend, 
reduce or alter the limits of a metropolitan area 
but the reduction or alteration shall not be so 
made as to reduce the population of such area to 
less than one million. 
In every metropolitan area, there shall be 
established as many courts of metropolitan Magistrates, and at 
such places, as the State Government may, after consultation with 
the High Court, by notification, specify. The presiding officers 
of such courts shall be appointed by the High Court. The 
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juri^iction and powers of every metropolitan Magistrate shall 
extend through out the metropolitan area. 
I 
As to subordination every chief judicial Magistrate 
shall be subordinate to the sessions judge. 
The chief judicial Magistrates may, from time to time, 
make rules or give special orders, consistent with the Criminal 
Procedure Code, as to the distribution of business among the 
judicial Magistrates subordinate to him. 
II 
The chief metropolitan Magistrate and every 
Additional chief metropolitan Magistrate shall be subodinate to 
the sessions judge. 
Every other metropolitan Magistrate, shall, subject to 
the general control of the sessions judge, be subordinate to the 
chief metropolitan Magistrate. 
The High Court may, for the purposes of Criminal 
Procedure Code difine the extent of the subordination, if any, of 
the Additional chief metropolitan Magistrate, to the chief 
metropolitan Magistrates. 
I. Section 15, Criminal Procedure Code. 
II. Section 19, Criminal Procedure Code. 
The chief netropolitan Magistrate may, from time to 
time, make rules or give special order, consistent, with the 
code, as to the distribution of business among the metropolitan 
Magistrates and as to the allocation of business to an Additional 
Chief Metrolopitan Magistrate. 
Jurisdiction 
Section 14 of Criminal Procedure Code explains the 
local jurisdiction of Magistrate of First Class. The chief 
judicial Magistrates may, subjects to the control of High Court, 
from time to time define the local limits of the areas within 
which the Magistrates appointed under Section 11 may exercise all 
or any of the powers with which they nay be invested under this 
code. Except otherwise provided by such definition, the 
jurisdiction and powers of every such Magistrate shall extend 
through out the district. 
Jurisdiction - Venue - In Inquiries and Trials 
The jurisdiction of Criminal Court to try a particular 
I 
offence is derived from: 
(1) The statute creating the court, or 
(2) from the statute defining the offence. 
Jhakar Ahi V. Proo. of Bihar, AIR 1945, Pat 98. 
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Further the jurisdiction of Magistrate to inquire into 
and dispose of criminal eases depends also upon: 
Magistrate must be competent to entertain and dispose 
of the cases. Schedule I of the Criminal. Procedure Code 
determines the competency. Under column 6 of the First Schedule 
the Matistrate of First Class has been shown as competent to 
inquire into and dispose of cases of criminal breach of trust 
falling under sections 406, 407, 408 and 409 of the Indian Penal 
Code. 
This competency is different from terrirotial 
jurisdiction. Criminal Procedure Code under Sections 177 to 185 
contain provisions regarding the place of criminal trial. 
Where a court is not empowered to try a particular 
offence does try, the entire trial is void. In cases of 
I 
territorial jurisdiction same importance is not attached to it. 
This is clear from the provisions of Sections 185, 188, 197(4) 
and section 462 Cr. P. Code. 
Territorial jurisdiction is provided as a matter of 
convenience: 
(1) With administrative point of view. In this 
connection work load of the court is to be taken 
I. Purshotam Das Dalmia V. State of West Bengal, AIR 1961 S.C. 
1589. Vp. 1593. 
. . 5"37 
into consideration, 
(2) With a view of convenience of the accused persons 
and of the witnesses. 
Section 177 of the Criminal Procedure Code embodies 
this principle within it. According to this section every 
offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a court 
within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. 
I 
In Narumal V. State of Bombay, it was held : 'The rule 
laid down by Section 177, is one of general application and 
governs all criminal trials held under the provisions of this 
code.' 
The competency of the court under section 177 to take 
cognizance or to try an offence is determined by the place where 
the offence is committed. Requirement is that the offences in 
their nature are local and the jurisdiction of the criminal 
courts is also local. 
A Magistrate is competent to try an offence within 
whose local jurisdiction an offence is committed. If the offence 
committed wholly outside the limits of his jurisdiction he is not 
authorised to take cognizance of and to try the accused. 
Therefore, the offence of criminal breach of trust may be 
I. AIR 1960, S.C. 1329 : 1960 Cr. L.j. 1674. 
inquired into or tried by a court within the local limits of 
whose jurisdiction any part of the property which is subject of 
the offence was received or retained by the accused person, or 
was required to be returned or accounted for by the accused 
I 
person or the offence was committed*. 
Section 177 makes it clear that ordinarily every 
offence shall be tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction 
it was committed. It does not say that it would be tried by such 
court except in the cases mentioned in Section 178 to 184 and 188 
or in cases specially provided by and other provision of law. In 
other words sections 178 to 184 and 188 cannot be read as 
exceptions to the general rule laid down by Section 177. They 
are rather elaborations of that rule telling where exactly an 
offence must be taken as committed in different situations and 
circumstances mentioned therein. Thus it leaves the place of 
trial open. Its provisions are not peremptory. Keeping this 
view in consideration it may also be said that provisions of 
Section 218 to 223 are also not exceptions to the general rule 
laid down by Section 177 Cr. P.C., if they do permit the trial of 
a particular offence along with others in one court. 
Section 178 deals with situations where it is uncertain 
in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or 
where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly 
I. D'Mello V. Pereira (1937) 39 Bom LR 620 : 1937 Bom 743. 
Sattenapalli Goparaju V. Meka Ramakrisha 1970 Cr. L.j. 
1290 (AP). 
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in another, or where an offence is a continuing one, and 
continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or where 
it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may 
be inquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any 
of such local areas. 
This section contemplates four contingencies. The 
first contingency as to when it is uncertain in which of the 
local areas an offence is committed, the type of contingency as 
envisaged by section 178 has been well explained by the Supreme 
I 
Court in State of M.P. V. K.P. Ghiara. Facts of the case were 
that 'the accused was employed as an agent in the company whose 
head office situated at Nagpur where its books were maintained 
and the staff located. On 12.9.1950, he was entrusted at Nagpur 
with a car belonging to the company for sale. The sale took 
place in Bombay and the proceeds were paid over to him at Bombay 
between the 13th and 14th January, 1951. It was clear from the 
evidience that the accused reached Nagpur on 17.1.1951 but the 
sale proceeds were not credited in the company's book nor the 
money paid over to the company then or thereafter. A charge 
sheet was filed against him under section 408 Indian Penal Code 
at Nagpur did not, either spedifically or by necessary 
implication, refer to the embezzlemant in Bombay nor did it 
indicate that it took place in Nagpur. There was no evidence to 
show that prior to his leaving for Nagpur, the accused had 
AIR 1957 S.C. 196. 
entertained or even been animated with an intention to 
misappropriate the sale deeds and there was nothing to show that 
he had utilised the funds during the period of his stay at Bombay 
for 4 days for his own use.' 
It was held that: 
(1) 'The venue of inquiry or trial of a case like the 
present must primarily be determined by the averments contained 
in the complaint or charge sheet and unless the facts there are 
positively disproved, ordinarily the court where the charge-sheet 
or complaint was filed, had to proceed with it, except where 
action had to be taken under section 202, Cr. P.C. 
(2) In the circumstances, it was uncertain whether the 
offence of embezzlement was committed at Bombay ol^Nagpur, and, 
therefore, section 178, Cr. P.C. applied, and the court at Nagpur 
had jurisdiction to inquire into the offence' 
In order to attract the provisions of section 178, it 
is necessary for the prosecution to lAver that the offence was 
committed in one or the other local area of which it was 
uncertain. 
The provisions of section 179 and 180 are quite wide to 
enable cognizance to be taken either by: 
(a) a court where anything was done within the local 
limits of its jurisdiction, or 
(b) a court where the consequences ensued. 
'When an act is an offence by reason of anything which 
has been done and of a consequence which has ensued the offence 
may be inquired into or tried by a court within whose local 
jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has 
ensued'. (S. 179). 
Where the accused was engaged in Kanpur as an agent of 
a firm of Kanpur to sell goods in Bengal and either bring or 
remit the money to Kanpur; and the accused made some sales and 
realised the prices at some places in Bengal but failed to bring 
or to remit the money to Kanpur; and there was no allegation or 
evidence that the accused had actually misappropriated or 
converted to his own use the money by any definite act committed 
at any particular place, it was held that 'the Kanpur Court had 
I 
jurisdiction to try him for an offence under sections 408/409'. 
Section 405 is in two parts. The first part will apply 
where it is known that the accused has dishonestly 
misappropriated or converted to his own use the entrusted 
property at a particular place, and the jurisdiction to try the 
I. Mahrulal (1935) 58 All 644; Kury Beharilal V. Brahama Datta 
(1942} ALj 559; (1942) 44 Cr. L.j. 102: (1942) (A) AIR, 
(A) 439. Hiralal (1956) Cr. L.j. 1165). 
accused will be at that place. But when it cannot be alleged 
that the misappropriation was actually and definitely comaitted 
at any particular place, there the case comes under the second 
part of section 405, namely dishonestly disposing of property in 
violation of any direction of law or of any legal contract; and 
if the legal contract required that the accused should remit or 
deliver or otherwise dispose of the property at a particular 
place, then his failure to do so constitute the offence, and the 
jurisdiction to try the accused exists at such place. Santosh 
I 
Kumar V. State may be discussed here as an illlustration. A 
seller at place X undertook to deliver refrigerators to purchaser 
at place Z after making due repairs of them. The seller 
delivered unrepaired refrigerators at place Z. Not only this but 
he also removed some material parts from them. it was observed 
that courts at place Z were competent to inquire into the offence 
under section 406 as the seller failed in discharging his trust 
in the manner undertaken by him. If there is evidence apart from 
the fact of non-delivery or non-accounting to show where the 
misappropriation was committed, the trial may be held at that 
place; but if there is no evidence to show where the 
misappropriation was committed, other than the fact of non-
delivery or non-accounting according to the contract, than the 
trial may be held at the place where the accused failed to 
deliver or to account, because that is where the offence was 
committed. 
I. 1975 Cr. L.j. 734 (All). 
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Under section 180 criminal Prodedure Code place of 
trial is determined where act is an offence by reason of 
relation to other offence. It contemplates two offences. Where 
an act which is an offence by reason of its relation to any other 
act which is also an offence, is committed, and the other act 
which is an offence is also committed, a charge of the first 
mentioned offence may be tried by the court within the local 
I 
limits of whose jurisdiction either act was done. The 
jurisdiction as regards the offence of dishonestly receiving 
stolen property under section 411 Indian Penal Code, would be 
governed by section 180, Cr. P.C. under which that offence can be 
enquired into or tried by a Magistrate within the local limits of 
whose jurisdiction either the offence under section 407 or the 
II 
offence under section 411 was committed. 
Section 181 deals with place of trial in case of certain 
offences. Claus (4) is relevant here. It reads that any offence 
of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may 
be inquired into or tried by a court within whose local 
jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the 
property which is the subject of the offence was received or 
retained or was required to be returned or accounted for, 
by the accused person. Where the offence 
committed at Gauhati which is outside the local limits of the 
I. In re L.N. Mukerjee, M R 1961 Mad 126 (DB). 
II. Rameshwarlal Bhura Mai V. .Dwaraka Prasad, AIR 1959 Manipur 
14. 
jurisdiction of any Magistrate of Manipur, but, because the 
property was handed over by the complainant at Zmphal within 
Manipur, the offence under section 407 I.P.C. can be tried at 
I 
laphal. 
In cases where offences committed by letters or 
telecommunication messages, could be tried or inquired by any 
court within whose local jurisdiction such letters or messages 
were sent or were received. (Section 182 Cr. P.C.) 
Section 183 is aimed to provide provision against 
difficulties which may arise while an offence is committed in the 
course of performing a journey or voyage, the offence may be 
inquired into or tried by a court through or into whose local 
jurisdiction that person or thing passed in the course of that 
journey or voyage. 
Place of trial for offences triable together under 
section 184 is determined where the offence committed by several 
persons are such that they may be charge with and tried together 
by virtue of the provisions of sections 219, 220 or 221 or, the 
offence or offences committed by several persons are such that 
they may be charged with and tried together by virtue of the 
provisions of section 223, the offences may be inquired into or 
tried by any court competent to inquire into or try any of the 
offences. 
I. AIR 1959 Manipur 14. 
Relevant renaining sections of Chapter XIII contemplate 
such situation as power to order cases to be tried in different 
sessions divisions. Right Court to decide, in case of doubt, 
district where inquiry or trial shall take place, power to issue 
suaaons of warrant for offences committed beyond local 
jurisdiction and offences committe outside India. 
The offence of criminal breach of trust is complete as 
soon as the dishonest intention of the accused is formed coupled 
with an overtact to show that intention to misappropriate or 
convert to his own use the entrusted property. The consequence 
loss, to the owner of the property is not a component part of the 
offence. Consequently, it is the court within whose jurisdiction 
the property was received or retained or the dishonest intention 
formed that has jurisdiction to try the offence and not the court 
of the place where the loss to the owner or other consequence 
I 
occurs. 
Where neither entrustment nor conversion has taken 
place within the territorial jurisdiction of a court that court 
II 
has no jurisdiction. 
I. A 1930 Bom. 490. 
II. 1970 Cr. L.j. 332. 
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Criminal Procedure Code lays down three types of 
trials:-
(1) Trial of Varrant Case by Magistrate - Chapter XIX. 
(2) Trial of Summons - Cases by Magistrate - Chapter 
XX. 
(3) Summary Trials - Chapter XXI. 
Offence of criminal breach of trust is covered under 
trials of warrant cases by the Magistrate. Thus the present 
study is confined to tirals of warrant cases by the Magistrate. 
Section 2(x) defines warrant case as a case relating to 
an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or 
imprisonment for a laraL excefi4ing_two years. While the summon 
case has been defined as a case relating to an offence, and not 
being a warrant case. It may be inferred from the definitions 
that the nature and measure of punishment which the law 
prescribes for a particular offences determines the character of 
summons-case or warrant-case. Cases which are punishable with 
imprisonment for two years or below 2 years are summon eases.~ On 
the other hand offences punishable with imprisonment exceeding 2 
years are warrant cases. Later category of cases covers the 
offence of criminal breach of trust. 
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Under warrant eases, a Magistrate is to follow two 
different procedures: 
(1) Where in a case instituted on a police report 
procedure to be followed has been laid down in 
sections 238 to 243j_4»dr' 
(2) Vhere any warrant case instituted otherwise than 
on a police report, the procedure has been 
specified in sections 244 to 247, Criminal 
Procedure Code. 
In respect of trial conducted by a Magistrate on a 
police report, the accused either appears or is brought before 
him at the commencement of the trial, the Magistrate shall 
satisfy himself whether the accused has been furnished with all 
documents referred in section 207, Criminal Procedure Code or 
not. The Magistrate on consideration of those documents and 
after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of 
being heard if he considers the charge against the accused as 
groundless he will discharge the accused; on the other hand if 
the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming 
that the accused has committed an offence triable. Under 
Chapter XIX of Cr. P. Code and that such Magistrate is competent 
to try, he will frame a charge against the accused. 
In cases instituted otherwise than on the police 
report, the Magistrate will frame charge after taking evidence 
for the prosecution, but the Magistrate may not frame charge if 
on such evidence the Magistrate thinks that no case against the 
accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his 
conviction and, in such case, will discharge the accused. 
In cases instituted otherwise than on the police 
report, the accused has the right to reserve cross-examination of 
prosecution witness till at a later stage. The Magistrate has to 
ascertain from the complaint or otherwise the name of any person 
to be able to give evidence for the prosecution and shall summon 
them; the Magistrate cannot discharge the accused without 
examining all witnesses for the prosecution. 
'As a general rule the cross-examination of a witness 
is to be made immediately after examination-in-chief, but 
exception to this general rule has been mde in cases of trial of 
warrant cases where the accused is entitled to defer the 
examination until after the framing of the charge. This right to 
cross-examine a witness after the charge is framed, is an 
absolute right and the omission to give the accused the benefit 
of that right would vitiate the whole proceeding, and then fact 
that the witnesses were once cross-examined by the accused before 
the charge is of no avail. 
I 
In Habeeb Mohammad V. State of Hyderabad, it has been 
observed that it is the bounden duty of the prosecution to 
T. AIR 1954 S.C. 51 : 1954 Cr. L.j. 338. 
examine a material witness particularly when no allegation has 
been made that, if produced, he would not speak the truth. For 
them observed that not only does adverse inference arise agaist 
the prosecution case from his non-production as a witness in view 
of illustration (g) to section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 
but that the circumstance of his being withheld from the court 
would cast a serious reflection on the fairness of the trial. 
'If it is shown that persons who had witnessed the 
incident, have been deliberately kept back, the court may draw an 
adverse inference and, in a proper case, record such failure as 
constituting a serious infirmity in the proof of the prosecution 
I 
case'. 
When the accused is not discharge then the accused 
after examining and cross-examining the prosecution witness shall 
be called upon to enter upon his defence and produce his 
evidence; and the provisions of section 243 shall apply to the 
case. 
Offences of criminal breach of trust cannot be tried 
II 
sununarily, and no order under section 360, Criminal Procedure 
Code can be made on conviction under section 408 Cr. P.C. To 
discharge frivolous complaints, section 250 enables the court to 
I. Darya Singh V. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 s.c. 328. 
II. Karnesh Kumar Singh V. state of U.P., AIR 1968 s.c. 1402. 
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compensation to the accused if there was no reasonable ground for 
accusation where civil case I'**' ^*««o filed and decreed criminal 
proceedings after a gap of qui-^^ lo°9 ^^"^ under section 406 were 
I 
not proper and maintable. But merely because there is a civil 
remedy a complaint for crimir»*l breach of trust cannot be thrown 
la 
out. 
A Magistrate cann<>t refuse to take cognizance of an 
offence under sections 405 an^ 40^' Cr- P.C. on the ground that 
II 
the amount mis-appropriated i? very small. (Five rupees). 
Being a cognizable «**« ^<> process fee is payable by 
the complainant for compelling tbe attendance of the accused. An 
order discharging the accuse^ ^°^ non-payment of such fee is not 
III 
sustainable. 
Vhere the facts iA a complaint case indicate a fair 
case under sections 405, 4'^ ^ against the accused, it is not 
proper to dismiss the complaint under section 203 of the Criminal 
IV 
Procedure Code. 
I. Kariraj Basudevananda V. State 1970 Cr. L.j. 632. 
la. 1978 Cr. L.j. 609 Punj. 
II. 1974 BLJR 49 (50). 
III. ILR (1954) Punj. 645. 
IV. A 1952 Ajmer 58. 
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When allegations in the complaint do not at all 
constitute the ingredients, to aake out a prima facie case under 
section 406, after acquittal of some the accused, it was held 
I 
remanding the case of other accused would be meaningless. 
A second class Magistrate cannot, in a case falling 
under section 409, try the case and convict the accused under 
II - . 
section 406 Cr. P. Code. 
Burden o|. Proof 
The term 'burden of proof in relation to the judicial 
proceedings has been used in two senses : (1) a burden of 
establishing the case, and (2) in the sense of introducing the 
evidence. First is covered under section 101, and later in 
section 102 Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 
Vhen a person desires any court to give judgement as to 
any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts 
which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. Vhen a 
person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said 
that the burden of proof lies on that person. If he fails in 
proving those facts, his suit fails. The burden of proof in a 
suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail of no 
evidence at all were given on either side. 
I. 1976 Mad. LW (Cr.) 70. 
II. (1899) - Bom. LR 27 (29) (DB). 
Sections 101 to 103 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 
'Simply explain who is to prove a particular fact and not the 
extent of proof required in any case. The extent of proof 
required in any case, infact, depends upon the nature of the 
case. In crimin«d cases the standard of proof required is proof 
beyond reasonable doubt. 
The burden of proof is on the party who asserts, not on 
him who denies. Whoever goes to the court and asserts any fact, 
he has to prove the fact. In a criminal prosecution the accused 
is not bound to prove the defence story, it is the prosecution's 
duty to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 
The basic principle of criminal jurisprudence is that an accused 
person is presumed to be innocent and the burden of proving the 
existence of all the facts on which the existence of criminal 
liability depends always lies on the prosecution. If the 
prosecution case does not reach this standard of proof, there 
I 
cannot be conviction of the accused. 
However, the burden of proving a fact, initially on one 
party may he shifted to the other party in the following 
conditions: 
I. Nohindra Singh V. State, AIR 1953 S.C. 415. 
Other revelant cases on burden proff : Bhagat Ram V. State 
of Punjab, AIR 1954 s.c. 621; Sarwan Singh Ratan Singh V. 
State of Punjab, AIR 1957 S.C. 637; Haripada Day V. State of 
West Bengal, AIR s.c. 757; Gurcharan Singh V. State of 
Punjab, AIR 1956 S.C. 460; Shaobhu Nath Mehra V. State of 
Ajmer, AIR 1956 s.c. 404. 
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(1) by proving facts giving rise to a presumption in 
his favour, (sections 107, 108 and 112 Indian 
Evidence Act). 
(2) by showing that the subject-matter of a party's 
allegation is paculiarly within the knowledge of 
his opponents, (section 106). 
(3) by proving an admission, and 
(4) by proving that case of accused comes within 
exceptions in the Indian Penal Code (Section 105). 
In cases covered under the second category when applied 
to criminal cases great care and caution is to be taken. 'An 
accused charged with the criminal breach of trust of his master's 
property left in his custody is the only person who can account 
for the property if he has not committed the offence and the 
burden of accounting the property is on him, if he fails, he may 
be convicted. 
Under section 109 of Indian Evidence Act, when the 
question is whether person are partners, landlords and tenant^ or 
principal and agent, and it has been shown that they have been 
acting as such, the burden of proving that they do not stand, or 
have ceased to stand, to each other in those relationships 
respectively, is on the person who affirms it. Once a relation is 
shown to be in existence, for a longer, or shorter period, there 
is a presumption of its continuance till contrary is proved. 
The court Bay also presuae existence of certain facts 
which it thioJcs likely to have happened, regard being had to the 
coiBon course of natural events, huaan conduct and public and 
private business, in their reletion to the facts of the 
particular case. (Section 114, Indian Evidence Act). 
The burden of proof of establishing all the ingredients 
of the offence such as entrusjaent,' misappropriation, dishonest 
—r 
intention, etc. is on the prosecution. Vhen the prosectuion 
succeeds in making out a prime facie case against the accused, 
the onus will shift to the accused to show how he is not 
II 
guilty. Once the entrustment of amounts in question is proved 
by the prosecution it is for the accused to explain how he dealt 
with the amount. 
The prosecution is to give evidence to prove: 
(1) That the accused was entrusted with property or 
with dominion over it; 
(2) That the accused misappropriated the property or 
converted to his own use or either used or 
disposed of the property; 
(3) That the accused did so in violation of any law 
prescribing the manner in which such trust was to 
I. (1979), 81 pUNJ. l.r. 247. 
II. 1978 Cr. L.j. (NOC) 293 (Goa.). 
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be excecuted, or any legal contract, express or 
implied, which he made touching the discharge of 
such trust, or, he wilfully suffered soae other 
person to do; 
(4) That the accused misappropriated the property or 
converted it to his own use or either used the 
property or disposed of it dishonestly. 
I 
In Nohd. Yasin's case, 'a coal depot was raided in 
the absence of the owner Qf the depot and the entire stock of 
coal was seized from the munia and entrusted to him for safe 
custody under Ziaaanaaa executed by hia and subsequently the 
entire stock of coal was found aissing froa the place where it 
at 
had been kept, the owner of the depot could not be itributed with 
criminal breach of trust unless criminal conspiracy was 
established between the owner and munia'. 
'The prosecution cannot rest content with pro^ving mere 
false entries to bring home to the accused that money had been 
misapproriated without further evidence to prove that the accused 
attempted to suppress all traces of his embezzelment by any 
manipulation of the accounts, or evidence of the financial 
circumstances of the accused which would render probable a case 
II 
of aisapprotiation'. 
I. 1986 Cr. L.j. 1810 (Pat.) 
II. Rame Rao V. Sub-Inspector of Police, Kahasti Station 
(1937), MWN 566. 
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In Jay Krishnadas it was held that 'conviction of a 
person for the offence of criainal breach of turst aay not, in 
all cases, be founded aerely on his failure to account the 
property entrusted to hia or over which he has dominion, even 
then a duty to account is imposed upon him, but where he is 
unable to account or renders an explanation for his failure to 
account which is untrue, an inference of misappropriation with 
dishonest intention may readily be made.' 
Onus lies on the prosecution to prove not only that 
money was paid to the accused in trust but also that he did not 
apply it for the purpose for which it was given. On the 
indictment for embezzlement, it is not enough to prove that a 
clerk has received a sum of money, and not entered it in his 
book, unless there be also evidence that he has denied the 
receipt of it or the like. 
II 
Proof of mode of misappropriation is not necessary. 
Mere failure to make an entry in account books is not sufficient 
III 
to establish charge of misappropriation. 
Gist of the offence is the dishonest intention. To 
retain property even temporarily with dishonest intention is 
I. AIR 1960 SC. 889. 
II. 1963 Cut. 877 (Sarat., AIR 1959 SC 1390 (Followed). 
III. 1975 UCR (Bom) 274. 
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sufficient. Vhere there is no dishonest intention an accused 
person would not be liable for crimiaal breach of trust though he 
may be accountable to a civil liability for damages. 
The essential thing to be proved in case of criminal 
breach of trust is whether the accused was actuated by dishonest 
intention or not. However, direct proof of intention is 
different. In a case of a public servant, charged with 
misappropration of moneys, the element of offence of criminal 
breach of trust will be established if the prosecution proved 
entrustment of money, which he has under a duty to account and 
had not done so. If the failure to account was due to 
cricumstances as pleaded by the accused in defence, then those 
facts being within the accused's knowledge it is for the accused 
to explain them. 
In accordance to section 106, Indian Evidence Act, if 
the facts and circumstances are within the knowledge of the 
accused then he has to prove them. This, however, does not mean 
that the burden is cast upon the accused person or persons that 
no crime has been committed. The prosecution has to establish a 
prima facie case in the first instance. Section 106 of the 
Evidence Act does not effect the prosecution's initial onus of 
proving the guilt of the accused. The non-payment by the accused 
of collections for a longtime may raise a presumption that he has 
misappropriated the amounts and it is for the accused to explain 
the delay. Vhere the evidence creates a doubt whether the 
accused is guilty or not, he is entitled to the benefit of the 
I 
doubt. 
A, clerk in sub-office drawing money from office for 
payment of rent to H owner of the building in which office was 
situated, and sending a receipt by the Head clerk of H for, such 
payment to head office. Receipt missing in the head office and 
H denying such payment. In the absence of receipt it was 
doubtful whether A forged the receipt or the head clerk of H did 
so, held that A could not be convicted under section 409 I.P.C. 
II 
or under section 477A, I.P.C. 
Dishonest misappropriation is essential for the offence 
under section 409. Vhere the accused retained money for 15 days 
and deposited it at once when demanded, it was held that the case 
III 
was not that of dishonest intention. 
'Amount drawn by principal for Chowkidar not borne on 
the register but Chowkidar not denying the receipt of payment. 
It was held that breach of rules not sufficient for conviction.' 
I. A 1972 SC 521. 
II. 1976 Chand. LR (Cri) 206 (Punj). 
III. Nageshwar Prasad V. State, AIR 1970 Pat. 311. 
IV. 1980 sec (Cri.) 116 (B.B. Lai). 
I 
In re B.V. Padaanabha Rao, where the prosecution proved 
that one of the thumb impressions onthe N.O. form was of the 
accused but did not prove that the other was not of the payee and 
the payee also did not state that she did not receive the money 
but only stated that the thumb-impression on the form were not 
hers, held, charge under section 409 was not proved. 
II 
In On Prakash,s case, non-production of writeen 
complaints by several affected persons who also appeard as 
witness made the case doubtful. 
'Where the Bank Manager made fictitious entries showing 
III 
repayments, held the conviction was justified*. 
'Vhere the keys of the safe remained with the cashier 
and there was no evidence that he parted'with the keys, he must 
IV 
be held guilty in case of embezzlement.' 
'Vhere the accused was charged with criminal breach of 
trust and falsification of accounts but the documents alleged to 
have been falsified was missing from the office recoitd, held the 
accused could not be convicted under sections 409 and 477A 
I. AIR 1970 Mys. 254. 
II. 1980 sec (Cri.) 125. 
III. 1974 sec (Cri.) 168 (Budh Singh). 
IV. 1972 sec (Cri.) 700 (Surendra). 
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Indian Penal Code*. 
Ixaaiaation of litneaaea 
The order in which witnesses are produced and examined 
shall be regulated by the law and. practice for the tiae being 
relating to crisinal procedure code, and in the absence of any 
II 
such law, by the discretion of the court. The prosecution or 
the coaplainant begins his case and produces prosecution 
witnesses and then accused is asked to enter his defence. 
Ill 
Exaaination of witness has three stages; the first is 
called, the 'examination-in-chief', second, 'cross-exaaination', 
and third, 're-exaaination'. 
The evidence of the witnesses is taken in open court in 
the presence of presiding officer of the court. In certain 
exceptional cases evidence may be taken on commission also. When 
the witness apprears in the court to give evidence he is first 
administered the oath to speak the truth and the only truth. A 
child witness below the age of 12 is not required to take the 
oath. 
I. AIR 1972 SC 521. 
II. Section 135, Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 
III. Section 137 - Indian Evidence Act. 
The examination of witness is oral in the form of 
question and answers, but recorded in the narrative form. 
However, where any question asked is objected by the opposite-
party but allowed by the court, it is proper to record question 
and answer both. 
The examination of a witness by the party who calls him 
shall be called examination-in-chief. The examination of witness 
by the adverse party is known as his cross-examination. The 
party who has called the witness, subsequent to the cross-
examination, if examines the witness again such examination is 
called as 're-examination*. The order of examination shall be 
first examination-in-chief, then if the opposite party so desires 
cross-examination, and thirdly of the party calling the witness 
so desires to re-examine the witness. 
The examination and cross-examination must relate to 
relevant facts but the cross-examination need not be confined to 
the facts to which the witness testified on his examination-in-
chief . 
The main characteristic feature of the examination-in-
chief is to tell the story of party calling the witness. It is 
the responsibility of the counsel to bring out clearly and in 
proper order every relevant fact in support of his client's case 
to which the witness can depose. The examination-in-chief is 
limited to facts-in-issue and facts relevant to the facts-in-
issue. The irrelevant questions should not be asked in the 
exaaination-in-chief. Ordinarily, leading questions should not 
be asked in the examination-in-chief. 
As to cross-exaaination, the object is twofold : (1) to 
weaken, qualify or destroy the case of opposite party, and (2) to 
establish the party's own case by means of his opponent's 
witnesses. Adverse party ispeach the accuracy, the credibility 
and general value of the evidence given in chief. The object is 
to detect and expose discrepencies, or to elicit suppressed facts 
which will support the case of the cross-examining party. In 
fact, cross-examination is a good method, in the hands of 
intelligent lawyers, to take every thing out of the mouth of the 
opponent's witness. 
From sections 146 to 152 lay down rules relating to 
questions which may be asked to shake the credit of a witness by 
damaging his character. 
A witness during cross-examination may be asked 
questions which tend to: 
(1) test the veracity of a witness, 
(2) discover who he is and what is his position in 
life, or 
(3) shake his credit, by injuring his character, 
although the answer to such questions might tend 
en 
directly or indirectly to incriminate him, or 
might expose ortend directly or indirectly to 
I 
expose him to a penalty or forfeiture. 
The court may forbid questions which may be seandulous, 
indecent, intended to insult or annoy. Court is to decide when 
question shall be asked and when witness compelled to annwer. If 
any question relates to a matter not relevant to the suit or 
proceeding, except in so far as it effects the credit of the 
witness by injuring his character, the court shall decide 
whether or not the witness shall be compelled to anwer it, and 
may, if it thinks fit, warn the witness tha he is not obliged to 
answer it. 
In exercising the discretion, the court shall consider 
the question proper only when the matter conveyed by the question 
would seriously affect the opinion of the court about the 
credibility of the witness. 
Question would be considered improper (1) if the 
imputetion refers to a matter which is so remote in time or of 
such a nature that it would affect the credibility of the witness 
in a slight degree or (2) if the matter asked is in disproportion 
between the importance of the imputation and the importance of 
witness's evidence. 
I. Section 146, Indian Evidence Act. 
The court may, if it sees fit, draw from the witness's 
refusal to answer, the inference that the answer if given would 
be infavourable. 
Sections 149 and 150 protect the witness from a 
questions being asked without reasonable grounds. If the court 
is of opinion that any such question was asked without 
reasonable grounds, it may, if it was asked by any barrister, 
pleader, vakil or attorney, report the circumstances of the case 
to the High Court or other authority to which such barrister, 
pleader, vakil or attorney is subject in the exercise of his 
profession. 
Section 153 Evidence Act is intended to prevent the 
litigation being extended to uncertain limit. If everything, 
what the witness has deposed to allow to be contradicted by the 
adverse party, there will be no end to the litigation. That is 
the reason when a witness has been asked and has answered any 
question which is relevant to the inquiry only in so far as it 
tends to shake his credit by injuring his character, no evidence 
shall be given to contradict him; but if he answers falsely, he 
may afterwards be charged with giving false evidence under 
section 193 Indian Penal Code. 
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This section has two exceptions: 
(1) Where the witness denies his previous conviction, 
evidence may be given to this effect contradicting 
his statement of denial. 
(2) Where the witness is asked any question tending to 
impeach his impartiality, and answers it by 
denying the facts suggested, he may be 
contradicted. 
In cases of hostile witnesses, unwilling to answer the 
questions or it appears to the party who calls the witnesses 
that the witness is not going to give the truth, the court may be 
asked by the party to permit to put any questions to him which 
I 
might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party. 
Impeaching credit of witness may be either by the 
adverse party or with the consent of the court, by the party who 
calls him. 
A witness may, while under examination, refresh his 
memory by referring to any writing made by himself at the time of 
the transaction concerning which he is questioned. The witness 
may also refresh his memory by reference to any document with the 
I. Section 154, Evidence Act. 
permission of the court. An expert nay refresh his memory by 
reference to professional treatises. 
Another important section relating to examination of 
witnesses is section 165 Evidence Act, where the judge has been 
empowered to cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in 
reply to any question subject to certain limitation laid down in 
the section itself. 
Right to be Defended 
Under section 303, Criminal Procedure Code an accused 
can, as a mater of right, claim to be defenced by a pleader of 
his choice. A conviction following- a trial cannot stand if there 
has been refusal to hear the lawyer. So also an appeal cannot be 
disposed of ex-paste where the appellant is entitled to be heard 
by a lawyer assigned to him by the government, who fails to reach 
the court in time to conduct the appeal. If the defence lawyer 
is weaX in presenting the case of his client, a duty is cast upon 
a trial judge to protect the interest of the accused and cross-
examine the witnesses of the prosecution himself. The main 
object of this provision is that the interest of the accused 
should remain supreme and in no way be prejudiced. 
Before the enactment of new Criminal Procedure Code an 
accused person as stated above had a right to be defended by a 
en 
pleader. But after the recommendation of lav commissions section 
304,, a new provision was added in the Criminal Procedure Code. 
According to this section, where an accused person is not 
represented by a pleader during the trial before the court of 
session and it appears to the court that the accused has not 
sufficient means to engage a pleader, the court shall assign a 
pleader for his defence at the expense of the state and also 
empowers the state government to extend this facility to other 
cases. 
A similar right accrues to the accused under section 56 
Criminal Procedure Code whete the accused person arrested by 
police without warrant should be brough before a Magistrate 
competent to try or commit with as little delay as possible or 
release him on bail. 
In Hadhu Limaye's case it was observed that the makers 
of the constitution of India were anxious to provide these 
safeguards, as integral part of the fundamental rights. 
Article 22 of the Constitution of India is relevant here. 
Clause (1) of Article 22 is meant to afford the 
earliest opportunity to the arrested person to remove any 
mistake, misapprehension or misunderstanding in the mind of the 
arresting authorty and also to know exactly what the accusation 
against him is, so that he can exercise the second right, namely, 
of consulting z> legal practioner of his choice and to be defended 
by him. 
Clause (2) of Article 22 provides the next and most 
material safeguard that the arrested person must be produced 
before a Magistrate within 24 hours of such arrest so that an 
independent authority exercising judical powers may, without 
delay, apply its mind to his case. 
iff 
CBXBTEBL VII 
PART B 
jBeirarchy ftf. SharijJh Courts 
The Shariah is recognized as one of the main sources of 
law in almost all Muslim countries. This notion is part of and 
incorporated in the constitutional laws of countries such as 
Bahrain, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Syria, United Arab Emirate, all 
from Middle East, and, Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan from 
East. Civil Codes of Egypt (1948). Iraq (1951), and Libya 1953 
recognise Islamic Shariah as a source of their respective 
national legal system. Saudi Arabia and Oman also consider the 
Shariah as the basis of the national law. However, the 
contemporary legal systems in these countries are nation bound. 
Courts of a country have a pivotal role in the 
implementation of its laws. Islamic courts, thus, are of the 
elements and symbols where Islamic law comes into action. How 
.far Islamic law is applied in Shariah courts and what is their 
present structure in different countries of the world, is the aim 
to examine in the following paragraphs. It is not possible to 
study the courts structure of all countries. Therefore, our 
study confines only to the tew selected countries. 
Court. Structure in Saudi l^ rabia 
In spite of the existence of a constitutional 
instruments, according to the official statements, Saudi Arabia 
has the Holy Quran and other classical Islamic law as the main 
source of law of the country. The Shariah governs all, even the 
King. Shariah courts in Saudia Arabia have general jurisdiction 
in all civil, criminal and family cases. 
A study in the history of Saudi Arabia may be divided 
into three distinct periods : (1) The pre-Islamic era, (2) The 
Islamic era, and, (3) period beginning with the establishment of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. To study all the periods is 
difficult. Though we will make some references but study 
confines particularly to the present era. 
In the Post Islamic period, Mecca period, Medina 
period, the Republic period - Khilafat period, the Umnayya 
period, the formative period when the development of Islamic law 
started, downfall of the Abbasids in 656 A.H/1258 - the 
underlying feature of this period is the closing of the doors of 
ijtihad (reasoning), the Ottoman period, and ultimately the 
modern Saudi period are all most outstanding. 
The Mecca period is marked by considerable opposition 
to the rise of Islam and little opportunity for Prophet (peace be 
upon him) to engage himself in the implementation of Islamic Law. 
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Ourinq Medina period Islamic Laws, Quran and the precepts of 
Prophet were qiven the practical shape and implemented in the day 
to day life affairs. After the death of Prophet (peace be upon 
him), comes the Khilafat period, durinq which period the 
"consensus of the Community" was established as a further source 
of Islamic Law, that is, where the Holy Quran and Sunnah did not 
provide any specific answer to the new questions, resort was had 
to the unanimous views of the Muslim conmunity. 
Under the modern period, in the mid-eiqhteeth century, 
Muhairmad-Ibn Abd. al-Wahhab, a Hambili jurist, beqan a compaiqn 
for the purification of the Islamic faith from the innovations 
(bedah) prevailinq in Hejaz (now part of Saudi Arabia). Muhammad 
ibn Sa'ud, the father of the Kinq Abdal Aziz, ioined the Wahabi^ 
rigid orthodoxy. This fact had impact on institutions later 
established after the Saudi Dynasty captured the whole of the 
Saudi Arabia from the Ottam Empire. Thus after the establishment 
of the Kinqdom of Saudi Arabia, the Hambali school was adopted as 
the official creed of the state. 
The Supreme Judicial Council of Saudi Arabia in the 
year 1926, made it mandatory by official decree for all courts to 
rely on Hambali Texts. The council laid down the followinq order 
of Hambali Texts as approved sources of law: 
(1) Sharh Mutaha ai-Iradat by al-Bahuti (Hansur, b. 
Yunus, b. Idris al-Hambali (d. 1051 A.H/1651-52). 
(2) Xashshaf al-Kina an N ^ al-Ikna by the same 
author, 
(3) Commentaries of Al ZAD, 
(4) Conmentaries of al-Oalil, and 
(5) If no answer is found then reference may be made 
to secondary sources in Hambali legal manuals, and 
(6) If there is no Hambali work to answer the question 
reference may be made to the authorities in other 
I 
sunni schools. 
The bulk of the law in Saudi Arabia is still to be 
found in traditional sources of Islamic Law. 
The second source of law in Saudi Arabia is State 
Regulations. They may be secular in nature, but it is true that 
the purpose of State Regulations in Saudi Arabia is not to 
detract from the Islamic law traditions or change and reform. 
These Regulations are simply aimed to supplement them. It is 
said that the Saudi Arabian jurists usually invoke a convenient 
legal fiction to support the statutes with a view to avoid any 
apprearance of encroaching upon the tradition Islamic law 
principles. This fact has resulted in a duel legal and judicial 
system: 
(1) First is the heirarchy of Shariah Courts, and 
I. S.H. Amin, 'The Middle-East Legal System', p. 313. 
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(2) Second, is the specialised judicial organs and 
quasi-judicial tribunals. 
Shariah Courts exercise the general and universal 
jurisdiction while specialised tribunals have the jurisdiction 
to decide the specific issues. Here our purpose is to confine to 
the study of Shariah Courts only. 
SHARIAH COURTS 
The Shariah Courts are organised by the Ministry of 
I 
Justice. At present there is a three-tiered judicial system 
comprising of: 
(1) Courts of first instance; 
(2) Courts of appeal; 
(3) The Supreme Judicial Council. 
Cpurts_ of .Pirat .Instance 
The courts of first instance are classified under two 
categories: 
(1) The Lower Courts, and 
(2) The General Courts or organized courts. 
Supra N - I, p. 
According to the law of 1927, two Shariah Courts were 
established, one in Jeddah and other one in Medina. 
Subsequently, this kind of courts began to spread in Saudi 
Arabia, so much so that their number is now greater than that of 
any other kind of courts. 
flvmiiet ot iudqea of th* Shariah Caurta were never 
fixed. They were to be appointed in accordance to the need of 
the time. The only exception was the law of 1927 which 
determined that Shariah courts of Jeddan and Medina were to 
consist of two judges, a first chief judge, and the other a 
deputy judge. 
The Lower Courts 
The lower court deal with minor offences and claims, as 
well as crimes of defamation and drinking, but have no power to 
impose sentences of death or amputation. These courts have been 
established in towns outside Hijaz, and in villages under all the 
provinces. These usually consisted of one judge, who heard cases 
in any convenient place, even in his home or in the market or in 
the building of the office of the governor, and at any convenient 
time, whether during the day or night. 
However, at present, every court, even if it is in a 
village, occupies a building called "the court' (ai-Mehkeme), and 
cases are decided during office hours. 
T ^ General Qsssts. or Qi:gsAis.e4 CoujtLs. 
Organised or general court occupies a permanent 
buildinq and works accordinq to fixed official schedules, such as 
the courts of Jeddah and Medina. These general courts have 
universal jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases. Generally 
the court comprises of one judge only. But in cases where 
sentence of death, stoning or amputation are to be pronounced, 
the court should be comprised and be presided over by a penal of 
three-judges. 
Shariah court may have a large criminal jurisdiction if 
there is no Magistrates' Court situated in its venue, but if 
there is a Magistrate,s Court established under the regulatioans, 
the criminal jurisdiction of the Shariah Court will be limited. 
Magistrate Court if existing in area was also to decide cases in 
accordance to the Islamic law. A single judge in a village which 
does not have a Magistrates' court, exercises much greater 
jurisdiction than a Shariah court in a big city, where a 
Magistrate's court exists. 
Thus Magistrates are also working side by side with 
Shariah Courts. 
Courts oi Appeal 
The words "tamyiz" and "tadqia" mean the same thinq. 
They have been used in the judicial laws and requlations to mean 
reviewing a judqement of a court of first instance, by an 
I 
appellant authority, in order to ensure: 
(1) That the judqement are delivered in conformity 
with the Islamic Laws^ 
(2) If judqement is not inconformity with Islamic Law, 
then the lower court or court of first instance 
was to be informed about the correct view or 
correct judqonent and instructions are sent not to 
repeat such errors in future. 
(3) That the sentence awarded should be inconsonance 
with Islamic Law. In cases where judges may use 
their discretions, it is to be reviewed whether 
the discretions used are incorformity with Islamic 
There are two appellate shariah courts one sitting in 
Riyadh and the other in Mecca. The former has jurisdiction to 
hear appeals trom lower courts sittinq in central and Eastern 
Provinces, and the later from the courts of the Western Province. 
The Chariman of the Court of Appeal is selected on the basis ot 
absolute seniority. 
The panel comprisinq of three -judges haar the—appeals. 
However, sentences of death, stoninq or amputation can only be 
imposed by a panel of five judqes. 
Decisions of the applellate courts are final, except in 
cases where sentence is death or stoninq or amputation. 
The Supreme Judicial Council (["Majl_is al-jjada' al-A'LA") 
This is the hiqhest judicial body in the heirarchy of 
Shariah Courts in Saudi Arabia. The judicial council comprises 
of ten members. Its chairman holds the rank of a Minister. 
Powers ot the supreme judicial council covers within 
its scope administrative, consultative, and judicial functions. 
It functions in the form of two committees. 
Traditionally, direct appeals to the Kinq in the form 
of petitions are permissible to seek redress of qrievances. This 
system of appeal to the Kinq is still in practice and considered 
to be a very useful procedure for obtaininq a fair hearinq. 
This is in brief judicial hierachy of Shariah courts in 
Saudi Arabia. Few more points about the powers and functions of 
Shariah courts may also be referred here. 
6 7S' 
Firstly, source of Shariah courts is traditionally the 
Islamic law, jury trials are unknown in the Saudi Arabian legal 
system. 
Secondly, cases are heard by a single judge, known as 
Qazi. He acts impartially in the role of an investigating 
magistrate who can examine and cross-examine the disputants and 
their witness. 
Thirdly, upon the completion of trial, the judge 
decides both guilt and innocance. 
Fourthly, in certain criminal cases the actual 
punishment may be determined by a local shaik with the advice of 
a local Muslim jurist or an advisory group of them known as ulema 
( > ^ ). 
Fifthly, the base year of Saudi Arabian legal system is 
1926. Thereafter, reforms in the judicial structure were 
introduced from time to time. Most outstanding official 
instructions are of 1927, 1936, 1938, 1954, 1957, 1962, 1967, 
1970, 1971 and 1973. Under these instructions, the constitution, 
powers and functions, originaal and appellate jurisdictions of 
Shariah courts were determined, and Courts of First Instance, 
Appellate Courts, and High Judicial Council (Majlis ai-Qada, Al-
Ala) were established. Now at oresent Saudi Arabia has a well-
knit Shariah judicial system administering justice to the people. 
' au4i<?4»l szaisB s i Afq^^nniitt^ n 
IVrticles 50 - 57 of the constitution of 1928, and 
Articles 213 - 226 of the Nizam - nama of Basic Organizations 
1923 set up three - tiered system of shariah courts in 
I 
Afghanistan, that is: 
(1) 'Mahkama-e-ibtida'iya' - Primary court, 
(2) 'Mahkaroa-e-morafia' - court of appeal, and 
(3) 'Hay'at-e-ali-e-tamiz' - cassation board. 
Primary Court 
Primary court was to exist in each administrative 
district (Lokumat-e-Mahali) court consisted of a Qadi, two Muftis 
and a clerk. 
This court had jurisdiction in all ordinary civil and 
criminal disputes. In criminal cases court was competent to 
pronounce iudqements and were enforceable insnediately except in 
death sentences and sentences which imposed corporal punishment 
or which effected the reputation of the convict. 
Death sentences were referred to all the three courts 
and subject to the approval of the^monarch before it could be 
excecuted. 
I. Mohamad Hashim Kamali, 'Law in Afghanistan', p. 212. 
^30 
Defendents could appeal aqainst penal sentences 
involving corporal punishment or sentences affectinq reputation 
of a person. Fifteen days after the pronouncement of judgement 
and its communication to the convicted person, an appeal could be 
made to the higher c ourt of appeal. 
Ordinarily, as a rule, sentences of the primary court 
in felonie5(jinayat) were regularly referred for a review to the 
Hiqher Courts. 
SSSSi. St hSBUi 
Constitution of the court was that it consisted of a 
Qadi, four Muftis and two clerks. This court existed in all the 
capitals of the provinces. Provincial administration was 
orqanised at three levels. 
(a) Wilayat, which was a larger administrative unit, 
(b) Hokumat-e-a'la (Hiqh Governorate), and 
(c) Hokumat-e-kalan (Major Districk), a court of 
Appeal was to exist in each. 
These courts were of general juristictions and also 
competent to decide all matters falling within the jurisdiction 
of the primary courts. 
^ 1 ) 
Proceedinqs at these courts were generally governed by 
the Shariah and the Nizamnamas. Aqainst the judqonent of this 
court, in criminal cases, a further appeal could be made within 
prescribed time to the higher court. 
These Shariah Primary and Appellate Courts had 
different chambers for deciding civil, criminal and conmercial 
cases. 
In criminal cases shariah courts were to order 
punishments in accordance with the privisions of the General 
Penal Code (Nizamnam-e-Omumiiaza). 
Cassation Board 
According to Nizanmama of Basic Organisation 1923, a 
Cassation Board was to be constituted which was to work in the 
country's capital as a final court of appeal for the whole of the 
Afghanistan. The cassation boart used to sit in combined 
sessions with the Kabul Court of Appeal. If the judge from Kabul 
court of appeal himself heard the case and awarded punishment, he 
could not part-take in the final review proceedings. 
The Cassation Board consisted of President and four 
members. The Minister of Justice was to be the president of the 
Cassation Board. This Board was the reviewing court. Its 
powers were confined to scruitinize the decisions of the Primary 
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Courts and the Appeal Courts, to ascertain whether the decisions 
of the lower courts were in conformity with Shariah and 
Nizamnana. Board was competent either to confirm the decidions 
of the lower court or to reverse them. However, it is not to act 
as a Trial Court. 
All the decisions of the Cassation Board were final. 
But the Death penalties were subject to the final approval of the 
Monarch. 
Prgcyiyre Bi hPPQiutwmgt, oi Judges 
All judges whether of Cassation Board, Appeal Court 
judqes or the Qadis of Primary Courts were to be appointed by the 
I 
Monarch. Muftis of Primary Court and Appeal Courts were 
appointed by the Minister of justice on the recommendation of the 
Appointments Coranittee (Komission-e-ta'inat). Provincial 
Governors were also empowerd to appoint Muftis for Primary 
Courts, and clerical staff in both the Primary and provincial 
courts of appeal. 
CrimiMl Lag Applied la shariah courts 
Hanafi School of Islamic Law was recognized as the main 
source of substantine law. Cases were to be decided in 
I. After revolution situation has changed. Under the present 
system instead of Monarch, the President of the Pepublic 
appoints the judges. 
6$B 
accordance to the Hanati Texts, unless there were express state 
laws to resolve the problem. 
Two types of punishment were awarded by the Shariah 
courts. Firstly, Hadd, the fixed penalties such as capital 
punishment for murder and cutting of hands for theft. These 
penalties were given in accordance to the primary source of 
Islamic Law and no one could dare to challenge their 
enforceability. Secondly, Ta'zir, the penalties which were left 
to the discretion of theTudges which were to be decided 
according to the circumstances of each case. 
King Amanallah attempted to codify the later aspect of 
Islamic Law punishment - i.e, Ta'zir, in the form of Nizamnama. 
The ulama, however, did not welcome the Nizamnama reforms. Qadis 
considered themselves all-powerful as the penalties were not 
specified prior to the commission of crime and were left to the 
discretion of the Qadi. Onder Ta'zir, Qadis had wide-ranging 
discretion to award any penalty which they considered appropriate 
and deemed fit to the circumstances of the case. The Nizamnama 
reforms restricted their powers. 
The guide for judges was compiled by a group of leading 
ulema under the chairmanship of Maulvi Abdul Wasi Oandahari, then 
president of the State Council. Its preamable, signed by King 
I 
Amanullah, reads as follows: 
I. Supra - N, p. 
"It is for the ruler to specify the shariah 
penalties of Ta'zir which are flexible and have 
remained undefined. The figh Manuals are, 
moreover, mainly available in Arabic which makes 
ascertaining the author!tive rules applicable to 
particular cases a difficult task, not only for 
government officials in general, but also to the 
Qazis and Muftis. I, therefore, ordered the ulema 
to collect and compile the authoritative opinions 
of the Hanafi school in Farsi, which is the spoken 
language of Afghanistan". 
Preamble makes it clear that the primary aim of 
Nizamnama was to consolidate the substantive Shariah Law in a 
codified form. But his codification of Ta'zir penalties was not 
liked by ulema. Even today owning to political conditions, 
inspite of possible efforts, in most areas the law of Afghanistan 
still remains uncodified in the form of either traditional 
Islamic law or of customary or tribed practices. Thus the Afghan 
legal system has retained its indigenous character, never 
influenced by European judicial system. The sources of 
inspiration have remained purely Islamic. A study of indigenous 
growth of Afghan Islamic judicial system in modern times would be 
a unigue study. Even today shariah judges in Afghanistan are 
religious leaders. At the same they also exercise judicial 
powers. They lead prayers in the mosgue, address religious 
congragations, deliver, Stttnons and render advises to the 
citizens on legal and religious problems. In brief the training 
of Shariah judges is religious. 
Judiciary was again organised and strengthened under 
the Administration of Justice Act, 1957. Main features, were as 
follows: 
(1) Shariah courts were regularised and centralised. 
(2) Courts of First Instance, with jurisdictions both 
civil and criminal continued to hear all cases in 
accordance with Islamic law 
(3) In criminal cases, in the absence of an appeal by 
the interested party, the decisions of the court 
of First Instance were final. Cases involving 
minors, life imprisoiunent, retribution under 
Islamic rule of Qasas and capital punishment were 
formed exceptions. Decision in such cases could 
be appealed to the High Courts. 
(4) Appeal courts were authorised to hear appeals 
against the decisions of the court of First 
Instance. 
(5) Further the Appeal Courts were also to try cases 
of important nature which were beyond jurisdiction 
of court of First Instance. 
Again reforms were introduced in the judicial systoii 
of Afghanistan under the constitution of 1964 which was amended 
in 1967, according to which the judiciary was made an independent 
organ of the state. Since then the heirarchy of the courts is as 
follows: 
(1) Suproae Court. 
(2) The Court of Cassation. 
(3) The High Central Court of Appeal. 
(4) The Provincial Courts, and 
(5) The cours of First Instance at sub-provincial and 
city level. 
(6) Under state secular statutes, there are : 
specialised courts such as Industrial Tribunal, 
Military Courts and Tax-Tribunals. 
The above structure of the judiciary was approved by 
"The Fundamental Principles of Democratic Republic of 
Afghanistan", passed by the Revolutionary Government in April 
1980. 
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Shariah Judiciary in Pakistan 
Pakistan inconsonnance with the provision of the 
constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan has taken an 
initiative in establishincr the Shariah Court. Initiative is not 
for constitutinq and establishing the shariah courts from the 
qrass-root. As such there is no heirarchy of shariah court 
structure. Under Chapter III A, Article 203 c of the above 
referred Constitution a Federal Shariat Court has been 
established. 
The Federal Shariat Court shall consist of not more 
than eight Muslim judges including the chief justice. They are 
appointed by the President of Pakistan (Artcile 203 c (2)). 
As to the qualification .for appointment to the 
Federation Shariat Court, Article 203 c(3) lays down that the 
chief justice shall be a person who is, or has been or is 
qualified to be a judge of the Supreme Court, and, as regard to 
other judges the requirement is that a judge shall be a person 
who is, or has been or is qualified to be a judge of a High 
Court. 
Clause 4 of Article 203 C of the Constitution of 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan further lays down that the chief 
justice and a judge shall hold office for a period not exceedinq 
three years, but may be appointed for such further term or terms 
as the President may determine. Provided that a judge of a High 
Court shall not be appointed to be a judge for a period exceeding 
one year except with his consent and except where the judqe is 
himself the chief justice after the consultation by the President 
with the chief justice of the High Court. 
The Principal seat of the court shall be at Islamabad, 
but the court may from time to time sit in such places in 
Pakistan as the chief justice may, with the approval of the 
President, appoint. 
Article 203 D of the constitution deals with the 
powers, jurisdiction and functions of the court. The court may, 
either of its own motion or on the petition of a citizen of 
Pakistan or the Federal Government, or a Provincial Government, 
examine and decide the question whether or not any law or 
provision of law is repttgnant to the injunctions of Islam as laid 
down in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (peace 
be upon him). 
If the court decides that any law or provision of law 
is repugnant to the injuctions of Islam, it shall set out in its 
decision: 
(a) The reasons for its holding that opinion; and 
(b) The extent to which such law or provision is so 
reougnant and specify the day on which the 
decision shall take effect. 
If any law or provision of law is held by the court to 
be repugnant to the injuctions of Islam: 
(a) The President in the case of law with respect to 
a matter in the Federal Legislative list or the 
concurrent legislative list, or the governor in 
the case of a law with respect to a matter not 
enumerated in either of those lists shall take 
steps to amend the law so as to bring such law or 
provision into conformity with the injuctions of 
Islam, and 
(b) Such law or provision shall, to the extent to 
which it is held to be so repugnant, cease to have 
effect on the day on which the decision of the 
court takes effect. 
Onder Article 203 D 0, Federal Shariat Court may call 
for and examine the record of any case decided by any criminal 
court under any law relatiang to the enforcement of Hudood tor 
the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality 
or propriety of any findinq, sentence or order recorded or passed 
by and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such court and 
may when calling tor such record, direct that the execution of 
any sentence be suspended and, if the accused is in confinement. 
that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the 
examination of the record. 
In any case the record of which has been called for by 
the court, the court may pass such order as it may deem fit and 
may enhance the sentence. 
Provided that nothing in this Article shall be deemed 
to authorise the court to convert a finding of acquittal into one 
of conviction and no order under this Article shall be made to 
the prejudice of the accused unless he has had an opportunity of 
being heard in his own defence. 
A party to any proceedings before the court under 
clause (1) of Article 203 D may be represented by a legal 
practioner whoj^s a Muslim and has been enrolled as an advocate 
of a High Court for period of not less then five years or as an 
advocate of the Supreme Court or by a jurisconsult selected by 
the party from out of a penal of jurisconsults maintained by the 
court for the purpose. 
For being eligible to have his name borne on the panel 
of jurisconsults, a person shall be an a'alim ( ^ ^ ) who, in 
the opinion of the court is well-versed in Shariat. 
Under Article 203 E (6) of the Contitution, a legal 
practioner or jurisconsult representing a party before the court 
shall not plead for the party but shall state, expound and 
interpret the injuctions of Islam relevant to the proceedings so 
far as may be known to him and submit to the court a written 
statement of his interpretation of such induction of Islam. 
Under clause (7) of Article 203 E, the court is 
empowered to invite any person in Pakistan or abroad whom the 
court considers to be well-versed in Islamic law to appear before 
it and render such assistance as may be required of him. 
The court shall have power to review any decision given 
or order made by it (Clause 9, Article 203 B). 
Article 203 P qives the riqht of appeal to any party to 
any proceedinq before the court under Article 203 0. Appeal is 
permitted in case when the party to the proceedinq feels 
aqqrieved aqainst the decision of the court. Party may prefer 
appeal within sixty day of such decision final order, sentence. 
Appeal lies aqainst the decision, final order, sentence of the 
court to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. 
The grounds for appeal aqainst the judqement, order or 
sentence of the Federal Shariat Court, are: 
(1) If the Federal Shariat Court has on appeal 
(a) reversed an order of acquittal of an accused 
and stttencod him to death or imprisonment 
for life or imprisonnent for a term exceeding 
fourteen years; or 
(b) on revision, has enhanced a sentence as 
aforesaid. 
(2) If the Federal Shariat Court has imposed any 
punishment on any person for contempt of court. 
(3) An appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgen^nt, 
decision, order a sentence of the Federal Shariat 
Court in a case to which the preceding clause does 
not apply shall lie only if the Supreme Court 
grants leave to appeal (Article 203 P). 
For exercising the jurisdiction for hearing appeal 
against the judgements or order or sentence of Federal Shariat 
Court, there is constituted in the Supi 
called Shariat Appellate Bench. It consists of -
(1) Three Muslim judges of the Supreme Court; and 
(2) Not more than two ulema to be appointed by the 
President to attend sittings of the Bench as ad 
hoc members thereof from amongst the judges of the 
Federal Shariat Court or from out of a panel of 
ulema to be drawn up by the President in 
consultation with the chief justice. 
The decisions of the Federal Shariat Court are 
binding, subject to Articles 203 0 and 203 F, on a Hiqh Court and 
on all courts subordinate to a Hiqh Court. 
The Federal Shariat Court has also been empowered under 
Article 203 i to make rules for carryinq out its jurisdictions. 
The Federal Shariat Court, no doubt, vrorkinq 
effectively. In a recent order of the court, number of statute 
in enforce in Pakistan has been annulled because the statutes 
were repuqnant to Islamic injunctions of Holy Quran. But the 
unfortunate fact is that the court has been establised at the top 
of judicial structure. No importance has been given to courts of 
First Instance and appellate intermediary courts. Infacts the 
cases in bulk are dealt with at the lower level. At the higher 
level only few selected go either in revision or appeal. Thus 
the process adopted in Pakistan is dead slow implementation of 
Islamic law. unless laws are framed in accordance to Holy Quran 
and Sunnah of Prophet (peace be upon him) and implemented by 
lower courts, efficacy of laws in relation to modem condition 
cannot be assessed properly. 
However, it does not mean that Pakistan is not 
Islamising the laws or not reverting from British Colonial system 
to its indiginous system. Promulgation of ordinance No. VII of 
1990 which amended the Pakistan Penal Code and Code of Criminal 
Procedure 1898, is a mile stone towards adopting the Islamic law. 
This Ordinance has made substantive changes in the Pakistan Penal 
Code. Section 53, Act XLV of 1860, dealing with different kinds 
of punishnents have been replaced by the following kinds of 
punishment in accordance to the Quranic injunctions and Suimah: 
"The punishments to which offenders are liable under 
the provisions of this Code are: 
(1) Firstly, 
Secondly, 
Thirdly, 
Fourthly, 
Fifthly, 
Sixthly, 
Seventhly, 
Eightly, 
Ninthly, 
TENTHLY, 
QISAS; y 
TA'ZIR; / 
DIYAT; ^ 
ARSH; ^ 
Daman;^ 
DEATH; 
Imprisonment for life; 
Imprisonment which is of two 
descriptions, namely -
(i) Rigorous, i.e. with hard 
labour; 
(ii) Simple; 
FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY; and 
FINE". 
Substitution of these punishment and their 
implementation is, infact, a remarkable progress. Apart from 
amendments made in the Penal Code of Pakistan Government has also 
enacted the following ordinances: 
(L) The Offences Against Property, 1979 (VI ot 1979). 
(2) The Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) 
Ordinance, 1979 (VII of 1979); 
(3) The Offence of Qatf (Enforcement of Hadd) 
Ordinance, 1979 (VIII of 1979); 
(4) The Execution of the Punishment of Whippinq 
Ordinance Ordinance, 1979 (IX of 1979); 
(5) The Zakat and Oshr Ordinance, 1980 (XVIII of 
1979). 
President of Palcistan, from time to time, has also 
passed orders: 
(1) The Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd Order 1979 
(P.O. No. 4 of 1979). 
(2) Baluchistan Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) 
Rules, 1979; 
(3) Punjab Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Rules 
1979; 
(4) North-West Frontier Province Prohibition 
(Enforcement Hadd) 1980. 
(5) North-West-Prontier Province Appointment and 
Powers Rules under Prohibition (Enforcement of 
Hadd) Order, 1979; 
(6) Sind Prohibition Rules, 1979. 
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Although constitution of Pakistan provides that all 
existing laws shall be brought in confirmity with the injunctions 
of Holy Quran and Sunnah, and all laws in the country repugnant 
to Holy Quran and Sunnah shall be struck down as null and void by 
the superior courts, so far only progress made is in regard to 
cases covered by Hadd, Qisas, Arsh, Daman, 'Qatl-i-amd', Qatl-i 
conmitted under 'Ikrah-i-tam' or Ikrah-naguis, but no remarkable 
or worth name work has been done in regard to cases covered under 
Tazir, a kind of discretionary punishment left with judges to 
awards as deem fit to them. Field covering Tazir cases is still 
open to work upon and needs greater attention as majority of 
offences conmitted in day to day life are covered under this kind 
of punishment. 
Federal Shariat courts' judges are taking keen interest 
in the process of Islamisation of laws. They have in their 
decisions not only laid the laws repugnant but also have 
explained the methodology to be followed. In declaring certain 
provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code, such as Sections 302, 304, 
326 and 329, as repugnant to the injunctions of Islam as they do 
not provide for Qisas or payment of compensation. 
Justice Aftab Hussain laid down the following guide 
I 
lines: 
Firstly, the judge should find ou^ the relevant verse 
or verses in the Holy Quran regarding the question in issue; 
Secondly, to find out the relevant Hadith or Tradition 
of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him). 
Thirdly, to ascertain the intent of Holy Quranic verses 
from the Sunnah of Prophet (peace be upon him); 
Fourthly, to know the opinions and views of learned 
jurists on the matter concerned and to assess their analogies in 
order to determine their harmony with the present day 
requirements or if possible to formulate them suiting to the 
demand of the modern age. 
Fifthly, to discover and apply as last resort any 
other option which would no doubt be in harmony with the Holy 
Quran and Sunnah. 
In cases when the Federal Shariat Court failed to give 
reasons for Islamization of laws, in appeal before the Supreme 
Court, case would be referred back again for clear cut opinion on 
the subject. It is the responsibility of the Federal Shariat 
Court to give reasons and refer in support specific Quranic 
injuctions and Ahadith in Support. 
I. Muhanmad Riaz V. Federal Government, PLO 1980 F.S.C.I 
Sunning up the discussion on judicial structure in 
Pakistan, it may be said that Islamisation of latrs, and 
substituting the present structure with indiginous Islamic 
judicial system is at preliminary stage. It has to take long 
travels, then would be able to reckon with. At present there is 
no heirarchy of courts as such enforcing and implementing the 
Shariat in its true spirit. 
Shariah Judiciary in I_ran ^ 
After the Islamic Revolution headed by AyatoUah 
Khomeini, in 1978-79, the First Iranian Constitution of 1906-07 
was repealed. A new constitution was enforced. According to 
principles 4 and 170, of the New Constitution 1979, the Shi'a 
School of Islamic Law was declared as the main source of law in 
Iran. Principle 4 of the constitution lays down: 
"All civil, penal, financial, economic, 
administrative, cultural, military, political and 
other laws and regulations must be based on 
Islamic criteria. This principle governs 
absolutely and universally all the principles of 
the constitution, laws and other regulations, and 
any determination of this matter is entrusted to 
the religious jurists of the Council of 
Guardians". 
This principle recognises lalamc law supreme over aill 
other laws whether constitutional or municipal or customing or 
conventional international law. In tact, the authorities of 
Islamic Republic of Iran, has made the supremacy of Islamic law 
clear either by their statements or by their practices. Thus the 
Islamic law is supreme over everybody and the state cannot change 
the law to suit the ever- changing socio-economic-climate. 
Society is to adapt itself to the reguirements of Islamic 
Law. 
The substantive Penal Law of Iran was codified in the 
year 1912, which was repealed by the 1926 Criminal Code. 
However, this Iranian Criminal Code was again repealed in 1979, 
and replaced by the Islamic Penal System. 
At present we have the following penal statute dealing 
with criminal cases: 
I 
(1) The Law of Retribution 1982 (Haddud and Qasas). 
II 
(2) The Law of Punishment 1983 (Ta'zir), both the laws 
are based on traditional Islamic Law. In cases 
III 
where Ta'zir is to be awarded, limits for those 
crimes which Islam leaves to the discretion of the 
I. Official Gazette, No. 44814, dated 22.6.1361 A.H. (Solar) 
13.9.1982 A.D. 
II. Official Gazette, No. 57112, dated 14.8.1362 A.H. (Solar) 
5.11.1983 A.D. 
III. S.H. Amin, Punishment in Islam, pp. 218-257. 
Islamic judge, has also been laid down." 
The Criminal Procedure Code was first approved and 
implemented in 1911, and amended in 1932, was repealed in 1979. 
Since then procedure based on Islamic Law has been implemented. 
Procedures relating to investigation, and ptmishment are enacted 
in accordance to Islamic Law. 
Supreme Judicial Council 
According to principle 157 of the Constitution Iran's 
Supreme Judicial Council is the highest rank judicial 
organisation. This council, understandably perhaps, is dominated 
by the clergy. Supreme judicial council has been empowered by 
the constitution to appoint all the judges of the Ministry of 
Justice. These judge must be learned in Islamic Law to the 
degree of Ijtihad as a faguih. Although the law states that a 
faqih does have to be "clothed' as a clergymen, none of 
professional lawyers educated in the law faculties will qualify 
for membership of the council. To be a faqih one has to study 
for several years 'fiqh' and 'usul' (Islamic jurisprudence) in 
traditional theological schools, usually in Qum or Najaf. The 
qualifications and suitability of the nominees will be examined 
by the Imam, the official Iranian title for Ayatollah Khomeini 
who, according to section 3(4), confirms their Ijtihad and 
righteousness.' 
The judicial council has exercised "legislative 
declaratory powers. Number of acts, such as extortion in the 
sale of necessaries, non-adherence to qovemment recommendations, 
obstructinq public roads, spreadinq rumours, etc. were declared 
criminal offences punishable by up to 12 months imprisonment. 
The Council ordered the Revolutionary Prosecution 
Departments as well as the Islamic Revolutionary Courts to 
enforce its "Leqislations". 
The Supreme Judicial Council also drafted some 199 
articles of the law of Retribution. These Articles were later 
approved by the Parliament. 
Court Structure 
Courts and tribunals can be divided into two classes : 
(a) Reqular judiciary, and (b) specialised courts. 
Since Islamic Revolution, 1979, five reqular courts are 
operative in Iran: 
(1) Revolutionary Court; 
(2) Public Courts -
(a) Civil Courts, 
(b) First Class Criminal Courts, and 
(c) Second Class Criminal Courts. 
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(3) Courts of Peace: 
(a) Ordinary Courts of Peace, and 
(b) Independent Court of Peace (The later have 
wider jurisdiction). 
(4) Special Civil Courts, and 
(5) Court of Cassation. 
i^^YPltttiQBarT £sfi£ts 
Revolutionary Courts, after the revolution, were set up 
to deal with persons responsible for opposing the revolution. 
Later on these courts heard all criminal cases under Islamic Law. 
These courts in the beginning functioned without 
official authority. However, later on by passing the 
Administration of Justice Act, 1981, authorising to administer 
criminal justice according to the Shi'ite School of Islamic Law. 
Only those persons who were learned and qualified in Islamic Law 
could be appointed as judges in these courts. * 
Public Courts 
These First Instance Courts were divided under the 
following categories: 
(1) Dadgah-i-Bakhsh {District Court), 
(2) Dadgah-i-Shahristan (Court of Township). 
The first cateqory has limited iurisdiction while the 
second court is the p,roper court of First Instance for all 
intents and purposes. These courts were to be presided by sinqle 
judge each. 
The Court of Township, if exercising criminal powers 
were known as : Dadqahe jonhe. In civil cases these court were 
knowns as Dadgha Sharistan. 
All judg^wnts of Court of First Instance were subject 
to appeal in 'Dadgah-i-Ostan' (The Provincial Court of Appeal), 
and second in Divan-i-Tameez (The Court of Cassation). 
The Court of Appeal heard the proof again and could 
recieve fresh evidence as to the merits of the litigations. 
Whereas the appeal to the court of cassation was simply designed 
to ensure the propriety of conduct by the trial courts. 
After the Revolution, both Oadgah-i-Shahristans (Court 
of First Instance), and Dadgah-i-Ostans (Court of Appeal) were 
dissolved and replaced by the newly-formed Dadgah-i-Umumi (Public 
Court), as opposed to the special civil courts and the 
Revolutionary Courts. 
The Public Courts became the proper courts of First 
Instance but the system of appeal was abolished. These courts 
have both the jurisdictions - civil and criminal. All judgements 
of public courts are final and no appeal is permitted against 
them except in cases when imprisonment has been awarded by the 
Public Court. A conviction of more than two months imprisonment 
can be appealed to the Court of Cassation. 
Public Courts are composed of three judges and 
judgements are pronounced by majority opinion. 
Courts of Peace 
These courts are manned by secular judges and are the 
lowest judicial courts. As a court of First Instance, it has 
limited civil and criminal jurisdictions. 
Special Civil Courts 
These courts are known in Parsi as Dadghahe Madani-e-
Khas. Scope of jurisdiction covers cases relating to Trust, 
succession and family law. All civil matters are vested in these 
types of courts. 
Court fif Cassation 
This court after the Revolution was re-structured but 
still it is the most supreme judicial forum within the Iranian 
jurisdiction, it has a controlling power over the legal value of 
the proved facts. 
Principle 161 of the Constitution 1979 state: 
"The Suprone Court of the country is formed on the 
basis of laws that are determined by the supreme 
judicial council. It is responsible for 
supervising the correct enforcement of lavs in the 
courts of the land, for creating unity in judicial 
policy, and for carrying out, according to law, 
the responsibilities that have been given to it". 
Of particular interest is Principle 162 of the 
Constitution which states: 
"The head of the court of Cassation and the 
Attorney-General must be just, religious jurists 
(mujtahid) and must have knowledge of judicial 
matters. The leadership, in consultation with the 
court of Cassation judges, will appoint them to 
those offices for a period of five years". 
Special Courts 
There are number of special courts with specialised 
juridiction, such as: 
Military Court, The State Council, Civil Servants' 
Penal Court, The Judges Disciplinary Tribunal. Pamiiy 
Courts, Children's Beaming, Imam's Connnittee/Court, 
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People's Tribunal, Houses of Equity, and Councils of 
Arbitration. 
These courts have their limited spheres within which 
they deal the cases. 
SbAEiait Courts i a M^UTgia 
Article 3, of the Federal Constitution of Malay declares 
that Islam is the reliqion of the Federation. 
In every state other than states not havinq a Ruler the 
position of the Ruler as the head of the reliqion of Islam in 
his state in the manner and to the extent acknowledqed and 
declared by the Constitution of that state, and, subject to that 
Constitution, all riqhts, privileqes, preroqatives and powers 
enjoyed by him as head of that reliqion, are uneffected and 
unimpaired, but in any acts, observances or ceremonies with 
respect to which the Conference of Rulers has aqreed that they 
should extend to the Federation as a whole each of the other 
Ruler shall in his capacity of Head of the reliqion of Islam 
authorise the Yanq DiPertuan Aqonq to represent him (Art. 3(2)). 
The Constitution of the States of Malacca, Penanq, 
Sabah and Sarawak shall each make provision for conferrinq on the 
Yanq DiPertuan Aqonq the position of Head of the reliqion of 
Islam in that State (Art. 3(4)). 
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Clause 4 of Article 3 of the Federal Constitution makes 
it clear that nothinq in this Article deroqates from any other 
provision of this constitution. 
With this brief introduction, let us examine the 
Shariah Court Structure in Malaysia. Article 121, recoqnises the 
Shariah Courts and lays down that the courts referred to in 
clause (1) shall have no jurisdiction and powers in respect of 
any matter within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts. Clause 
(lA) Art. 121). 
Before the advent of Britishers in Malay, Shariah 
Courts were existed. Aqainst the judqement of Shariah Court, an 
appeal could also be made to the Sultan. Durinq British rule 
Shariah Courts were releqated to the subordinate position. Its 
jurisdictions were also restricted to familty matters and minor 
criminal Islamic offences. 
After achieving independence, the constitution, 
organisation and procedure of Shariah Courts were matters 
included inthe state list. Now states in Federation of Malay 
have established Shariah Coaurts with jurisdiction only over 
person professing the religion of Islam and in respect only 
matters included in List II - State List, paragraph (1), but 
shall not have jurisdiction in respect ot offences except m so 
far as conferred by Federal Law. 
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According to List II, - state List, paragraph (1), 
Shariah Court jurisdiction extends to such matters as: 
"Islamic Law and personal and family law of persons 
professing the religion of Islam, including the Islamic 
Law relating to succession, testate and intestate, beth-
rothal, guardianship, gifts, partitions and non-
charitable trust, wakfs and the definition and 
regulation of charitable and religious trust, the 
appointment of trustees and the incorporation of 
persons in respect Islamic religious and charitable 
endowments, institutions, trusts, charities and 
charitable institutions operating wholly within the 
state; and punishment of offences by persons professing 
the religion of Islam against precepts of that 
religion, excepty in regard to matters included in the 
Federal List." 
As regard to offences, Shariah Court, as referred 
earlier, has jurisdiction only to the extent as given by the 
Federal law, that is, 'Muslims Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) 
Act, 1965". This Act authorises the Shariah Court to deal with 
criminal cases where punishment of imprisonment does not exceed 
six months or with any fine not exceeding $1000/- or both. 
The working of Shariah Courts in Malaysia States has 
6^f 
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been very learnedly analysed by Sheikh Tan Sri Dato' Prof. Ahmad 
Mohamed Ibrahim, Oean, KuUiyyah of Laws, International Islamic 
University, Malaysia. To him Shariah Courts were kept in a truly 
subordinate ;position. He observed that: 
"The subordinate position of the Shariah Courts was 
emphasised by the provision in some of the State 
Administration of Muslim Law Enactments that "Save as 
expressly provided in the Enactment nothinq contained 
therein shall deroaate from or affect the rights and 
II 
powers of the Civil Courts". The Enactments emphasise 
this by providing "nothinq in this Enachemnt contained 
shall affect the jurisdiction of any Civil Courts and 
in the event of any difference between the decision of 
a court of a Kathi and the decision of a Civil Court 
acting within its jurisdiction, the decision of the 
III 
Civil Servant shall prevail". 
Above referred observation and reference to the relevant statutes 
makes it clear that the Shariah Court were kept in subordinate 
position. Furthering the working conditions of Shariah Court the 
learned Professor remarked: 
I. Sheikh Tan Sri Dato' Prof. Ahmad Ibrahim, "The Shariah Court 
and its Place in the Judicial System," 'Shariah Law 
Journal,' ISSN 0/27-9033 - December 1989 - Vol. 5 - Page 30. 
II. Selangor Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 1952 - S. 
4(1). 
III. Ibid. S. 45 (6). 
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"Many of the courts had no proper court houses, many 
did not have adequate staff. The Kathis, some ot whom 
were University graduates were not given any 
professional status, with the result that graduates 
from the Faculties of Shariah were not attracted to 
become judicial officers in Shariah Courts. The rules 
of procedure and evidencie applicable in Shariah Courts 
were unclear. The State Enactments provided for the 
application of the civil laws of criminal and civil 
procedure and of evidence but these were not familiar 
to the Kathis and some of their provisions conflicted 
with those of Shariah. The result was that the laws 
were often ignored. Theve was no provision for aooeals 
from the Shariah Courts to the Suoreme Court. Appeals 
were still heard by Appeal Committees. Decisions of 
the Kathi's court and Appeal Committees were ndt 
reported and there were therefore no precedents to 
guide and instruct the Kathis." 
These unsatisfactory working conditions were realised 
by the qovernment as well by people with the result a committe 
was set up to improve the existing conditions. Late Sved Nasir 
Ismail was appointed as Chairman of that committee. The 
Committee was assigned the task to study the working conditions, 
powers and status of Shariah Court in the judicial structure of 
.the Court. It was also to study the position and status of the 
judges of the Shariah Courts. 
The Conmitted in its report made the following 
reconmendations for improving the position of Shariah Courts in 
I 
Malaysian Judicial set up: 
(1) The organisation of the Shariah Courts should be 
separated from that of the Majlis Ugama Islam in 
the States; 
(2) That the status and jurisdiction of the Shariah 
Courts should be improved and increased; and 
(3) The status and position of the judges of the 
Shariah Courts "should also be increased and a 
•judicial and legal service set up for the judges 
and officials of the Shariah Court and the 
prosecutors before the court. 
Reconmendations of the committed have been given 
practical shape in some states while some states are under the 
process of implementing them. Kelantan Administration of Shariah 
Court Enactment, 1982, amended in 1985, is one such example which 
has followed the recommendation of the comnittee and implemented 
them in Kelantan State. The Enactment empowers the Sultan to 
constitute: 
'Lapuran Mengenai Kedudukan Hahkamah - Mahkamah Shariah dan 
Taraf Kadi Seluruh Malaysia, 1981.' (Translation into 
English noted from learned Dean's article referred (in 
earlier pages). 
(1) Shariah Appeal Court; 
(2) Court of Qadhi Besar; 
(3) Court of Qadhi Khas; and 
(4) Courts of Qadhi Jajahan. 
The Court of Qadhi Besar is presided by the Qadhi 
Besar. Its jurisdiction includes Materiamonial matters and 
matters effecting the personal status as well as criminal 
matters. It can try any offence comnitted by a Muslim and 
nunishable under the Enactment or any other written law relating 
to Muslim offences. Court of Qadhi Besar normally try cases 
which cannot be tried in the courts of Qadhi Khas or a Qadhi 
jajahan. 
Jurisdiction of Court of Qadhi Khas confines only up to 
imprisonment not exceeding one year or fine not exceeding $200/-, 
or both. 
The court of Qadhi jajahan can try offences which are 
punishable with fine not exceeding $1000/- or imprisonment not 
more than six months or both. 
Both the courts of Qadhi Khas and Qadhi Jajahan have 
civil jurisdictions also. Qadhi Khas may deal cases up to the 
value of $50,000/-, while on the other hand Qadhi Jajahan, only 
up to the value of $20,000/-, not exceeding the limits 
respectively. 
Appeal against the judgement is made to the Shariah 
Appeal Board which consists of three members, one of them shall 
be a Mufti and the remaining two persons are to be chosen from a 
panel of persons appointed by the Sultan. 
In the State of Terengganu, a comprehensive law dealing 
with Shariah Courts, its constitution, powers and jurisdiction 
was enacted in the year 1986, known as 'Administration of Islamic 
I 
Religious Affairs Enactment of 1986. Shariah Court under 
section 2 of the said Enactment has been defined as: 
"Shariah Court means the Syariah Appeal Court, the 
Shariah High Court, or Shariah subordinate Court, as 
the case may be" 
Thus three types Shariah Courts have been established 
under the Enactment with different defined jurisdictions and 
spheres of actions. 
Constitution £i ^haiiab ^ S ] ! ! ^ 
Under section 29, of AIR A Enactments, 1986, His Royal 
Highness the Sultan may, by notification in Gazette, Constitute: 
(1) a Shariah Appeal Court, and 
(2) a Shariah High Courts for the State, 
I. State of Terengganu Enactment No. 12 of 1986. 
. These Shariah Courts shall have their sittings and hear 
cases at Kuala Terengganu, the capital of the State. His Royal 
Highness the Sultan may also constitute Shariah subordinate 
Courts at such places as he thinks fit and may prescribe the 
local limits of jurisdiction of such court. 
The Shariah High Court shall have jurisdiction 
throughout the state and shall be presided over by the Chief 
Qadhi or the Deputy Chief Qadhi (S. 31 (1)}. 
His Royal Highness the Sultan of the State may appoint 
suitable person as Chief Qadhi and Deputy Chief Qadhi as 
Chairman of the High Court, and Qadhis to preside over 
subordinate courts for such cases as may be prescribed (S. 28 
{b)(c). 
ESJLfioi sL Jurisdiction si Sbauai^ High Court 
The Shariah High Court would have both criminal and 
civil jurisdictions. In criminal case its jurisdiction extends 
to try any offence coimnitted by a Muslim and punishable under 
this Enactment and the Administration of Islamic Family Law 
Enactment 1985, and may impose any punishment provided for the 
offence (S. 32 (1)). 
In its civil jurisdiction, hear and determine all suits 
and prodeedings in which all the parties profess the Religion of 
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Islam (S. 32 (1)). 
Appeals against the judgements of Qadhis sitting in 
subordinate court are made to Shariah High Court. In its 
appellate jurisdiction, it hears, and determines all appeals (s. 
32 (c)). 
Under section 33, procedure for appeal has been laid 
down. Accordingly an appeal from any decision of a Shariah 
subordinate Court may be preferred to the Shariah High Court -
(a) in its criminal jurisdiction, by an accused person 
or prosecutor who is dissatisfied with the 
decision. 
(b) in its civil jurisdiction, by any person 
dissatisfied with the decision. Monetary limits 
have been laid down for appealing purposes. 
(c) no appeal shall lie if the decision is made with 
consent. 
(d) in all matters, if Shariah Court gives leave to 
appeal. 
Section 36 further lays down the detailed procedure for 
criminal appeals. Any person who is dissatistied with any 
judgement, sentence, or order pronounced by a Shariah Subordinate 
Court in any criminal proceedings to which he is party may appeal 
to the Shariah High Court on the following grounds: 
(1) In respect of any error in law, or 
(2) error relationg to facts, or 
(3) on ground of alleged severity, or 
(4) on ground of alleged inadequacy of any sentence. 
The appeal would be made by filling or lodging a notice 
of appeal with the court appealed from, addressed to the Shariah 
High Court, and by paying the prescribed 'Appeal Fee'. 
The notice of appeal shall be filed or lodged within 
fourteen days from the date on which the judgement, sentence, or 
order was passed or made, unless on application to the Shariah 
High Court the period of fourteen days is extended. 
At the hearing of an appeal the Shariah High Court has 
been empowered, if it considers that there are no sufficient 
grounds for interfering with the decision, sentence, or order of 
the coutt appealed against, dismiss the appeal, reverse or change 
the decision of the subordinate Shariah Court. 
On termination of the hearing of the appeal, the 
Shariah High Court shall, either at once or on some future date, 
which shall either be fixed for the purpose or of which notice 
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shall be given to the parties,deliver the judgement in open 
court. 
As to power of revision, section 58 authorises the 
Shariah High Court to examine the records of any proceedings in a 
criminal matter before a Shariah subordinate court for the 
purpose of satisfying itself that the decision in the proceedings 
is correct and valid, and that the proceedings were carried out 
in accordance with the rules of the court. 
The Enactment futher authorises under section 59 the 
Shariah High Court on examining the records of Shariah 
subordinate courts to issue directions for making futher 
inquiries into the matter decided by the Shariah subordinate 
court. 
Shariah Appeal Court 
Shariah Appeal Court shall be constituted by His Royal 
Highness the Sultan. Place of sitting of the court would be at 
Kuala Terengganu. 
His Royal Highness the Sultan may, by notification in 
the Gazette, any suitable person to be the chairman of the 
Shariah Appeal Court. His Royal Highness the Sultan shall grant 
a Tauliah to the chairman and may impose in the Tauliah any 
condition particularly as regards the limits on the exercise of 
any power to be conferred. 
Shariah Appeal Court shall consist of three members: 
(1) Chairman; 
(2) A person selcted from Fatwa Committee, and 
(3) One other person selected from a penal of ten 
persons who profess the Religion of Islam 
according to Mazhab Shafi'i and who are appointed 
every three years. 
Under section 35, an appeal may be preferred to the 
Shariah Appeal Court from any decision of the Shariah High Court 
by any person aggrieved. Appeal would be either the decision 
given by Shariah High Court sitting as an appellate or against 
the decision made under its original jurisdiction. 
An appeal shall be decided in accordance with the 
majority opinion of the m«nbers of Shariah Court. 
Procedure as to criminal appeal and extent of 
jurisdiction of Shariah Appeal Court, powers relating to revision 
and issuing directions for revision under its Revision 
Jurisdiction are same as that of Shariah High Court. 
Shariah Subordinate Court 
Shariah Subordinate Court is lowest in heirarchy of 
Shariah Courts. Subject to the provisions of the Enactment, it 
shall have jurisdiction in respect of civil and criminal matters 
both. Its local limit of jurisdiction are prescribed under 
section 29 (2), if no local limits are so prescribed, then it can 
have jurisdiction within the State, and shall be presided over by 
the Qadhi appointed by His Royal Highness, the Sultan. 
In its criminal jurisdiction, the Shariah Subordinate 
Courts, try any offence connitted by a Muslim and punishable 
under this Enactment, except offences under section 194, 197, 
205, 211 and 215 of the Penal Code of Malay, and any offence 
under the Administration of Islamic Family law Enactment 1985, 
except offences under sections 35, 36, 125 and 127, and may 
impose any punishiMnt provided for the offence. 
An appeal from any decision of a Shariah Subordinate 
Court may be preferred to the Shariah High Court, in its criminal 
jurisdiction, by an accused person or prosecutor who is 
dissatisfied with the decision. 
Sliamb <?9urta ia ihs Stat? ai £sdali 
Similar steps as noted earlier are being taken in othev 
States of Federation of Malaysia. In the State of Kedah under the 
Mahkamah Shariah Enactment, 1983, Shariah Courts have been 
established. The Enactment provides for the establishment of a 
court of appeal and courts of Qadhi for the administration of 
Islamic Law. His Royal Highness the Sultan appoints the Qadhi, 
who presides over the Court of Qadhi. 
Court of Qadhi in its criminal jurisdiction try any 
offence connitted by the Muslim in violation of State enacted 
Islamic Law. Qadhi may impose any punishment provided by the 
Enactment. 
The court ofappeal constituted of a Qadhi Besar, three 
Deputy Qadhi Besar and three other persons appointed by His Royal 
Highness the Sultan who in the opinion of the Sultan are 
qualified to sit in the Court of Appeal. 
Normally, the Court of Appeal consists of three persons 
Qadhi Besar, a Deputy Qadhi Besar and one other person from those 
appointed by the Sultan. 
An appeal against the decision of the Court of Qadhi is 
made to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal hears the 
appeal and also exercises general supervision. It also exercises 
the revisionary powers vested in it by the Enactment over all 
courts of Qadhis. 
6?/ 
Efforts are being made in the Federal Territory of 
Malay to establish the following courts also: 
(1) Shariah Subordinate Courts. 
(2) Shariah High Court; and 
(3) Shariah Appeal Court. 
All these efforts show that the State Governments are 
improving the Shariah Courts status in Malaysia. Attempts are 
being made to raise these courts from its relegated position and 
have recognition to its officers as well. All round efforts are 
under development to make the Shariah Judicial Intitutions 
effective. 
SSMIM copRTs 111 INDIA 1 8r;gf Hjgtpirigal Pgrsp??Uy? 
Necessity of Administration of Justice arose since the 
dawn of civilization when societies were gradually formed, social 
and personal disputes were required to be settled, and 
antagonistic claims adjusted. To the Muslim jurists, the 
protection of the week and punishment of the wrong-doer are 
fundamental in the administration of justice. 
The basic teaching of Holy Quran is: "When you decide 
between people, give your decision with justice". Administration 
of justice according to Quanic injunctions are not confined to 
Muslims only. Its purview extends to the whole mankind. With 
reference to the cases and concern, of the jews. Holy Prophet 
(peace be upon him), explained the above noted verse as: And when 
you give your decision, decide between them (i.e. the jews) with 
justice : surely God loves those who do justice." 
In Holy Quran Allah ta-aala has laid great stress on 
justice. ''We have not created the heavens and the earth, and 
whatever is (contained) between them, otherwise than in justice" 
(15:55). Allah ta'aala further coimnands : And He appointed the 
Balance that he should not transgressed in respect to the 
balance; wherefore observe a just weight and diminish not the 
balance (i.e. measure of justice) that men may conduct themselves 
with equity". (57:25). 
In the Holy Quran, one of the Divine attributes of God, 
called 'asma-i-husna, is "just". Hence, justice is regarded as 
integral part of Divine nature of God, and the administration of 
justice as a divine dispensation. Muslim Rulers in India most 
obediently adhered to this Divine Dispensation. Judicial set up 
established in India was aimed to fulfil this Divine dispensation 
of justice to the mankind irrespective of caste, creed, colour or 
religion. 
When Muslim came to India, a gallaxy of scholars, 
polished writers, cautious chroniclers, laborious historians, 
venerable theologions and casuistic jurists came along with them. 
Ulema and Faqih (jurists) well learned with the functionary of 
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courts were appointed to administer justice in accordance to 
Quranic injunction and Sunnah of Prophet (peace be upon him). 
Under their advise Muslim sovereigns of India took for model the 
judicial machinery of 'Abbasid Caliphs of Iraq, the Dmayyad 
I 
Caliphs of Spain, and the Fatimide Caliphs of Egypt'. 
This fact has created confusion in the minds of some 
thinkers. 'It is ordinarily believed by the comnon run people 
that the Muslim sovereigns governed Indian with laws of shara 
II 
(canon laws of Islam). "Imported ready made from outside India." 
This is not wholly true. This mistaken notion has arisen and got 
currency from the off-hand remarks and careless writing of a 
certain class of historians, who with a little knowledge of 
Persian and less of Arabic, pose themselves as the exponents of 
the laws of shara. They do not take notice of the fact that 
Muhamnedan law consists of two parts, religious and secular; and 
that each portion has its special application. This may be due 
to ignorance or lack of proper appreciation. But a sbrewed 
suspicion lurks in their writings that their apparent object is to 
III 
hold up the Muslim rule to ridicule and create racial hatred.' 
It should be borne in mind that Islamic Law, religious 
in nature, applies to Muslims only. The complete Code of Islamic 
I. Hahed Husain, 'Administration of Justice During the Muslim 
Rule in India, page 10. 
II. Sarkar : "Mughal Administration," pp. 2-4. 
III. Supra - N.I.P. 
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Law does not apply to non-Mttslims. Muslim jurists classify the 
Islamic Law under two distinct heads: 
(1) Tashri'yi, religious; and 
(2) Ghair - tashri'yi, secular. 
The second class is secular in nature in substance 
conanon to all nations, applies to Muslims and non-Muslims 
equally. Non-Muslims (Dhimni'i) under Islamic State are not 
subject to the first categery of law which is entirely religion 
in nature. Non-Muslims are to be governed "according to precepts 
I 
of their own faith." Prophet (peace be upon him) himself 
enjoined - "leave alone the non-Muslims and whatever they believe 
in." 
Thus the policy of applying Islamic law during the 
Muslim rule was : that 'The Hindus. The Budhists and other non-
Muslim subjects were governed by their own respective religions 
and personal law. When the tribunal happened to be the court of 
Qazi, or the Court of the Sovereign the suits involving the points 
of personal law of the Hindus, were used to be decided with the 
aid of the learned Pandits and Brahamanas; in the case of other 
II 
races, with the aid of their learned men'. It shows that non-
I. Bail lie : "Digest of Muhanmiadan Law," p. 174. 
II. ;tUp. 174. 
Fatawa-i-Alamgiri, Vol. II. p. 357. 
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Muslims were not governed by the Islamic Law which was purely 
religion in nature. Kon-Muslims under Islamic rule were having 
full liberty to be governed in accordance to their o<m faith and 
religious laws. 
Islamic criminal law dealing with religious 
infring«nents, was applied to the Muslims only, 'such' as 
drinking, marrying with the prohibited degree, apostacy, etc. 
For such offences non-Muslims were not held liable to punishment* 
I 
under the laws of shara'. 
Only that portion of Islamic criminal law which 
punishes the acts as crimes in the estimation of all nations, was 
applied to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. 
'The Qanun-i-Shahi or the Edicts and Ordinance, 
contained in the farmans and Dastur-ul-amal for guidance of the 
officers of the state, were the common law of the people of the 
country as opposed to the canon law. These Qanun, were binding 
upon the judicial and excecutive officers, and in compliance 
II 
therewith the courts of coinnon law were established in India.' 
I. A. Rahim : "Muhammadan Jurisprudence." p. 59. "Sharh-i-
Vagaya, Vol. II, Chapter on Qada (Judicial Administration). 
II, Supra, p. 
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The study of Judicial Institutions under Muslim Rule 
I 
may be divided under four periods: 
(1) The period of conquest and military occupation 
(712-991 A.D); 
(2) The period of successive invasions without any 
attempt to establish a government in India, - From 
the death of Sabuktagin till the invasion by 
Muhammad Ghori (999-1206 A.D); 
(3) The period of settled government with judicial 
tribunals - From the time of Slave Dynasty till 
the death of Sher Shah (1206-1555 A.D.) and 
(4) The period of well-established government with an 
extensive judicial and administrative machinery -
From the Mughal Rule till the grant of the Diwani 
(1556-1765 A.D.); 
Tracing all periods' judicial institutions is not 
possible. Only we confine here to some abstracts relevant to our 
study. 
I. Division of periods, Table next following borrowed from Wa-
heed Husain's book. Administration of Justice during the 
Muslim Rule in India, p. VI. 
The study n«y be divided into parts : 
(1) Pre-Mughal Period (1206-1555 A.D.); 
(2) Prom the Mughal Rule till the grant of Diwani 
(1556-1765 R.D.). 
The first period begins where the Slave Dynasty was 
settled and established an organized government in India and 
thereafter history passed through where different Dynasties 
established their governments one after the other, e.g. Khilji 
Dynasty, Tughlaq Dynasty, The Lodi Dynasty, and Sur Dynasty. 
Duyring this period the judicial institutions were set up to the 
complete satisfaction of the people and on regular basis. 
Judicial officers of different ranks and grades were appointed. 
Judicial courts started fimctioning in built up court-houses 
(mahkume-i-Adalat), observed rules of procedure as found in Law 
of Shariah, regular hearing of cases and passed and enforced the 
judgement. 
In Kutbuddin Aybak's time the Chief-Judge (Qazi-ul-
Quzat) was first time appointed. He was responsible for 
supervision of Subordinate Courts of Qadis. Court of Revision 
were also established. Kutbuddin Aybak, in fact, was famous for 
I 
his love to justice. Hasan Nizami in Taz-ul-Masri, remarked: 
I. H.M. Elliot : "History India," Vol. I, pg. 208. 
"He distinguished the flame of discord by the splendour 
of the light of justice". 
Huslim sovereigns themselves were holding courts, 
hearing and deciding cas*^ personally in this period. 'Al-
Badayuni points out that Sultan Muhammad Tughlaq constituted 
himself "The Supreme Court of Appeal", and used to revise the 
decisions of Qazis and to upset their judgement for the ends of 
I 
justice.' 
The Sultan used to keep four Muftis to whom he alloted 
quarters in the precents of his own palace so that when 
anyone was arrested upon any charge, he might in the first place 
argue with the Muftis about his due punishment. He used to say, 
'be careful that yo do not fail in the slighest degree by defect 
in speaking that which you consider right, because if anyone 
should be put to death wrongfully the blood of that man will be 
upon your head.' Then if after long discussion they convicted 
(the prisoner) even though it were midnight he would pass order 
II 
for his execution". This show the love for justice. Even the 
Sultan was taking pain sitting up^to midnight, deciding the cases 
and ordering for execution of the punishment so awarded after 
long discussions. 
Muslim Sultans of India, although they were sovereign, 
but found themselves, accountable before courts for their misdeed 
I, Muntakhab-i-Tawarikh, p. 311 (Translated by G.S, Ranking). 
II. "Al-Badayuni" - p. 37. 
if any. Sovereign were not above judiciary but subject to 
judiciary. This fact also shows how much regard was paid to the 
judicial institutions of the country. 
Ibn Batuta made his observations about Sultan Nuhamad 
Tughlag in the following words: 
"Of all men this King is the most humble and of all men 
he most loves justice The Sultan submitted 
I 
to the decrees of the court passed agaist himself." 
Sultana Razia, the queen transacted court proceedings 
like King in open courts. 'She used to hold court and dispense 
justice in person with the assistance of Qaziz and Muftis in 
Public audience Hall. 
Ghia'suddin Balban, another King was also famous for 
dispensing justice to his subjects. He was famous as an 
impartial judge, who decided cases without showing any partiality 
towards any of his subject even if they were closely related to 
him. He also introduced the system of espionage with a view to 
make the administration of justice effective and efficient. The 
persons deputed for espionage purpose weje to report about the 
functioning of court directly to the King. This espionage 
continued even during the Mughal rule. 
I. Supra - N, p. 
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Sikander Lodi another Monarch introduced number of 
reforms in different government institution including the 
judiciary the designation of Qazi-ul-Qazat (Chief Judge) was 
changed to 'Mir-i-Adl,' and the court of chief-judge was replaced 
by 'Darul-Adl'. 
Sher Shah Suri is famoust for introducing judicial 
reforms during his reign. He divided provinces into Sarkars, 
which were sub-divided into pargannas. He created a new post of 
Shigdars, executive officers, responsible for the administration 
of criminal justice. For administering civil suits, Munsifs were 
also appointed. The chief Shiqdar (Shiqdar-i-Shiq daran) was 
responsible for the administration of each sarkar, and the Chief-
Munsif for civil administration in each sarkar. he also acted as 
a circut judge. He also posted officers in pargannas and took 
care not to destroy the autonomy of the village community. A 
marked thing to be noted is that the civil judges of his period 
were not necessarily ulema or faqih, and thus introduced common 
law courts also. Thus in his reign, two sets of courts, canon 
law courts where Qadis and Muftis sitting and deciding the cases, 
and comnon law courts, where ordinary persons sitting as judges, 
not necessary learned in fiqh. 
In brief the judicial set up prior to Mughals during 
Slave, Khilji, Tughlaq and Lodi Dynasties could be summarised as 
follows: 
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(1) The Royal Courts. 
(2) The Chief Court of Justice 
(3) The Court of Chief Qadi 
(4) The Subordinate Court of Canon Law 
(5) The Subordinal Court of Comnon Law 
Presiding QfUg^ys 
The Sultan 
The Mir-i-Adl. 
The Chief Qazi-ul-
Quzat 
The Qazi 
The Adl or Qazi 
During the reign £i Sher £bfik Suri 
Tribunals 
(1) The Court of Sultan 
(2) The Chief Civil Court 
(3) The Chief Criminal Court 
(4) The Civil Court of Common Law 
(5) The Criminal Court of Common Law 
(6) The Court of Canon Law 
Presiding Officers 
The Sovereign 
The Munsif-i-
Munsifan (Chief-
Munsif) 
The Siqdar-i-
Shiqdaran (Chief-
Shi qdar) 
The Munsif. 
The Shiqdar. 
The Qazi. 
"appeal" 
Appeals lay from the subordinate courts to the Chief 
Civil and Criminal Courts respectively and there from the Royal 
I • 
Court. 
I. Supra - N, p. 
The above Table shows that a regular and systematic 
judicial heirarchy of courts was established by the Muslim Rulers 
of above noted period. Sovereigns themselves took interest in 
dispensing justice. The administration of justice was fair and 
impartial. For non-Muslims, first time, connon law courts were 
established where they were governed according to their religous 
faiths. 
Mughal Period \i£ ifi Grant ^ PiyjtBJ 
The Mughal period is considered to be the golden age of 
India. It was a period of prosperity, power and glory to India. 
Government with elaborate administrative machinery became the 
most powerful. Judicial and administrative institutions were 
further reformed. In fact, Mughal rulers were famous for love 
for justice. 
Beginning with Emperor Akbar, he retained his' pre-
decessor's judicial structure, but added to the State-Machinery 
the officers Wakil, the Wazir, the Diwan-i-Kul, the Mir-i-Saman, 
the Bayutal, the Sadr-i-Jahan, The Bakshi, the Sadr, The Mustafy, 
the Amin, the 'Amil, the Tapukchi, the Mushrif, the Mir-i-Mahal, 
the Mir-i-Bahr, the Mir-i-Bar and many other officials. Here we 
will explain only those offices connected with the judiciary. 
Akbar's regard and love for justice has been best 
explained by Mr. Vincent Smith, a historian, by referring A'yin-
i-Akbari, where Akbar has been noted saying: 
"If I were guilty of an unjust act, I would rise in 
judgement against myself. 
Mr. Vincent Smith, then, observed : 
"The saying was not merely a copy-book maxim. He 
honestly tried to do justice according to his lights 
I 
in the sunroary fashion of his age and country". 
Another historian Peruchi following the authority of 
Monsewate observes: 
"As to the administration of justice, he is most 
zealous and watchful In inflicting punishment 
he is deliberate and after he has made over the guilty 
person to the hands of the judge and court to suffer 
either the extreme penalty or the mutilation of some 
limb, he requires that he should be three times 
reminded by messages before the sentence is carried 
II 
out". 
Mr. Waheed Husain, further elaborates that 'the above 
quotation one need not run away with the idea that the Emperor 
used to inflict only two kinds of punishments, viz. of death and 
mutilation of some limbs. For we find in A'yin-i-Akbari the 
I. Vincent Smith : "Akbar the Great Mughal," p. 34. 
II-. Supra - N, p. 
following instructions to the Subahdar (Provincial Governor): 
"He should strive to reclaim the disobedience by good 
advice. If that fails, let him punish with reprimands, 
threats, imprisonment, stripes or even amputation of 
limbs, but he shall not take away life till after the 
most mature deliberation Those who apply for 
justice let them not be inflicted with delay and 
expectation. Let him shut his eyes against offences 
and accept the excuse of the penitent Let him 
I 
object to no one on account of his religious or sect." 
Emperor Akbar used to send similar letters of advice to 
different governors of provinces. He frequently instructed that 
the capital punishment should be sparingly used. Only in cases 
of diuigerpvs sedition it could be inflicted but, it was subject 
that the court record be sent to the Emporer directly. Unless he 
approved death penalty was not applied. Similarly in Amputation 
cases, the penalty was sparingly allowed. 
During Akbar's period the Mode of Trial of Criminal 
cases was that the judicial officers such as Chief Qazi, the 
Qazi, and the Mir- Adl, used to try cases according to Islamic 
Law if the offence committed by the Muslims. These officers 
followed the procedure laid down in the books of Piqhah. As to 
non-Muslim, they were tried in accordance to the common law. 
I. A'yun-i-Akbari, Vol. II, pg. 254. 
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The subahdar and Foujdar being lay-judges were assisted 
by Qasis and Muftis. They were also to follow the guidance laid 
down in Shahi Farmans. 
Akbar himself used to decide cases and also hear 
appeals at his Chamber of Audience at his palace (Daulat-Khanah). 
In the Emperor's court, nobles, the law officers of the crown, 
the Darogha-i-adalat (superintendent of the court), the clerks 
and scribes also used to attend. Decisions, after giving due 
hearing, were pronounced in consultation with law-officers and 
his wazirs. Once judgement pronounced it was connnmicated to the 
proper authority under the seal of the court for its' execution. 
The scribe used to take down notes, and the Mir-Munshi to draw up 
proper order under the direction of the Mir-i-Adl. In cases 
where the judgement was to be despatched to the Subehdar or the 
Provincial Governor for implementation and enforcement, a fair-
copy used to bie sent and also was to be properly stamped under 
I 
imperial seal. 
Akbar also adopted another method of trial by ordeals. 
It is said that this method was prevelant in India during the 
Hindu Period. Akbar enforced this method especially at the 
instance of learned Brahmans who assisted the Emperor in the 
trial of cases of the Hindu subjects. Smith says, that "Akbar 
encouraged the use of trial by ordeals in the Hindu Fashion." 
I. Supra - N, p. 
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Precisely during Emperor Akbar's period there were 
regular court of justice, at the centre, in Provinces, and 
districts. Heirarchy of courts is graded as follows: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7, 
In ihs Capital 
Tribunals 
The Royal Court 
Diwan-i-Adalat or Court of Diwan 
I 
Pregjdinq officers 
The Emperor 
The High Diwan or 
The Chancellor 
The Court of the Chief Judge 
The Chief Court of Justice 
The Court of Cannon 
The Court of Connnon 
The office of the Mohtasib - who held no regular court 
but exercised the quasi-judicial power of the Police and 
the Municipal Officer. 
The Qazi-ul-Quzat 
The Mir-i-Adl. 
The Qazi 
The 'Adl 
la t M prpvin??? 
Tribunals 
1. The Court of the Subahdar 
(Popularly known as Nizamat Adalat) 
2. The Court of Foujdar 
3. The Court of the Chief Qazi 
(in some provinces only) 
4. The Court of Diwan 
Presiding Offjceyg 
The Subahdar or 
Nazim 
The Foujdar 
The Qazi-ul-Quzat 
The Provincial Diwan 
I. Supra - N, Table II, p. 38, 
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5. The Court of Canon Law The Qazi 
6. The Court of Comnon Law The 'Adl (civil 
judge) 
(The office of Muhtasib as stated above) 
After Emperor Akbar, during the periods of Shah Jahan 
and Aurangzeb, certain changes in judiciary were made suiting to 
the requirements of the society. Both emperors were holding 
public courts in Oiwan-i-Khas. They were taking personal 
interests in hearing and deciding the cases. 
Emperor's court use to be full of law officers of the 
crown, the judes of the Canon Law (Qazis), Judges of Coiranon Law 
('Adilj), Muftis, Ulema, jurists learned in precedents (fatwas) 
the Superintendent of the Law Court (Daroghe-i-adalat), and the 
Kotwal or prefect of the city police. None else among the 
courtiers was admitted unless his presence was specially 
necessary. The officer of justice presented the plaintiffs one 
by one and reported the grievances. His Majesty used gently to 
ascertain the facts by enquiry, was to take the law from the 
ulema and, then, was to pronounce judgement accordingly. Many 
persons had come from far-off provinces to get justice from the 
highest power in the land. Their points could not be 
investigated locally, and so the Emperor wrote orders to the 
governors of those places, urging them to find out the truth, and 
either to do them justice there 
/»5 
I 
or send the parties back to the capital with their reports." 
During the period of Emperor Jahangir the most 
significant feature of the Royal Court were the Golden Chain and 
bells hung up by the Emperor for administering justice to the 
masses. This device was adopted with a view that the litigants 
and aggrieved persons could tie their petitions which had direct 
reach up to the Emperor without the assistance of intermediary 
officers. It was aimed that people should had easy and direct 
access up to the Emperor without undergoing any harassment of the 
porters and court - under-lings. In fact Jahangir took keen 
interest in the administration of justice. Undoubtedly, this 
sense of justice deserve praise. 
The rest of the courts and their heirarchy was as 
follows: 
IM i M Capital 
Tribunal Presiding Officer 
1. The Royal Court ) The Emperor 
) 
2. Diwan-ul-Mazalim ) 
Adalat-i-Shari'ya ^ Court of Canon Law 
1. The Chief Court of Qazi The Qazi-ul-Quzat 
2. The subordinate Court of Qazi The Qazi 
I. Prof. Sarkar : "Studies of Mughal India", pp. 14 and 70. 
1. 
2 . 
Court si. QssaBSai hSiS. 
The Court of High Oiwan The Diwan-i-Ala 
The Court of Mir-i-Adl Mir-i-Adl or 
The Chief Justice 
3. The Court of Sadri-i-Jahan 
4. The Subordinate Court of the 'Adl 
5. The Subordinate Court of the Sadr 
The Chief Sadr 
(Judge) 
The 'Adl 
(Civil Judge) 
The Sadr 
(Civil Judge) 
Comparing the present table with the earlier table of 
Emperor Akbar's period, one significant modification in the court 
structure was that in this period Oiwan-i-Mazalin, actual name 
'Ad-Diwan-un-Nazr fil Mazalim' was established at. the top of the 
heirarchy. This was a Board for the investigation of grievances. 
It was, in fact, established in the period of Aurangzeb and the 
King himself presided over. Its main functions were to set right 
cases of miscarriage of justice which might had occurred in the 
administration and judicial department. It also exercised 
control over the judiciary. 
As to appeal and revision, courts were authorised to 
hear them in the following order: 
la ihs. Capital 
1. The King' Court 
2. Diwan-i-Mazaiim 
) 
Appeals from all courts. 
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3. The Court of High Diwan - Appeals from Subordinate 
Civil Courts. 
4. The Court of Mir-i-'Adl - Civil Appeal from the Court 
of the 'Adl. 
5. The Court of Chief Qazi - Civil and Criminal Appeals 
from the Court of Qazi 
6. The Court of Sadr-i-Jahan- Appeal from the Court of 
the Sadr. 
The Subordinate Court of Qazi could revise the decision 
of another Qazi if empowered to do so. 
The courts having the power of hearing appeal had also 
revisional jurisdiction. Thus in Mughal period we find a regular 
and systematic procedure of appeal and revision was establised. 
is tl^ frovince sr Subah 
1. The Court of the Nazim - Appeals from Criminal Courts. 
2. The Court of the Diwan - Appeals from the Subordinate 
Civil Courts. 
3. The Court of the Chief Qazi Appeal from the Subordinate 
Court of Qazi. 
Death penalty could not be executed unless an approval 
of the King was obtained. 
A second appeal was allowed from the Provincial 
appellate court to the High Diwan, or the Mir- -Adl, or the 
'Qazi-ul-Quzat,' in the capital according to the nature of 
appeal. 
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li the paties were not satisfied even with the decisi on 
in the second appeal, they could qo UP to the Royal Court which 
I 
was the highest court of appeal in the land. 
Functioning of Court an4 Hode, of Trial 
Habeed Husain in his thesis on Administration of 
Justice durinq the Muslim Rule in India has described a working 
scence of Qazi's court and mode of trial therein which gives the 
correct picture of functionong of courts of that period. this 
scene belongs to Aurangzeb's period, borroweed from Fatawa-i-
Aiamqiri and other comtemporary records of history, the details 
are as follows: 
'In a auadranale stands the imposing building called 
'Darul-Oaza', the court of iustice. The 'Iwan-i-Adalat' contains 
a capacious hail where the Qazi holds trial. The side rooms are 
for the court officials and court records. On one side of the 
big hall is a raised platform (takht) covered with rich carpet 
(qalin). This is the seat for the Qazi. On his right and left 
are the seats for the Mufti and Alim. A carved ivory (and 
sometimes highly polished wooden) ink-stand and a desk of 
polished wood for writing, are placed before the Oazi. The floor 
of the hail is covered with carpets. On one side facing the 
e court (katib-Oazi's spqt is the seat of -^he clerk of tb 
I. Supra - N, p. 
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scribe). On another side is the seat of the court vakil (the 
government advocate). In front of the seat of the Qazi is a 
table covered with coloured cloth. On this table are heaped up 
records and files (muhazir and sijilat), plaints and petitions. 
In front of the Qazi and on the floor sit the parties in two 
distinct rows. The witnesses and partisans of the litigants sit 
at the end of the hall. The Darogha-i-Adalat (the Superintendent 
of the Court) who is in charge of the records brings the files 
required by the Qazi. The court peon, and orderlies control the 
crowd*. 
This court scene shows that Qazis were having dignified 
and honourable status. The court's perafernelia reflects that 
Qazi's court was even superior to the present day District 
Judge's Court. 
It is further stated that 'the plaintiff goes straight 
to the Katib (scribe), and either hands over the plaint, or 
states orally the facts of his case. the Katib writes out the 
plaint in the court register and notes down the name of the Qazi 
in whose court the case is to be tried. The names and addresses 
of the parties and of their fathers as well as the particulars of 
the cases are entered in the register. The court sits from the 
morning till noon.' 
'The Imperial Regulation of Aurangzeb urges upon 'the 
judges to sit in their offices on Saturday, Sunday, Monday, 
^9i 
Tuesday, and Thursday, i.e. five days, while on Wednesday they 
should attend the subahdar, and Friday alone should be a holiday. 
Prom two gharis (about an hour) after day break to a little after 
midday (i.e. when the sun has bequn to decline) the judqes should 
sit in the court room and do justice, and go to their homes at 
I 
the time of the 'Zuhr prayer.' 
This fact also reflects the punctiality and reqularitv 
with which the judqes attendinq the court work and disposinq them 
off. Further everthinq was reduced to writinq and reqistered, 
and kept in official court record. 
When Qazi cominq to attend the court, due regard was 
given by those present in the court and thereafter the Qazi was 
to attend the day's work. Model Trial is noted below: 
'When the Qazi with his attendants enters the hall, the 
audience stands up and bows in obsisance. He qoes throuoh the 
record to see if it is in order. If not, it is returned. The 
plaintiff or his vakil then states his case. It the defendant is 
present he will be called to state his defence. If the defendant 
admits the claim, the case is decided in accordance with law, 
and the decree is to be drawn up in conformity with the 'mahzur' 
record of proceedings) and 'sijil' (form of' decree). If the 
defendant denies the piaintirf's claim, then two courses are open 
I. Mirat-i-Ahmadi, p. 291; Vide Sarkar's 'Mughal 
Administration', p. 117. 
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to the plaintiff, viz, either he may produce evidence to prove 
his claim, or he may put the defendant on oath. If he refuses to 
take oath, and if the plaintiff's witnesses are present, they are 
examined. The defendant then enters his plea by way of avoidance 
and is required to prove it by evidence. Both parties are 
entitled to an adjournment of the case for sumnoning their 
I 
witnesses'. 
Above observation of court trial makes it clear that 
the decisions were based on Qazi's capabilities to administer 
justice inconformity with law. The decrees were also passed in 
accordance to set forms and principles. Further the decrees or 
order or judgements passed by the judges were also to be 
incorformity with the record of the case kept property in court 
registers and records. In brief Qazis were to proceed step by 
step in a most systematic way and in conformity with law. It is 
further stated: 
'2Vs the trial proceeds the Qazi is to take down the 
evidence of the party and his witnesses. He may ask the katib to 
note their names and addresses. If for any reason the Qazi is 
unable to take down the depositions, he may ask the katib to do 
so. But the law of procedure requires that the Qazi should 
himself take down the depositions. The witnesses are to be 
examined separately so that one may not know the statements of 
I. Hidaya (Grady), p. 451. 
I 
the other. Cross-examination is alowed. The court may also put 
questions to elicit facts and tests the veracity of the parties 
and their witnesses. Then after going through the evidance, if 
the Qazi finds that plaintiff has established his claim, he 
enters judgement in his favour. A decree follows, and is drawn 
up in accordance with the prescribed form.' 
The whole proceedings form a record called 'mazhur' and 
the decree which forms the part of the record is called 'sijil'. 
it is necessary for the validity of the decree that sijil must 
II 
conform to 'mahzur.' 
The above observation about the mode of trial and 
procedure followed in Shariah Courts, abundantly makes it clear 
that they were all at par with the modern procedural laws. 
Examining and cross-examining the witnesses by the parties 
separately with a view to determine their credibility and also by 
the judges to test the veracity are all in line with the natural 
justice principle. It means justice was administered with due 
care and caution; with an object before the judges that none of 
the parties should feel aggrieved. Justice should be given to 
the justman. Mughal Judicial system, no doubt, is compatable 
with any modern judicial system with its' present day legality. 
It was simple free from legal wrangles and technicalities. 
I. Al-Qaza fil islam, p. 66, 
II. Fatawa-i-Alamgiri, Vol, VI, p. 247. 
£SID£ Charaeteriatic Peaturea ^ HiJsli&JL Judicial System 
First, the most systematic and scientific judicial set 
up was in existence during Mughal period. At the centre there 
were Appellate Courts. Kings themselves were sitting in courts 
and dispensing justice to the litigants. At the Provincial level 
also there were courts having original and Appellate 
jurisdictions. 
Secondly, aggrieved litigants were had rights to go in 
appeal twice, first to the provincial courts and second to the 
central appellate court. Above all even if the party felt 
aggrieved, they were given an opportunity to have direct access 
to the Emperor and seek redress. Emperors were personally 
attending the petitions in Royal Court and deciding the petition 
with the council and assistance of Muftis and learned ulema 
(jurists Faqih). All grievances were reddressed in accordance 
with Shariah or Islamic Law, i.e. Quranic injunctions and Sunnah 
of Prophet. In their absence, Qyas or Ijmas was resorted to. 
Thus every litigant had right to appeal Courts were competent to 
hear appeal, Revision or Reference, Qazi could revise his 
judgement if any error found in the judgement. 
Another note worthy feature is that justice was 
administered, at the beginning of Islam, in the name of God, or 
of Caliphate representing the entire Muslim community, but not in 
the name of Caliph, or sultan, or Emperor. The author of 
01 
Musihaj-ul-Talibin points out that "the entire Muslim comnunity 
is responsible for the administration of justice. After the end 
of Republic form of Islamic Commonwealth of Caliphs, Kings later 
started administring justice in their names. The Mughal Emperors 
loved to pose as the fountain of justice followed the tradition 
to administer justice in their names." 
A noticeable feature was that cases were decided in 
open courts in public place. During Prophet (peace be upon him) 
time cases were decided in the Mosque because mosque was a public 
place .where public could had easy access. Then Dar-ul-Qaza was 
established in separate building, Qazis started hearing cases 
there. This court was established during Hazrat Omar's (Razi-
allah-Anho) time. Darul-Qaza was regarded as public place and 
was open to all. This practice was followed in India. Shariah 
Courts were all open courts where public had free access. 
Another significant feature of the judiciary was that 
the Hindus, the Budhists and other non-Muslims subjects were 
governed by their own respective religious and personal laws. 
Suits involving personal laws of the Hindus, were used to decide 
with the aid of the learned pandits and Brahmanas. Similarly, in 
the case of other non-Muslims, their cases were decided with the 
aid of their learned men. Islamic law was applied to Muslims 
only. Islamic criminal law was invoked to Muslims and non-
Muslims alike only in cases where the acts which constituted 
crimes were considered crimes in the estimation of all nations. 
en 
If there was religious infringment then, then the Islamic 
criminal law was applied to Muslims only. In such cases non-
Muslims were not governed by Islamic criminal law. 
In fact, we find that Muslims and non-Muslims were 
dealt with in two different sets of courts - Canon Law Courts 
and Common Law Courts. First were Shariah Caourts while the 
later were secular coaurts. Muslim sovereigns were had all 
regards for the customs and usages of the Hindus although many of 
them were militant against the Muslim Law. Sovereigns never 
interferred in personal and religious liberty. No law which 
could be said external was ever applied to them. The 
institutions which the Caliphs and other Muslim sovereigns 
adopted were considered the best and worthy of imitation. For 
this reason, perhaps, some of the Hindu Rajas also adopted the 
Muslim judicial and administrative system in their Kingdoms in 
India. 
Wide and elaborate judicial machinery at the centre, 
province and sub-divisional level were established for 
administering justice to the subject. But there was paucity of 
cases. There was no passion for litigation. People lived a 
simple life, a self-contended life under a strong central 
government. Ordinary disputes and caste matters were decided by 
village panch (headman). Muslim sovereign never interferred with 
the village autonomy. Instead the sovereign encouraged it. 
check upon frivolous litigation is another important 
characteristic. Appellants were severely fined when their 
appeals against judgements of the lower courts were if found 
frivolous and ill-founded. 
In cases if the judgement were found unjust, judges 
were removed from their posts. Aurangzeb when took the charge of 
the Kingdom, he removed such judges whose judgements were unjust. 
As to punishment of death and amputation of lioiby^  we 
find that the first was totally unknown during Aurangzeb time and 
the later one was moved with a slow speed. First the culprit was 
awarded Tazir, kept in prison till he repented. First offenders 
were not awarded with the punishment of amputation. Even on 
proof it was postponed and the culprit was given an opportunity 
to reform himself. But even if this did not reform him then 
he was given a prolonged imprisonment. Amputation was the 
last resort. 
The most outstanding feature was that all men, 
irrespective of caste, creed, colour or religion were treated 
justly and on equal footing. It was kept in mind by the judges 
that the poor or weak should not had disappointed from justice 
and well-to do might not had hope to get any advantage from. 
The burden of proof was upon the party who made 
allegatiaons. The defendant or respondent was not to be 
compelled to take oath in his proof. He was at liberty and could 
plead no guilty and could contest the case. Rules of pleadings 
were also very advance. There was no concept of King can do no 
wrong. Rule of law was prevalent. Even, Emperors could be sunanoned 
before court like other ordinary litigants. Courts' orders, 
judgements and decree were to be in consonance with the court 
records. Evidence law was also well difined. parties could 
employ vakeels to represent them before the courts. 
These were some of the characteristic features of 
Mughal judicial system, that is, of Shariah Law and Shariah 
Courts. The impact of Mughal judicial system is even quite 
noticeable upon the present day judiciary. Even today almost all 
the terms concerning the court nomenclature are the same as those 
of Mughal period. In other words the legal vocabulary and the 
glossary of law terms daily remind us of the influence of the 
Muslim system of judicial administration. Very slight changes 
have been effected so far. 
Such was the edifice of Shariah Judicial System but 
after Aurangzeb its decline started. There was a contest for the 
crown between the brothers. Later emperors were more titulor 
than real but non of them was powerful enough to save the empire 
from disruption. Within half a century from the death of 
Aurangzeb in 1707 to the grant of the Diwani to the East India 
company in 1765 A.D. the splendid edifice of the empire gradually 
crumbled down. India became a threatre of warfares. Judicial 
system of the country suffered it's worst. When the servants of 
the East India company took the charge of the administration of 
the country, they found it in a chaotic condition. Islamic civil 
law was easily superseded, but the penal law was continued to be 
administered in the criminal courts of the time. Gradually even 
that law was superseded. Sir Ronald Wilson says: 
"The system was gradually Anglicised by successive 
Regulations, the Muhammadan elements did not entirely 
disappear till 1862 when the 'Penal Code and the First 
Code of Criminal Procedure came into force, nor as 
regards the rules of evidence till the passing of the 
I 
Indian Evidence Act in 1872". 
Critics even do not spare the Islamic judicial system 
existed up to Aurangzeb. No doubt we can discuss merits and 
demerits of the system then existing, but it should be clear that 
it is all due to certain miscomception of the historians foreign 
or Indians. The misconceptions has resulted in good deal of 
misunderstanding and race-prejudice also. In the words of Mr. 
Waheed Husain, "These misconceptions have arisen from the 
haphazard writings, off-hand observations, and sarcastic remarks 
of a certain class of historians who pose themselves as authentic 
chroniclers of the Mughal Courts. But their accounts, when 
II 
critically examined, betray their ignorance and prejudices." 
I. Anglo-Muhammadan Law, p. 30. 
II. Supra - N, p. 
"PRESEHT POSITION" 
Shariah criminal courts were abolished during British 
Rule. At present Muslims and non-Muslims are governed by general 
Penal Code enacted by the Britishers. In evidential ^HA 
procedural matters, we have separate Evidence Act and Criminal 
Code. Substantive Criminal Law is secular in nature. In personal 
matters such as marriage, dower, divorce, maintenance, 
guardianship, will, gift, wakf and inheritance, Muslims are 
governed by their personal law known as Muslim Law. Cases 
relating there to are dealt with and decided by secular courts. 
In other words at present there are no Shariah Caourts in 
existence. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
PART A 
I - "JUDGBUNT ; INDIAN CRIMINAL LAW" 
Judgement as defined in Kuppcf^ anrii Rao, is the 'final 
decision of the court intimated to the parties and the world at 
large by formal pronouncement of delivery in open court by the 
trial judge and signing and dating it simultaneously and thereby 
I 
terminating the criminal proceedings finally.' 
The judgement in every trial before criminal court of 
original jurisdiction shall be pronounced in the open court by 
the presiding officer of the court. It would be pronounced 
immediately after the termination of the trial or at some 
subsequent time of which notice shall be givern to the parties or 
their pleaders. 
Judgement may be delivered by the court either as a 
whole or only operative part is read out explaining the substance 
of the judgement in a language which is understood by the accused 
or his pleader. 
I. AIR 1949 F.C.I. Cr, Lj. 625, and 1954 SCR 330 : 1954 Cr. Lj. 
475. 
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Judgment when completed, every page of it is to be 
signed by the Magistrate and also to write the date of the 
delivery of the judgement in open court. The copy of judgement 
immediately after the pronouncement shall be made available for 
the perusal of the parties or their pleaders free of cost. 
If the accused is in custody, he shall be brought to 
hear the judgement pronounced. If the accused is not in custody 
he shall be required by the court to attend to hear the judgement 
pronounced. In cases where during the trial accused's personal 
attendance has been dispensed with and the sentence is one of 
fine only or he is acquitted, accused's presence at the delivery 
judgement is not required. (S. 353, Criminal Procedure Code). 
When there are more accused than one, and one or more 
of them do not attend the court on the date on which the 
judgement is to be pronounced, the presiding officer may, in 
order to avoid undue delay in the disposal of the case, pronounce 
the judgement notwithstanding their absence. 
Judgement delivered by any criminal court shall not be 
deemed invalid on ground of: 
(1) the absence of any party or his pleader on the day 
or from the place notified for the delivery 
thereof, or 
70 > 
(2) any omission to serve, or defect in serving on the 
parties or their pleaders, or any of them, the 
notice of such day and place. 
Every judgement referred in section 353 Cr. PC shall be 
written in the language of the court. It shall contain: 
(1) point or points for determination, the decision 
thereon and the reasons for the decision. 
(2) the offence (if any) of which, and the section of 
the Indian Penal Code, or other law under which, 
the accused is convicted and the punishment to 
which he is sentenced. 
(3) the offence of which the accused is acquitted and 
direct that the accused be set at liberty. 
(4) indoubtful cases where it is not clear under which 
of the two sections or two parts of the same 
section of the Indian Penal Code an accused can be 
convicted the court shall distinctly express the 
same, and pass judgement in the alternative. 
(5) reasons for passing different sentences in 
accordance to the requirements of laws. Even 
where a statute lays down a minimum sentence for 
an offence but gives discretion to the court to 
impose a lesser sentence for reasons to be given, 
the fact that the accused was on bail for a pretty 
long time, would be a relevant ground in using the 
discretion to impose a lesser sentence. 
Every case in the final determination has to depend 
upon its own facts. No court is permitted to alter or review 
its judgement or final order disposing of a case when it is 
signed except as otherwise provided by the Criminal Procedure 
Code or by any other law for the time being in force. 
The original judgement shall be filed with the record 
of the proceedings and where the original is recorded in a 
language different from that of the court and the accused so 
requires, a translation thereof into the language of the court 
shall be added to such record. 
In cases tried by the court of session or a chief 
judicial magistrate, the court or such magistrate, as the case, 
may be, shall foward a copy of its or his finding and sentence, 
if any, to the District Magistrate within whose local 
jurisdiction the trial was held. 
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II - 'P""TSffff»F 1 INDIAN CRIMINAL IML 
Section 406, Criminal Procedure Code provides 
punishment for criminal breach of trust which is defined in 
section 405. Punishment provided in the section is imprisonment 
of either description for a term which may extend to three years, 
or with fine with both. 
Procedure for sentencing has been laid down in section 
248 Criminal Procedure Code. In cases where charge has been 
framed, the Magistrate finds the accused not guilty, he shall 
record an order of acquittal. 
Where the Magistrate, in any case, finds the accused 
guilty, but does not proceed in accordance with the provisions of 
section 325 or section 360 Criminal Procedure Code, he shall, 
after hearing the accused on.the question of sentence, pass 
sentence upon him according to law. 
Clause (3) of section 248 deals with cases of previous 
conviction where the accused denies, the Magistrate may, after 
he has convicted the accused, take evidence in respect of the 
alleged previous conviction, and shall record a finding thereon. 
Before taking evidence, conviction under clause (2) section 248 
is necessary. 
The court before passing the sentence is to weigh the 
merit of each case, the mitigating circumstances, and facts 
which differ from case to case. In one case where a long time had 
elapsed since the offence took place it was held that a heavy 
sentence of fine was sufficient to meet the requirements of 
I 
justice. 
In another case where the secretary of a cooperative 
society was held guilty undersection 406, and the treasurer who 
appeared to be in collusion with him was not prosecuted and all 
amounts received were correctly entered in the account book, the 
II 
court reduced the punishment to a fine. 
Under extenuating circumstances some time severe 
punishment is rendered unnecessary. In a case where the hirer 
under a hire-purchase agreement disposed of the property, but 
payment of instalment, the insurance and other expenses were not 
disrupted. It continuously paid by the hirer. It was observed 
III 
that a simple imprisonment was sufficient. 
I. 1968 Cr. Lj. (983 Andh. Pra). 
II. 1970, Pat LjR 600. 
III. A 1923 All 598 : 24 Cr. Lj. 620. 
Offence of criminal misappropriation and breach of 
trust by the chairman of cooperative society must be viewed 
seriously and no leniency in sentence should be shown, yet, in 
the instant case where transfer of amount was merely from one 
branch of the society to another branch lenient view taken was 
I 
held correct. 
However, where the accused is a man of position and the 
secretary of a cooperative society, a sentence of fine of Rs 
175/= and imprisonment till the rising of the court was held in 
adequate and the fine was raised to Rs 1000/=. But the jail 
sentence was held unnecessary under the circumstances of the 
II 
case. 
If a man makes a criminal misappropriation of property 
of another valued for Rs 2000/=, it is in no way be an 
extenuating circumstance to plead that the accused and the victim 
are close relations; the extenuating circumstance would be that 
III 
there has been no real misapplication. 
In a case where amount of criminal breach of trust is 
large and the offence has been committed by a member of the legal 
profession in which the litigating public must repose entire 
trust and confidence calls for severe sentence. Under the 
I. 1978 Cr. LR (Mah) 500. 
II. A 1943, Sindh. 164 : 44 Cr. Lj. 798. 
III. (1926) Cr. Lj. 331 (Mad) 
particular circumstances, it was held that the ends of justice 
will be simply met by a sentence of nine months rigorous 
imprisonment. 
Analysing the above cases it can be observed that there 
is no fixed criteria to ditermine the liability of the accused 
when his guilt is proved by the prosecution. Sentencing is 
discretionary with the court and differs from case to case. All 
depends upon the extenuating circumstance in individual cases. 
Courts sometime^ take a lenient view while on other occasion a 
serious view. Punishment thus may be severe or lenient as the 
ease may be. 
Same approach is to be adopted in cases considering 
under section 408 when offence of criminal breach of trust has 
been committed either by the clerk or servant. In Kassim Pillai 
I 
Abdul's case, the accused, a clerk-cum-accountant, failed to 
deposit various sums amounting to Rs 100/= in the treasury as 
required by the rules. He during enquiry explained that as there 
was no safe in the office he had kept money in his drawer from 
where it was stolen. The accused was allowed to re-imburse the 
amount. In appeal, on question of sentence the supreme court 
held that considering the inexperience of the accused and the 
fact that he reimbursed the misappropriated amount the sentence 
could be reduced to the period already undergone.' 
I. 1978 Cr. Lj. 1994 (SO . 
1" 
The fact that the servant lost the benefit of his 
I 
service is no ground for mitigating the sentence for the crime. 
Where the accused was 18 years of age and a person of 
good character and the offence was due to unpardonable laxity in 
management and his own miserable pay, a sentence of one year was 
II 
held sufficient. 
Where a clerk of many years standing and in a position 
of trust misappropriated large sums of money, it was held that a 
III 
sentence of 5 years rigorous imprisonment was not too severe. 
Section 408 Indian Penal Code authorises the court in 
criminal breach of trust cases involving either the clerk or 
servant to punish with imprisonment of either description for a 
term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to 
fine. A sentence passed by the High Court under section 408 can 
be reconsidered by the High Court under its powers under section 
482 Criminal Procedure Code which is not limited by section 362 
IV 
of the Criminal Procedure Code. 
I. (1890) 13 Mys. LR. No. 421 p. 656. 
II. A. 1937 Sind 242 : 39 Cr. Lj. 6. 
III. A. 1934 All. 173 : 35 Cr. Lj. 617. 
IV. A. 1927 Lah. 139 : 28 Cr. Lj. 239. 
A young law graduate as an employee committed his first 
offence of misappropriation. Supreme court held that no serious 
notice needs to be taken of the lapse. He was sentenced to a 
nominal sentence of 1 month's Rigorous Imprisonment and fine Rs 
I 
500/=. 
Offence under section 409 Indian Penal Code, involving 
servant or agent, etc is considered most serious and an accused 
person shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 
ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
'Where separate trials were held in respect of various 
items misappropriated and sentences passed in each to run 
consecutively (totalling 11 years) it was held by the Supreme 
Court that the sentence could not be attacked as too severe 
having regard to the fact that the accused was holding a 
II 
responsible post.' 
However, it is not desirable as a general rule to 
proceed with an indefinite number of trials and impose sentences 
III 
to take effect one after the other. 
I. A 1979 SC. 1195 : 1979 Cr. Lj. 912. 
II. A 1965 SC. 1248 : 1965 (2) Cr. Lj. 253. 
III. A 1938 Cal. 697 : 40 Cr. Lj. 90 (DB). 
As the offence under section 409 Indian Penal Code is 
punishable with imprisonment for life. Hence the benefit of 
section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be availed of 
I 
by an accused under this section. The breach of trust by clerk 
or public servant is of an aggravated nature calling for 
II 
substantial punishment. Misappropriation by public workers, 
III 
held sentence must be severe. But having regard to the large 
number of cases against the same person accused with respect to 
acts committed at different places and at different times, the 
sentences of 5 years rigorous imprisonment awarded in each case 
were allowed to run concurrently and not consecutively as the 
IV 
cumulative effect would be too severe. 
"The admission of the accused of his guilt and his 
paying up the amount misappropriated before the filing of charge-
sheet and the lapse of a long period after the date of the 
offence, are all matters which may be considered in awarding the 
V 
sentence. The fact that the amount misappropriated was 
deposited during the pendency of the appeal may also be 
VI 
considered by the appellate court. (Sentence reduced to period 
undergone and fine). 
I. (1974) 76 Punj. LR. 103. 
II. A 1950 Lah. 199 (222) (FB). 
III. 1959 Cr. Lj. 1197. 
IV. 1958 Cr. Lj. 15 (DB). 
V. A 1954 SC. 715 (719). 
VI. A 1974 SC. 2336. 
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A sentence of imprisonment is obligatory for an offence 
under this section.- While a sentence of fine is not obligatory. 
In a case where the accused was acquitted by the trial 
court but sentenced to 4 months rigorous imprisonemtn by the High 
Court. The Supreme court on appeal, reduced it to the period of 
19 days already served, in view of the fact that the accused had 
I 
secured another job after this acquittal and was working at it. 
An accused convicted of an offence under section 409 
Indian Penal Code. Tiral Court only admonished the accused and 
warned him to be of good conduct in future as : (1) he pleaded 
guilty of speaking the truth; (2) promptly deposited the entire 
amount involved; (3) he was not a previous convict and was 
physically invalid. High court in this case refused interfere to 
II 
revision. 
An accused convicted under this section cannot be 
III 
released under section 360 of the Criminal Procedure Code. ' 
From the above cases it is clear from sentencing 
pattern that punishment is awarded keeping in view the mitigating 
conditions though criminal breach of trust under section 409, 
Indian Penal Code by public servants is specially of serious 
I. A 1972 SC. 1618 
II. 1970 All WR (HO 11 (DB). 
III. A 1946, Mad. 178. 
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nature and requires severe punishment. Court before awarding the 
punishment is to take into consideration the gravity of the 
offence, the impact on the public and particularly the persons 
who were deprived of their properties. 
"Rules Governing Sentences" 
Once a sentence is awarded the general law that a 
sentence commences to run from the time it is imposed, but 
section 427 (1) engrafts an exception to this general rule in the 
case of a person who is already undergoing a sentence of 
imprisonment. A discretion is given to the court to direct that 
the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with the previous 
sentence. However, the court would not be competent to exercise 
the discretion conferred by section 427 (1) Criminal Procefure 
Code after the final judgement is. passed. 
Section 428 of Criminal Procedure Code provides that 
the period of detention of an accused as an under trial prisoner 
shall be set off against the term of imprisinment imposed on him 
on conviction. 
When any person has been sentenced to punishment for an 
offence, the appropriate government may, at any time, without 
conditions or upon any conditions which the person sentenced 
accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the 
whole or any part of the punishment to which he has been 
1I& 
sentenced. This part is to be studied in relation to other 
remaining clauses of section 432, Criminal Procedure Code. 
Section 433, Criminal Procedure Code, authorises the 
appropriate government to, without the consent of the person 
sentenced, commute a sentence of imprisonment for life, for 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years or for fine. 
A sentence of rigorous imprisonment, for a simple imprisonment 
for any term to which that person might have been sentenced, or 
for fine. 
The powers conferred by sections 432 and 433 upon the 
state government to remit or commute a sentence, in any case 
where the sentence is for an offence which involved the 
misappropriation of any property belonging to the central 
government, or which was committed by a person in the service of 
the central government while acting or purporting to act in the 
discharge of his official duty, shall not be exercised by the 
state government except after consultation with the central 
government. 
yfhere persons prosecuted for offences, under the laws in 
the state field and some in the union field and sentence to 
separate terms of imprisonment to run concurrently, the state 
government. Sometimes, remitted the whole sentence without a 
reference to the central government, the person cannot be 
7/7 
released unless the central government also reaits the parts of 
the sentence to an offence itf the central field. 
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PART B 
I - ".mncWfWtT ; ISLAMIC CRIMIMAL LAW" 
When a judge adjudges a thing dependant upon the rights 
of the litigant parties, it is an essential condition that there 
must be a claim made by one party against the other. Judgement 
must be given after formal beaming or trial. It must be 
prepared by Shariah court judge personally in his - own 
hand-writing. The preparation of the judgement should not be 
handed over to others. it is also a condition that the two 
parties be present at the time of pronouncing the judgement. 
But when one person has claimed something and the 
defendant has voluntarily admitted the claim, the judgement may 
be pronounced in the absence of the defendant also. 
Similarly, when the defendant denies the claim, the 
witnesses of the plaintiff have been examined in his presence, 
and before the credibility of witnesses has been examined, and 
the judgement to tbe given, the defendant leaves the court, the 
judge may pronounce the judgement even in his absence. 
The judgements may be classified into: 
(1) Judgement on the merit; 
7/f 
(2) Judgement by default; 
(3) Judgement on the pleading; 
(4) Judgement upon compromise; 
(5) Judgement upon confession; and 
(6) Judgement upon an oath. 
These judgements are based upon certain principles. 
These principles, which a judge while preparing the judgement is 
to adhere with, are: 
"Judgement based upon Shariat" 
The most important rule is that every judgement should 
be ' in accordance to Shariah. It means that the disputes be 
decided in the light of Quranic injuctions. If there is no 
( ) injunction on a particular point, the disputes be 
decided in accordance to Ahadith, that is, the traditions of 
Prophet (peace be upon him). Even if there is no hadith, then 
the judge is to determine the issue according to Ijma and Qiyas. 
Even if the Ijma and Qiyas, are absence, then on the opinions of 
honest Muslims, and ultimately if nothing is there then the judge 
Shariah is free to make an Ijtihad. In other words, in the end, 
ultimately, he may form his own opinion which should just and 
best suiting to the circumstances. 
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First prefence is to Quranic inductions. Allah ta'ala 
says: 
"If any do fail to judge By What Allah Hath revealded, 
they are unbelievers." (5:44) 
At another place in the same sura, Allah has again 
commanded: JlJ:JiJl 
UjJi ^ LUj. J£J •j^l ,>* J*U U ^J_^l ^ "i^, <UI J^ il L. 
"To Thee We sent the scripture in truth, confirming the 
scripture that came Before it, and guarding it in 
safety: So judge Between them by what Allah hath 
reveal^ and follow not their vain Desire,s diverging 
from the truth that hath come to thee. To each among 
you have We prescribed a law And an Open Way." (5:48). 
In another verse Allah commands: 
,^y» ill 1^ dLJjU 
"Let the people of the gospel judge by what all hath 
revealed therein. If any do fail, to judge by what 
Allah hath revealed they are those who rebel." (5:47). 
In sura An'am again Allah says: 
^ JJIj 'l-uu wi£Jl plJI Jy,\ ^IJI jxj L ^ ^ ^ 1 <UI ^ ^ 1 
qiijM^ o^ <?^ ^ j*«ii^  ^ j <>- J>- *i» or^. T^^ r ^ i 
"So should I make now any other as judge beside God 
though He sent down to you the Book distinctly clear, 
and those whom We have given the Book know that it is 
sent down from the Lord truely, so be not thou of the 
doubtors." (6:llM. 
Again Allah says: 
(no :oI iA.iiS"i\ 3j_^) 
"And the word of thy Lord is perfect in truth and 
justice. No one is the changer of His word, and He is 
the Hearer, Knower". (6:1X5). 
It is not possible for the Prophet (peace be upon him) 
and his followers, who have accepted God as the Supreme 
Sovereign and the Sole Judge in all their affairs, to listen to 
the greasy talks of anyone leaving God aside. 
It is never possible, because they have received from 
God a perfect and miraculous Book which contains the necessary 
details and explanation of all fundamental principles and 
important souvenirs. 
Its tidings are all true. Its laws are moderate and 
just and no one has the power to change them. 
In the presence of such a grand Book and the perfect 
and guarded laws how the muslims can fall prey to fallacies of 
mind and reason and the betraying conjectures, particularly when 
they know that God, whom the Muslims have recognized as the 
Supreme Sovereign and whose Book has been accepted as the final 
constitution and authority. 
Allah knows the talents of all human beings and hears 
all their demands made by their internal talents and knows well 
those conditions and circumstances which will take place in time 
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and space and knows well what laws should be given to mankind 
best suited to those conditions and circumstances intime and 
space. 
When the laws of God possess a universal character and 
application then the Muslims of today also need not listen to the 
conflicting ideas of modern thinkers in the presence of the 
perfectly just and truthful teachings of the Holy Quran. 
Thus the judgement of Shariah court should based on 
Quranic injunction. If there is no injunction, then resort to 
sunnah. 
Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) asks Hazrat Ha-
aaz-bin-Jabal ( ) when he was appointed 
Qazi of YAMAN, 'how would you decide the cases'. 
^ :JUi .-^ 1 J( liU- ±^^j<J^ ^\ J- aJI J^j J 
J - aji j ^ j •<!- ^ ^ i^ ^ 1 jis <iJi j ^ j 'c^ :ji5 saji 
Jij ^ j^JI Ui d*^l : JU - ^\j ^z^\ :J13 ^ (J-j <J* UJI 
.4JI Jj^j J^^J 
He replied, "I will decide the cases in accordance to 
wharever is given in the Quran." 
The Prophet asked, "If there is no versie in Quran 
relating to that natter then"? 
He replied, "Then I will decide in accordance to Sunnah 
of Allah's Prophet." 
Prophet again asked, "If there is no sunnah on that 
point then"? He said, "Then I will decide whatever is just and 
best in my opinion. I will ijtihad ( 
Prophet hearing this 'reply thanked God that the 
Prophet's representative had been bestowed with such an ability." 
This Hadith makes it clear that the judgement of the 
court should be based upon Quran and Ahadith. In the absence of 
any specific injuction relating to the matter concern, then 
Ahadith should be consulted. If no answer found then Ijma, 
Qiyas, and Ijtihad of the Qazi, then only judgement would be 
perfect. 
Similar view was expressed by Hazrat Umar (r.a) the 
second Caliph in his letter addressed to Qazi Shariah. He 
advised the Qazi: 
"First whatever is there in Holy Quran, decide the 
cases accordingly. If Quran is silent on any 
particular point, then decide according to Prophet's 
(peace be upon him) Sunnah. If no answer in Ahadith, 
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then, decide according to such precedents laid donn by 
Honest men of Muslim umma ( * * - ^ ^ ) . If still you do 
not find any answer either in Quran, or Sunnah or the 
opinion of learned and honest persons of Huslim umma 
{ C^lcr^)^ then decide yourself. Do Ijtihad. It will 
be better for you." 
Now it is clear that Qazi during Caliphat period were 
following the same principle. The most significant thing is that 
decision not based on Shariat would not be valid in law. Judges 
have to adhere to the above procedure laid down by Allah and His 
Messenger both. 
"Judgement b^sed on Justice" 
The second most honoured and significant principle is 
what has been laid down in Surah-al-Maida, verse 42, surah-al-
Araf, verse 29, sura-al-Nisan, verse 58, surah-al-Mahl, verse 90, 
that is, whenever, a decision given it must be based on justice. 
Whims or desires or liking, disliking of a judge should have no 
place in the judgement. Order of the judge must be impartial and 
just. 
"Judgement ba»«d on Oarain ( )_ z Signs" 
^ -
Judgement on the basis of Qarain ( (*^V* ), that is, 
analogical deductions from the facts of the case. Some passages 
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from sura-Yusuf are generally cited in support. 
It has been revealed in Quran-e-Pak that the brothers 
of Hazrat Yusuf (a.s.) prepared a plot against him to kill, and 
tell their father a false story about his death. Thus plotters 
carried Joseph ( • c '^^^) and pushed him into a well, and 
thereafter retured to father a Jacob with a false story. They 
came after sun set so that they could convince their father that 
they made all possible efforts to search him but failed. They 
wanted to make out that they were not negligent of Joseph. The 
story told was when they were having games, exercise, and racing, 
Joseph was that left behind. Meanwhile wolf came and devoured 
him. In fact, they told that they were busy in racing that 
prevented them from seeing the wolf. 
Joseph wore a garment of many colours, which was a 
special garment peculiar to him. Brothers produced blood-stained 
cloths before their father, with a view that father could be 
convinced that Joseph had been killed by a wild beast. But the 
stains on the garment were stains of 'false-blood'. 
The above arguments could not convince their father. 
This story has been narrated in Quran as follows: 
II n 
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"Then they came to their father in the early part of 
the night, weeping." (12:16). 
"They said : "0 our father! We went racing with one 
another, And left Joseph with our things; And the wolf 
devoured him. But thou wilt never believe us. Even 
though we tell the truth." (12:17). 
"They stained his shirt with false blood. He said : 
"Nay, but your minds have made up a tale (that may 
pass) with you, (for me) patience is most fitting : 
Against that which ye assert, it is Allah (alone) whose 
help can be sought " (12:18). 
Plotters were surprised that Jacob received the story 
about the wolf with cold incredulity. So they grew petulen, put 
on an air of injured innocence. Therefore, they also had shown 
the blood-stained shirt. Jacob did not believe that also. 
These are some of the verses from which learned jurists deduct 
that ( (iTh* ) analogy can be one of the basis of judgement. 
Similarly, sura-Yusuf, verses 23 to 29, are referred by 
jurists, on the basis of which they consider Qarain ( ) as 
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basis of judgement. Verses are quoted below in which a false 
charge was made against Joseph for act of iomorality and how 
Joseph was declared innocent: 
dU . i - ^ JLJIJJ ^\y,^\ .^Lili^j <^ ^ {^1^, J y. ^\ C^jljj 
.(Ul -11. jl ;^;*—JJ J "ill L_^  dLkl Jjl ^ *l> 
di <--J ^1^ J 1^ 1 ^ JALA ^ j ^ ^ ^ iT^^j'j 15* J^ 
. ^ x J I ^ jAj 4 i - J ^ ^A ^^ ^ al <-»--i ^ l ^ Jj 
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"But she in whose house he was, sought to seduce him 
and she fastened the doors, and said : "Nov come", He 
said : "Allah forbid 1 Truly (they husband) is my lord! 
he made my sojourn agreeable! Truly to no good come 
those who do wrong" (12:23). 
"And (with passion) did she desire him, and he would 
have desired her, but that He saw the evidence of his 
Lord : thus (Did Ve order) that Ve Might turn away from 
him (all) evil and indecent deeds : For he was one of 
our servants chosen." (12:24). 
"So they both raced each other to the door, and she 
tore his shirt from the back : They both found her lord 
near the door. She said "Vhat is the (fitting) 
punishment for one who formed an evil design against 
thy wife, but prison or a grievous chastisement?" 
(12:25). 
"He said : "It was she that sough to seduce me from my 
(true) self". And one of her househould saw (this) and 
bore witness, (thus):- 'If it be that his shirt is torn 
from the front, then is her tale true. And he is a 
liar". (12:26). 
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"But if it be that his skirt is torn from the back, 
then is she the liar, And he is telling the truth!". 
(12:27). 
"So when he saw his shirt, - that it was torn at the 
back, - (her husband) said : "Behold! It is a snare of 
you women! Truely, might is your snare!" (12:28). 
"0 Joseph, pass this over! (0 wife), ask forgiveness -
for thy sin, for truly thou hast been at fault!". 
(12:29). 
This is another example of judgement pronounced on the 
basis of ( ) - analogical deduction from the facts of 
the case. In this case woman was proved a liar, and Joseph was 
acquitted of the false charge. Judges of the Shariah Courts 
follow this as basis of the judgements. In other words, judges 
O'j/ form their opinions on and decide the cases 
On (y y * (Qarain), a hadith has been reported in 
Sunan-Ibne-Maja, in which Hazrat Nimran-bin-Jaria' quoted his 
father who told that once a group of persons came to Prophet 
(peace be upon him) with a dispute that related about a hut. 
Both the parties were making claim to that. Prophet (peace be 
upon him) after listening the matter referred that to Hazrat 
Hazefa-bin-Aleeman and asked him : 'to go, and inspect the site 
and give the decision'. Hazrat Hazefa-bin-Aleeman after 
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inspection of the hut decided : 'that the, hut belonged to those 
in whose side its' bamboos were standing and returned back to 
Prophet. Then Prophet asked about his decision. He narrated in 
details of his judgement. Prophet praised him and said : "You 
I 
gave a correct decision." 
Most probably on this case the parties were not having 
proof in their support and Hazrat Hazefa-bin-Aleeman decided the 
dispute on the basis of Qarain ( ^ . y )• 
Thus it is an approved method when the both have no 
proof in their support, Shariah Court Judge may give his decision 
on the basis of analogical deduction from the facts of the case. 
"Judgement based on Farasat 1 i-JL-f^jy^ YL 
Judge Shariah Court may also base his judgement on the 
basis of vJl-'-'V/' (understanding) also. It means that if the 
judge after examining the facts fairly comes to any conclusion 
which he considers correct, may give his judgement. Hazrat Abu 
Hurera (r.a.) reported that Prophet (peace be upon him) said to 
II 
him: That two women while going with their children, all of a 
sudden came across a wolf which took away one of their children. 
Both started disputing and claiming the remaining child. One 
I. 
II. 
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woman said to the other : 'Your child had been take away and the 
the remained one was her. The other said : 'No! your child had 
been taken away! They carried the matter in dispute to Hazrat 
Daud (a.s.) Hazrat Daud after hearing the case, decided in 
favour of the elder lady. Then both of them, after feeling 
unsatisfied with the judgement went to Hazrat Sulaiman-bin-Daud 
(a.s.) and narrated the whole story. He asked them to bring a 
knife and said that he would cut the child into two and would 
give half to one and half to the other. Upon hearing this, the 
younger one immediately reacted and said, : "No, No, do not cut. 
The child belong to the elder woman" Thereupon, Hazrat Sulaiman-
bin-Daud, basing his judgement on his "^jA (understanding) 
gave the child to the younger lady and decided the case 
accordingly. 
Thus the intelligence and understanding capabilities of 
the judge also have due place in coming to correct judgement. 
Under Islamic Law basing judgement on such understanding is an 
approved practice. From the above quoted Hadith, jurist declare 
v—ll--**j^/(understanding capability) of a judge a correct 
approach to decide the case. 
Judgement based on Qura - ("^ 
Hazrat Saeed-bin-Almuseed narrated that Prophet (peace 
be upon him) said: 
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"If both the parties have produced equal number of 
witness in the court, then judgement should be given on 
the basis of Qura ( 
This is one way of deciding*the case. Where number of 
witnesses of both parties are equal in number and weight and 
credibility than Prophet (peace be upon him) permitted that 
judgement can be given on the basis of Qura ( < - ^ ) • 
Prophet (peace be upon him) also allowed in such cases 
to declare the property in dispute as joint property of both the 
parties. 
"Judgement based on Possession" 
This matter requires a lot of detail discussion which 
is not possible to summarise it in this thesis Only it may be 
said that possession of the party may be considered a ground for 
declaring the ownership of one of the parties. But it is not 
always the ground justifying possession as proof of ownership. 
It may be or may not be depend upon case to case. Vhen the 
complainant has no proof in support of his allegations, then the 
defendant if having possession over the disputed thing or 
dominion over the disputed thing and (takes an oath in support. 
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then matter may be decided in his favour. 
Hazrat Adi-bin-Adi-al-Kandi narrated that his father 
told him that two persons came to Prophet (peace be upon him) 
with a dispute. One of them said to Prophet that land in dispute 
is his land and he is the owner of it. The second one said, that 
the land belong to him. He had cultivated it also and the crop 
standing thereupon belonged to him. Prophet (peace be upon him) 
administered the oath to the person who had possession over the 
land and thereafter decided the case infavour of him*. 
Thus when complamjt has no proof m his supportand the 
defendant is having possession over the disputed land, his 
possesion can be basis for giving judgement in his favour. hut 
it is always not so. The defendant may also be administered 
oath. On taking oath, judgement would be given in his favour. 
??< 
"Judgement based on. apparent conditions" 
Judgement can be given on apparent conditions and such 
a decision would be sound under Islamic Law. 
Hazrat Um-Salama (r.a.) narrates that Prophet (peace be 
upon him) said : "See! I am also a human being. You come to me 
with your disputes. It is possible that some of you may be 
eloquent, more sharp and intelligent in arguments in comparison 
to others. I base my judgement whatever I hear. Therefore, if 
on the basis of arguments of one, I give my judgement on any 
issue in favour of a person who does not deserve to that right. 
Then he should not take that because it is a piece of fire cut.by 
my hand, fallen and received by that man". 
It is clear that court may base its judgement on 
apparent force of argument of one party to a dispute and that 
party may receive the right to which, infact, he is not entitled, 
in such circumstances he should give thing to the true claimant. 
But the judgement based on such apparent force of argument would 
be valid under the Islamic Law. 
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'General Governing Rules" 
A judgement should not be given when the judge is 
angry. He should pronounce the judgement when he is cool and 
composed. 
Judgement must be given in writing after hearing both 
the parties. Judge should himself write—th&—judgement. It 
should not be left to some other person. 
Further judgement shall clearly state the facts and the 
law on which it is based. Judgement based on merits of the case 
shall become final-
Judgement upon a compromise is that where the parties 
have agreed and that agreement has been submitted in the court. 
The court may give effect to such agreement. However, the 
compromise should not be opposed to social morals, law, custom, 
public policy, public order and public interest. 
Judgement may be based upon confession made by the 
accused. Such a confession must be free, voluntary, and not 
obtained by inducement, fear, fraud, violance or intimidation. 
On confession of guilt, judgement would be given to the other 
party. 
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Judgement on oath is based upon, when the complainant 
has no witness in support, he may challange the defendant accused 
to take an oath, and if the later takes the oath, judgement shall 
be rendered in his favour. However, if the defencant accused 
refuses to take the oath and the complainant affirms his claim 
under oath, judgement will be given in his favour. If the 
complainant refuses to take oath, the case shall be dismissed. 
If a Qazi happens to be inefficient and unablamake 
analogical deduction, he may take the opinions of learned persons 
or refer the matter to known Islamic jurist for his opinion. On 
receiving such an opinion he may give his judgement. Opinions of 
(experts) can also be taken into consideration. 
In fatawa-i-Alamgiri, it has been observed : "If in any 
case the Qazi be perflexed by opposit proofs, let him consult 
other able lawyers, and if they differ after weighing the 
argument let him decide as appears just". 
To avoid any miscarriage of justice, we find that with 
every court a Mufti is also attached who advices the judge with 
legal opinion. 
If a Qazi is learned in Islamic jurisprudence, and 
efficient in making his own opinion by resorting it Ijtihad 
( j>l^^) ) he may decide the case on his conclusions taking 
c 
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into consideration all the facts and circumstance and rules of 
equity and justice. 
The judges of the shariah Court should not delay in 
delivering the judgement. If he intentionally delays, he will be 
siaaer and aay be removed from the post also. Thus judgement 
must be expeditiously delivered. However, if there is any 
reasonable cause, it may also be delayed. 
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II - "PUHISHHENT : ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW" 
Crime under Islamic Law 'consists in legal prohibitions 
imposed by Allah, whose infringement entails punishment 
I 
prescribed by Him*. 
Legal prohibition entails within it the acts and 
omissions both. An act and omission would amount to crime only 
when it is prohibited by Shariah. When a person does an act 
which is prohibited or omits to do an act, commanded or for doing 
which he is under a legal obligation, commits crime - 'janayaf. 
Shariah imposes punishment for such violations. 
Punishment is prescribed for a crime with a view that 
people may refrain from committing it. Without punishment, 
prohibition or command is of no use. It is the fear of 
punishment which contained people within limits. They abstain 
from committing offences, from acts detrimental to social order, 
beliefs, individual's life, property and honour. They refrain 
from causing disturbances, acting harmfully, and doing evil acts. 
Punishment is recognized in the society only in the public 
interest. 
I. Mawardi - Al-Ah Kam-ul-Sultania, p. 92. 
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In brief Islamic Law has declared certain acts as 
crimes and has prescribed punishments with a view to protect 
general interest and the system on which the entire social 
edifice rests and to enable to safeguard moral values, peace, 
tranquality and harmony. Disobedience to Allah's commands and 
injunctions does not effect Him. He is always kind and merciful 
to His servants. These commands and injunctions, prohibiting and 
restraining human beings from sin and inducing to obey /^ llah are 
aimed to guide the mankind and bring them out from darkness to 
light. 
Modern law concept of punishment and of Shariah are 
inconsonance as far as both aim to safeguard the social system 
from lawlessness, but Shariah regards moral virtues as the 
principal base of society, and modern law does not. Modern law 
ignores moral values unless such values directly prejudice the 
interest of the community and the society at large. Further 
Shariah has been revealed by Almighty. Modern law is man made. 
Law punishing crime, not only emanate, from Holy Quran, 
but from the traditions and acts of Prophet (peace be upon him). 
Still there are acts not covered under either Quran or Sunnah, 
may be declared offences and punishment may be laid down by the 
body of authority or on the basis of Ijma and Qiyas of ulamah. 
However, under Islamic law, no authority has been given power to 
do whatever it chooses. No authority has any power to declare 
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any act as offence and prescribe punishment thereto contrary to 
(ff Quranic punction or Sunnah of Prophet (peace be upon him). 
The effect is that Islamic law has assumed immutable, 
everlasting and universal character. Another effect of divine 
character of Islamci law is that it is highly respect. Ruler and 
ruled both consider it sacred. They believe that the laws have 
been revealed by Allah and it is imcumbent upon them to respect 
and regard it. 
'Nature of. Punishment" 
Islamic law classifies the crimes under three heads: 
(1) Crimes falling under Huddud; 
(2) Crimes falling under Qisas, and Diyat; and 
(3) Tazeer. 
This classification of punishment is based on the 
severity and mildness of punishment. 
The 'Hud' ( .-^ ) is defined as the punishment 
I 
prescribed as the(rigftyof Allah. Under this category both the 
quantity and nature of punishment are determined and specified. 
It does not admit any degree of flexibility. Prescibed as right 
I. Fathul-Qadeer, Part IV, pp. 112-113. 
Al-Ah Kam-ul-Sultaniyah, pp. 192-195. 
of Allah here means that the punishment as laid down cannot be 
altered or annulled by any individual or community or authority. 
Number of offences covered under Huddud are also limited and 
prescribed; such as, adultrv, false allegation of adultry, 
drinking wine, theft, bloodshed and plunder, apostasy and, lastly 
rebellion. 
Qisas and Diyat covers such crimes as: 
Wilful murder, suspected wilful murder, murder 
committed by error, intentional wrong other than murder and 
unintentional wrong other than murder. 
"TAZEER" 
The third category punishment is known as Tazeer. 
Islamic law does not lay down any limit for such crimes as we 
have noted under the above two categories. In fact , theare 
cannot be any limit to this category. Punishment under this 
category is ranging from light to harsh one. It is a sort of 
corrective and preventive punishment awarded by the judge keeping 
in view the circumstances and seriousness of the situation. 
Futher awarding of punishment is left to the discretion of the 
Shariah court judge. 
As breach of turst is covered under the penal 
punishment known as Tazeer. We will have some details study 
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about it here. 
Tazeer means, prohibition, and also instruction. In 
Hadayat it has been explained as : "in lair it signifies an 
infliction undetermined in its degree by law, on account^of the 
right either of God or of the individual, ande occasion of it is 
any offence for which Huddud (stated punishment) has not been 
appointed; whether that offence consist in word or deed. 
Tazeer has been defined by the jurists ( ^v^ ) as: 
( 
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Means to punish a person for an offence not covered by 
Hud and for which Shariah has not prescribed the punishment. 
Imam Zelee ( -> C^^ ) in his book 
II 
explains Tazeer as: O 
For every crime ( ^-'"'^t?-^) there will be Tazeer and 
for Tazeer no quantum is prescribed. It depends upon the 
discretion of Hakim ( ). He will decide keeping in view 
the nature of the offence and circumstances in which the crime is 
committed." 
In ' <-—v^^ ', Fiqh Shafi'i, Tazeer has been 
explained as: 
".^UJUI *IJ-L W - - . J * J > .SjLi^  Vj' l^ id^ V l^ --u. Jl ^ 
"A person who commits an offence not covered under Hud, 
he will be punished with Tazeer, according to the discretion of 
{ ) Hakim whatever he considers, appropriate." 
"In ' c i ^ ' ^ ^ ' Fiqh Maliki, Tazeer has been 
defined^^a^j:^ jl UJI ;--uJL ^Wl\ j>-j ^ Ul ^Up^'i J^>. ykj .^>:JI ^ ^ ^ UIJ^LJ 
"Except offences covered under Hud, in other cases 
Tazeer is incumbent ( ^^^.^Ar)- It depends upon the {-'7*?') 
Ijtihad of Hakim ( ^ ^ ) . Hakim will award Tazeer in 
offences against right of God or Masiat ( ^ ~vr^^) against God. 
Some of the Tazeer offences are mentioned in the divine 
injuctions, such as: 
111 Mi'^' v<VO^  ' ^ ^ V - y 
IP. 
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'Breach of Trust' usury, abuse and bribery. Detailed 
Quranic injuctions on breach of trust have already been discussed 
ealier in Chapter I. 
These are the crimes treated always as such. "Decision 
in respect of the crimes of penal nature have been left to the 
discretion of people in power. But the Shariah has not conferred 
on the rulers unqualified powers of determining crime and has 
laid down conditions that an act should be treated as penal crime 
consistent with the situation obtaining in the community and its 
existing set up so as to safe-guard its interests and maintain 
public order. Moreover, the treatment of an act as a penal crime 
should not be in compatible with the provisions of Shariah and 
the fundamental principles thereof. Conferring the right of law-
making on the rulers by the Shariah within these limits is 
designed to organise the community, guide it in the right 
direction, safeguard its interests and to prepare the people to 
I 
guard collective interests and deal with changing conditions". 
Actually Tazeer (penal punishment) under Islamic law is 
a corrective measure for which no huddud have been laid down in 
the Shariah. 
I. Abdul Qadir Qudah Shaheed,. 'Criminal Law of Islam, Vol. I, 
p. 87. 
"Kinds oi Tazeer" 
There are three types of Tazeer: 
Firstly, Tazeer for offences (Sins); 
Secondly, Tazeer for offences against public interest; 
and 
Thirdly, Tazeer for minor offences (misdemeanours). 
The first category includes the cases of 
. ( d-ij^C^^ ), that is, acts prohibited by Shariah or declared 
by Shariah as ( CJ/^ ^' ^^® commission of which is a crime 
(SIN).. 
The following Quranic verses contains such injunctions: 
In Sura-al-Nisa', verse 58 Allah commands: 
I I ' I I 
.Jj-JL 1 ^ , ^ 
ff Iff 
(OA : ; ^ I <*UJ1 » j ^ ^ ) 
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"Allah doth command you to render back your trusts to 
those to whom they are due; and when ye judge between 
people that ye judge with justice." (4:58) 
In another verse Allah prohibits as: 
^>^' H-* r-^ '^  '^' r^ r^  '^ 
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"Forbidden unto you (for food) are carrion and blood 
and swine flesh". (2:173). 
Similarly Allah coiuaands: 
"An come not near adultry. Lo! It is an abomination 
and an evil way". (17:32). 
In sura-al-Maida, verse 90, there is another 
prohibition: 
"0 ye who believe! In«foxicants and gambling, 
sacrificing to stones. And (divination by) arrows, are 
an abomination - of satan's handi work : Eschew such 
(abomination), that ye may prosper". 
In there above verses we find that Allah has prohibited 
certain type, of food stuffs, adultry, intoxication, gambling, 
any idolatrous or superstitious practices, violation of these 
verses amount to offence. There are similar number of others 
verses in which Allah has commanded to do, violation of which 
would be an offence. 
We may also make a distinction here between absolute 
prohibitions and desirable prohibitions under the first the 
inhibitory injunction constitutes an absolute command, the act 
involved is unlawful. If the injunction for doing an act is 
imperative, the act is a duty, violation is an offence. Where 
act is undesirable, one is required to abstain therefrom, but 
injunction prohibiting is not imperative. The above referred 
injunctions are all absolute prohibitions. Doing an act contrary 
is a crime ( ). 
The second type of Tazeer has been explained as penal 
punishments enjoined for deeds which in themselves do not 
constitute prohibited acts but assume the character of such acts 
on account of certain qualities. These acts in fact, constitute 
exception to the general rule. 
Penal punishment may be awarded for an act if the 
public interests so requires although such act may not be crime 
in itself as defined by the Shariah, with no injunction declaring 
it unlawful. These crimes are not possible to be listed in 
advance as they are not intrinsically unlawful but are treated as 
such because of a certain quality in them. When this quality 
predominant these acts become unlawful, when absent, they resume 
their normal legitimate character. Only criteria is that 
punishment is awarded in the public interest. If the acts 
detrimental or prejudicial to the public interest, maintainance 
of public peace, law and order may be termed as crime under this 
head. 
Punishment in such cases is justified on the basis of 
an hadith. Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) is reported to have 
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once imprisoned a person accused of stealing a camel. But the 
I 
accused was not found guilty and was released. Holy Prophet has 
treated such practice as mandatory and justification for it is 
public interest and maintenance of public peace. To keep a 
person till his guilt is proved. 
Practice of Hazrat Umar (r.a.) is also a precedent. He 
justified penal punishment for protecting the public interest. 
Once he over heard a woman saying, "I wish I could drink wine or 
have access to Nasr bin Hujjaj. Hazrat Umar (r.a.) sent for Nasr 
who was very handsome person. He got Nasr's head shaven. By 
that he became more charming and handsome. The Caliph then 
externed him to basra lest the women of the city, fascinated as 
they were by his masculiar beauty, should become licentious. It 
was all done in public interest. 
Penal sentence in such cases is not authoritative, the 
court is empowered in such cases to impose any sentence provided 
the act is potential danger to the public interest. 
Further penal punishment (Tazeer) in the public 
interest also pre supposes injunctions of the Shariah. This 
makes it clear that no provision can be more flexible to suit 
social requirement then the present one. The presence of such 
"flexible provision, makes it easy to act promptly when public 
I. Sharh 'Fathul Zadeer' Vol. IV, p. 117. 
interest so requires". 
Under the third head are acts which Shariah prohibits 
as such but describes their commission as misdemeanour or 
'mukhalafat and not as a crime or sin. These acts are known as 
mukhalafat-e-Shariah, and not called as iJL.^<:^ (masiat). 
Jurists favour punishment for misdemeanours only in cases when 
minor acts are repeated and not generally. Precedent followed 
again is from Hazrat Umar (r.a.) that once he saw a man who was 
about to slaughter a goat, he tied goat first and then sharpened 
his knife. Hazrat Umar (r.a.) scolded him and said : "Why did 
not you sharpen your knife before hand". 
However, even if the act is not repeated, a person may 
be punished if the act is detrimental to the public interest. It 
should not be harmful to the common good or the social order. 
Offence of 'Breach of Trust' is covered under the head 
absolute prohibitions, violation of which is vJll—«gLi^ (crime). 
"Rules governing punishment" 
Fundamental rule governing punishment under Islamic Law 
is: 
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"Unless relevant provision exists, no judgement can be 
passed on the actions of a sensible person". 
It means that a sane and responsible person would be 
liable for acts or omission when a provision exists either 
prohibiting or commanding the doing of an act. No act can be 
declared illegitimate unless it is contrary to law in existence. 
The other fundamental rule is: 
"things and actions are legitimate in themselves". 
It means that acts or omission are not illegal unless a 
provision forbidding such a course of action .exists. If no 
provision exists, a person is not accountable for his acts or 
omission. 
The third governing rule is" 
"A person legally under obligation is one who is able 
to understand the reason for being so. He is also 
capable of being under legal obligation in respect of 
whatever is declared obligatory. Again, according to 
Shariah a person is deemed to be under obligation and 
the person in question knows so much about it that he 
can be prevailed upon to carry out his injuction". 
Thus the requirements are that a person should be under 
legal obligation. He should be capable of understanding the 
obligation and lastly should be capable of performing his 
obligation also. Further the obligation should be such which may 
be capable of carrying out. Impossible things would not create 
any liability. Again a thing which is beyong his power to 
perform would also entail no liability. Person should also be 
sensible, capable of knowing his obligation, he should know that 
provision exists by wich he is made duty bound to do an act. 
Disobedience will make him liable for punishment. 
As to the sources of the above noted rules, jurists 
infer from Quranic injunctions. Some of the injunctions are 
noted below: 
In Cj^'i'7(ir'^>'^(Surah-Bani Israil) Allah 
says 
"Nor would We punish until. We bad sent A messenger 
(to give warning)". (17:15). 
Again in Sura-al-Qasas: 
( iy^ ' OJ^^ ) Allah says: 
"Nor was thy Lord the one to destroy a town until He 
had sent to its centre A messenger, rehearsing to them 
our signs". (28:59). 
In ( (ia^'Ult^) (Sura-al-Inam) Allah says to his 
Prophet (peace be upon him): 
"Say : "Vhat thing is most weighty in evidence"? Say : 
"Allah is witness between me and you; This Quran hath 
been revealed to me by inspiration, that I may warn you 
And all whom it reaches". (6:19). 
In Sura-al-Baqr ( 6^^) <u^ ) again Allah says: 
"On no soul Allah place a burden greater that it can 
bear Our Lord! lay not on us a burden greater 
than we have strength to bear". (2:286). 
We have referred only few of the illustrated verses 
from which the jurists (Faqih) analogically deduce the above 
noted principles. 
It is clear that under Shariah no act can be considered 
as a crime and no punishment can be awarded for it unless a 
provision to that effect exists. No doubt Shariah requires that 
these principles be applied to all crimes but the procedure 
varies with different crimes. 
In Huddud cases there is no crime and can be awarded no 
punishment without a provision to this effect. 
Similarly no crime and no punishment under cases 
involving Qisas and Diyat unless provision exists. 
Under the third category covering cases of penal 
punishment (Tazeer), same principle is applied - no crime and no 
punishment without a provision« It is a fundamental principle of 
Shariah and in cases involving Tazeer, it cannot be overlooked. 
However, Shariah does not apply in the same manner in Tazeer as 
it does to cases involving Huddud, Qisas and Diyat. In Tazeer 
we find the application of tUe general rules have wider scope 
keeping in view the demands^ of public interest and penal 
character of such crimes. BUt this wider sphere of operation 
relates only to punishments \.0 the exclusion of the penal crimes 
themselves. The wider sphere of operation under Tazeer is due to 
the fact that Shariah does not lay down such specific punishments 
as may be binding upon the judge to award as in the case of Hud 
and Qisas. Judge, in fact, is free to choose any punishment most 
fefitting and appropriate to the crime committed and the 
circumstance under which it is committed. He may reduce the 
punishment or award more severe punishment, all is included 
within his jurisdiction. tHis makes the operation sphere of 
Tazeer much wider in comparision of crimes involving Hud, Qisas 
and Diyat. 
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Another important principle governing punishment under 
Shariah is that if the 'public interest is in jeopardy, there is 
nothing inhibiting the combination of a penal punishment with a 
hud. On this there is an agreement among the jurists of all the 
four schools. 
Imam Malik deems it fit to add penal punishment (y^A ) 
to Qisas for wilfully committing any offence involving qusas 
except death sentence. Argument in support given is that it is 
the right of the aggrieved person whereas penal punishment is a 
corrective measure and it is the right of the community as 
distinct from the right of an individual. 
Imam Halik does deem it proper to combine Qisas and 
corrective measures in cases of wilful murder, since the latter 
would serve no purpose along with death sentence. But if the 
Qisas is annulled for some reason or other penal punishment 
(Tazeer ,^/^/^^ ) ""ay be awarded. Imam Shai'i also allows the 
combination of corrective punishment with hud. Tazeer may be 
awarded in addition to Diyat also. 
"How Shariah determines Tazeer (Penal Punishment" 
In Hedaya, explaining larceny and the punishment 
awarded therefor, 'Breach of Trust' has also been discussed. It 
has been made clear that breach of trust is not larceny because 
the requisites of larceny are absent in the former. Hence a 
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person charged for the offence of 'breach of trust' cannot be 
subjected to same degree of punishment as for larceny. In breach 
of trust amputation of limbs cannot be awarded. It has been 
explained as: 
"A 'Breach of Trust' (in Arabic langauge knows as 
khianit), by a trustee secreting any property committed to his 
charge, does not induce amputation; as a deposit is not in 
custody of the proprietor. In the same manner, the hand of a 
plunderer, or of one who snatches away anything, is not struck 
off, as the act of such is not theft, since those carry away the 
property openly, and not in a secret manner; and the Prophet 
(peace be upon him) has said: 
"The hand of a plunderer, or a snatcher taking away 
I 
property, or a 'Breach of Trust' is not to cut off". 
Secretly taking away another's property out of his 
possession without consent are the requirements for punishing a 
person for larceny. These elements are absent in breach of 
trust. entrustment or deposit or giving dominion over the 
property voluntarily to another who accepts the thing or property 
so entrusted are the basic requirements which are not 
inconsonance with the elements of larceny. Hence Breach of trust 
is not covered under the same criteria which is applied or taken 
into consideration when awarding the punishment for larceny. 
I. Supra N. p. 
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Turning to general principles governing the award of 
punishment for Tazeer cases, we can admit in the beginning that 
Shariah contains provisions by which Tazeer crimes are 
determined. Ve have already discussed in earlier paragraphs 
provisions under which acts constituting penal crimes are 
declared as illegitimate. Similarly, Shariah has also laid down 
the principles for determining the punishment for offences 
covered under Tazeer. Determination of Tazeer may be studied 
with reference to injunctions of Shariah. 
"Chastisement" 
Chastisement is wide in scope. It includes different 
methods of oral or corporal punishments. Injunctions as to these 
punishments are found in the Holy Quran as well as in Sunnah. 
Allah ta'ala says: 
O^JiJii*^J C t ^ ' t5* O^JJ^^J O^J^^ O^j^ 0 > ^ iS^^J 
. . . 1 ^ u . i^^  Jii 1^ V - ,^ 4-1. 1 ^ !a ^ 1 ^u 
"As to those women on whose part ye fear disloyalty 
and ill-conduct. Admonish them (first) (Next), refuse 
to share their beds, (And last) beat them (lightly); 
But if they return to obedience, seek not against them 
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means (of annoyance): For Allah is Most High, Great 
(above you all). (4:34) 
From this verse, jurists infer three different kinds of 
punishments: 
(1) Admonition or exhortation or warning; 
(2) Separation to beds; and 
(3) Corporal punishment or beating lightly. 
Disobedience of women is an offence__afflt rnvftrad-—under 
Qisas or Hud, thus jurists draw an inference that these 
punishments may be applied to all cases excluding Hud or Qisas. 
It is argued that leaaving women alone to their beds is 
a punishment confines to wives only but there are other kinds or 
separation or boycott too. The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) 
ordered boycott of three of his companions who did not join him 
at the Battle of Batook. 
Similarly, cases are available in which Hazrat Umar 
(r.a.) also followed the procedure of Prophet (peace be upon him) 
and ordered boycott of a Sahabee ( 
However, boycott comes to an end if the women or man 
realises her or his mistake and repents thereupon. 
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other Ahadith on chastisement may be noted below: 
Prophet (peace be upon him) says: 
"May Allah have mercy on the man who hangs his filth in 
a house at a place where it could be seen by the 
members of his family". 
In another tradition, Prophet (peace be upon him) says: 
"Do not raise stick against family". 
Again Prophet (peace be upon him) says: 
Teach your offsprings how to offer prayer till the age 
of seven and beat them if they give up gayintj prayer at-
the age of ten". 
Again: 
"The man who takes the penalty of a non-hud crime to 
the degree of hud is a transgressor". 
From these Ahadith jurists infer two kinds of 
punishment: 
(1) Warning of punishment and intimidation; 
(2) Beating with a stick and scouraging. 
The last of the above injuctionslegitimize s-couraging 
for crimes other than entailing huddud. A jurist holds that this 
injuction prescribes the higher limit of corporal punishnent. 
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However, there is difference of opinion on this point. Some 
jurists say that higher degree of corporal punishment is 
prescribed by the last injunction quoted above. Others are of 
the view that higher degree of corporal punishment is left to the 
discretion of the person in power. 
It is, however, clear that Quran and Ahadith, no doubt, 
have presented limits in Tazeer also. A judge is to award penal 
punishment within limits, that is, exhortation, warning, 
boycotts, intimidation, scouraging physical punishments, fine, 
and imprisonment. 
The reason for imposing Tazeer is that men should not 
become habituated to the commissions of such acts. If permitted 
to perpituate such acts may make them habitual and to be more 
atrocious in the criminal behaviour. Thus the design in the award 
of Tazeer is correction of the offencer. That is the reason that 
in Fatawa-e-Timoor-Tasbee of Imam Sirukhsh, it is written that in 
Tazeer, or chastisement, nothing is fixed or determined, but the 
degree of it is left to the discretion of Qazi. However, this 
discretion for the purpose of correction, is not without limits. 
Quranic and Ahadith injactions are certainly impose limitations 
on the power of Qazi. 
Abdul Qadir ^udah Shaheed is of the view that Quranic 
injuctions and Ahadith lays down limits. To him, 'exhortation 
and warning constitute, by nature, punishments with a single 
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limit and the limit of boycott as has already been indicated, is 
I 
the repentance of the person boycotted'. 
Rebu-king a person is also a kind of punishment which 
we infer from sunnah of Prophet (peace be upon him). 
Hazrat Abu Zar (r.a.) narrates that he approached 
Prophet (peace be upon him) and told him: 
"I reproached a man, wounding his pride by speaking ill 
of his mother's lineage". 
"Didst thou speak ill of his mother?" said Prophet 
(peace be upon him). 
"Thou still hast the vestiges of the days of 
Ignorance". 
Thus, from the above Sunnah of Prophet (peace be upon 
him), jurist infer rebuke also as a penal punishment (Tazeer). 
About chastisement another governing rule has been laid in 
Fatawa-e-Shafee. 'It is said that there are four orders or 
degrees of chastisement; - First, the chatisement proper to the 
most noble of the noble, - (or, in other words, princes, and men 
of learning), which consists merely in admonition, as if Qazi 
were to say to one of them, :I understand that you have done 
thus, or thus", so as to make him ashamed'. 
I. Supra N. p. 
'Secondly, the chatisement proper to the noble, (namely 
commanders of armies, and chiefs of districts), which may be 
performed in two ways, either by admonition, (as above), or by 
'Jirr', that is by dragging the offender to the door and exposing 
him to scorn.' 
Thirdly, the chastisement proper to the middle order, 
(consisting of merchants and shop-keepers), which may be 
performed by 'Jirr', as above noted and also by imprisonment; and 
Fourthly, the chastisement proper to the lowest order in 
the community, which may be performed by Jirr, or by, 
imprisonment, and also by blows.' (Hedaya). 
This also shows that the award of Tazeer is 
discretionary with the judge, but jurisdiction is not without 
limitations. Classification under four heads makes it that the 
judge is to use the discretion within certain prescribed limits. 
Another rule governing Tazeer is that the Sultan may 
punish by means of imposing fine upon the offender proportionate 
to the offence committed. This is the learned view of Imam Abu 
Yusuf (r.a.) but some jurists differs on this point. Further 
the amount of fine should be small and proportinate to the 
crimes. In other words fine should not be excessive not 
warranted by the crime. 
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In cases where crime relates to the violation of the 
right of God, chastisement may be imposed by any person. It is 
with a view to remove evil. Prophet (peace be upon him) has 
authorised every person to remove evil with the hand. Prophet 
(peace be upon him) say: 
"Whoever among ye see the evil, let him remedy it with 
his own hands; but if he be unable so to do, let him 
forbid it with his tongue." 
This ' type of chastisement is peculiar in nature. 
Generally on a complaint it is the responsibility of the 
Magistrate to chastise an offender. But Islamic law permirt/that 
chastisement can be by a private individual even, if it relates 
to an evil effecting the righs of God. 
Chastisement (Tazeer), is to be inflicted only when 
authorised by law or when the Imam consider it advisable to 
chatise the law breaker. 
Chastisement is not inflicted in cases where a person 
calls the other as dog or ass. But the modern jurists are of the 
view that in the present day conditions, such words are held to 
be 'abuse' Circumstances and status of the person to whom 
addressed are to be taken into consideration then a decision is 
to be taken whether chastisement can be inflicted or not. 
7^^ 
Imprisonment and execution are other ways where the 
offencers are punished. The source of these types of punishments 
is the practice of the Prophet (peace be upon him). 
It is reported that Prophet (peace be upon him) 
imprisoned a man found guilty of slander and hanged another named 
Abu Nat at the top of a mound. 
Execution of offenders is inferred from the saying of 
Prophet (peace be upon him): 
"If you arrive at consensus on the choice of a man and 
someone comes to undermine your solidarity and seeks to 
disintegrate your party, then kill him". 
Again, 
"If someone seeks to cause a split in the ranks of the 
ummah, then slay him with a sword." 
It should be kept in mind that death sentence is 
intended for dangerous crimes. 
As to the inflicting of Tazeer chastisement by 
stripping a person, there is a difference between different 
jurists as to the minimum or maximum limits. However, blows or 
stripes may be inflicted from the most lenient to the severiest 
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degree depending upon the nature of crime serious or a 
misdemeanour. 
If a person dies in consequences of inflicting 
chastisement in accordance to the order of the Magistrate, the 
latter is not liable because whatever is done for which the 
Magistrate was authorised and it was all done in the enforcement 
of law. 
Lastly, another principle governing Tazeer is that 
imprisonment may be added to scouraging or inflicting stripes 
depended again on the nature of the crime. It is lawful to unite 
imprisonment with blows. 
"Crimes and Punishment in Tazeer Pre-Suppose Provisions in 
Shariah" 
Abdul Qadir Qudah Shaheed makes his observations about 
crimes and punishment in cases of penal punishment (Tazeer) pre-
suppose provisions in Shariah as follows: 
"It is clear that the Islamic law contains provisions 
pertaining to all the penal crimes and corresponding 
punishments which have been so subtly and 
comprehensively determined that the judge cannot award 
punishment for an act that has not been declared 
unlawful by the Shariah, nor can he pass such' a 
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sentence as has not been provided for; nor can be 
I 
overstep the limits laid down for him." 
Often it is said that in case, of Tazeer, the Shariah 
judge is having authoritative and unlimited powers. It is 
wrong. It is only because of lack of understanding and ignorance 
of the Shariah. 
In the ealier above noted discussions, we have seen that 
there are specific shariah injunction on different crimes and the 
judge performs his duties accordingly. He pronounces 
punishment corresponding to the injunctions relating to crime and 
punishment. If he finds that the injunction is applicable, then 
he may pass a sentence. 
However, Shariah judge has power to choose any of the 
numerous penalties presented for the crime. For this purpose a 
judge is to take into consideration, the following: 
(1) Antecedent of the accused; 
(2) Extent of the effect of punishment on the 
offender, 
(3) Possible impact of the crime on the community. 
Supra N, p. 
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Shariah also allows a judge to inflict any punishment 
he likes. He may also unite imprisonment with stripes. He may 
award lenient punishment as well as severe and harsh or rigorous 
punishment. He may admonish, threaten, warn to resist from doing 
criminal acts, fine or impose imprisonment. The judge also has 
the power to suspend the execution of any sentence passed. 
Thus the assumption that the Shariah has no determined 
penal crimes in baseless. Judge in Tazeer case does not enjoy 
absolute powers. Shariah does not confer powers on the judge or 
upon anybody also to declare an act a crime which Shariah does 
not treat as one. Further the judge is not empowered to award a 
punishment for any crime which is not prescribed by the Shariah. 
Criminal breach of trust is one such crime absolutely 
prohibited by Quranic and ahadith injunctions for which Tazeer is 
prescribed. As to quantum and type of penal punishment to be 
awarded, a judge is allowed to select according to the nature of 
crime and the gravity of the circumstances, it's effect on the 
offender from corrective point of view, its impact upon the 
community, and his Ijtihad that is on the basis of analogical 
reasoning. 
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CHAPTER IX 
PART A 
APPEALS. RKTERKMCE AND REVISIOM ; IMDIAM CRIHINAL LAW 
Chapter XXIX, Criminal Procedure Code guarantees the 
rights of appeal either against acquittal or conviction of 
accused persons involved in the commission of crimes. Section 
372 lays down that no appeal, shall lie from any judgement or 
order of a criminal court except as provided for by this code or 
by any other lav for the time being in force. 
Section 374, clause (2) incorporates the right to 
appeal to the High Court by persons convicted on a trial held by 
a sessions judge, or an additional sessions judge or on a trial 
held by any other court in which a sentence of imprisonment for 
more than seven years has been passed. Any other court includes 
the court of magistrate of the first class. 
A person convicted on a trial held by a metropolitan 
magistrate or assistant sessions judge or magistrate of the first 
class, or of second class, or sentenced under section 325 or 
section 360 by any magistrate may appeal to the court of session. 
Thus against a conviction by a first class magistrate 
an appeal lies to the sessions, judge irrespective of the sentence 
imposed. Previous to the enforcement of new code, such appeals 
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were made directly in the High Court if the sentence was one of 
the imprisonment for more than four years. 
In cases where the accused person has pleaded guilty 
and has been convicted on such plea, there shall be no appeal 
except as to the extent or legality of the sentence. 
Notwithstanding anything contained in section 374 there 
shall be no appeal by a convicted person where a court of session 
or metropolitan magistrate passes only a sentence of imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding three months or of fine not exceeding 
two hundrend rupees, or of both such imprisonment and fine or 
where a magistrate of the first class passes only a sentence of 
fine not exceeding one hundred rupees. 
Section 377 explains rule governing appeals by the 
state government against in adequacy of sentences. It is not 
permissible to alter the conviction to an aggravated category of 
offence for which the accused was not convicted. 
The central government or the state government may 
direct the public prosecutor file an appeal to the High Court in 
respect of cases investigated by the Delhi special police 
establishment against sentence on the basis of its in-adequacy. 
State government may in any case of acquittal direct 
the public prosecutor to appeal to the High Court from an 
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original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any court 
other than a High Court. 
Section 378 provides for appeal by: (a) a state 
government; or (b) the central govenment; or (c) the complainant 
in a case instituted upon a complaint, provided that special 
leave from High Court under sub-section (4) has been 
obtained. 
Right of appeal against acquittal rests primarily in 
the government for all cases. The complainant before filing the 
appeal has to obtain special leave from the High Court. As the 
leave may be granted or refused, therefore, it cannot be claimed 
by the complainant as a matter of right. Government's right to 
appeal is unrestricted against all cases of acquittal. 
The responsibilities of a complainant in prosecuting 
the complaint after conviction ceases and that of the state 
begins. The corresponding right of this responsibility 
primarily vests in the state and not in the complainant for being 
heard in an appeal against conviction though there was no bar to 
a complainant also being heard if he was present in the court. 
In an appeal under section 378, Criminal Procedure Code 
the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which 
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the order of acquittal is founded but the findings of the trial 
court which has the advantage of seeing the witness and hearing 
their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and 
I 
costpelling reasons. 
Section 379 gives the right of appeal against 
conviction by High Court in certain cases. Where the acquittal 
order has been reversed and the accused convicted to imprisonment 
for life or to imprisonment for a term of ten years or more, he 
may appeal to the supreme court. Hearing of appeal in the 
supreme court would be in accordance to the provisions of Article 
136 of the Constitution. 
Section 380 gives special right of appeal in certain 
cases when more persons than one are convicted in one trial, and 
an appellable judgement or order has been passed in respect of 
any of such persons, all or any of the persons convicted at such 
trial shall have a right of appeal. 
Every appeal shall be made: 
(1) In the form of a petition. 
(2) Petition will be in writting. 
(3) Presented by the appellant or his pleader. 
I. Surajpal Singh V. State, AIR 1952 SC. 52 : 
Ajmer Singh V. State of Punjab, AIR, 1953 SC. 76. 
772' 
(4) Every such petition shall (under the court to 
which it is presented otherwise directs) be 
accompanied -by a copy of judgement or order 
appealed against. (Section 382 Criminal Procedure 
Code). 
If the appellant is in jail, he may present his 
petition of appeal and the copies accompanying the same to the 
officer incharge of jail, who shall there upon forward such 
petition and copies to the proper appellate court. (Section 383, 
Criminal Procedure Code). 
If, upon examining the petition of appeal and copy of 
the judgement received under isection 382 or section 383, Criminal 
Procedure Code, Appellate court considers that there is no 
sufficient ground for interfe^ring, it may dismiss the appeal 
summarily. 
I 
Supreme court in Mustak Hussein V. State of Bombay, 
held that in case which, prima facie, raises no arguable issue, 
summary dismissal of the appeal may be justified but, in an 
arguable case, a summary rejection order must give some 
indication of the views of the High Court on the points raised. 
I. AIR, 1963 SC 282 : 1953 SCR 809 : 1953 Cr. Lj. 1127. Same 
view was followed in the later noted cases also : 
Shrekantiah Ramayya Hunipalli V. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 
SC 287, 1963 SC. 1996 : (1964) 3 SCR 237 ; AIR 1968 SCR 88 : 
1968 SCD 675 : 1968 Cr. Lj. 657; AIR 973 SC 2187. 
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The question as to whether the appellant has been given 
opportunity of being heard under section 344, Criminal Procedure 
Code, is not only an arguable point but also a substantial and 
I 
important one. 
A jail appeal shall not be dismissed summarily without 
recording reasons and before the time for filing a regular appeal 
has expired. 
II 
Section 385, Criminal Procedure Code, lays the rules 
governing the procedure to be followed by the appellate court for 
I. (1968), 2 SCR 88. 
II. Procedure for hearing appeals not dismissed summarily - (1) 
if the Appellate Court does not dismiss the appeal 
summarily, it shall cause notice of the time and place at 
which such appeal will be heard to be given -
(i) to the appellant or his pleader; 
(ii) to such officer as the state government may appoint in 
this behalf; 
(iii) if the appeal is from a judgment of conviction in a 
case instituted upon complaint, to the complainant; 
(iv) if the appeal is under section 377, or section 378, 
to the accused, and shall also furnish such officer, 
complainant and accused, with a copy of grounds of 
appeal. 
(2) The appellate court shall then sent for the record of 
the case, if such record is not already available in 
that court, and hear the parties : 
Provided that if the appeal is only as to the extent or 
the legality of the sentence, the court may dispose of 
the appeal without sending for the record. 
(3) Where the only ground for appeal from a conviction is 
the alleged severity of the sentence, the appellant 
shall not, except with the leave of the court, urge or 
be heard in support of any other ground. 
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hearing appeals not dismissed suaaarily. 
Section 386 deals with the powers of the appellate 
court. The court has the power to examine the record and hear 
both appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and the public 
prosecutor, if he appears, and if it considers that there is no 
sufficient ground for interferring in the judgement of the lower 
court may dismiss the appeal. In cases under section 377 where 
an appeal has been made by the state government against sentence 
passed by the lower court or an appeal under section 378 against 
acquittal the appellate court has the power after perusal of 
record and hearing of appellant accused, if he appears, to 
dismiss the appeal if it considers that there is no sufficient 
ground for interfering. 
The appellate court has also the power in an appeal 
from an order of acquittal to reverse such order and direct that: 
(a) further inquiry be made, or 
(b) the accused be re-tried, or 
(c) committed for trial, as the case may be, or 
(d) find him quilty and pass sentence on him according 
to law. 
In cases of appeal from a conviction the appellate 
court has the power firstly to reverse the finding and sentence 
and acquit or discharge the accused, secondly, to order him to be 
re-tried by a court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such 
appellate court, or thirdly committed for trial or fourthly, to 
alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or fifthly, with or 
vrithout altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or 
the nature and extent of the sentence but not so as to enhance 
the same. 
In cases of an appeal for enhancement of sentence the 
appellate court may: 
(1) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or 
discharge the accused, or 
(2) order him to be re-tried by a court competent to 
try the offence, or 
(3) alter the finding maintaining the sentence, or 
(4) with or without altering the finding, alter the 
nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of 
the sentence, so as to enhance or reduce the 
sentence. 
In cases of an appeal from any other order, alter or 
reverse such order and make any amendment or any conseqential or 
incidental order that may be just or proper subject to the 
limitations: 
(1) that the sentence shall not be enhanced unless the 
accused has had an opportunity of showing cause 
against such enhancement; 
(2) that the appellate court shall not inflict greater 
punishment for the offence which in its opinion 
the accused has committed, than might have been 
inflicted for that offence by the court passing 
the order or sentence under appeal. 
The above discussion shows that the powers of the High 
Court in an appeal against the acquittal and against conviction 
are not different. High Court in such appeals may examine all 
questions of fact and law and reach its own conclusions on 
evidence provided it pays due regard to the fact that the matter 
bad been before the session court and the sessions judge had the 
chance and opportunity of seeing the witnesses deposing the 
facts. High court in reversing the judgement of the sessions 
judge, must also pay due regard to all the reasons given by the 
sessions judge and must dispel these reasons effectively before 
I 
taking a contrary view of the matter. 
The rules contained in Chapter XXVII as to the 
judgement of a criminal court of original jurisdiction shall 
I. AIR 1968 SC 1390 (Luxman Kallu Nikalje V. State of 
Maharashtra) 
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apply, so far as may be practicable, to the judgement in appeal 
of court of session or chief judicial magistrate, unless the 
appellate court otherwise directs, the accused shall not be 
I 
brought up, or required to attend, to hear judgement delivered. 
Whenever a case is decided on appeal by the High Court 
under Chapter XXVIII, it shall certify its judgement or order to 
the court by which the finding, sentence or order appealed 
against was recorded or passed. When the judgement or order is 
communicated to the lower court having original jurisdiction 
shall there upon maXe such orders as are conformable to the 
judgement or order of the High Court, and if necessary, the 
II 
record shall be amended in accordance therewith. 
Sectopm 389, Criminal Procedure Code lays down the 
procedure for suspension of sentence pending the appeal and 
release of appellant on bail. Similarly section 390 deals with 
the arrest of accused in cases of appeal from acquittal. 
Under 391, Criminal Procedure Code, appellate court may 
take further evidence itself or direct to be taken by the 
magistrate or when the appellate court is a High Court, by a 
court of session or a magistrate. The court of session or 
I. Section 387, Cr. P.C. 
II. Section 388, Cr. P.C. 
fflagistrate, as the case say be, who has recorded the additional 
evidence on such direction shall certify such evidence to the 
appellate court, and thereupon such court shall proceed to 
dispose of the appeal. The accused or his pleader shall have the 
right to be present when the additional evidence is taken. The 
taking of evidence under this section shall be suject to the 
provisions of Chapter XXIII, as if it were an inquiry. 
Where an appeal is heard by the High Court before a 
bench of judges and they differ with their opinions, in such a 
situation in accordance to section 392 Criminal Procedure Code, 
the appeal shall be laid before another judge of that court, and 
that judge, after such hearing as he thinks fit, shall deliver 
his opinion and the judgement or order shall follow that opinion. 
Provided that if one of the judges constituting the bench, or 
where the appeal is laid before another judge under this section, 
that judge so requires, the appeal shall be re-heard and decided 
by a larger bench of judges. 
Judgements and orders passed by an appellate court upon 
and appeal shall be final. Exceptions are provided in sections 
378, 384 (4) of Chapter XXX. Appellate court may hear and 
dispose of, on the merits: 
(a) an appeal against acquittal under section 378, 
arising out of the same case, or 
(b) an appeal for the enhanceaent of sentence under 
I 
section 377, arising out of the same case. 
II 
A new provision has been added that an appeal against 
a conviction and sentence of iDprisonnent will not abate on death 
of the appellant if his near relatives, within thirty days of the 
death of appellant, apply to the appellate court for leave to 
coatiaue the appeal and obtains it. Phrase near relatives aeaas 
parents, spouse, lineal descendant, brother or sister, 
"RETERBICI AMD RKVISIOW 
"RETERKMCE" 
Power of making a reference in respect of any question 
of law involving validity of a statutory provision rests in 
sessions judges and in all metropolitan judges. Under section 
395, Criminal Procedure Code, where any court is satisfied that a 
case pending before it: 
I. Section 393 - Criminal Procedure Code. 
II. Section 394 - Criminal Procedure Code. 
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(1) Involves a question as to the validity of any Act, 
Ordinance, or Regulation, or 
(2) of any provision contained in an Act, Ordinance, 
or Regulation, or the determination of which is 
necessary for the disposal of the case, and 
(3) the court is of opinion that such Act, Ordinance, 
Regulation or provision is invalid or inoperative, 
but has not been so declared by the High Court to 
which that court is subordinate or by the supreme 
court, the court shall state a case setting out 
its opinion and reasons therefor, and refer the 
same for the decision of the High Court. 
Under clause (2) a court of session or a metropolitan 
magistrate may, if it or he thinks fit in any case pending before 
it or him to which the-provisions of sub-section (1) do not 
apply* refer for the decision of High Court any question of law 
arising in the hearing of such case. 
When a question has been so referred the High Court 
shall pass such order thereon as it thinks fit, and shall cause a 
copy of such order to be sent to the court by which the reference 
was made, which shall dispose of the case conformably to the said 
7fi' 
I 
order. 
"REVISIOH" 
Section 397, Criminal Procedure Code contains the 
revisional powers. Section is most important hence reproduced 
II 
below: 
Powers of revision at the district level have been 
given only to the court of session and not to the chief judicial 
I. Section 396, Criminal Prodecure Code. 
II. Calling for records to exercise of powers of revision: 
(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and 
examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior 
criminal court situated within its or his local jurisdiction 
for purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to 
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence 
or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of 
any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when 
calling for such record, direct that the execution of any 
sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in 
confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond 
pending the examination of the record. 
Explanation - All magistrates, whether Executive or 
Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate 
jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions 
Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of section 
398. 
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) 
shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory 
order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other 
proceeding. 
(3) If an application under this section has been made by 
any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions 
Judge, no further application by the same person shall be 
entertained by the other of them. 
magistrate. Where a case proceeds on a police report, a private 
party has no locus standi. However, section 397 Criminal 
Procedure Code contains very vide provisions and court can take 
up the matter even suo motu. 
As to revisional powers the sessions judge and the High 
Court have concurrent revisional jurisdictions. Generally the 
Kiwtice of all High Courts have been that the High Court do not 
Wtertain an application for revisions except on some special 
grounds unless a previous application has been made to the 
session ju«ige. However, there is no legal bar to a party coming 
directly to the High Court without first moving the the sessions 
judge. High Court of Kerala has-been entertaining such petitions 
I 
in the High Court directly. 
Section 397, Criminal Procedure Code is important as to 
revisional powers of the sessionvjudge and of High Court. Under 
this section either the sessions Jlidge or the High Court may call 
for any record from court subordinate, situated within his or its 
local jurisdiction and examine the same with a view to satisfy 
himself or itself as to correctness, legality or propriety of the 
finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed and also as to the 
regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The 
sessions judge or the High Court may, on calling such record. 
I. S. Narayanan V. Kannamma Bhargavi, AIR 1969. Ker. 126 (F.B); 
ILR (1968) 2 Ker. 138 ; 1968 Ker. Lj. 601. 
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direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, 
and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail 
or on his own bond pending the examination of that record. 
Section explains that all magistrates, whether 
executive or judicial, and whether exercising original or 
appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the 
sessions judge for the purposes of section 397 and 398. 
Clause (2) of section 397 is important. Before the 
enactment of this new Code, the High Court could interfere in 
revision in respect of interlocutory order also. But this clause 
makes it clear that the powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any 
interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other 
proceedings. Fact is that the interference in revision against 
interlocutory orders was extensively abused and because of 
interference was the major factor in delaying the diposal of 
pending cases in the inferior courts. Once the sessions court or 
High Court interfered under its revisionary powers all 
proceedings in the lower court were to be stayed and caused delay 
and sometine resulted in injustice also. This facility was 
availed of mostly by the rich men, industrialist, corrupt 
officials, and the like who were able to delay disposal of cases 
against them almost indefinitely. During such pendency sometime 
witnesses died or lost interest in the case and sometimes even 
the prosecution lost its keeness. Such 
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revision petitions against interlocutory orders, therefore, not 
only delayed justice but sometimes defeated it. Interlocutory 
orders have, therefore, been specifically excluded in section 397 
of the new Criminal Procedure Code. 
Clause (3) of section 397, Criminal Procedure Code is 
also significant. It bars the same party to file a second 
revision. If a revision petition under this section has been 
made by any person either to the High Court or to the sessions 
judge, no further application by the same person shall be 
entertained by the other of them. Thus where the new code gives 
the choice of forum for filing a revision petition to a party, at 
the same time, it bans the same party from filing a second 
revision petition to the other forum after his application is 
dismissed by one forum. However, where an application has been 
withdrawn from the sessions judge court, a fresh application 
before the high court is maintainable. 
The revisional powers of the High Court and the 
sessions judge have been enumerated in sections 397 to 402 
Criminal Procedure Code. These sections are to be read together. 
Section 398 deals with power to order inquiry after examining any 
record called for under section 397 Criminal Procedure Code. 
Sections 399, 400 and 401 authorize the sessions judge, 
additional sessions judge and the Hiigh Court with powers of 
revision that is to examine the accuracy, correctness and 
legality of any judgeaent or order of the inferior court and pass 
such orders as nay deea fit and proper. In fact, it is a 
discretionary power which has to be exercised in aid of justice. 
I 
In Afflarchand's case Bigh Court observed that the 
jurisdiction under section 401, Criminal Procedure Code is to be 
exercised only in exceptional cases where there is a glaring 
defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on point of 
law and there has been flagrant miscarriage of justice. Power of 
revision conferred either upon the sessions judge or the High 
Court, indeed, with an object to set right grave injustice. 
These extra-ordinary discretionary powers vested in the superior 
courts is to see that the justice is done in accordance with the 
recognised rules of criminal jurisprudence, and the subordinate 
courts have not exceeded their jurisdiction or abused the power 
conferred on them by law. 
II 
In Akalu Akhir, it was held that sections 397 to 401 
Criminal Procedure Code though confers wide ranging discretionary 
revision powers in the superior court but these sections do not 
contemplate any interference, with the conclusions of facts of 
the inferior courts in the absence of serious legal infirmity and 
failure of justice. 
I. Amarchand V. Shanti Bose, AIR 19-73 SC. 799 : 1973 Cr. Lj. 
577. 
II. Akalu Ahir V. Ramdeoram, AIR 1973 SC. 2145. 
The court vested with powers of revision is not 
empowered to pass order which may prejudice the interest of the 
accused or other person unless he has had an opportunity of being 
I 
heard either pesonally or by pleader in his own defence. 
Similarly nothing shall be deemed to authorise a High 
II 
Court to convert finding of acquittal into one of conviction. 
Further where an appeal lies under the Criminal 
Procedure Code and no appeal is brought, no proceeding by way of 
revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who 
III 
could have appealed. 
Where under this code an appeal lies thereto but an 
application for revision has been made to the High Court by any 
person and the High Caourt is satisfied that such application was 
made under the erroneous belief that no appeal lies thereto and 
that it is necessary in the interest of justice so do to, the 
High Caourt may treat the appalication for revision as a 
IV 
petition of appeal and deal with the same accordingly. 
I. Clause (2) Section 401, Criminal Procedure Code. 
II. Clause (3) Section 401, Criminal Procedure Code. 
III. Clause (4) Section 401, Criminal Procedure Code. 
IV. Clause (5) Section 401, Criminal Procedure Code. 
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When the revisional powers of the High Court against an 
order of acquittal has been invoked by a private party under 
section 401, such powers are not to be lightly exercised. It is 
no ground to reject it because the state government was having 
power of appeal but did not prefer it. In K. C. Reddy's ^ case 
supreme court made observations that the High Court is certainly 
entitled in revision to set aside the order of acquittal even at 
the instance of private parties, t hough the state may not have 
thought fit to appeal, but it was emphasised that this 
jurisdiction should be exercised only in exceptional cases when 
there is some flaring defect in the procedure or there is a 
manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been 
I a flagrant miscarriage of justice. The power being 
discretionary, it has to be exercised judiciously and not 
arbitrarily. 
Over and above these wide powers of revision vested in 
the High Court, where no remedy is available under any provision 
of the Code, in order to prevent miscarriage of justice or abuse 
of process. High Court can invoke inherent jurisdiction, under 
section 482 Criminal Procedure Code. 
K.C. Reddy V. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC. 1788. 
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Further, if a criminal court acts: 
(a) without jurisdiction, or 
(b) in excess of jurisdiction, or 
(c) fails to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it, 
or 
(d) commits an illegality or irregularity, or 
(e) acts in breach of rules of natural justice. 
High Court can interfere under Article 227 of the Indian 
Constitution. 
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PART B 
APPEAL. REVISION. REFERENCE i ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW 
In this section we will study the law relating to 
appeal, revision, and reference. 
APPEAL AND REVISION 
Concept of appeal is not alien to Islamic lav. Sufian 
Suri says: 
rUil ^^ Hi- jl UJI wliS ^ ^ ^^UJI \ ^ lil :JIA ^ j ^ l ^ 
(T *t ^^ tM^LLk. jJL. <jlj^l<^ ^ 
"That when a Qazi gives a judgement contrary to Quran 
or Sunnah of Prophet (peace be upon him), or against 
any order upon which there is consensus, then the later 
Qazi may quash such a judgement. But if it relates to 
public opinion or Ijtihad, then it should not be 
rejected. Let the person who has made Ijtihad bear the 
responsibility". 
From this observation of Hazrat Sufian Suri (^^UUi<^) 
•A 
it is clear that the judgement or order of a subordinate or the 
same court may be quashed if it is inconsistent vith: 
(1) Book of Allah - Holy Quran; 
(2) Sunnah - Rasool - Allah; 
(3) Ijma -
Any other order upon vhich community ( (t? ) has 
reached to a consensus ( ) by means of assembly 
decision or a decision by political authority or on any 
controversial or Ijtilihadi matter decided by an Adil Ruler ( ^(^^i^ 
) , it becomes enforceable and binding on all. But if 
it is such a controversial and Ijtihadi matter in vhich Qazi has 
been left to use his discretion and he decides such an issue, in 
such a case there vill be no appeal or revision, 
Hazrat Imam Bukhari (r.a.) says: 
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(^ •ni ^ Y^"^' - ^ -(^j^ C?*^ -w^j^ r^ '^  
"If any hakim { (^ ) decides a case arbitrarilly 
or cruelly or against ( } (consensus) of 
learned scholars, then such a decision may be 
reversed". 
These above noted observations of Imam Bukhari and 
Sufian Suri make it clear that against cruel and arbitrary 
decisions or orders, or orders contrary to Quran, Ahadith and 
Ijma, of the judges there can be an an appeal and such decision 
may be reviewed, changed and reversed. 
The question is : What is the basic source from which 
these learned scholars have inferred this principle of appeal and 
review? 
The answer lies in a Hadith. It has been quoted that 
"in a certain case parties approached Prophet (peace be 
upon him) and complained against the judgement of 
Hazrat Ali-bin-Abi-Taalib, who was then judge in Yemen 
-7^2-
appointed by Prophet himself. The Prophet (peace be 
upon him) beared the statements of both the parties and 
I 
he affirmed the judgement". 
This baditb shows that if appeal had no place in Sbariah 
than Prophet (peace be upon him) should had rejected the 
complaint out rightly in the very beginning. Instead he beared 
both the parties and then confirmed the judgement. It means that 
in Islam appeal is permitted. Any aggrieved person may approach 
to the higher authority in appeal and that higher authority may 
review the case. 
Hazrat Umar (r.a.), the second Caliph, in his letters 
to the governors and judges of the provinces, laid down some of 
the most improtant basic rules of judicial procedure. In his 
letter to Hazrat Abu-Musa-Al-Ash.ari, he instructed him in the 
following words: 
"Let not a judgement in a case which you have given, 
but which you reviewed again in your conscience, and 
were guided in it to a more sound judgement, be a 
hinderance to you from returning to the decision which 
you know is right, for what is right can never be 
II 
annulled by anything." 
I. Madkur, M.S., al-Madkhal-li-al-Fiqh-al-Islami, Cairo, 1960. 
p. 322. 
II. Waki, M.B.K.B.H., Akhbar-al-Qudat, Cairo, 1947, pp. 283-284. 
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However, the answer is not so easy. Two conflicting 
views of jurists are there. One uphold, the appellate review as 
valid according to Islamic law, the other denies the right of 
appeal. In other words the second group of jurists are of the 
view that there is no provision for appeal or review under the 
Islamic law. 
Professor Dr. Mohammed Hashim Kamali in his article, 
I 
'Appellate Review and Judicial Independence in Islamic Law', has 
pointed that appellate review has two opposing responses, one 
which denies the validity of such review and other upholds it. 
He discusses both the points of views in his article in quite a 
detail. To quote him: 
"Many observers have drawn the conclusion that the 
Shariah does not vest any superior jurisdiction with 
the authority to review the decisions of the Qazi 
(Judge). This view calls in support historical 
evidence to the effect that no court of appeal came 
into being during the life time of Prophet Muhammad, 
nor during the ensuring period of the pious Caliphs 
(Khufa-e-rashidun-c. 621-665 A.D.)." 
I. Prof. Kamali, is Professor, at Rulliyyah of Laws, 
International Islamic University, P.J. Selangor, Malaysia 
(He read this article in Kulliyyah of Law lectures 
programme, organised by the Kulliyyah of Laws, IIU). 
Published in Islamic Studies Quarterly Journal, 
International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan. 
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He further quotes in support of the argument A.A. 
Fazee, commenting concerning Qazi that "His judgement was 
I 
decisive, there being ordinarilly no appeal from it". 
He refers another observer with regard to penal 
sentences in which "there is no appeal (Murafa'ah) against the 
sentence of a qazi. The punishment is excecuted without delay or 
II 
resistance " 
Prof. Kamali also refers in the article the 
observations of Al-Nubhani who "is categorical in stating that 
Islamic law makes no provision either for appellate jurisdictions 
(mahakim Isti'naf) or cassation courts (mahakim tamyiz). For 
adjudication of disputes before the court is rendered in a single 
instance. 'When Qazi has pronounced his decision, neither he 
himself no another Qazi has the authority to reverse it. The 
reason for this is the consensus of companions. The first Caliph 
Hazrat Abu Bakr, his successor Hazrat 'Umar bin-al-Khattab, the 
fourt Caliph Hazrat Ali, and other companions have all 
adjudicated cases on the basis of their personal reasoning 
(Ijtihad). They have disagreed with each other, but such 
disagreemtns have on no occasion affected the validity of their 
I. A.A. Fazee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law, New Delhi : 
Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 328. 
II. Muhammad Iqbal Siddiqni, The Penal Law of Islam, Lahore 
p. 183. 
judicial decisions. None of the leading companions has reversed 
the judgement of a fellow companion on grounds of a mere 
difference of opinion and personal judgement." 
Prof. Kamali also refers learned views of jurists in 
favour, upholding the validity of appellate review under Islamic 
law. He observes that "The foregoing needs, however, to be 
qualified in that it is valid in so far as the clear injunctions 
(nusus - ) of the Quran and Sunnah are concerned. For 
only in such cases where the Qazi merely declares the existing 
law and ascertain its application to a particular case." 
He refers Fathi 'Uthman who observes that those who 
maintain Islamic prescribes appellate review have themselves 
acknowledged the circumstances in which judicial decisions are 
I 
liable to reversal under Islamic law". 
According to another observer the argument that in 
"Islam there is no provision for appeal is simply fallacious. 
To remove error t hat leads to evil and injustice is one of the 
fundamental teachings of Islam and a foremost function of its 
II 
administration of justice". 
I. Fathi 'Uthman, Al-Fikr-al-Qanuni-al-Islami : Bayn Usul-
al-Shariah-wa-Turath-al-Fiqh, Cairo : Maktabah Vahbah, 
n.d. p. 314. 
II. Ghulam Murtaza Azad, Judicial System of Islam, Islamabad 
Islamic Research Council, 1987, p. 100. 
Ve have noted two different views referred in the 
article. But views of jurists supporting denial of appellate 
review do not seem to be accurate. The author has already cited 
a case which was subnitted before Prophet (peace be upon him) 
for review in the earlier pages which he beared and decided. 
This is an authentic proof that appeal is permissible under the 
Islamic law. It is not so than Prophet should had refused the 
hearing of complaint of Yemeni Parties. Though the judgement of 
hazrat Ali-bin-Abi Talib was confirmed by the Prophet (peace be 
upon him) but it only when both parties were given proper 
opportunities to explain their view points. It also makes it 
clear, that the argument that during Prophet (peace be upon him) 
time no appellate courts were existing is false. Tradition of 
the Prophet is an ample proof that there could had been appeal 
also against the judgements of the Qazi. 
It is also to be noted that the denial that no 
t 
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appellate court were existing during Khulfa-e-i;hasedun (Four 
Caliphs) is also baseless. Hazrat Umar's (r.a.) instructions to 
Hazrar Abu-Musa-Al-Ash'ari, quoted earlier, is a proof. During 
their period also appeals against the decisions were allowed. No 
doubt, for a sound judicial judgement, it is necessary that if 
any error left in judgement that must be remedied. This is the 
principle of natural justice. Islam is the strongest advocate 
for the administration of justice. 
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In original books of Muhaamadan Lav, for appeal vord 
'Marafi'at' vas used. This word not only included appeal but 
I 
review also. In Sbarh-i-Viqaya, discussion on Harafi'at, refers 
the observations of certain jurists that 'Qazi of a higher court 
can revise the decision of a lower court in a point of law also'. 
In the 'Administration of justice dn Muslim Law', Dr. 
II 
Muhammadullah has also made similar observations. 
Some jurists claim that the court of Wali-al-Mazalim 
had appellate jurisdiction, and had exactly the same jurisdiction 
as that of the supreme court in the modern time. However, its 
power were restricted. It was to execute the judgements 
expeditiously. It also had original jurisdictions in some 
matters. However, anyone well learned in Islamic jurisprudence 
cannot deny that Muslim jurists have recognised appeal in 
principle. 
Muslim monarchs, especially the Mughal Emperors 
established regular courts of appeal and revision. The Lubbat-
i-TawarihX-i-Hind gives the following description: 
"But if the offenders were discovered, the local 
authorities used generally to try them on the spot 
I. Sharh-i-Viqaya, Chapter III, Discussion on Marafi'at. 
II. Dr. Muhamamadullah : "Administratiion of Justice in 
Muslim Law, p. 67. 
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where the offences had been committed according to lav 
and in concurrence with the officers; and if any 
individual dissatisfied with the decision passed on his 
case, appealed to the governor or the Diwan or to the 
Qazi of the Subah, the matter was reviewed and the 
judgement awarded with care If the parties were 
not satisfied even with these decisions they appealed 
to the Chief Diwan or to the Chief Qazi on matters of 
I 
law". 
The above statement shows that during Muslim Ruler's 
period there existed courts of different grades for appeal and 
revision. 
II 
In Saudi Arabia a royal will was issued in 1932 
declaring that if either of the two parties to litigation felt 
aggrieved by a decision below, the party had the right to appeal 
against this decision. In cases of dismissal by the lower court, 
III 
an appeal was permitted if the aggrieved party so desired. In 
1971, the Ministry of Justice made it known that anyone aggrieved 
IV 
with the decision of the lower court may go in appeal. The 
I. H.M. Elliot : "History of India", Vol. VII, pp. 172-178. 
II. Royal Will - No. 39 of 21/1/1351 (1932). 
III. Maj., P. 29, L., of P.J. to Vic. No. 3185 of 25/11/1357 
(1938). 
IV. D.M.J., C. No. 98/1/T of 1391 (1971). 
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right of appeal in criminal case judgement has been recognized by 
I 
the judges fully. 
Review in the Shariah Court, in Saudi Arabia may be 
classified into: 
(1) Automatic; and 
KVi Ordinary review. 
The automatic review lies in cases involving death 
sentence, mutiliation, or any punishment imposed upon a juvenile. 
It is applied in breach of trust cases committed by trustee of 
endowment (Vaqf), or principal of bait-al-mal ( c/^^'-^-^), and in 
decisions concerning real estate, and decision given by default. 
Appeal to grand Shariah court from the decision of a 
magistrates court comes under this category, since the latter 
court, used to commit some of its criminal decisions to the fomer 
for revision before 1957, even without request from either party. 
The original court of jurisdiction must automatically 
refer any decision which comes under this category to the 
appropriate appellate court, which must in turn review it. 
I. Al-Nansur V. b. Masud, C.C. (R), D. No. 116/2 of 1389 
(1969). 
IOC 
The ordinary review is that which does not arise 
without demand from the party who has the right to appeal. Thus 
when, dealing with this question of how to appeal against a 
conviction, reference will be made only to ordinary review. 
In appeal, generally speaking, judgement of lower court 
may only be reversed when it contradicts the Quran, the Sunnah, 
or consensus (Ijma), or when it is against what the trial judge 
believes to be a proper judgement, in cases where determination 
of the sentence is left to the judge himself. The Mufti and the 
President of the judiciary of Najd, having acted as an appellate 
authority, maintained that the decision of the trial judge ended 
the case^tbat the grounds just mentioned were the only valid 
grounds for reversal. 
Other grounds which may be considered are: 
(1) Violation of rules regarding evidence, 
(2) The non-observance of the rules concerning trial. 
(3) Court reaching on a wrong judgement. 
(4) Excess of jurisdiction with regard to the type of 
offence, and 
(5) Newly discovered evidence, or evidence which is 
not produced before the trial court. 
(6) In tazeer, no change to be made by the appellate, 
court^but if the Tazeer awarded on the basis of 
a wrong presumption, can be changed. 
These are some of the grounds which the appellate court 
may take into consideration and may reverse the order or 
judgement of the lower courts in Saudi Arabia. 
In Pakistan also appeal against the judgement of lower 
co'.urt is recognized as a matter of right of the aggrieved party. 
In Malaysia criminal appeal is permitted against the 
judgment of the lower courts. 
Section 36, lays down detailed procedure for appeal 
against the judgement of the lower courts. Clause (1) of section 
36 says: 
"Any person who is dissatisfied with any judgement, 
sentence, or order pronounced by a Shariah subordinate 
I 
court in any criminal proceedings under this Enactment 
to which he is a party may prefer an appeal to Shariah 
High Court against the judgement, sentence, or order in 
respect of any error in law or in fact or on the ground 
of alleged sfiverity or alleged inadequacy of any 
sentence, by filling or lodging a notice of appeal with 
the court appealed from, addressed to the Shariah High 
Court, and paying the prescribed fee". 
I. Administration of islamic Religious Affairs Enactments 1986, 
Malaysia. 
The notice of appeal shall be filed or lodged within 
fourteen days from the date on which the judgement, sentence, or 
order was passed or made, unless on application to the Shariah 
High Court the period of fourteen days is extended. 
Thus the grounds, envisaged for appeal in the section 
may be divided: 
(1) Error in law or fact, and 
(2) Alleged severity or alledged leniency or inadequacy 
of any sentence. 
On these gounds appeal from lower court to the High 
may be made. Then t-ime limitation within which the appeal is 
to be filed and the detail procedure to be followed in that 
connection has been laid down in the section 36. 
At the hearing of an appeal the Shariah High Court may, 
if it considers that there are no sufficient grounds for 
interfering with the decision, sentence, or order of the court 
appealed against, dismiss the appeal. 
Appellate Shariah High Court is also empowerd that it 
may in an appeal against an order of acquittal, reverse the order 
and direct that further inquiry be made or that the accused be 
retried, or find him guilty and pass sentence on him according to 
law. 
In an appeal against conviction or in an appeal against 
sentence the court may reverse the judgement and acquit or 
discharge the accused, or order him to be retried, or alter the 
decision, confirm the sentence or, with or without altering the 
decision, reduce or enhance the sentence or alter the nature of 
the sentence. 
In an appeal against any other order, the court may 
alter or reverse the order (Section 44). 
Shariah High Court is also empowered that in dealing 
with any appeal, the Shariah High Court, if it thinks that 
further evidence is necessary, may either take such evidence 
itself or direct it to be taken by the court appealed from. 
Where further evidence is taken by the court appealed 
from, it shall certify such evidence to the Shariah High Court 
which, as soon as possible thereafter, shall proceed to dispose 
of the appeal. 
Unless the Shariah High Court otherwise directs, the 
accused or his counsel shall be present when the further evidence 
is taken (Section 45). 
On the termination of the hearing of the appeal, the 
Shariah High Court shall, either at once or on some future date. 
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which shall either be fixed for the purpose or of which notice 
shall be given to the parties deliver judgement in open court 
(Section 46}. 
Section 48 further gives a chance to the aggrieved to 
go in appeal second time against the judgement of Shariah High 
Court. Appeal may lie in two ways: 
(1) Against the judgement of Shariah High Court under 
its' original jurisdiction, and 
(2) Against judgement after hearing an appeal against 
the judgement, sentence or order passed or made by 
the subordinate Shariah Court. 
An appeal can be made by the accused or by the public 
prosecutor, as the case may be, to the Shariah High Court. It 
means both the parties are allowed to go in appeal if either of 
them feel aggrieved. The decision of the appellate court will be 
inconformity with Shariah or Islamic law. 
Now after examining the provisions relating to appeal 
in Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, it is clear that not only in theory 
the law for appeal exists but in practice it is being 
implemented. In fact. Islamic concept of justice is realised 
only when confidence among the masses about the performance of 
fee J 
judiciary is created and that is possible when for all errors, 
there are reaedies available. 
Reference 
The constitution of Shariah Courts as we can study from 
the record of History, is that it has always been composed of at 
least two judicial officers, that is, Qazi and Mufti. Sometime 
we find more than two, that is, ulema are also included in. Thus 
the Qazi is assisted by Hufti, learned in islamic law, and by a 
Alim { ( ^ ) also. Islamic law also permits to appoint two 
Qazi to sit together in the court. In such circumstance one of 
them cannot decide the case. Both conjointly are to take a 
decision. 
The procedure is that Qazi is to consult Mufti on the 
point of law. But if he disagrees with the opinion of the 
Mufti, he must refer the matter either to the higher court for 
decision, or to a full court consisting of the Qazi, Mufti, the 
Muhtasib and a scholar learned in law. After discussion their 
opinion is binding in law. This shows that under Islamic 
law provision for reference exists. 
SiBilarly when two Qazis are sitting together in the 
court and there is a difference of opinion aaong them, the 
matter Bay be refered to another learned scholar or jurist or 
Bay be refered to the higher authority and thus judgeBent on 
s^t 
receiving the opinion may be given. 
I 
Mr. Waheed Bussain, in his book quotes a letter of the 
committee of circuit to the council at Fort William dated 15th 
August, 1772, trhich clearly explain how the Shariah court were 
applying the lav relating to reference. The letter reads as: 
"The Cazee is assisted by the Mufti and Muhtassib in 
this court. After hearing the parties and evidence, 
the Mufti writes the Fatwa, or the law applicable to 
the case in question, and the Cazee pronounces 
judgement accordingly. If either the Cazee or Muhtasib 
disapproves the Fatwa, the case is referred to the 
Nazim who summons the Ijlas or general assembly, 
consisting of the Cazee, Mufti, Mubtasib, the Darogha 
of the Adawlat, the Moulvis and all learned in the law, 
to meet and decide upon it. Their decision is final". 
It is commented upon this letter that it' throws a 
flood light on the mode of reference and holding a full court. 
II 
In Sharh-i-Viqaya it has been reported that when a 
complicated point of law arises the Qazi can refer it to another 
I. Administration of Justice during the Muslim Rule in India 
p. 76. 
II. Vol. Ill, Section on Marafi'at. 
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Qazi for his opinion. But if the Qazi differs from the opinion 
of the second Qazi, or if the opinion of the latter conflicts 
with a well-known juristic principle, the matter may be referred 
to a third Qazi for his opinion. 
In a case where Qazi feels difficulty in forming an 
opinion because of complications involved in the issues, two ways 
are open for him. First he should take decision on his own. 
But it will be better that he refers the matter to the jurists 
) and consult them. Secondly^ if there is a difference 
of opinion among jurists ( /^f^^ ) of that time, th^n he should 
form his own opinion which may be more nearner to the truth and 
justice. Even his opinion is in conflict with the jurists //***) 
of that time, he may do so, and may give judgement accordingly. 
But he should not do it hurriedly. If he gives the judgement 
without due consideration, it would not be valid and Allah would 
not be pleased with it,{ Uh^i.^:>j ). 
To conclude, the above discussion makes it clear that 
in Islam, law exists relating to appeal, revision and reference. 
Those who deny, their approach is not correct. 
BPB 
CHAPTER X 
PART A 
"RECAPITULATION" 
The present study if analysed with little sense of 
justice brings one to the conclusion that the general impression 
of the legal experts educated in western environment about the 
criminal law of Islam that it is not in tune with the modern 
conditions and does not come up to the standard of modern laws is 
based on in sheer ignorance. In fact, this notion of western 
educated people is far from being true. Criminal law of Islam 
has been abandoned and thrown into oblivion without any reason. 
The modern curriculum of academic institutions include 'Personal 
Law' of Islam only and criminal law of Islam has been made 
totally obsolescent. This is the reason why the modern scholars 
of law are absolutely ignorant of the provisions relating to the 
criminal law of Islam. This study, though confined to a minor 
part of criminal law has shown the fallacy of the notion. Each 
and every principle and doctrine of the Islamic law referred in 
the study gives the lie to it. The view declaring the Islamic 
criminal law as incompatible with the demands of modern age is 
unwarranted and untenable, as it is not the result of academic 
research or logical reasoning. 
Criminal breach of trust in Islamic criminal law is 
different from human lavs or man made laws. The provisions and 
rules contained therein are universal and flexible which could be 
applicable to all the problems arising in every age, in every 
phase of social development and in the ever changing conditions 
of the society and could fulfil the multifaj'ious social needs at 
all times to come. It is immutable, everlasting and perfect, 
characterized by permanence. 
Comparing the Islamic Criminal Law with Indian Criminal 
Law in relation to breach of trust, the fundamental difference 
between the two is that the former is Divine Revealed Law and the 
later is man-made law. In fact, there is no comparision between 
the two. Islamic law has been made by the Creator of Universe 
Himself and reflects the Maker's perfection, glory and the light 
of omniscience which covers the past and the future. It is based 
on perfection, sublimity and permanence. However, in the light 
of the present study, the researcher has inferred some 
resemblances and differences between the two laws which are 
analysed below. 
The basic principle which is common between two laws is 
that 'no commission or omission of an act would be tantamount to 
crime unless a provision exists either prohibiting or commanding 
it and also prescribing punishment for it*. Under Indian Penal 
Code Criminal breach of trust has been defined and explained in 
section 405. Section 406 prescribes the punishment for breach of 
trust cases. The remaining sections 407 to 409 deal with other 
aspects related to the breach of trust. 
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Similarly under Shariah Quranic Injuctions and Sunnah 
of Prophet (peace be upon him) explain the nature of trust and 
breach thereof. In the light of Quranic injuctions and sunnah, 
later Islamic law scholars (Faqih) developed and propounded 
definitions of breach of trust and also rules governing thereto. 
Explanation of breach of trust by the jurists is based on very 
sound principles and rules prepared relatiang thereto are quite 
exhaustive. 
As to punishment, the Quranic injunctions and sunnah 
have restricted the powers conferred upon Qazi (Judge). His 
jurisdictions are ineffective beyond the limits laid therein. 
However, the difference lies between the two that the 
provisions of Shariah or Islamic law have assumed immutable and 
everlasting character, not withstanding their diversity, it has 
emanated from one source that is divine revelation. No change of 
ruler or government makes any difference in them. These 
provisions are rather linked with religion and faith which do not 
admit of any change. Believers must exploit every method and 
system to enforce it. On the other hand Indian Law can be 
subjected to successive modificatioans. The change of government 
may be an adequate justification for the amendment of laws. 
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Under Indian Law a trust is a relationship of a 
fiduciary character. • Such relationship is with respect to 
property, not one involving merely personal obligations. It 
involves the existence of equitable obligations imposed upon the 
holder of the title to the property to deal with it for the 
benefit of another and such obligations arise out of confidence 
reposed in and accepted by the owener, or declared and accepted 
by him, as a result of a minifestation of an intention to 
create the relationship. 
Any act or neglect on the part of a trustee which is 
not authorised or excused by the terms of the trust instrument or 
by law is treated as breach of trust. 
It requires entrustment of property or dominion over 
property to any person, and such entrustment must be in trust. 
Such person should misappropriate or convert to his own use such 
a property or using or disposing of that property, or wilfully 
offering any other person so to do in violation of any direction 
of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be 
discharged or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he 
has made touching the discharge of such trust. The important 
element is that such misappropriation or user or disposal must be 
dishonest. There is no criminal breach of trust if dishonest 
intention to misappropriate or convert is not proved. It is in 
fact this element of mental condition of fraudulent 
e/2--
misappropriation or conversion that distinguishes an act of 
embezzlement which is a civil wrong or tort, from the offence of 
criminal breach of trust. Every breach of trust in the absence 
of mensrea, that is, dishonest intention cannot legally justify a 
criminal prosecution. 
As to scope the terms of the section explaining breach 
of trust are very wide. Section 405, Indian Penal Code applies 
in cases where a person is in any manner entrusted with property 
or dominion over property. Except in cases where the trust is 
the result of a contract, it is not required that it should be in 
furtherance of any lawful object. However, where a trust is 
created by a contract, all the valid requisits be satisfied. 
Proposal and acceptance, age of majority, sound mind, and no 
compulsion or fraud in creating trust should be fulfilled. 
Further the entrustment may be in any manner, not 
necessarily what implies a trust to be in the sense of a law 
relating to trust. The accused may get dominion over the 
property in any manner. What is contemplated by the section is 
that the person charged for criminal breach of trust should 
receive the property. 
Criminal breach of trust involves a civil wrong, the 
relief available to the complainant is that he may seek his 
redress for damages in the civil court, but criminal prosecution 
/^J 
is not barred even if the amount involved in the breach of trust 
is very small. However, if a civil case is pendino on the same 
issue in a civil court, there cannot be a criminal prosecution. 
Under Islamic law the concept of trust and conditions 
violating trust are very wide. It's nature is spiritual, civil 
as well as penal. The redness available may be divine 
chastisement, civil compensation or a criminal liability. 
Quranic injunctions and Ahadith do not make any distinction 
between civil and criminal breach of trust. Unlike Indian law, 
Islamic law defining breach of trust, do not demarcate a line 
between civil and criminal aspect. The same definition and 
governing rules thereto may cover both aspects. The whole 
edifice of the nature of trust and breach of trust may be summed 
up as: 
Trust results from Divinine and spiritual covenant 
between God and human beings. It may result from treaties and 
covenants entered into either during peace or war with enemies or 
enemy countries. Futher trust may be created by the conduct of 
human beings either by covenant or without covenants. The last 
part is being compared with Indian Law. 
As to the requisites of a trust there is no much 
difference between the two laws. A person empowers another to 
keep his property, the proprietor of thing is termed as Modee 
( C--'-^ ) the depositor, the person so empowered, the Mode 
{ (^ '^-''^  ) oj. trustee, the property so left with another for 
the purpose of keeping it, is named widdeeyat ( fJl^^i ). 
Literally, the thing in question is left with the trustee. 
Reposing confidence, fiduciary relationship, 
entrustment, giving dominion over the property, proposal and 
acceptance express or implied (by implication - «-:i-J4*' ) ^  
creating equitable obligations are essential ingredients of 
Islamic law as well as Indian Law. 
Like Indian Law, under Islamic Law also, for breach of 
trust, there must be mensrea, a dishonest intention with which a 
person misappropriates or converts the property. The trustee 
( O^^^""^ ) should use or dispose of entrusted property or 
allows any other person so to do inviolation of any Quranic 
commandment or Ahadith directing the manner in which such trust 
is to be executed or discharged. Violation may also be in regard 
to any lawfully entered contract which may be express or implied 
laying down conditions of discharge of such a trust. But such 
misappriation, user or disposal either by himself or allowing 
some other person so to do must be with criminal design. Islamic 
law does not determine any liability for any act or omission 
unless done or omitted with criminal intention. So far there is 
no difference between the two systems. 
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However, difference lies between the manner entrusted 
the property to the trustee. Indian law envisages any manner of 
entrustment whether moral or immoral. A person would be liable 
for breach of trust even in conditions where he obtained the 
possession illegally. But under the Islamic law, the manner of 
entrustment must be moral. Immorality has no place under the 
Islamic law. Manner of entrustment must be incoosonance with 
Shariah. Morality, religion and law are not separate under 
Islamic law. 
AS to trust created by contract both the laws have the 
same resembling governing rules except a difference as to the age 
of majority. Under the Islamic law, it is a condition that the 
person, who delivers the thing to be kept, and the person, who 
accepts it, be of sound mind and capable of contracting 
(munmeyyiz)• Unlike Indian law it is not a condition that they 
should be of full age. Under Islamic law an infant who is not 
capable of contracting to deliver a thing for safe Keeping, or to 
accept a thing delivered for sage-keeping is not competent to 
contract. But a delivery for safe keeping, and the acceptance of 
a thing delivered for safe-keeping by an infant, who is capable 
of contracting and freed from control (me'zun) is good. A person 
is competent to contract, though young if capable to understand 
selling and buying, that is, by sale rights of ownership are 
lost and that by purchase they are ecquired and able to 
distinguish between small deceit and excessive deceit, like 
being deceived five in ten. 
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Under Indian law the combination of proposal and 
acceptance characteristics the notion of the trust. But under 
Islamic law sometime trust is inferred by implication ( *^L^*>^ ) 
only and mere proposal is enough to create the trust. For 
example where the owner of the property says to the usurper 
{ «-7-^t^ ), 'I entrust thing usurped as trust.' Usurper is 
immuned from the liability as Usurper of the thing though he may 
not have accepted the proposal. Another example may be where a 
person sitting in a gathering leaves behind his property at the 
place of sitting, all those present become trustees though there 
is neither proposal nor an acceptance. Such a trust is created 
by implication under the Islamic law. Whereas under Indian law 
trust is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and 
arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, 
or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another or of 
another and the owner. Proposal and acceptance are basic 
requirements. However, proposal and acceptance may be express or 
implied. 
Law relating to breach of trust .is contained in 
sections 405 to 409 Indian Penal Code which is precise and brief. 
But it has been elaborated by the decided cases. In India the 
principle of precedent is followed. Governing rules relating to 
precedent rest on the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta 
movere ('Let it stand as decided and what is fixed should not be 
moved'). Some jurists interprete it as stare rationibus 
gr? 
decidendis ("keep to the rationes decidendi of past cases"). 
Stare decisis results froE decisions of the superior courts only. 
Decisions of the higher courts are cited as authority for 
deciding similar facts on that principle, or by an analogy in 
lower courts. It includes ratio decidendi, the ground of a 
decision, and obiter dictum, an opinion not necessary to the 
courts' judgement. 
Contrary to it, Islamic law relating to breach of trust 
has been laid down by Quranic injunctions and Ahadith. One 
feature is common among both the laws that they are precise and 
brief. But unlike Indian law, under Islamic law, it has not been 
elaborated by citing decided cases as authority. Precedent has 
no place in Shariah. However, precise and brief Quranic 
injunctions and Ahadith have been elaborated by Faqih (Muslim 
jurists). They have laid down elaborate governing rules relating 
to breach of trust cases. These elaborated and detailed rules 
diVZ all inconsonance with the spirit of Quranic injuctions and 
Ahadith. Nothing contrary can be added by the jurists. Every 
case is to be decided in the light of Quran and Ahadith afresh. 
Past decided cases have no relevance. 
Another basic feature of the two laws is entrustment of 
a thing but under Islamic law it has some wider horizon, such 
as, that eaanat is a thing found with someone, who is considered 
to be in charge of it. Further it may be an emanat in a contract 
requiring compensation for loss, like a thing taken on hire, or a 
thing received as a loan for use, and whether it passes as an 
emanat into the hands of someone without contract existing or a 
design formed. If the property of a neighbour falls into the 
house of someone on account of the wind, by reason there being no 
contract, that property is not property entrusted with another 
for safe-keeping, but it is an emanat. This distinguishes the 
Islamic law relating to breach of trust from Indian law where in 
entrustment and dominion over the property are the basic 
requirements. Comparatively the scope of trust under Shariah is 
wider. 
Finder's Liability 
Comparing some specific situations, we may begin with 
the Finder's Liability relating to the lost goods. Under Indian 
Law if a person finds a thing on the high road, not knowing to 
whom it belongs; he picks up and appropriates it, he is neither 
liable for breach of trust nor for misappropriation. It is not 
breach of trust because in such a case there is no entrustment. 
In a case where a person finds a letter on the road, 
containing a bank note. From the direction and contents of the 
letter he learns to whom the note belongs. He appropriates the 
note. He is liable for misappropriation but not for breach of 
trust. In this case also there is no breach of trust. 
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But under Islamic law, under both the situations above 
referred, finder is liable for breach of trust if he 
appropriates the picked up good. The law is that if someone 
finds a thing on the road, or in any other place and takes it for 
the purpose of giving it to its owner, if its owner is known, in 
his hand it is pure emanat. It is necessary that he should 
deliver it to its owner. If he appropriates it in his own use, 
he is liable for committing breach of trust. Similarly, if its 
owner is not known, it is a thing picked up by a chance, still it 
is an emanat (trust) in the hands of the person who picks it up 
and takes it. He should make efforts to know the owner of the 
lost good. Until the owner appears, he keeps it with Jiimseli as 
an emanat - (trust). 
Loan 
As to loan whether it amounts to trust, and non-
repayment a breach of trust, depend upon the facts of each case. 
According to Indian Law, the relationship between debtor and 
creditor is not a fiduciary one and the advance of a loan is not 
an entrustment of money. Once the money advanced after the grant 
of loan, it becomes the property of the debtor. A failure to 
repay the loan is not a breach of trust. However, ' there may be 
transactions between debtor and creditor where there may be 
entrustment also. It may be in cases where the money is to be 
disposed in a particular manner. 
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On the other hand Islamic law recognizes Arriyyat 
( O l ^ ^ ), the thing lent for use is emanat in the hands of 
the borrower. It signifies an investiture with the use of a 
thing without a return. The borrower is made entitle to use and 
utilise the usufructs arising from the property borrowed without 
return. There is no consideration. A loan is gratitiously given 
for use. If the borrower violates the conditions agreed, he 
would be liable for breach of trust. 
Pledge 
Comparing the law relating to pledge in connection with 
breach of trust, according to Indian law, it may be explained as 
that pledge or pawn is a bailment of goods by a debtor with his 
creditor to be kept as security till the payment of the debt, and 
the relationship thus resulted are fiduciary in character between 
the pledgor and the pledgee, a dishonest conversion or 
misappropriation of the property pledged, thus would amount to a 
criminal breach of trust. 
A sub-pledge by the pledgee to the extent of his 
interest (in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the 
contract of pledge) would be fully within the rights of the 
pledgee and would not constitute a breach of trust. It may be 
otherwise if it is made in violation of a condition in the 
contract of pledge. 
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Under Islamic law, pledge, like deposits or loans 
cannot be taken as trust. However, it is lawful, that both 
pledger and the pledgee may agree to deposit the pledge with an 
honest, upright person. Such a person known as 'adil' ( 
would act as trustee for both. but Imam Malik (r.a.) is of the 
opinion that it is not lawful. 
Hire Purchase Agreement 
As regard to 'Hire-purchace Agreement' cases there is 
no difference between Islamic and Indian Laws. Under this 
agreement a person agrees to bind himself with the terms of 
agreement, that is, to pay the instalment for the article 
purchased under the agreement, till the payment is made for the 
instalments agreed, not to assign, underlet, or part-with the 
property during the period of hire, if he violates the terms he 
would be guilty under both the laws for breach of trust because 
simply he is entrusted with the property, ownership still remains 
with whom he has entered the agreement for hire-purchase. In 
case if the hirer pledges, or disposes off the hired-property in 
violation of hire-purchase agreement, he is responsible to 
criminal breach of trust. 
Both the laws agree that a mere transaction of sale is 
not an entrustment. The fact that the purchaser subsequently 
denies receipt of the goods does not make him guilty of the 
offence of criminal breach of trust. 
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Liability of. Joint-Owners 
Indian Law as to the liability of joint-owners of the 
property for breach of trust is different from Islamic Law. 
According to Indian Law a co-owner of property cannot be 
considered to be entrusted with the joint-property in the absence 
of an agreement of entrustment, hence no liability for breach of 
trust. But on the other hand Muslim co-owners are not joint-
owners and the principle above noted is not applicable in their 
cases. They own separate shares, any misappropriation by either 
one may amount to criminal breach of trust. 
Husband and Wife 
Indian Law for determining the liability of husband and 
wife for criminal breach of trust has two conflicting views. 
Firstly, that the wife is in joint possession with her husband 
and cannot therefore be convicted of criminal breach of trust. 
Secondly, it is not correct to say that a woman's stridhan 
property becomes a joint property with her husband on entering 
into the matrimonial relations. Stridhan property of a woman may 
be placed in the custody of either of her husband or in-laws, but 
they are treated as trustees and are bound to return the same 
when demanded by her. If the stridhan is mis-appropriated or 
convered by the in-laws or husband, they would be considered 
guilty for breach of trust. 
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Under Islamic law for making the spouses liable for 
breach of trust there are two governing rules. The first is that 
the things which are in the house by custom in the hands of 
either the wife or husband and the nature of the things is 
perishible, if either one disposes off without the consent of 
other one, there would no liability for breach of trust. 
Secondly, if the thing is exclusively in the use of either 
husband orjfjije-r- and anyone disposes or partwith would be liable 
for breach of trust. For example if a thing is not found in the 
hands of the wife, like a horse, and some one borrows it from the 
wife without the persmission of her husband, in case of loss or 
destruction, husband can make both of them liable for breach of 
trust. Things received by the wife as gifts from in-laiws, at the 
time of marriage, exclusively is the property of the wife, if the 
husband is in possession misappropriates or converts it to his 
own use without her consent, he would be guilty for breach of 
trust. On this later principle both the laws are the same. 
Liability of Auctioneer and Superdar 
The law relating to the liability of Auctioneer and 
superdar appointed by the court for a particular purpose is the 
same under both the laws. 
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Servant's Liability 
There are two categories of servants under the Indian 
Law, that is, ordinary servant, and public servant. Consequently 
the liability is to be determined according to two different 
sections 408 and 409 of the Indian Penal Code respectively. 
Who is a servant, a definite precise answer is not 
possible. It is said that a person is a servant who by implied 
or express contract of service executes the orders and submits to 
the control of his master in the course of business. It is his 
responsibility and a duty to transact the business as directed. 
The generally accepted test of the relationship of master and 
servant is that of a contract, and contract of service is thought 
to be one by virtue of which the employer cannot only order or 
require what is to be done, but how it shall be done. But this 
test is criticised on the ground that control test seems to be 
more of a fiction than of fact. There are other tests also 
discussed earlier under relevant chapter, but no single test can 
be claimed as appropriate to cover all cases. Question is 
ultimately one of fact differing from case to case. 
The requisites to make a servant liable are : Firstly, 
being servant or employed as servant; secondly, entrusted with 
property in any manner in the capacity of a servant; or any 
dominion over the property; and thirdly, servant commits criminal 
e. i.^ 
breach of trust in respect of that property. 
The basic requirement is that the person must be a 
servant. Offence is committed when the act of the servant is to 
cause wrongful loss to his master for a temporary period even. 
Word whosoever used in section 408 includes a minor 
above the age of 12 years, so long his case is not covered under 
section 82 and 83 Indian Penal Code. 
A servant is bound to carry out all the orders of his 
master, but orders must be reasonable and in the course of 
business for which he is employed. 
Where a person serves as servant, though there is no 
contract binding him to work, so long as he performs the duties 
his acts would be covered by section 408. 
Where a servant deputed to receive money for a 
particular object and spent on did not utilize it for that object 
inspite of the fact that he was called to account for, but gave a 
false statement that he used the received money for that 
particular object is liable for the commission of criminal breach 
of trust. 
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What is important to make servant liable is that there 
should be dishonest intention, entrustment or dominion over 
property and conversion to his own use. These elements make the 
servant liable for criminal breach of trust. If these elements 
are absent, he would not be liable under section 408 Indian Penal 
Code. 
As to the liability of public servant under section 
409, some requirements are to be satisfied. Further it must be 
proved that he has authority to receive the property in his 
capacity as a public servant. 
Separate section is devoted because the 
responsibilities of public servant are of highly significant 
character. It involves greater control and care because of 
secrecy and confidentiality. If there is a breach of trust, it 
may lead to serious public and private loss. It is necessary 
that criminal liability must be strictly proved. 
There is a controversy about the application of section 
409, I.P.C, after enforcement of a new provision under the 
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. It is said that section 5 of 
the said Act, after its enforcement, concerning offences by 
public servants has pro-tanto repealed section 409 I.P.C. 
However, the controversy has rested with the decision of suprme 
court in Veereshwar Rao,. 1957, that the offence of criminal 
misconduct punishable under section 5(2) of the Prevention of 
Corruption Act, is not identical in essence, imuort and content 
with an offence under section 409 of Indian Penal Code. 
Another important feature for the prosecution of a 
public servant for criminal breach of trust is that for 
prosecution either under section 409 I.P.C or section 5(2) P.C. 
Act, prior sanction for prosecution must be obtained from the 
appropriate authority. Without prior sanction ,trial of a public 
servant would be illegal. Section 197 Criminal Procedure Code 
has laid down the procedure to be followed in such cases. 
Under Islamic law, there is no distinction between an 
ordinary servant and a public servant. No separate privileged 
class for public servants exists. No discrimination between 
servants is to be made. 
According to Quranic inductions and Ahadith, it is 
justified to employ servants for work in accordance to the 
directions of the masters. 
Ther term used for servants under Islamic law is 
hireling. According to the nature of work for which they are 
employed, they may be called common hirelings and particular 
hirelings. This classification is not the same as exists in 
Indian Law. Prior sanction for prosecution for any class of 
hireling is not required. 
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An article delivered to a common hireling is a deposit 
trust) in his hands. Such a hireling is responsible 
for any loss or destruction of the entrusted property, if the 
loss has been caused due to his fault. He is liable for breach 
of trust. However, if no negligence, no fault of his own; he is 
not liable. Further loss must be caused to the entrusted 
property of his master in the course of his work. 
Contract for service, emplo3fment for work, payment of 
wages, control over the servants' conduct of the master, work 
done in the course of business or for which employed, entrustment 
of property or giving dominion over the property to the servant 
by the master, and dishonest misappropriation or conversion by 
the servant to his own use, and causing loss to the master, all 
these elements are common among both Indian and Islamic Law. 
There is no difference on these ingredients. 
Agents' Liability 
Agent, according to Indian Law, has a representative 
character. He is to act on behalf of his principal in bringing 
about a contract between his principal and a third party. In 
other words agent means a person whose object is to establish 
contractual relations between his principal and a third party. 
His representative capacity depends upon his relations with the 
principal and functions and responsibilities assigned to him as 
agent. 
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Agent, generally, drops out of the picture once the 
relationship between principal and third party under the contract 
are established. Agent generally has no right or liabilities 
und.er that contract. 
A minor agent can effectively bring about contractual 
relations between his principal and a third party. Age of 
majority or full contractual capacity is not the requirement for 
an agent. 
To make an agent liable under section 409, the 
requirement is that there must be an entrustment of property or 
dominion over the property in the course of commercial 
transactions to a person as agent. 
If the property has been entrusted or dominion given 
over, for some other purpose than for which an agent is under a 
duty to perform, such entrustment or dominion over would not be 
covered under this section. The accused must be the 
complainant's agent, if not, then the case would not be covered 
under section 409 I.P.C. A commission agent who has not been 
entrusted with property or any dominion over property cannot be 
held guilty of breach of trust. He should be an agent at the 
time of entrustment of property. The section does not require 
that be should be an agent at the time of committing the criminal 
breach of trust. 
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In a case where the accused was authorised to lend his 
master's money and he lent it to himself without his master's 
permission, it was held that he was guilty of criminal breach of 
trust. 
Agent is bound to exercise lawful instructions of the 
Principal but he is not under the direct control and supervision 
as in "the case of a servant. If entrusted property is 
dishonestly misappropriated, he is liable for criminal breach of 
trust. 
Under Islamic law a person may lawfully employ another 
his agent to represent him in dealing with third persons. 
Prophet {peace be upon him) himself authorised persons to 
represent him in the distribution of things, exchanging money, 
weighing goods and saving thing from spoiling. Thus agency under 
Islamic law is legal and permissible. 
As to competency of the agent, the requirements are 
that the agent should be capable to have reasons and 
understanding (mumeyyi-z). Age of puberty is not the requirement. 
Here on this point Indian Law and Islamic Law differs. JJnder 
Indian Law even a minor can be an agent. Maturity of 
understanding is not the requirement. The only consideration is 
that he must be above twelve years of age. Under Islamic law to 
be of aature understanding is the basic requirement. 
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Principal should be competent. If he is not, the 
appointment of the agent is a concluded contract subject to the 
permission of the guardian of the infant. 
The rights and liabilities accruing under the contract 
do not effect the agent. These rights relates to the person who 
appoints him as agent. 
The property, handed over by the principal to the 
agent, when received and taken possession over on behalf of the 
principal is a deposit. Here on this point there is a similarity 
with the Indian Law. 
Again there is no difference between the two laws where 
in a case if the agent does not return the entrusted property to 
the principal nor does he discharge his duties concerning it, 
instead misappropriates it, he would be liable for breach of 
trust. 
An agent cannot purchase for himself any specific 
article which he is directed to purchase for his principal. If 
he does so, he commits the breach of trust, for which he is 
liable under the Islamic law. Here also there is no difference 
between the two laws. 
Under Islamic law when the agent sells the property on 
his own accord for a less sum than that fixed by the principal he 
would be liable for breach of trust. On completion of entrusted 
work, the agent is released from the agency. 
In brief it may be said that on basic principles 
governing agency and breach of trust, both laws mostly are 
similar with slight difference on some points as discussed above. 
Liability of. Partners 
Another area compared is partnership under Indian and 
Islamic laws. Indian concept of partnership has been explained as 
relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of 
a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. Word 
business includes every trade, occupation and profession. 
However, literal meaning of word business creates problems. 
Therefore, this word is to be construed in the practical sense 
which the businessmen use in their day to day transactions and 
dealings. The term business includes all such activities which 
if successful would result in profit. The second important 
element is the agreement for creating partnership. Partnership 
is created by contract and not by status. The third element is 
to carryon business-in-common. It may be carried on by all or any 
of them acting for all. Last comes the sharing of profits. 
Merely, two or more persons carry on business jointly with a view 
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of sharing of profits is not enough to make them partners. 
Division of profits is essential for the existence of 
partnership. Partners should have a right to share the profits. 
As to number forming the firm, it has two different categories: 
Banking business where number cannot be more than ten partners, 
while in all other cases twenty is the maximum limit of partners. 
For formation of partnership, partners must be competent to enter 
into partnership contract. Further partnership must not be for 
an illegal purpose. Limit of number of partners as laid down by 
law should not exceed. Another significant point is the 
relationship of partners to one another. Such relationship is 
wholly governed by the terms of partnership agreement. Partners 
are bound to be just and faithful to each other. The statutory 
obligation thus created cannot be warded off by any agreement to 
the contrary. The agreement made between partners results in 
giving them certain rights, and inconsequent imposing certain 
duties upon them, violation of them make then liable. 
Islamic law signifies the conjunction of two or more 
estates, in such a way that one of them is not distinguishable 
from the other. Further, the term Shir^at_<partnership) extends 
to contracts, although there may be no actual conjunction of 
estates but the contract is the cause of such conjunction. It 
signifies the union of two or more persons in one concern. Thus 
according to Islamic law to form partnership two different 
methods are adopted, one by conjunction of estates, and another 
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by contract. The last element is common between both the systems 
of laws. 
Partnership by contract under Islamic law consists of 
agreement for association, on the condition that the capital and 
its benefit be common between two or more persons. The essence 
of partnership by contract under Islamic law is an offer and 
accpetance expressed or implied. Further the partners should be 
competent to contract the formation of association. 
Participation=in-common and sharing of profits are other 
significant elements of Islamic law of partnership (Shirkat). 
Further every kind of shirkat by contract contains a contract of 
agency and condition for reason and discernment as followed in 
contract for agency are to be applied in partnership as well. 
Division of profits should be made clear. If it is doubtful or 
unknown to the partnership than such partnership would be fasid. 
All these requisites for forming a Shirkat (partnership) are 
identical between both the laws under consideration. 
Under Islamic law it is a condition that the capital be 
a thing, which is known and individually perceptible (Ayn). A 
debt which will be recieved being on accounts of debts due from 
people, cannot be the capital of a prtnership. If the capital of 
one is corporeal property (Ayn) and the capital of the other is a 
debt, again the partnership is not good. 
The right to profit may come from property or work or 
sometimes in consequence of responsibility. When one is the 
apprentice of a skilled workman, if he makes him do the work, 
which he has undertaken, for half pay, it is lawful. So also by 
reasong of his responsibility and undertaking his master shares 
to the other half is also legally justified. In Mudarebe, the 
partner who supplies the capital, by the property, and the party 
who supplies the labour, by the labour, becomes entitled to the 
profit. In cases where property, work and responsibility are 
absent, there is no right to share the profits, no partnership is 
constituted, and he cannot.take a share of the profit. 
As to number of partners forming partnership, unlike 
India Law, Islamic law does not lay down any categorisation or 
any minimum or maximum limit. Partnership may comprise of any 
number of partners, whether it is partnership by contract ( 
), or Shiket-i-vujuh (partnership for many accounts) or 
Shirket-i-*Amal, etc. 
As to liability the general law in India relating to 
partnership is that like a joint-owner who cannot commit mis-
appropriation of property which he holds jointly with other co-
owners, the partner also cannot misappropriate partnership's 
property belonging to him and other co-partners.. A partner 
cannot be held guilty of criminal breach of trust even in respect 
of partnership assets. A partner not rendering account and 
withholding share of property of other partners is not liable 
under section 406 Indian Penal Code. In cases of disputes 
regarding the liabilities of the partners the court will not 
interfere under this section 406 I.P.C. The court has to be 
cautious and careful in proceeding against partners for charges 
of criminal breach of trust- If a partner receives money on 
behalf of the partnership, he does not receive it in a fiduciary 
capacity. Consequently, where a partner alleged to have had with 
held the share of the profits of the partnership business said to 
be due to anather partner, could not be prosecuted for criminal 
breach of trust. 
However, in R.K. Dalmia V. Delhi Administration, 
discussed in earlier chapters in detail, it has now been settled 
that sections 405 and 406, Indian Penal Code, are quite wide 
enough to include within their purview the case of a partner if 
it is proved that he was in fact entrusted by agreement with the 
partnership property or with dominion over paroperty, and that he 
dishonestly misappropriated the property. 
Thus for making a partner liable the prosecution must 
prove clearly and beyond reasonable doubt that a special 
agreement entrusting or giving dominion over property does exist 
and the accused has acted dishonestly in misappropriating the 
partnership property at the expense of those with whom he was 
working in partnership. 
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The mere fact that the partnership property belongs to 
the firm does not in any way indicate that any partner has 
entrusted his share to the other partners. Such entrustment 
cannot read in the mere relationship of partners. k special 
agreement entrusting the dominion over the property and dishonest 
misappropriation make a partner liable for criminal breach of 
trust. 
Islamic law on partner's liability is totally oppose to 
India Law. According to this the partners are persons entrusted 
( ) the one by the other. The partnership assets or 
property in the possession of each of them is like a thing 
entrusted - ( T/ii^-^r _ <:le^j>> ). 
Each partner holds the stock in the manner of a trust. 
The possession of each of the two partners, by reciprocity or in 
traffic, over the partnership stock, is considered as the 
possession of a trust Since each possesses the 
property with consent of the proprietor, for this reason, that he 
is to give something in lieu of it, in the same manner as where a 
person takes possession of a thing with a view to purchase it 
(not because it is a pledge, as in pawnage). The stock is 
therefore a deposit (Trust -
Each of the partners is at liberty to lodge his capital 
as a deposit (trust - ) with the other partner. In 
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Mudarebe, the Mudarib is a person entrusted (Emin - trustee). 
The capital in his hands is like property deposited for safe-
keeping (vedia - v.ll.s5^9 - trust). 
All the partners in the partnership have right to 
deposit (•*ii-»<*.S? - trust) the partnership property for safe-ty 
keeping. One partner cannot mix the partnership property with 
his own property. He cannot make a partnership with another. If 
he does, and the partnership property is lost, he is responsible 
for the share of his partner. Such acts of a partner would 
amount to breach of trust. 
Acts done by one of the partners in violation of 
express prohibition would also amount to breach of trust. Any 
partner makes loan of the partnership property without the leave 
of other partners, he would commit breach of trust. Consent of 
other partners for lending a loan is the essential requirement. 
Partnership by way of Hudarebe may be limited or 
unlimited based on the nature of transaction. If it is a 
restricted Hudarebe, violation of such restrictions would amount 
to breach of trust as the Mudarib is a person entrusted (Emin -
trustee). 
Precisely it may be said that the liabiality of the 
partners would be based upon the nature and kind of each 
partnership and effect of violation of conditions governing such 
partnerships. 
PROCEDURE 
Analysing the procedural aspects both the laws have 
some resemblances and differences. Under both the laws 
administration of justice, maintenance of law and order, 
protecting the week from the aggresors and providing redress to 
the aggrieved persons are the basic responsibilities of every 
state. 
Under Indian law in criminal cases justice is 
administered according to the penal law of the land while under 
Islamic law it is executed in accordance to the commanments of 
Holy Quran and Ahadith, in the absence, Ijma and Qiyas is 
followed. 
Cognizance 
The first important step according to Indian law in the 
prosecution of the offenders is cognizance of the offence. 
Although word cognizance has not been defined in the criminal 
procedure code, infact, it means a mental act and also a judicial 
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act. A magistrate is said to have t aken cognizance of an 
offence when he applies his mind to the contents of the petition 
with the purpose of proceeding in a particular way. When the 
Magistrate £omes» to the conclusion that there is a case to be 
inquired into, he proceeds with the prosecution. 
Magistrate take cognizance of the offence upon 
receiving a complaint about the commission of crime, or upon a 
police report, upon information received from any person than a 
police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has 
been committed. 
Upon receiving such information the magistrate before 
whom a complaint is pending may adopt either of the two courses. 
Firstly, he may conduct a preliminary inquiry under section 202 
Criminal Procedure Code or secondly, may scrutinize the case 
diary and other relevant material before him. Then if he is of 
the opinion that the offender be prosecuted, he may place the 
accused on trial. Further he may call for charge-sheet from the 
police and take cognizance under section 190 (l)(b), or he may 
take cognizance on the complaint under section 190 (1)(a) Criminal 
Procedure Code. 
Taking cognizance of an offence does not require any 
formal action or action of any kind. It may happen as soon as 
the magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an 
offence. 
It is with the magistrate's discretionary power either 
to take cognizance of a case or not to take cognizance of a case. 
But the magistrate must act in a judicial manner. It should be 
clear that the cognizance of an offence is not the cognizance of 
offenders. Once the magistrate takes cognizance of the offence, 
it is his duty to find out who the offenders are. 
Another important point relating to cognizance of 
offence is that the magistrate must be competent to take 
cognizance. If he is not competent, then, he should either if 
the complaint is in writing, return it for prosecution to the 
proper court with an endorsement to that effect, or if the 
complaint is not in writing, direct the complainant to the 
proper court. 
The law relating to take cognizance for the offence of 
breach of trust committed by public servants under section 409 
Indian Penal Code is different. Section 197 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code has laid down the procedure to be followed in,.such 
cases. Vhen any person who is a public servant not removable 
from his office save by or with the sanction of the government is 
accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him 
while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his 
official duty, no court shall take cognizance of such offence 
except with the previous sanction of either the central 
government or the state government as the case may be. The 
object of the prior sanction is to give protection to 
responsible public servants against possible vexatious criminal 
proceedings while acting under colour of their offices. 
Under Islamic law the crimes are divided under three 
categories : Hagoog - Allah ( Haqooul-Ibad ( 
^l^JC3^^), and common Haqooq (Q:r^—"^Z^). These are further 
sub-divided. However, for procedural convenience crimes related 
to these Haqooq may be classified under two heeds : Private right 
or Haqooqul-Ibad ( those which are tried only on a 
demand by a private claimant, and public rights or haqooq Allah 
( c^ji^s^^' those in which action can be brought by any one. 
The claimant or complainant has to file a 
(S£^^ (petition) in the Shariah court. Then the court is to 
take cognizance of the offence and is to notify if the action is 
of private right, and to inform the prosecution if the action is 
of a paublic right. The person against whom allegations have 
been made is to be summoned on a fixed date before the court. 
The inference from the above discussion is that 
cognizance of offence is common in both the systems with minor 
procedural differences. Under Islamic law preliminary inquiry 
or scruiting of diary by the court are not required. Merely on 
private or public complaint or complaint made by the police the 
court takes the cognizance of the offence and summons the 
offender. 
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Further for taking cognizanze under Islamic law no 
distinction between servant and public servant is made, both are 
treated equal before the law. For the prosecution of public 
servants no special sanction either of the central government or 
the state government is needed. Simple complaint petition is 
required to prosecute the public servants also. There is no 
distinct class or category privileged because of the nature of 
service. 
Warrant of Arrest 
The procedure for the appearance of the parties under 
the two systems is different. 
Under Indian law, though the offence under sections 
406, and 408 is cognizable in which case a police officer may 
arrest a person without warjrant, but for breach of trust a 
warrant of arrest is to be issued by the magistrate. A police 
officer, has no authority to arrest without warrant. Magistrate 
before issuing the warrant of arrest has to apply his judicial 
mind. 
Offence committed un^er 409 I.P-C. by a public servant, 
then, under such a situation it is discretionary with the 
magistrate not to issue warraiit, instead issue summons for the 
appearance of the accused. But arrest without warrant cannot be 
made. Police has no authority to arrest the offender without 
obtaining warrant of arrest from the magistrate. 
Islamic law follows a different procedure which is more 
simple and less humiliating. Vhen the complainant files the 
petition, the court on receiving it will not issue a warrant of 
arrest for committed breach of trust. Instead it would issue 
summons to the offender for his appearance in the court on a 
fixed date. 
If a person on receiving summons does not appear on the 
fixed date, court presumes his case weak and the opponent's claim 
has force in it. However, if on receiving summons the offender 
abstained and gives reason for such absence, then court must take 
such reasons into consideration. 
There is another situation where in cases of complaint, 
if the Shariah court is of the view that person he detained or 
arrested, it may order to this effect. But this is required only 
in cases of serious nature, and when the possibility is that the 
person may abscond or would avoid attenting proceedings in the 
court against him. 
If an accused is summoned, does not appear before the 
court on the fixed date for hearing, the cout may compell his 
apprearance. Warrant of arrest may be issued against him. Then 
police may arrest and bring him before the court. Thus the 
procedure of arrest is totally different from the Indian 
procedure of arrest. Under Islamic law emphasis is on summoning 
the accused rather than issuing the warrant of arrest against 
the accused. 
Bail 
The next thing requires comparison is the release of the 
accused on bail. Bail is aimed at to set the accused at liberty 
from his arrest and imprisonment on receiving security for his 
apprearance on a day and at a certain place. 
Under Indian Law Criminal Breach of Trust^s been shown 
in the first schedule, column five, Criminal Procedure Code, as 
an offence which is not - bailable. In such a case bail cannot 
be claimed as a matter of right but section 437 criminal 
procedure lays down certain conditions keeping in view of them 
the accused may be released on bail. The court releasing any 
person under sub-section (1), or sub-section (2) of section 437 
Criminal Procedure Code shall record in writing his or its 
reasons for so doing. 
Non-bailable cases not concluded within a period of 
sixty days from the first date fixed for taking evidence in the 
case, such person shall, if he is in ci(stody during the whole of 
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the said period, be released on bail to the satisfaction of the 
magistrate, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, the 
magistrate otherwise directs. 
Again after conclusion of trial of a person accused of 
a non-bailable offence and before judgement is delivered, the 
court is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that the accused is not guilty of any such offence it 
shall release the accused, if he is in custody, on the execution 
by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance to hear 
judgement delivered. 
In cases where a person on reasonable believe that he 
may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-
bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the court of 
session for a direction; and that court may, if it thinks fit, 
direct that in the event of such arrest, he shall be released on 
bail. Such direction may be conditional which the accused 
released on bail is to abide with. 
It is also be noted that the object of the detention of 
the accused person during trial is not punitive, it is merely to 
secure the accused appearance. The court, no doubt, has 
discretion in refusing or granting bail in non-bailable offences 
but it is to take into consideration the probability of the 
accused appearing to stand the trial and not his supposed guilt 
or innocence. 
Under Islamic law bail may be of two descriptions. 
Firstly, bail for person, and secondly, bail for property. It is 
all discretionary with the court to release a person on bail. If 
the possibility in breach of trust cases is that the released 
person would damage the trust property the court may also ask 
bail for securing the property as well. 
If the circumstances warrant that he should not be 
released even on furnishing the sureties, the bail may be 
refused. Court may grant the bail or may not grant the bail. 
However, it is not arbitrary with the judge. Decision to grant 
bail depends upon the seriousness of the allegations and 
surrounding circumstances. Refusal '^^  grant bail must be based 
on reasons. 
Under Islamic law there is no such division as bailable 
offence or non-bailable offence as existed under the Indian 
system. Simply the judge, without involving in the 
technicalities of law, take into consideration certain relevant 
factors effecting the release and the proceedings of the case and 
form his decision either to release or not to release a person on 
bail. 
Jurisdiction - Venue 
The magistrate taking cognizance of the offence must be 
competent to entertain and dispose of the cases. In India 
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Schedule I of the Criminal Procedure Code determines the 
competency. Under Colum 6 of the First Schedulu the magistrate 
of first class has been shown as competent to inquire into and 
dispose of cases of criminal breach of trust falling under 
sections 406, 407, 408 and 409 of the Indian Penal Code. 
As to place of trial, Criminal Procedure Code under 
section 177 to 185 contain provisions regarding the place of 
trial. Every offence shall ordinarilly be inquired into and 
tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was 
committed. 
Competency of the court to try an offence depends upon 
its local jurisdiction within which an offence is committed. If 
the offence committed wholly outside the limits of its 
jurisdiction court is not authorised to take cognizance of and to 
try the accused. Where a court is not empowerd to try a 
particular offence, does try, the entire trial is void. 
The offence of criminal breach of trust may be inquired 
into or tried by a court within the local limits of whose 
jurisdiction any part of the property which is subject of the 
offence was received or retained by the accused person, or was 
required to be returned or accounted for by the accused person or 
the offence was committed. 
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Section 177 of the Criminal Procedure Code has 
incorporated a general rule. Sections 178 to 184 and 188 are 
elaborations of this general rule. These sections are not 
exceptions. Similarly sections 218 to 223 are also not 
exceptions to the general rule laid down by section 177, Cr. P.C. 
Where an act is an offence by reason of anything which 
has been done and of a consequence which has ensued the offence 
may be inquired into or tried by a court within whose local 
jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has 
ensued. Detailed study has already been made of all the 
provisions under the head jurisdiction and venue in inquiries and 
trials. 
Briefly it may be summed up that the offence of 
criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a court 
within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any 
part of the property which is the subject of the offence was 
received or retained or was required to be returned or accounted 
for, by the accused person. Where neither entrustment nor 
conversion has taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of 
a court that court has no jurisdiction. 
Shariah courts are appointed by the ruler of the state 
at a distance which a person may cover in a day on foot. 
Distance of a day includes going from and coming back of 
complainant to his house. 
Considerations for determining the venue and 
jurisdiction of Shariah courts are: 
(1) Complainant and his witnesses should not cover 
long distances. 
(2) There should be no inconvenience in approaching 
the courts, and 
(3) Easy access for seeking redress is the purpose 
behind. 
The suit lies in the court within the jurisdiction of 
which they - complainant and his witnesses reside. 
Defendant's residence or the subject-matter of dispute 
situated within the jurisdiction of another court is not the 
consideration for determining the jurisdiction and place of trial 
by the court. Because complainant is the aggrieved party. 
Another factor which determines the jurisdiction of 
Shariah court is the powers of Qazi contained in his letter of 
appointment. Such letter may limit the jurisdiction of the court 
to try specific class of cases, or to cover specific area. 
It is a basic requirement under Shariah also that the 
complainant must file his petition in a competent court in whose 
jurisdiction the matter in dispute and the area is covered in. 
Thus on competency of court in relation to jurisdiction 
and the place of trial there is a similarity. In India statutes 
determines the jurisdiction and the limits. Under Islamic law 
the ruler determines them. But both based on the same principle 
of convenience of the litigants. 
Investigation 
In India Chapter XII from sections 154 to 176 Criminal 
Procedure Code deals with the information to the police and their 
powers to investigate. This information is known as 'First 
Information Report' about the commission of crime with the object 
of setting the police in motion. Such information is usually 
made by the victim of crime known as complainant or by someone 
on his behalf. The information be given by a person who has 
personally seen the occurrence of crime or has the personal 
knowledge of the incident reported. 
It must be an information, and must relate to a 
cognizable offence. If no cofnizable offence is disclosed, the 
police would have no authority to undertake an investigation. If 
police without a cognizable offence undertakes investigagion, 
High Court may interfere with under section 482 Criminal 
Procedure Code. Criminal breach of trust is a cognizable 
offence, hence covered under this provision. 
First information report is different from complai/t. 
It is given in writing to police officer while the complaint, 
whether oral or in writing, is made to the magistrate. The 
report by the police of the same information to magistrate 
empowers him to take cognizance of such offence. Thereafter he 
may direct an investigation or, if he thinks fit, at once 
proceed, or depute any magistrate subordinate to him to proceed, 
to hold a preliminary inquiry into, or otherwise to dispose of 
the casei in the manner provided in the Criminal Procedure Code. 
Police officer's power to investigate also include 
within its scope to require attendance of witnesses - and 
examination of witnesses. 
No statement made by any person to a police officer in 
the course of investigation under Chapter XII, Criminal Procedure 
Code shall, if reduced to writing, be signed by the person making 
it. 
Statemenst recorded during police investigation under 
section 162, Cr. P.C. are wholly inadmissible in evidence except 
for the limited purpose stated in proviso thereto. However, 
recorded statement under section 162, Cr. P.C. may be used both 
by the defence as well as PY the prosecution to contradict 
witnesses or to confront hosti-le witnesses. Such statements are 
not used for corroboration pufPoses. The object of section 162. 
Cr. P.C is to protect priiparily the interest of the accused 
against the use of such stateiPei^ts. Section 162 clause (2), Cr. 
P.C. exempts from its operati<ia the dying declarations which are 
admissible under section 32 (X) Evidence Act. 
Section 162, Cr. f'C enacts a rule of evidence. The 
relevant sections of Evidence Law are 24 to 27, dealing with the 
recording of confession an^ its evidential value while the 
accused is being investigated during police custody. 
Another important procedure laid down in section 165 
Cr.. P.C. relates to the powef of search by police officer making 
the investigation. Further a police officer investigating the 
offence cannot detain a person in custody for more than twenty 
four hours in the absence o^ special order under section 167, 
Criminal Procedure Code. Wh^n investigation cannot be completed 
within the stipulated time of 24 hours and the keeping the 
accused in police custody if further required than the matter is 
to be referred to the nearest judicial magistrate. The 
magistrate may order the detention of the accused beyond 24 
hours, but he must record hi^ reasons in writing. No magistrate 
shall authorise the detentio<i of the accused person in custody 
for total period exceeding si^ty-days. 
Further details related to investigation covered under 
sections 168, 169, 170, 171, 172 have already been discussed. 
Any refence would be a repitition of the same. Lastly, section 
173, Cr. P.C. lays down the final stage of investigation. It 
should be completed without unnecessary delay. As soon as the 
investigation is completed, the officer-incharge of the police 
station shall forward to a magistrate empowered to take 
cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the 
form prescribed by the state government. Such a report may be in 
the form of charge-sheet, or a final report. 
On receipt of the report magistrate is not bound to 
accept it. He is to scruitinise the material whether the facts 
disclosed will warrant the issue of a process against the 
accused. An illegality in the course of investigation does not 
affect the competence and jurisdiction of the court of trial. 
In Saudi Arabia where Islamic law is inforce, it is 
difficult to draw a line between investigation and enquiry. 
Police makes the investigation. Interrogation is aimed for 
establishing the suspicion. This preliminary investigation of 
crime before the trial is purely administrative in nature. It is 
not subject to any form of judicial restrains. Police makes the 
investigation only on receiving the complaint of commission of 
crime. Procedural technicalities as to first information report 
as we noticed in Indian system is not found in Saudi System. 
Qazi, judge of Shariah Court, on receiving complaint 
also conduct an investigation into the case with a view to give 
cognizance to the suit. Here also no distinction, like India, 
is drawn between inquiry and investigation. Qazi simply enquires 
to know whether any prima facie case exists against the accused 
or not. 
Under Islamic law auother peculiar feature related to 
investigation is that there is an institution of Ahtisab ('V—<^ l ) 
headed by Muhtasib, who is also responsible to make 
investigation. It is connected with 'Amar-bil-Maroof 
and Nahe-Anil-Munkir ( y * ^ ) t / ^ ) ' that is, when people leave 
doing good deeds ( <_Jj-^^ ) and indulge in doing evil deeds 
( }^) {i^(S* ). Under such conditions the ruler of the state 
appoints Mohtasib { — 1 ^ ) . an officer to check, control, 
and prevent spreading evils in the society, and promote good and 
virtuous things. It is impe^fative ( (j^(j[5^ ) upon him to 
attend all complaints made to l>im and investigate them. However, 
Mohtasib in Haqooq-ul-Ibad-Kh*s ( C r L ^ ^ t o ^ ' q ^ ) , moves and 
investigates only when a cotfPlaint is made to him. Without 
receiving such information, he is not to move or take any action. 
No doubt, it may be stated tuat powers vested in Mohtasib, in 
cases of Ahtisab {<-J!>^iy' ) and ( y^!^(f^) are very wide. 
Not only investigation of eviJS, but prevention and control of 
evils are also included within tiis power. In Saudi Arabia, there 
is no such designation as Mohtftsib, but his powers are performed 
by different committees formed under the Royal Regulations, such 
as. Forgery Committee, Bribery Committee, Grievance Board, etc. 
etc. 
Referring again to police powers to investigate in 
Saudi Arabia, we find that there are some practical difficulties. 
Although police is authorised to investigate the crimes 
committed, but judges often do not receive the minutes of police 
investigation. Keeping in view the difficulties. The Draft 
Law of the Judicial Authority, suggested " that the power of 
police to investigate crime should be withdrawn and handed over 
to the prosecution. It should be conducted by the prosecution 
instead of the police. 
Investigation system under Islam is there but not on 
lines with the Indian law. In fact, Qazi is responsible under 
Islamic law to investigate also. 
Trial 
In India three types of trials are there, such as, 
'Trial of Warrant Cases', Trial of Summon Cases', and lastly, 
'Summary Trials'. Breach of trust is covered under the first 
one. Under the trial of warrant cases offences punishable with 
death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding 
two years are covered. It may be inferred from the definitions 
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that the nature and measure of punishment which the law 
prescribes for a particular offence determines the character of 
the trial. 
In the trials of warrant cases, the magistrate is to 
follow either of the two procedures: 
(1) Where in a case instituted on a police report 
procedure to be followed has been laid down in 
sections 238 to 243, and 
(2) Where any warrant case instituted otherwise than 
on a police report, the procedure has been 
specified in sections 244 to 247, Criminal 
Procedure Code. 
In respect of trial conducted by a magistrate on a 
police report, the accuse either appears or is brought before 
him at the commencement of the trial, the magistrate shall 
satisfy himself whether the accused has been furnished with all 
documents referred in section 207, Criminal Procedure Code or 
not. The magistrate on consideration of those documents and 
after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of 
being heard if he considers the charge against the accused as 
groundless he will discharge the accused; on the other hand if 
the magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming 
that the accused has committed an offence triable under Chapter 
XIX Criminal Procedure Code and that such magistrate is competent 
to try, he will frame a charge against the accused. 
In cases instituted otherwise than on the police 
report, the accused has the right to reserve cross-examination of 
prosecution witnesses till at a late stage. The magistrate 
cannot discharge the accused without examining all the witnesses 
for the prosecution. 
The right to cross-examine thewitnesses after the 
charge is framed, is an absolute right and the omission to give 
the accused the benefit of that right would vitiate the whole 
proceeding, and the fact that the witnesses were once cross-
examined by the accused before the charge is of no avail. 
When the accused is not discharged then the accused 
after examining and cross-examining the prosecution witnesses 
shall be called to enter upon his defence and produce his 
evidence; and the provisions of section 243 Criminal Procedure 
shall apply to the case. 
To discharge frivolous complaints, section 250, 
Criminal Procedure Code enables the court to award compensation 
to the accused if there was no reasonable ground for accusation. 
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A second class magistrate cannot, in a case falling 
under section 409, try the case and convict the accused under 
section 406 Criminal Procedure Code. 
Under Islamic law the procedure in relation to trials 
is simple. There is no such division as trial of warrant cases, 
or trial of summon cases, or summary trials. There is uniform 
procedure of tiral for all cases. Institution of suits in 
Shariah courts depends upon the nature of crime committed and the 
category under which it falls. Broadly speaking crimes may be 
covered under Haqooq-Allah { ) or Haqooq-ul-Ibad 
Mushtriq-Haqooq. Again Haqooq-ul-Ibad 
are divided into: 
(1) Haqooq-ul-Ibad Khas and 
(2) Haqooq-ul-Ibad-Aam ( \^>{j^\o^ )• 
Cases under Haqooq-ul-Ibad-Khas or Jara'im-al-Haqq-al-
Khas can be tried by the court of Qazi only on a demand by a 
private claimant or aggrieved party. While in Haqooq-ul-Ibad-
Aam, action can be brought by anyone. These are the crimes of 
public nature. 
Criminal breach of trust as discussed earlier comes 
under private right, that is, Haqqoq-ul-Ibad Khas as well as 
Haqqoq-ul-Ibad-Aam if the crime is of a public nature connected 
with ( QWCl^,) Bait-ul-Mal or public wakfs KiS^jit^^ ). 
S&t 
The procedure followed in the institution of suit is 
simple. Plaint ( filed by the complainat in the 
competent court of jurisdiction. In cases of Haqooq-ul-Ibad-Aam 
any person including government or police may file a complaint. 
Breach of trust in Islamic law is civil nature wrong. 
It depends upon the plaintiff, if he is interested to have 
criminal trial, then he is to move an application to this effect 
before the Qazi. Qazi on receiving such petition will conduct 
the trial for breach of trust. For a valid petition certain 
formalities have been laid down by the Islamic law. If those 
formalities, discussed earlier under the relevant chapter, are 
not fulfiled the petition or plaint would not be considered by 
Qazi. It would not be considered legally valid. 
Qazi on giving cognizance to the offence on receiving 
the plaint petition orders to call the person against whom the 
plaint is filed to appear before him and answer the allegations. 
The defendant is given the full opportunity to prepare the 
defence and reply it. 
Same procedure is followed in Saudi Arabia in Shariah 
courts. Since the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
most crimes related to public rights are brought to the court by 
the. excutive authorities. But there is no bar if any public man 
files a suit relating thereto. If a private claimant brings an 
action and the court discovers that he himself has in some way 
participated in the crime, the court may take the initiative and 
try him without asking the public prosecutor to handle the 
prosecution. But if the case is so complicated that it requires 
a preliminary investigation, the court must refer it to the 
police and after the investigation by the police has been 
completed the public procecutor may prosecute the accused. 
Thereafter, giving cognizance to the charge, the date for hearing 
is fixed. The law of 1952 (A) also lays down provisions relating 
to the dropping of a case if the claimants fails to appear in 
the first session without a reasonable excuse. Case can also be 
restored if the claimant or complainant moves the court for 
fixing hearing date again. The dropping of a case does not mean 
its dismissal. The whole procedure of trial is simple. It is 
not divided into different types of trials as we have in India. 
CHARGE 
Charge is a notice of the matter of which a person is 
accused. It is the first step in the Criminal Prosecution Case 
against him which he is to answer. The charge is to enable the 
accused of the allegations which he will have to meet. It must 
convey to the accused clearly and accurately the allegations 
which the prosecution is to prove against him and which he will 
have to defend himself. The offence imputed must be positively 
and precisely stated, so that the accused may certainly know with 
what he is charged and may be prepared to answer the charge in 
the best possible way. Charge is also an information to the 
trial court of the allegations against the accused person to 
which evidence is to be directed. In fact it is a basic 
principle of criminal law to convey to the accused with 
sufficient clearness and certainly what the precise accusation 
against him is, before he is asked to defentG himself. It 
includes facts and law both. Significance of charged lies in the 
fact that the charge is a safeguard to the accused against 
injustice. 
In criminal breach of trust cases a charge must 
indicate and specify the gross-sum of money, and dates on which 
such crime committed. A charge under section 405 is defective if 
it does not set out the time and the manner of entrustment 
alleged with sufficient particularity. 
Errors or omissions in the charge cannot be regarded as 
material unless it is shown by the accused that he had in fact 
been misled or that there had been a failure of justice as a 
result of such error or omission. 
As to modification, amendment and joinder of charges if 
we discuss here it would a repetition. The detailed discussions 
about them may be read under the head charge. 
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Under Islamic law where the defendant or accused 
appears in the court, the plaintiff or is his advocate will 
explain the allegations to the defendant. Qazi also explains the 
allegations and asks the defendant or the accused to reply. If 
the defendant accepts the claim, the Qazi will decide the case 
accroding. If he denies the allegations, he will be given an 
opportunity to prepare the defence and reply the allegations. 
Under both the laws the charge is first step in the 
trial of the offender. It is an information to the accused 
precisely and accurately about the allegations with which he is 
to meet. 
Burden of. Proof 
The author has already discussed in details that in 
India under the Evidence Law, burden of proof in relation to the 
judicial proceedings has been used in two senses, that is, a 
burden of establishing the case, and in the sense of.introducing 
the evidence. 
When a person desires any court to give judgement as to 
any legal right or liability dependant on the existence of facts 
which he asserts, must prove that those fact exist. When a 
person is bound to prove the existence of any facti, it is said 
that the burdern of proof lies on that person. 
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In fact, the burden of proof is on the party who 
asserts, not on him who denies. Whoever goes to the court and 
asserts any fact, he has to prove the fact. The basic principle 
of criminal jurisprudence is that an accused person is presumed 
to be innocent and the burden of proving the existence of all the 
facts on which the existence of criminal liability depends always 
lies on the prosecution. However, the burden of proving a fact, 
initially on one party may be shifted to the other party in 
certain exceptional cases. 
In criminal breach of trust cases the burden of proof 
of establishing all the ingredients of the offence such as 
entrustment, mis-appropriation, dishonest intention, etc. is on 
prosecutidn. 
When the prosecution succeeds in making out a prima 
facie case against the accused, the onus will shift to the 
accused to show how he is not guilty. 
Islamic law is also based on the same general principle 
as Indian law is, that is, the burden of proof is on a person who 
alleges a fact. He must proof it. It is the responsibility of 
the plaintiff or complainant that he should prove his 
allegations. 
Prophet (peace be upon him) in his address clearly 
emphasised the significance of this general rule when he said 
that the responsibility of burden of proof is on plaintiff, and 
oath is on defendant. This has been followed by Prophet's 
followers ( Uni all other learned scholars in 
practice also. These words that 'burden of proof is on plaintiff 
and oath on defendant have been repeatedly used in Ahadith. 
Islamic law makes it abanduntly clear hat the burden of 
proof shall rest with the person who asserts a right and desires 
a court to give judgement in his favour in respect of that right. 
So far there is no difference between Indian and Islamic law. 
But the later part relting to oath taking is totally different 
from the Indian law. 
If the complainant has no proof in support of his 
allegation than he may ask that the oath be taken from the 
defendant. Then on the oath of defendant case will be decided. 
It is not of significance that the possibility is that defendant 
may take a false oath. Only the oath of defendant under such 
cricumstances would determine the suit. 
Oath taking is subject to the demand made by the 
plaintiff or complainant, if the defendant takes the oath on his 
own, it would not be covered under this section. Once oath taken 
by the defendant on the demand by the complainant and he denies 
the allegation, complainant's case would be dismissed. 
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Oath can be demanded in criminal breach of trust cases 
and oath or refusal to take oath can be made the basis of 
decision. 
The demand for oath may be made by a representative of 
a party but he, in his representation capacity, cannot be 
subjected to oath. 
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The vakeel ( (j^^ ~ agent) of a plaintiff or 
complainant may demand oath from the defendant but in place of 
defendant his vakeel or representative shall neither take oath 
nor have the authority to refuse it. 
If the party from whom oath has been demanded by the 
court, clearly refuses to take oath or remains silent without due 
excuse, the court shall decide the case against him on the basis 
of his refusal to take oath, and he shall have no option to take 
oath afterwards. 
In oath taking court has to warn three times the 
defendant of consequences of his refusal to take oath. Even 
after warning refuses to take oath, the court would decide the 
case against him. 
This law, though sounds strange, but law is law. 
Further Islamic law is not seperate from one's faith or religion. 
In case where there is only one witness in support of allegation, 
then the alternative is that the complainant may be given an 
opportunity to demand the oath to be given to the defendant. In 
Saudi Arabia, Shariah courts are following this law which is 
totally alien to its Indian counterpart. 
Examination of Witnesses 
There are three stages of examination of witnesses, 
that is, examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and re-
examination. The evidence of the witnesses is taken in open 
court in the presence of presiding officer of the court. In 
certain exceptional cases evidence may be taken on commission 
also. When the witness appears in the court to give evidence he 
is first administered the oath to speak the truth and the only 
truth. A child witness below the age of 12 is not required to 
take the oath. The examination of witnesses is oral in the form 
of question and answers but recorded in the narrative form. On 
objection, it is proper to record question and answer both. 
The examination of a witness by the party who calls him 
shall be called examination-in-chief. The examination of witness 
by the adverse party is known as his cross-examination. The 
party who has called the witness, subsequent to the cross-
examination, if examines the witness again such examination is 
called as re-examination. 
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The irrelevant questions should not be asked in the 
examination-in-chief. Ordinarily, leading questions should not 
be asked in the examination-in-chief also. 
Cross-examination is aimed to weaken, qualify or 
destroy the case of opposite party, and to establish the party's 
own case by means of his opponents' witnesses. It is said that 
cross-examination is a method, in the hands of intelligent 
lawyers, to take everything out of the mouth of the opponent's 
witnesses. 
From s.ections 146 to 152, Evidence Act, lay down rules 
relating to questions which may be asked to shake the credit of a 
witness by damaging his character. 
The court may forbid questions which may be scandulous, 
indecent, intended to insult or annoy. A witness may be 
protected from questions being asked without reasonable grounds. 
In cases of hostile witnesses, unwilling to answer the 
question and tell the truth, the court may allow a party, if so 
demand, to put any questions to him which might be put in cross-
examination by the adverse party. 
Impeaching credit of witness may be either by the 
adverse party, or with the consent of the court, by the party who 
calls hiE. 
A judge has also been empowerd to cross-examine any 
witness upon any answer given in reply to any question subject to 
certain limitations laid down in section 165 Evidence Act. 
Under Islamic law witnesses are examined at the third 
stage. First and second stage are meant for recording the 
statements of complainant and the accused in their own words. On 
denial of the claim or charge by the defendant or the accused, 
the court orders the plaintiff or complainant to produce evidence 
in support of claim or charge. 
In Shariah courts, like Indian, the order of 
examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and re-examination is 
not strictly adhered to. 
Two conflicting views are there. One view advocates 
the order of examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and re-
examination. The other view is that under Islamic Law there is 
no procedure for examination-in-chief. But in practice use of 
all the three methods are very common. Izhar ( 
examination-in-chief, and Jirah ( ^ y j ) (cross-examination) 
were first adopted by the fourth Caliph Hazrat Ali (r.a.) in his 
period of Caliphat. 
In Saudi Arabia Shariah court judge, have very vide 
jurisdiction which cannot be said to be restricted to any 
particular method of examination. Examination-in-chief is not 
the feature of Saudi Arabian Law. Judges themselves assume this 
responsibility. Due to this it is said that there is no cross-
examination of witnesses in Saudi Arabian judicial system except 
by the judges themselves. But an indept study of system may 
tfill that the cross-examination not only by the judges but also 
by the opposing party or his representative does exist in 
practice. However, re-examination is not a common practice. But 
the rule of challenging probity of witnesses is common in Shariah 
courts. 
In brief it may be said that examination of witnesses 
is similar to Indian law but not to that extent inpractice which 
is recognised by Indian Evidence Law. 
Confession 
If an accused or a suspected person during 
investigation volunteers confession, the investigating officer 
should present him before a magistrate for recording the 
confession under section 164 of Criminal Procedure Code. 
Any magistrate whether has jurisdiction or no 
jurisdiction in the case may record the confession under Chapter 
XII Criminal Procedure Code; or under any other law for the time 
being in force. 
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A police officer cannot record a confession. 
The magistrate before recording the confession must 
administer a caution to the accused or suspect who volunteers to 
make confession and explain to him that, if he does so, it may be 
used as evidence against him. 
The magistrate shall not record any such confession 
unless be is satisfied and has reasons to believe that it is 
being made voluntarily. 
Recording of confession shall be in the manner la.id 
down in section 281 Criminal Procedure Code. Recording should be 
in the same language as of the accused, if not then it should be 
explained and interpreted to him. He shall be at liberty to 
explain or add to his answers and shall be signed by him. The 
magistrate shall make a memorandum at the foot of such record and 
at the end he is to sign the statement. 
The investigating officer may get valuable information 
from the confession recorded by the magistrate, but he is not to 
rely upon. He should try to obtain corroborative evidences. It 
will help him in judging the nature and character of the 
confession. 
For making confession admissible it should be proved 
beyond reasonable doubt that at the time of recording the 
statement or even before when the accused is in custody of police, 
no police officer or other person in authority should offer or 
make or caused to be offered or made, any inducement, threat or 
promise in violation of the provisions of section 163 Criminal 
Procedure Code and section 24 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 
If above noted conditions are satisfied then confession 
is admissible in evidence. Section 463 Criminal Procedure Code 
makes the confession admissible only when it is established that 
the expediency of justice so requires and the accused in his 
defence is not prejudiced. 
Under Islamic law the significane of (Iqrar) confession 
is proved by Quranic injunctions and Ahadith. Allah-ta'ala makes 
it obligatory to give the testimony if a person knows the facts 
of a case. Confession is one such testimony upon which the 
decision depends. When the party concerned demands it is not 
lawful to conceal it. 
After a confession is made by the accused the judge is 
to pronounce the judgement. In other words it is the basis for a 
judgement. 
For a valid confession Islamic law requires that there 
should be a person who makes the confession. He should be of a 
sound mind, adult, and independent or free person. If a 
confession is made by an infant, not capable to judge thing 
rightly or wrongly, such a confession would be illegal. 
According to Prophet (peace be upon him), three person are not 
competent to make confession: 
(1) An infant till he becomes major or adult; 
(2) A person - sleeping, till he is not awaken; and 
(3) 0 > ^ (unconscious or insane) till gets into 
senses or gains consciousness. 
This principle has been incorporated in section 65 of 
Pakistan Islamic Law of Evidence. Aqil and Baligh are the 
conditions for a valid confession. 
A confession by a guardian against the interest of his 
minor ward shall not be valid and cannot be admitted. 
Coercion is another ground which makes confession in 
admissible. An Iqrar of a person who is under the influence of 
intoxication would not be valid in cases where liability is under 
Hudud. 
If these conditions are satisfied a confession made 
voluntarily would be valid and admissible in evidence. Judge is 
to pronounce judgement on such a confession. 
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In Saudi-Arabia confession is divided in two parts : 
formal confession, and informal confession. Formal is one which 
is made before the trial court. Whereas informal confession is 
usually made outside the court. The later one must be proved in 
the same way as fact is proved in the court. It is not considered 
a hearsy evidence. It is considered a confession, when proved, 
as conclusive as the formal one is. 
The confession made about a crime outside the court 
under a sudden shock is also admissible although he may claim 
that he was not aware what he said due to sudden shock. 
Ability to speak is another ground to determine the 
validity of confession. Confession by a dumb person is 
controversial. However, in Saudi Arabia an admission of a dumb 
person by signs is not valid, except in Tazeer. 
Inducement, threat or compulsion should be absent when 
a confession is made. It must be made voluntarilly and freely. 
Confession must be express. Saudi Arabian Law does not 
recognize implied confession. 
If the confession is not consistent with the fact in 
issue, the court on grounds of doubts or suspicion will not 
recieve it as valid confession. 
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If a confession, in Saudi Arabia, is made to the 
police, while in police custody, in such a case police will 
immediately take him to the nearest Shariah Court where his 
statement would be recorded. If the confession is made to the 
police at a time when he cannot be produced before the court, 
then the person will be detained alone in custody till the next-
morning. He would not be allowed to mix with other detainess 
till he is produced before the court and his statement is 
recorded. He is kept alone because if mixed with other persons 
then possibility is that others may persuade him not to confess 
his guilt. 
Generally, recording of confession before the Shariah 
court is in cases of serious crimes. 
Statement may be recorded in any court. it is not 
necessary that it should be recorded in the trial court. 
As a caution the court must ascertain whether the 
statement made by the accused is voluntary or not. It must be an 
authentic one. 
The extra-judicial confession must be corroborated by 
independent witnesses, then only would be admissible. 
Accused may also retract his confession. Even the 
judge may hint to the confession to recall his confession. 
The retraction or calling back the confession is not by 
w ords but it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused 
also. An accused who intends to flee when he is being prepared 
for the execution of his sentence or after he has received part 
of the sentence, is to be r'egarded as having retracted his 
confession. If a convicted person recalls his confession before 
the punishment is implementesd, the punishment should not be 
enforced and the person must he committed back to the trial court 
to consider his retraction. 
In Tazeer cases confession retracted is admissible but 
not in Hudud cases. In sUch a situation Hudud cases are 
converted into the Tazeer. As breach of trust is covered unter 
Tazeer, hence any confession made in such a case would not be 
retracable. 
The above discussion makes it clear that the confession 
under Indian Law and Islamic I^ aw stands almost on the same basis 
except in retraction of cofession cases. In 
India under the evidence law the mere fact that a confession is 
retracted may not be a ground for its rejection and to draw 
inference that it was obtained by improper inducement. A mere 
subsequent retration of a confession, when the confession was 
duly recorded and certified by a competent magistrate is not 
enough to make it inadmissible in all cases. But a retraction 
may raise a doubt in the mi^d of court about it's voluntary 
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character and trustworthiness. It is now a settled rule of 
prudence that before convicting an accused on the basis of 
confession, which has been retracted afterwards, the court must 
see that it has been corroborated by some other independant 
evidence, though, no doubt, that a conviction without 
corroboration is not strictly illegal. 
However, under Islamic law, retracted confession in 
serious offences cannot be made the basis of conviction. 
Further, the judge of a Shariah court may give an hint recalling 
the confession. It is not so in India. Only caution is 
administered. Hint is not preferred. However, in Tazeer cases 
even a retracted confession if made voluntarilly can be the basis 
of conviction. On this later rule no difference lies between 
Indian and Islamic law except that Indian law requires 
corroboration of retracted confession by independent witnesses. 
In India critics on law of confession in the Evidence 
Act requires some changes. Vhere the confessions are generally 
obtained, not in all cases, by inducement, threat or promise and 
even in cases where it is made voluntarily, after getting the 
advice of the legal profession, it is retracted at the time of 
trial, they make an observation that in such a situation, 'there 
is only one remedy, no confession made before the trial begins, 
should be admitted in evidence. If the person is really 
penitent, let him confess and plead guilty at the trial. 
Evidence 
Under Indian Law evidence means and includes - all 
statements which the court permits or requires to be made before 
it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; 
such statements are called oral evidence; and all documents 
produced for the inspection of the court; such documents are 
called documentary evidence. 
Generally evidence has been classified under three 
heads: 
(1) Direct or indirect which is known as 
circums'tancial evidence; 
(2) Real or personal; and lastly, 
(3) Original or unoriginal. 
Direct evidences are those which are evidence of the 
precise point-in-issue. Eye-witnesses are covered under it. On 
the other hand circumstantial evidences are the evidences of 
collateral facts and circumstances for which a reasonable 
conclusion about the question in issue may be drawn which is 
always based on experience and thereby a relation is established 
between known and proved facts and the facts sought to be proved. 
Circunstancial evidence should be such which will reasonably lead 
to the conclusion that it was the accused who did the act. 
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The criminal breach of trust case may be proved either 
by direct or circumstancial evidence alone or with the help of 
both. So far as admissibility is concerned direct and 
circumstancial both stand on the same footing. 
A real evidence is that which is addressed to the 
senses of the court. The thing which is an evidence of a fact 
may be brought before the court or, the judge, in some cases, may 
go to the spot for the inspection of the thing. Personal 
evidence is that which is afforded by a human agent, either in 
the way of discourse or by voluntary signs. 
Original Evidence is one which a witness states to have 
heard or seen through his own senses. 
Unoriginal evidence is the second-hand evidence, which 
has been derived from some other source. It is also known as 
hearsay evidence, the witness has no first-hand knowledge of the 
fact. 
Hearsay evidence with certain exceptions is not 
admissible (see section 60). 
Now-a-days tape-recorded statements and dog tracking 
evidences are produced before the court, the first one has been 
declared by the supreme court as admissible evidence (R.K. 
Malkaai V. State of Maharashtre, AIR 1973v SC. 157), the later 
one, in the present state of scientific knowledge, even _ if 
admissible, is not ordinarily, of much weight. 
Under Islamic law Shahadab ( means to give 
c 
true information for the purpose of proving any right or fact, in 
or before a court. Such statement or information be recorded in 
the presence of both the litigant parties or their legal 
representatives. The procefure is that the witness should utter a 
word 'Ashhadu' { Jl/f^\ ) or use any synonymous expression. 
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The signigicance lies in the fact that it must be a 
just and honest information. Justice is Allah's attribute, and 
to stand firm for justice is to be a witness to Allah, even if it 
is detrimental to one's interest. 
So far we do not find any marked difference between 
Indian and Islamic laws. Under Islamic Law it is connected much 
with the faith, that is, God, rewards or punishes for just or 
honest and false witness as the case may be. 
But as to quantum of evidence ( ^ -'fp^L-rCei ) to be 
produced before the court, Indian and Islamic law differs. 
Islamic law prescribes different quantum of evidence in different 
cases based on the nature of offence committed. Indian law does 
not specify any such quantum for different kinds of offences. 
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For criminal breach of trust, the facts may be proved 
by two male witnesses, and in the absence of two male witnesses 
by the evidence of one male and two female witnesses. Two female 
witness are considered equal to one male witness. India law does 
not lay such limits. 
There may be a situation where evidence of a single 
witness coupled with oath by the plaintiff may be admissible. 
Such a -situation may arises when the defendant fails to appear 
before the court although summons were duly served to him. 
Further under Islamic law where the plaintiff fails to 
produce a witness but produce documentary evidence the court may, 
if it is of the opinion that the plaintiff's claim appears to be 
probably true, decide the matter by giving an oath to the 
plaintiff. But this is subject to one limitation, that is, the 
defendant must have been served with the summons three times and 
the defendant inspite of receiving the summouns without any uz-
re-sharai ( fails to appear in the court. This is 
another distinguishing feature of Islamic law comparing with 
Indian Law. 
Indian Law again differs from Islamic law in 
relation to qualification of admissible witnesses. According to 
Islamic law, characteristic of witness admissible in evidence are 
to be determined according to the stages of Shahadah ( 6^ c*-***' ). 
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: ^^ Q (jr ~ Tahammal-e-Shadah, and Ada-e-Shahadah Stages are 
Capability of a witness to give evidence at the time of 
) - Tahammaul Shahadah includes such condition as : 
witness should be of sound mind, witness should not be blind, 
witness should bean eye-witness. He should himself inspect the 
{ r'-tJ*'*^Mashud bihi). But in specific cases Tahammul-Shadah 
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can also be by hearsay. As to blind witness there are 
differences between the Imams of different schools as regard to 
it's admissibility. 
For Ada-e-Shahadah ( 40Mfv^c^/>I ) the conditions 
requisite are : Baligh (adult), sane person, Baseer ( yw^ ^ ~ 
having-eye-sight, independent, Adil, Natiq-having the faculty of 
talking and Muslim. These conditions must be fulfiled otherwise 
an evidence would not be sound in law. 
The last condition would not apply in cases where non-
Muslims are involved. A non-Muslim's evidence according to 
Shariah is admissible. 
If the minor witness is Muslim, sensible and 
intelligent enough to understand thing and not has a reputation 
of a liar, his evidence would be admissible in law. 
Evidence of a dumb person shall be admissible, except 
in cases relating to Hudud, only when it is written by the 
witness himself in the presence of the presiding officer of the 
court. 
Tazkiyah-al-Shuhud is an special 
feature of Islamic law of evidence which is not found under the 
Indian law. This authority is vested in the court, it is a mode 
of inquiry adopted by a court for the purpose of declaring a 
witness Adil ( c)^^ ) or Ghair-Adil ( Q^^t/f ) • The 
court proceeds with the Tazkiyal-al-Shuhud after the statements 
of the witness are recorded. In this connection two persons 
reliable, well-inform and belonging to the same walk of life to 
which the witness belongs, shall be consulted either openly 
) or confidentially ( r**^ ) • it is the 
discretion of the court to adopt any mode of Tazkiyah-al-Shuhud. 
Compounding of Offences 
Offences under sections 406 and 408 of the Indian Penal 
Code are compoundable. But offences covered under section 409, 
Indian Penal Code are not compoundable. Section 320, Criminal 
Procedure Code is a relevant section which permits such 
compromises. But the offences covered under section 406 and 408 
Indian Penal Code are compoundable subject to three conditions. 
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(1) Prosecution for such offences may be compounded 
where the value of the property which is the 
subject matter of breach of trust does not exceed 
two hundred and fifty rupees. If exceeds the 
limit, no compromise is allowed; 
(2) Prosecution for such offences can be compounded 
with the permission of the court before which the 
prosecution is pending; and 
(3) Prosecution is compoundable by persons referred in 
the third column of the table referred in earlier 
chapter under compounding of offences head, and by 
non-else. Here the person referred in the third 
column is the owner of the property in respect of 
which the breach of trust has been committed. 
On the other band Islamic law prefers compromises and 
compounding of disputes rather than parties contesting in the 
court. Allah-ta'ala also prefers it. There is no monetary 
limitation as to the compoundability of criminal cases as exists 
under the Indian Law. If the victims forgive or compromise with, 
it is far better. His reward is with Allah. Allah does not love 
the wrong-doers. Allah ta'ala commands for self-restrained 
practices, and do what we can to come to an amicable settlement. 
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Islamic law not only allows compounding of cases of 
breach of trust but also permits to the parties to refer the 
matters in dispute for arbitration to settle the disputes even 
outside the courts. 
Breach of trust is an offence which is both 
compoundable and may be referred to artitration if the parties so 
desire. 
However, some Muslim jurists are of the view that if 
all the cases referred to the court, irrespective of knowing the 
nature of dispute, are returned for compounding the cases, it 
will result in loosening the confidence in the efficacy of 
courts, and, it would also lower down the honour and dignity of 
Shariat ( ^-^L.*3^/^ ) and Shariah court. They suggest that 
compoundability of cases be restricted only where there is no 
legal ambiguity or the matter referred to the court is not too 
complicated, or court considers that past relations between the 
parties were such that compounding of the case be preferred. In 
such case there should not be any hitch in referring back for 
compounding the cases. But if it is otherwise than court should 
decide itself. 
For artitrators Islamic law requires that they should 
possess the qualifications of a Qazi on the ground that the 
arbitrator virtually performs functions of the Qazi. 
This preferential attitude of Islamic law for returning 
back cases for compounding and permitting arbitration of disputes 
outside the court distinguishes the Islamic law and Indian Law. 
In India compoundability of offence is restricted on the basis of 
value of property involved. Under Islamic law there is no such 
restriction. 
Vikalat ^ ^^Uy 
Under section 303, Criminal Procedure Code an accused 
can, as a matter of right, claim to be defended by a pleader of 
his choice. 
A conviction following a trial cannot stand if there 
has been refusal to hear the lawyer. So also an appeal cannot be 
disposed of ex-parte where the appellant is entitled to be heard 
by a lawyer assigned to him by the goveriunent, who fails to reach 
the court in time to conduct the appeal. 
If the defence lawyer is weak in presenting the case of 
his client, a duty is cast upon a trial judge to protect the 
interest of the accused and cross-examine the witnesses of the 
prosecution himself. The main object of this provision is that 
the interest of the accused should remain supreme and in no way 
be prejudiced. 
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Section 304, Criminal Procedure Code authorises the 
court that where an accused person is not represented by a 
pleader during the trial before the court of session and it 
appears to the court that the accused has not sufficient means to 
engage a pleader, the court shall assign a pleader for his 
defence at the expense of the state and also empowers the state 
government to extend this facility to other cases. 
Islamic law is different from Indian law on this point. 
No doubt under Islamic law, it is lawful for an accused to 
appoint another his agent for the management of suits or criminal 
prosecutions or for the payment or exaction of all rights. 
However, Hadd and Qasas are exceptions to this general rule. 
Even on this point there is a difference of opinion among Muslim 
jurists. 
Imam Abu Hanafee (r.a.) is of the opinion that an agent 
or vakeel cannot be appointed without the permission of the 
opposite party in cases where the client is not sick or on 
journey which may not be for three days or more. 
But according to Imam Mohammad and Imam Abu Yusuf, a 
vakeel or agent may be appointed in such conditions even without 
the consent and permission of the opposite party. Imam Sbafi'i 
(r.a.) is also of this view. 
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Argument of the two disciples is that the appointment 
of an agent or vakeel is the act of an individual in regard to a 
right purely his own. Therefore, it should not depend on the 
consent of another in the present instance. 
Hazrat Imam Abu Haneefa on the other hand, argues that 
the constituent is himself under the necessity of giving an 
answer, and must attend in case the magistrate should summon him. 
Individuals differ with respect to their capacities of managing 
suits. Therefore, if it were admitted that the appointment of an 
agent is absolute, this would be injurious to the adversary. 
Thus the validity of the appointment must be suspended on his 
consent. It is otherwise where the person is sick or absent. 
There is a consensus of all the modern Muslim jurists 
on the point that a woman may appoint an agent for litigation in 
all cases. 
In practice we find that in Islamic countries persons 
under accusation may employ agents to conduct their defences, and 
agents may make replies and submit rejoinders, and the doubt with 
respect to deputation does not prevent this. 
It is clear that Islamic law and Indian Iw on the point 
of deputing someone as agent or vakeel to defend in prosecution 
based on different principles. Accused as a matter of right 
cannot claim to be defended by the lawyer under Islamic law. But 
on the other hand in India, he may claim to be defended by a 
lawyer of his choice. Not only this courts have also been 
authorised to appoint lawyers to defend accused if they are not 
in the position of engaging a lawyer to defend. 
Hierarchy of Courts 
In India, at present, there are three types of criminal 
courts, that is, courts constituted by the constitution of India, 
courts constituted by criminal procedure code, and courts 
constituted by other special statutes. 
Heirarchy is in the following order: 
(1) Supreme Court; 
(2) High Court; 
(3) Courts of Session; 
(4) Judicial magistrates of First Class, 
In any metropolitan area, metropolitan magistrate; 
(5) Judicial magistrates of the second class; and 
(6) Executive magistrates. 
This heirarchy of criminal courts is based on the 
principle of seperation of the judiciary from the executive. As 
a consequence of seperation there are two categories of 
magistrates, namely, the judicial magistrates, and the executive 
magistrates. 
Offences relating to criminal breach of trust are 
triable by the court of magistrate of first class. 
Considering governing rules relating to jurisdiction, 
territorial division, etc., would be a repetition of what the 
author has discussed under Chapter VII Part A of this thesis. 
Therefore, let us distinguish the heirarchy of courts in India 
with Islamic courts. 
For the purposes of studying heirarchy under Islamic 
law the author has devoted Part B of the said Chapter in detail. 
Structure of Shariah courts in different countries have also been 
discussed. To make a comparision with all is very difficult. In 
India we are not having Shariah courts. But in the past, during 
Mughal period Shariah courts were existing. Our study, thus 
confines to the comparision of Shariah courts existing during 
Mughal period with that of the present day seculars courts of 
India. 
I. The Royal Court (Diwan-i-Shahi) under Islamic law 
was the highest court. At that time it was resembling with the 
British Privy Council. At present it resembles with the 
am 
Supreme Court of India. It was presided over by the Emperor or 
Sultan. He used to hear and decide cases personally. Muslim 
Emperors' decisions were the real decision of the sovereign, not 
like that of Privy Council's decisions which fictitiously 
regarded as the king decision. There was no appeal against the 
decision of the royal Court. Same is the position of Supreme 
Court of India. It is the highest court of appeal. Only Mercy 
petition may be filed to the President of India against the 
decision of supreme court. King or Emperor was having original 
and appellate jurisdictions both. 
The Royal Court was presided over by the sovereign and 
decision was given in consultation with the law officers of the 
crown, the highest state officials and the persons learned in 
law. 
II. The Mir-i-Adl, the High Diwan, The provincial 
Oiwan, these judicial officers resemble the judges of the High 
Court and of the District courts of today. 
They had the original jurisdiction, like the High Court 
(original side), and as well as the District judges of the 
present day. 
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Under Islamic judicial structure judges of the High 
Court and of Districts had the power of superintendence over the 
lower courts under their respective jurisdictions. These 
administrative and supervisory powers just resembles with the 
present High Courts powers in their respective Provinces. At the 
District level resemble*with the powers of the District judge. 
III. -The Qazi-ul-Quzat resembles with the chief 
metropolitan magistrates or magistrates of the first class. 
The chief Qazi also resembles the session judge to some 
extent, i.e. in his power of hearing criminal appeal and holding 
session trial exercising original criminal jurisdiction. 
IV. The subehdar occupied the position of the governor 
of a province. The subehdar used to preside over the chief 
criminal court of the province. 
V. The Foujdar of the District town or the Parganah 
resembles the sub-divisional magistrate and had jurisdiction over 
criminal matters. 
VI. The Muhtasib or the public censor offider used to 
perfom the function of police, and excise officers, as well as 
municipal supervisors of our time. He was empowered to control 
and prevent the spreading of evil and vices in the society. 
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In brief it may be said that Mughal Shariah structure 
completely resembles with the present day judicial heirarchy. In 
other Islamic countries also a well-set Islamic judicial 
structure from bottom to top exists. All these judicial 
structures resemble with the present modern system. 
Punishment 
In India punishment for breach of trust has been 
provided for different situations under different sections. 
Section 405, Indian Penal Code defines the offence and for 
violation of conditions enumerated in the said section, 
punishment has been referred in section 406. Sections 408, 409, 
deals with the offences committed by servants, agents, partners, 
and public servants and punishments have also been prescribed 
there in respectively. For every breach of trust, maximum, 
punishment has been given in the relevant sections up to which 
punishment may extent. 
The court before passing the sentence is to weigh the 
merit of each case, the mitigating circumstances, and facts which 
differ from case to case. 
Procedure for sentencing has been laid down in section 
248 Criminal Procedure Code. 
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Where the magistrate after framing the charge, finds 
the accused not guilty, he shall record an order of acquittal. 
However, where the magistrate, in any case, finds the 
accused guilty but does not proceed in accordance with the 
privisions of section 235 or section 360 Criminal Procedure Code, 
he shall, after hearing the accused on the question of sentence, 
pass sentence upon him according to law. 
Clause (3) of section 248 deals with cases of previous 
conviction where the accused denies, the magistrate may, after he 
has convicted the accused, take evidence in respect of the 
alleged previous convictionr and shall record a finding thereon. 
Before taking evidence, conviction under clause (2) section 248 
Criminal Procedure Code is necessary. 
As to quantum of punishment to be awarded, it differs 
from case to case. In one case it may be lenient, and in 
another severe. Sometine in view of extenuating circumstances 
severe punishment is rendered unnecessary. But for every offence 
of breach of trust there is a before hand prescribed punishment 
which the court, after hearing both the parties is to award to 
the accused. 
The breach of trust by a clerk or public servant is of 
an aggravated nature calling for substantial punishment. 
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Under section 409, Indian Penal Code, offence committed 
by the public servant is specially of a serious nature and 
requires severe punishment. 
The court before awarding the sentence is to take into 
consideration the gravity of the offence, the impact on the 
public and particularly the persons who were deprived of their 
properties. 
Once a sentence is awarded the general law is that a 
sentence commences to run from the time it is imposed, but 
section 427 (1) engrafts an exception to this general rule. 
Exception relates to the case of a person who is already 
undergoing a sentence of imprisonment. A discretion is given to 
the court to direct that the subsequent sentence shall run 
concurrently with the previous sentence. After the pronouncement 
of final judgement the court is not authorised to exercise this 
discretion. 
Section 428, Criminal Procedure Code provides t hat the 
period of detention of an accused as an under trial prisoner 
shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him 
on conviction. 
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The powers conferred by sections 432 nd 433 Criminal 
Procedure Code upon the state government to remit or commute a 
sentence in which public servants of central government are 
involved cannot be exercised by the state government without 
consultation with the central government. Where persons 
prosecuted for offences under the laws in the state field and 
some in the union field and sentenced to separate terms of 
imprisonment to run concurrently, both state as well as centre 
have the power either to remit or commute the sentences. 
Under Islamic law crimes are acts or omissions contrary 
to legal prohibitions imposed by Allah-ta'ala, the infringement 
of which entails punishment prescribed by Him. 
Law punishing crimes not only eminates from Holy Quran, 
but from the traditions and acts of Prophet (peace be upon him) 
also. 
Still there may be acts not covered under either Quran 
and Sunnah, are declared offences and punishment may be laid down 
by the body of authority on the basis of Ijma and qiyas of 
Ulemah. 
However, under Islamic law, no authority has been given 
power to do whatever it chooses. No authority has any power to 
declare any act as offence and prescribe punishment thereto 
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contrary to Quranic injunctions or Sunnah of Holy Prophet (peace 
be upon him). 
The basic rule governing Shariah punishment is -
'unless relevant provisions exist, no judgement can be passed on 
the actions of a sensible person". An Act cannot be declared 
illegitimate unless it is contrary to law in existence. 
The other fundamental rule is - 'things and actions are 
legitimate in themselves'. It means acts and omissions are not 
illegal unless a provision forbiding such a course of action 
exists. If no provision exists, a person is not accountable for 
his acts or omission. 
The third governing rule in Islam is - 'a person under 
legal obligation is one who is able to understand the reason for 
being so*. it is inferred from this that a person should be 
under legal obligation, capable of understanding the obligation, 
and lastly should be capable of performing his obligations. 
Impossible things would not create any liability. Further a 
thing which is beyong his power to perform would also not make 
him liable. Knowingly disobedient under such conditions will 
make him liable for punishment. 
For all these fundamental rules Holy Quran is the 
fountain. 
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However, as to the application of these principles, the 
procedure varies with different crimes. No crime and no 
punishment in cases involving Hudud, Qisas and Diyat, unless 
provision exists. Same principle applies to cases covering penal 
punishment (Tazeer). However, Shariah does not apply in the same 
manner in Tazeer as it does in cases involving Huddud, Qisas and 
Diyat. In Tazeer cases the application of the general rules have 
wider scope keeping in view the demands of public interest and 
penal character of such crimes. The wider sphere of operation 
under Tazeer is due to the fact that Shariah does not lay down 
such specific punishment as may be binding upon the judge to 
award as in the case of Hud and Qisas. The judge, infact, is to 
choose any punishment most be fitting and appropriate to the 
crime committed and the circumstances under which it is 
committed. He may be lenient in awarding the punishment or may 
award severe punishment as circumstances and facts of a case 
demands. 
If public interest is in jeopardy, there is nothing 
inhibiting the combination of a penal punishment (Tazeer) with a 
hud. Futher penal punishment may be added to Qisas for wilfully 
committing an offence involving qisas except death sentence. 
Penal punishment, as such under Islamic law, is a 
corrective measure and it is the right of the community as 
distinct from the right of an individual. 
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Tazeer may be awarded in addition to Oiyat also. 
As to determine the punishment for breach of trust, 
Prophet (peace be upon him) has said: 
"The hand of a plunderer, or a snatcher taking away the 
property, or a breaker of trust, is not to cut off". 
It means that breach of trust is different from 
larceny. Breach of trust is covered under Tazeer, which is a 
reformative and corrective measure. Punishment for breach of 
trust cases are determined in accordance to the injunctions of 
Quran and Ahadith. 
Holy Quran and Ahadith have prescribed limits in Tazeer 
also. A judge is to award penal punishment within limits, that 
is, exhortation, warning, boycotts, intimidation, scouraging, 
physical punishment, fine, and imprisonment. The purpose for 
imposing Tazeer is that the man should not become habitual to the 
commissions of such acts. It is discretionary with the judge but 
jurisdiction is not without limitations. The charge against 
Shariah that it has no determined penal punishment is baseless. 
Judge in Tazeer cases does not enjoy absolute powers. 
Comparing these general principles with Indian law, it 
may be inferred that these principles are common under both the 
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laws. There is no difference between the two except that one is 
a revealed law, and another a man made law. Both intend to 
protect the society from the wrong-doers. 
In breach of trust cases where Tazeer is awarded, in 
fact, there is no difference. No doubt, under the Indian Law 
maximum punishment is provided in the relevant sections, but when 
the judge awards the sentence, he takes into consideration the 
mitigating circumstances, and it is discretionary to award any 
sentence befitting the facts of the cases. Same is the position 
under Shariah. The judge is to take into consideration all 
extinuating and mitigating conditions and facts of the case, and 
it is his discretion to award any sentence most appropriate and 
most suiting to the conditions of the case. This discretion of 
the judge is not absolute and limitless. He is to act, as in 
Indian Law, within bounds. 
Judgement 
Judgement is the final order or decision of the court 
intimated to the parties and the world at large by the formal 
pronouncement of delivery in open court by the trial judge and 
signing and dating it simultaneously and thereby terminating the 
criminal proceddings finally. 
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Every case in the final determination has to depend 
upon its own facts. No court is permitted to alter or review its 
judgement or final order disposing of a case when it is signed 
except otherwise provided by the Criminal Procedure Code or by 
any other law for the time being in force. 
As to the general principles governing the judgement 
there is no difference between the two laws except on issues 
relating judgements based upon compromise, confession, oath and 
possession the details of which the author has already given in 
earlier Chapter on judgement. 
Unlike India, under Islamic law judgement may be also 
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based on Qura ( c ^ ). It must be based upon Shariat, that 
is, on Quranic commandments and traditions of Prophet Mohammad 
(peace be upon him). 
The common principles goverhing judgement under both 
the laws: 
That it must be based upon justice, ( 
Qarain^ ( <«—.-v«.^i^ Farasat, apparent conditions relating to 
the facts of a case, should be pronounced in the open court, in 
the presence of both the parties except otherwise where both the 
laws provides to be so. 
The differences between the two are: 
When judgement is pronounced in the open court under 
Indian law, it cannot be changed, altered, modified, etc. 
Decision pronounced is final even if there is an apparent error 
in the judgement. Such an error can be corrected only on appeal 
against such a judgement. But under Shariah, for the sake of 
justice, it may be amended, modified or'altered by the judge even 
after the judgement has been pronounced. Main purpose behind is 
that no injustice be done to the litigant parties. 
Another differentiating point is that the judge in 
India in lower courts sits all alone and hears the case. On the 
other hand judge in Shariah court is assisted by Mufti and 
Muhtasib. In cases where the judge of a Shariah court is not in 
a position to form his opinion about any legal issue, he may 
consult other Islamic known jurists and thus form his opinion. 
This reference system is not permitted under the Indian Law. 
As to judicial activism of the judges, In India, 
judgements are based on creativeness, giving liberal 
interpretations and trying to make law cooping with the 
prevalaint conditions of the society. On this point also there 
is almost little difference between the two laws. Under Islamic 
law if a Qazi learned in Islamic law or jurisprudence, and 
efficient in making his own opinion by resorting to 'Ijtihad' 
) he may decide the case on his conclusions taking 
into considerations all the facts and circumstances and rules of 
equity and justice, and thus applying the law best suiting to the 
existing requirements of the society. 
Both the laws require that the judges should not delay 
in delivering the judgement. If, under Shariah, a judge 
intentionally delays, he will be sinner and may be removed from 
the post also. Thus judgement must be expeditiously delivered. 
However, if there is any reasonable cause, it may also be 
delayed. But in India delay in delivering judgements are often 
complained of. There is no such provision in Indian Law that if 
a judge delays in delivering the judgement he may be removed from 
his office. 
Appeal, Revision and Reference 
Chapter XXIX, Criminal Procedure Code guarantees the 
rights of appeal either against acquittal or conviction of the 
accused person involved in the commission of crimes. 
An appeal shall lie from any judgement or order of a 
criminal court except as provided for by Criminal Procdure Code 
or by any other law for the time being in force. 
An appeal to High Court lies from a judgement or order 
of a session court or additional session court or any other court 
which include the court of magistrate of the first class subject 
to the limitations and restrictions laid down in the chapter 
above referred which the author has already elaborated under 
appeal chapter earlier. 
In fact, Chapter XXIX comprises sections beginning with 
372 to 405 which have laid down exhaustive rules governing not 
only appeal, but revision and reference also. All these rules 
governing appeal, revision or reference have been discussed in 
detail earlier. A reference of those rules would be an 
irrelevant repetition of the same. 
In cases where the accused person has pleaded guilty 
and has been convicted on such plea, there shall be no appeal 
except to the extent or legality of the sentence. 
Again no appeal in cases where sentence of imprisonment 
does not exceed three months, or of fine not exceeding two 
hundreds rupees or of both such imprisonment and fine or where a 
magistrate of first class passes only a sentence of fine not 
exceeding one hundred rupees. 
Government may also go in appeal against the inadequacy 
of sentences, or against an order of acquittal. It is not 
permissible to alter the conviction to an aggravated category of 
offence for which the accused was not convicted. 
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Section 378 provides for an appeal by - state government, or 
central government or the complainant provided in the later case 
special leave obtained from the Hight Court. 
In an appeal Hight Court has full po>rer to review the 
evidence upon which the order of acquittal is based. Findings 
of the trial court can be reversed only for very substantial and 
compelling reasons. 
The appellate court has the power to examine the record 
and hear both appellant or his pleader and also the public 
prosecutor. If the court considers that there is no sufficient 
grounds for interferring in the judgement of the lower court may 
dismiss the appeal. It may reverse the order and may direct 
further inquiry be made, or the accused be re-tried, or committed 
for trial, as the case may be, or find him guilty and pass-
sentence on him according to law. 
In cases of appeal for enhancement of sentence the 
appellate court may reverse the finding and sentence, and acquit 
or discharge the accused or order retrial. 
When an appeal is decided by the High Court, it shall 
certify its judgement or order to the court by which the finding, 
sentence or order appealed against was recorded or passed and 
such court shall make orders confomable to the judgement or order 
of the High Court and record is amended accordingly. 
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In a case where an appeal is heard by the High Court 
before a bench of judges and they differ in their oppinions, in 
such a situation the appeal shall be laid before another judge, 
and that judge after hearing, shall deliver his opinion, and the 
judgement or order shall follow that opinion provided that if one 
of the judges constituting the bench, or where the appeal is laid 
before another judge under this section, that judge so requires, 
the appeal shall be re-heard and decided by a larger bench of 
judges. 
The judgements or orders passed by the appellate court 
upon an appeal shall be final. 
Power of making rerefence in respect of any question of 
law involving validity of a statutory provision rests in sessions 
judges and in all metropolitan judges. Section 395, Criminal 
Procedure Code gives detailed rules governing reference to the 
High Court. When the question has been so referred the High 
Court shall pass such order thereon as it thinks fit and shall 
cause a copy of such order to be sent to the court by which the 
reference was made, which shall dispose of the case conformably 
to the said order. 
As to power of revision at the district level, it has 
been given only to the c ourt of session and not to the chief 
judicial magistrate. Section 397 of Criminal Procedure Code is 
(?i7 
the relevant section which gives very wide powers and court can 
take up the matter even suo motu. 
Powers of revisions are conferred upon High Court also. 
Session judge as well as High Court judge have concurrent 
revisional jurisdictions. 
General practice of all High Courts have been that the 
High Court do not entertain an application for revisions except 
on some special grounds unless a previous application has been 
made to the session judge. However, there is no bar to a party 
coming directly to the High Court without first moving the 
session judge. 
Under revisional powers of the session judge and High 
Court, they may call for any record from any subordinate courts 
situated within their respective local jurisdictions and examine 
the same with a view to satisfy themselves as to correctness, 
legality or propriety of the findings, sentence or order, 
recorded or passed and also as to regularity of any proceedings 
of such subordinate courts. 
High Court may also intefere in revision in respect of 
interlocutory order also, but not the orders passed at the stage 
of appeal. 
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The court under revisionary powers cannot pass order 
which may prejudice the iuterest of the accused or other person 
unless he has had an opportunity of being heard. 
Further nothing shall be deemed to authorise a High 
Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. 
No proceeding by way of revision shall be entertained 
at the instance of the party who could have appealed. 
If a person files a revision under an erroneous belief 
that no appeal lies against the order, then court may treat it as 
appeal and deal with the same accordingly. 
Over and above if the powers of revision vested in the 
High Court, in order to prevent miscarriage of justice or abuse 
of process, High Court can invoke inherent jurisdiction under 
section 482 to remedy the errors. 
Under Islamic law the concept of appeal, revision and 
reference is not alien. The judgement or order of a subordinate 
court or the same court may be quashed if it is inconsistent with 
Holy Quran, Sunnah and Ijma. if any judge decides a case 
arbitratilly or cruelly or against ( ^Ic) ) consensus of 
learned scholars, then such a decision may be reversed, reviewed 
or changed. 
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Both the parties are allowed to go in appeal if either 
of them feel aggrieved. The decision of the appellate court 
will be in conformity with Shariah or Islamic law. Detailed 
governing rules are discussed under the chapter dealing with 
appeal and revision. 
In revision, the Higher Shariah courts have the 
corrective powers of errors of the lower courts. The procedure 
adopted in Shariah courts is almost the same as under Indian law. 
As to reference, there is a provision under the Islamic 
law, that in cases where two Qazis are appointed as judges to 
Shariah court to sit together, hear and decide the cases, if 
there is difference of opinion between the two judges or Qazi and 
Mufti, the matter may be referred either to the High Court for 
decision, or to a full court consisting of the Qazi, Mufti, the 
Muhtasib and a scholar learned in law. 
In cases of complications on point of law, the Qazi may 
refer the matter to another Qazi for his opinion or the jurists, 
learned in Islamic law. 
If there is a difference of opinion among jurists 
) of that time, ther» he should form his own opinion which 
i 
may be more nearer to truth and justice. Even his opinion is in 
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If there is a difEerence of opinion among jurists 
{^^y ) of that time, ther» he should form his own opinion which 
may be more nearer to truth and justice. Even, his opinion is in 
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conflict with the jurists of that time, he may give the judgement 
contrary to their opinions. 
Islamic concept of justice is realised only when 
confidence among the masses about the performance of the 
judiciary is created. It is possible when for all errors, there 
are remedies available in the form of appeal, revision and 
reference. 
Position of Non-Muslim 
Islam is said to be a totalitarian religion- It 
is an inevitable result of the very faith in God. A believer 
surrenders to Almighty completely. His prayers, sacrifies, life 
and death all are surely for God. Under such a situation, the 
question arises whether non-Muslims be also subjected to such a 
law to which they have no faith in. 
The answer to the above question has been elaborated in 
detail earlier under the head 'non-Muslims and Islamic Law'. 
Precisely it may , be said that non-Muslims membership of the 
nation in an Islamic state is based on contracts and compromises 
reached between them and the Islamic state. Once such a contract 
is entered into and obligations resulted therefrom, such 
obligations become trust upon the conscience and pledge of the 
state or the nation to take care of them. 
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dealings with non-Muslims in his life time further adds 
significance and importance to the dealing with non-Huslims in an 
Islamic state. 
Some of the treaties which Prophet (peace be upon him) 
entered with non-Huslims are the constitutional landmarks 
guaranteeing all types of freedoms to non-Huslims in an Islamic 
state. 
According to Islamic law, Muslims and non-Huslims, all 
are equal and to be equally treated. All non-Huslims living in 
an Islamic state are well secured and protected in matters of 
right to property, life and freedom of religion. They are to be 
governed by their own religious laws or community customs or by 
secular laws. There can be no molestation or humiliation on the 
basis of religion. Further non-Muslims are not to be governed 
by Islamic law which is purely in religion. They are to be 
regulated according to the precepts of their own faith. Only 
the secular portion of Islamic Law Code is applicable to non-
Muslims. Secular law in the sense,that is, the law which is 
commonly followed by all nations irrespective of their religion, 
caste, creed, colour or culture, is to be applied to them. 
Islamic law does not interfere in non-Muslims customs 
and traditions which they follow as a matter of their faith. In 
brief, there is nothing to alarm non-Muslims living under an 
Islamic state. They are well-protected and privileged in all 
respects. During Mughal period in India, non-Muslims were not 
only to be governed by their own laws but were having courts 
where Brahmins and Pandits were sitting as judges and deciding 
their cases in accordance to their faith and law. This is a 
significant feature of Islamic law which has no parallel even 
today in existing penal law of India in herited from British 
Colonial Law. 
9n 
PART B 
"PROJECTION" 
The comparative study has made it abundantly clear that 
Islamic criminal law relating to criminal breach of trust is 
quite comprehensive and exhaustive. There exists a wide scope 
for legal speculation within the frame work of Islamic law for 
meeting the challenges arising from the fast changing conditions 
in the modern era. Excellence of Islamic law has no comparision 
with any system of law even in the so-called age of contemporary 
enlightenment. 
Islamic law regards the moral virtues as the 
fundamental base of the so^ci^tY^ Religion, morality and law are 
not separable. But the modern law on the other hand ignores 
morality and religion. It does not concern itself with them so 
long as acts repugnant to them do not directly prejudice and 
adversely effect the individuals, public order, peace and 
tranquillity. In fact, moral deterioration is the main cause 
which leads to corruption, malpractices, vices, decay and 
disintegration of the community. Islamic law provides the 
solution by integrating religion, morality and law all together. 
This study has shown the fallacy of the view declaring 
Islamic law as incompatible with the requirements of the modern 
age. 
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It is an erroneous assumption rather than the result of 
academic reasoning and research. In fact, such loud thinkings 
are based on sheer ignorance of law. However, for futher 
familiarising and getting the Islamic law more acquainted with 
the masses in general, the author makes the following 
suggestions and recommendations. 
Islamic states should solemnly declare as a general 
principle of state policy that no law shall be repugnant to the 
teachings of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah and 
that all existing laws shall be brought into conformity with 
these two fundamental sources of law. 
Researches be conducted by the scholars learned in 
Islamic law to explore the vast area of the development of 
Islamic law, through the centuries after the Hejra, in order to 
bring out the richness of law and essential principles on which 
the edifice of Islamic law rests. 
A community will never gain vigour and vitality until 
it recognizes the catastrophic consequences of imitating of 
foreign law, a foreign culture and do everything possible to put 
an end to this. If the community takes pride in its faith and 
its heritage is genuine, it must be expressed by adopting its own 
judicial system. When men recognize the sovereignty of God and 
the Supremacy of His Law, all false values will be automatically 
swept away. 
Another significant point worth consideration is that 
Islamic law, no doubt, is very rich. Learned scholars have 
compiled big treatises. But these treaties are decorative pieces 
of libraries. Masses in general are un aware of. To make it 
easily approachable it is necessary that the law should be 
subject wise codified so that it may increase its accessibility, 
intelligibility and simplicity, as well as general convenience. 
Further the subject wise codified law should be 
translated in all important languages of the world. It should be 
the responsibility of all Islamic states to get the codified law 
translated in languages which are prominently prevalent in 
respective states. 
In all Islamic states. Ministry for Religion, Law and 
Justice be established and under its auspicious patronage 
research sections be established where in eminent faqih (learnerd 
scholars) and jurists be appointed. They should be assigned the 
task of conducting researches in different fields and 
(injunctions) Quranic or Ahadith be separated, systematised and 
uniformly consolidated. Such a codified law will be more easily 
approachable by jurists as well as by the public. Emphasis 
should be not on technicalities but on simplicity. It should be 
consolidated, uniformed and a logically articulated skeleton for 
the law. 
^'U^C'Q^^ Deeni Makatib {^-c^ iS p ) should 'also have separate 
and independent research wings where researches on different 
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aspects of law concerning the changing environment of the modern 
society be conducted. However, such researches must be conducted 
within the permissible limits of Shariah. All suggestions and 
recommendations must be inconsonance with Quranic injunctions 
and Ahadith. No innovation be taJcen into consideration. 
National Universities in Islamic countries, like 
international Islamic University, Malaysia, should include in its 
curriculum, and syllabi Shariah Degree and Diploma courses. 
Study of such courses will improve the competence, efficiency and 
the professional status of Qazis. It will also make them more 
confident and not suffer from any inferiority complex. 
Learned Prof. Tan Sri Datuk Ahmad Ibrahim, the Dean, 
Kulliyyah of Laws, International Islamic University, Malaysia, 
has rightly observed that in order to ensure that the judges in 
Shariah courts are able to deal with the cases that come before 
them justly and competently it is necessary to ensure that they 
are qualified and trained. This is possible only when they learn 
Shariah and obtain the degrees thereof. 
At present Kulliyyah of laws. International Islamic 
University is imparting education in Islamic law. It attempts to 
integrate both the Shariah and common law at the LL.B degree 
level and it is hoped that its graduates will be accepted as 
qualified persons under the Legal Profession Act. They may thus 
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be eligible to join the judicial and legal service or to be 
called to the Bar; and also that some of its graduates, who are 
competent in Arabic, will be accepted to join the Shariah 
judicial and legal service and to become judges or Qazis or 
Peguam Sharie in the Shariah courts also. For Shariah courses 
study of Arabic language is compulsory. International Islamic 
University also has provision for Diploma for Qazis where Qazi 
are trained in procedural laws of Islam. 
Thus on similar pattern universities in other countries 
may also, adopt such LL.B Degree and Diploma courses which will 
enhance the significance of studying Islamic Law. In due course 
of time it would have its own recognition in the society. 
With the introduction of such courses expectations for 
future become very bright. Qualified and trained staff of 
Shariah courts would again attain dignified status, position, and 
its lost glory of which Shariah courts and judges were deprived 
of during colonialism. Honourable Tan Sri Datuk prof. Ahmad 
Ibrahim rightly says that "We look forward to a time when judges 
who are appointed in the Shariah courts will be fully competent 
in the Islamic law and be able to refer to the original sources 
of the law in Arabic'. He makes a suggestion that "We need also 
to have more exchange of decision between the various Islamic 
countries so that we can learn from each other and work together 
for the re-establishment of the superamacy of the Shariah and the 
Islamic Law". His emphasis on learning Arabic language, exchange 
of decisions of Shariah courts and laison between Islamic 
courtries in this connection are very significant points for 
promoting and re-establishing the superamacy of Islamic Law. 
Efforts be made to raise the status and position of 
judges or Qazis of Shariah courts through proper selection and 
recruitment. Recruitment to the post should be through the 
lawfully appointed commission. It may be given the name of 
Shariah judicial and legal service commission. Learned scholars 
in Islamic law should be appointed on competitive merit basis. 
Appointed persons should also have incentives for future 
promotions. They should also be well-learned in Arabic language. 
Only qualified lawyers in Shariah be permitted to 
appear before the Shariah courts. Courts may permit legal 
officers, advocates and solicitors having degree in Islamic law 
to represent the parties if their presence as lawyer is not 
contrary to the Islamic law. These measures would improve the 
status and position of Shariah courts, judges and lawyers. It 
will also create confidence among the masses about courts, judges 
and the lawyers. 
In connection with Indian Law relating to prior 
sanction for prosecution of public servant, some modification is 
needed. It seems as if public servant is a privileged class and 
^ 2 / 
if any wrong is committed he is not to be treated alike as 
layman. Ruler and the ruled should be equal before the law. 
Under Islam law there is no such distinction. Ruler and ruled 
both are treated alike before the law. 
No doubt, principle of prior sanction for prosecution is 
to avoid any harassment to be caused to the public servant in the 
discharge of official duty. It is true. When apparently crime 
has been committed, there should not be any protection extended 
to the public servants. This breeds corruption and indirectly 
encourages and perpetuates malpractices. 
If there is a fear of harassement and false 
implication of public servants effecting discharge of official 
duties, at the most there may be imposed a restriction. Before 
prosecution departmental preliminary inquiry be made about the 
conduct and then if irregularity or illegality is found, simple 
report to the police should be enough authorising police to 
investigate the complaint. Prior sanction for prosecution should 
not be the requirement. Therefore, this principle, in cases of 
breach of trust committed by public servant should be suitably 
amended. In fact, section 197 Criminal Procefure Code needs 
modification. 
Another area under Indian Law need consideration is 
partner's and agent's liabilities for breach of trust during the 
discharge of their respective business transanctions. 
^2) 
if any wrong is committed he is not to be treated alike as 
layman. Ruler and the ruled should be equal before the law. 
Under Islam law there is no such distinction. Ruler and ruled 
both are treated alike before the law. 
No doubt, principle of prior sanction for prosecution is 
to avoid any harassment to be caused to the public servant in the 
discharge of official duty. It is true. When apparently crime 
has been committed, there should not be any protection extended 
to the public servants. This breeds corruption and indirectly 
encourages and perpetuates malpractices. 
If there is a fear of harassement and false 
implication of public servants effecting discharge of official 
duties, at the most there may be imposed a restriction. Before 
prosecution departmental preliminary inquiry be made about the 
conduct and then if irregularity or illegality is found, simple 
report to the police should be enough authorising police to 
investigate the complaint. Prior sanction for prosecution should 
not be the requirement. Therefore, this principle, in cases of 
breach of trust committed by public servant should be suitably 
amended. In fact, section 197 Criminal Procefure Code needs 
modification. 
Another area under Indian Law need consideration is 
partner's and agent's liabilities for breach of trust during the 
discharge of their respective business transanctions. 
For breach of trust, under both business transactions, specific 
entrustment is required. If not, there is no liability. Neither 
agent nor partner is liable under such circumstances. In fact, 
it is merely a technical requirement, otherwise in both cases 
there is an implied entrustment. Dishonest misappropriation 
either by the agent or partner should make them liable for breach 
of trust. Merely on legal technical grounds, they should not be 
exempted or exonerated from criminal prosecution. Law needs 
appropriate amendment. Islamic law does not need any 
modification in this respect. 
Further phrase 'entrustment in any manner' whether 
moral or immoral under Indian Law needs modification. Law is to 
protect moral values of the society and not to give incentive and 
encouragement for promoting immorality. Any entrustment for 
immoral purpose should have no legal force behind it. Islamic 
law is not separable from morality. Hence requires no change. 
Indian law in this regard needs modification. 
In breach of trust cases another area under Indian Law 
needs modification is compoundability of cases. Right is 
available to the parties but in a very restricted and limited 
way. It is not enough. Exigency and relations between the 
parties should be the consideration, because litigation leads to 
perpetual enemity. There should not be any monetary limit for 
permitting the parties to have their cases mutually compromised. 
However, if public interest demands that there should be a trial 
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for the crime committed, then, under such conditions court should 
not permit the parties to compromise the case outside the court. 
Law, therefore, needs suitable modification. Under Islamic law 
compromise in cases of breach of trust is preferred and court 
itself gives the hint for such compromises, need no modification. 
Criminal breach of trust is more in the nature of civil 
wrong. Therefore, while awarding punishment preference should 
be given to indemnification and awarding compensation to the 
victim rather than sending the convict behind the bars. Indian 
law in this regard needs rethinking. As Islamic law emphasises 
awarding compensation to the victims rather than punishing with 
imprisonment needs no change. 
In India Lakhs of cases are pending trials in the 
court.__Pelay defeats justice. It creates disappointment and no-
confidence in the litigates . against the judicial system 
of the country. The remedy lies that indiginous judicial system 
should be developed suiting to Indian conditions. Our heritage 
is rich. Gupta Period, and Mughal Periods are Known to be the 
golden periods of the Indian History. They gave the best 
judicial systems to the country. The government should establish 
a research centre where investigations may be conducted to find 
out the indigenous laws best suiting our environments and 
conditions. 
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Special courts, like family courts or economic courts 
be established deciding cases in accordance to such indiginous 
laws. 
In fact, legal fictions and technicalities of English 
doctrines relating to crimes are hurdles in expecditious 
decisions. when these technicalities are substituted by 
simplicity, obviously decisions would not be delayed and no 
disappoint would result. 
All communites in India have their rich heritage. If 
they are prosecuted in accordance to their respective simple laws 
connected with their faiths, it will encourage morality which at 
present becoming obsolet and also will increase the efficiency 
and expediency in criminal trials. 
Though the suggestion may sound strange in an 
environment where like 'Common Civil Code' is being advocated. 
Fact is that solution of current problems lies in laws connected 
with one's faith. In cases where persons of two distinct 
communities are involved in litigation, then only, the secular 
law should be applied. Indian government is required to consider 
the matter seriously. 
As to Islamic law relating to breach of trust, we have 
seen that rules governing thereto are quite exhaustive but the 
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illustrations and examples elaborating these governing rules are 
too old and primitive. These rules should remain as it is but 
old and primitive illustrations and examples be replaced by 
illustrations most suiting to the modern conditions. In other 
words, without effecting the spirit of law, these illustrations 
and examples be made up to date. 
Doors of Ijtihad under Islamic law should remain open. 
Judges and Qazis of Shariah courts should strive to discover the 
true application of the teachings of Quran and Sunnah to 
particular situations arising in the modern age. However, such 
interpretations should not go against the plain sense of these 
teachings. Free thinking should not mean to contravene the 
commandments of Holy Quran and Sunnah. These two sources as we 
discussed earlier, are basically concerned with the general rules 
that only outline legal speculation. In cases where Quran and 
Sunnah are silent, judges have to exert with a view to form an 
independent judgement on a legal question. But Ijtihad should 
be subjected to the following considerations: 
(1) That the judges and Qazis should be learned in 
Islamic law. They should be Mujtabid; 
(2) That it may be resorted to only in absence of an 
applicable ( ) injunctions of Quran and 
Sunnah; 
(3) That Ijtihad does not mean to contravene the 
teachings of Quran and Sunnah; 
(4) That Ijtihad should not effect and complicate the 
simple and plain meaning of Quran and Sunnah. 
(5) That the Mujtahid judge or Qazi should be learned 
in Arabic language. Unless he knows Arabic, he 
should not resort to Ijtihad. 
Unless these basic qualifications are fulfilled, Islam does 
not give any authority either to the judge, Qazi or Mufti in the 
matters of doctrines and rules to formulate or enact and resort 
to Ijtihad. 
Law relating to court procedure in Islam is very rich. 
However, it needs streamlining and codification. Evidence law 
has been codified in Pakistan. On same like all matters relating 
to procedure followed in criminal court should also be given 
statutory shape. 
Not only the provisions exist relating to appeal, 
revision and reference under Islamic law but the courts are 
following them in practice as well. However, it needs precise 
consolidation. This measure would further strengthen the 
confidence of the masses in the Islamic judicial structure. 
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In Islamic countries where Shariah courts exist, case 
reporting on regular basis should also be introduced- It will 
help to make law commonly known. It should not remain the domain 
of only few. Case reporting will popularise the law in masses. 
It is also said that in Tazeer {penal punishment) maxim 
punishment for different offences be prescribed. There should be 
statutory enactment to this effect. But I do not consider that 
there is any need for. The determination of Tazeer should be on 
the merits of case. The judge should take into consideration the 
extin\^ting and mitigating circumstances, and facts of the case, 
and then should determine the sentence most appropriate and 
befitting to the requirements of each case. It should remain 
with the judge to decide whatever is needed for the 
administration of justice in the given conditions. 
In an Islamic state if non-Muslims are living, they are 
to be assured that religious law of Islam is not to apply them 
and the law with which they are to be governed is secular in 
nature which applies by all other nations. Further to be assured 
that Under Islamic law they are to be treated on equal basis 
with Muslims. No discrimination on the basis of religion is to 
be made. Their rights, life, liberty and property are all safe. 
Nothing is to worry about. 
As to the accused's rights to be defended by a lawyer 
of his choice, Islamic law does not encourage. Although there is 
no prohibition. But some jurists do not favour employing 
lawyers to defend. This discouragement needs no modification but 
it should not be generalised. In cases where an accused due to 
^some disability is unable to defend himself, he should be 
permitted to be defended by a lawyer of his choice. 
To popularise the Islamic law, the learned scholars 
should write more and more articles and commentaries on different 
aspects of law and get them published in reputed journals and 
Magzines. Text books on law should also be written. More 
comparative research studies be conducted covering different 
fields of law. 
Treatises and classics in Arabic on Islamic law be 
translated into different languages of the world, particularly in 
English, so that the critics of Islamic law may know the worth of 
it. 
Relevant research datas covering the vast and varied 
field of law from Quran and Ahadith, and Ijma and Qiyas be 
classified scientifically and feeded in the computers so that 
research scholars may have easy excess to the relevant literature 
suiting to their studies. 
In the administration of justice more emphasis be given 
to Tazkiyah-al-shahud { JoO^^^ c-Ti^yr^ ) to know the 
credibility of witness. 
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Institution of Ahtisab for controlling and preventing 
the spread and rise of vices and evils in the society be 
strengthened and powers of Muhtasib be given statutory 
recognition. 
To summarise if the modifications are made in the light 
of these suggestions Indian law as well as Islamic law would be 
far better suiting to the modern requirements. Particularly 
Islamic law would be far better in excellence to other laws. 
This comparative study has proved the fallacy of the 
notion that the assertion of secularists and western educated 
scholars that law must be man made if it is to fulfill the 
changing needs of the changing society has no basis. 
The introduction of the traditions, values and laws of 
the west has corrupted society, bread immorality, destroyed the 
inherited and traditional values. It has resulted in giving rise 
to a feeling of inferiority and frustration which is often 
expressed itself in nihilism and despair. 
A law which is not separate from morality and religion 
can only provide remedy to modern problems. 
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